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Sally Elizabeth Weston 
The Legal Regulation of Interoperability in an Oligopolistic Market 
Abstract 
3D CAD (Computer Aided Design) software is widely used in engineering industries to design 
products and manage their lifecycles.  It is crucial to the economy as it records vital design 
information and knowhow on all engineered products in the developed and developing worlds.  The 
industry is oligopolistic with few suppliers and while efforts have been made to standardise data 
transfer formats by the promulgation of standards there are formidable interoperability issues.  
Once users have purchased a particular brand of software they are essentially “locked in” and the 
industry has all the elements associated with a lack of interoperability, namely network effects, 
lock-in, and proprietary software and interfaces.   
Intellectual Property Rights in software are granted to incentivise innovation but cause a lack of 
interoperability.  The ideas and principles which underlie software interfaces are not protected by 
copyright but there is no such exemption for patents.  Interfaces are similar to standards and their 
indirect effect amplifies their impact and value and distorts the intended intellectual property 
protection.  As the machine code which is distributed to users is not readable, reverse engineering is 
permitted to enable interoperability, subject to restrictions, including prohibiting the sharing of 
interface specifications, which is tantamount to making the information a statutory trade secret.    
Using legal doctrinal research of primary and secondary materials including case law, previous 
research alongside industry documents and interviews with experts in the industry, this thesis 
makes original and significant contributions to knowledge.  Firstly, the research provides an 
assessment of the legal regulation of lock-in in an oligopolistic market and identifies the inability of 
competition law to provide a remedy. It had previously been assumed that competition law would 
provide a remedy of last resort to require disclosure of interface information.  Secondly, considering 
the indirect function of control of interfaces the justification for patents in interface standards is 
critically evaluated.  Thirdly, with reference to the normative framework of balancing control and 
openness of interfaces, the ability of the studied market to achieve an optimum balance is 
evaluated, taking account of the impact of market conditions including the lock-in of the users’ 
proprietary data, the software’s functional nature and the need for data integrity.  Fourthly, with 
reference to this research and intellectual property law principles and practice existing proposals are 
critically evaluated including the reduction of the term of protection which will harm vertical 
interoperability of complementary software.  The argument that the time and cost of reverse 
engineering has a purpose in protecting first comers is countered and it is proposed that reverse 
engineering of interfaces should be easy and effective.  Recommendations are made to improve the 
dissemination of interface information to allow markets to move towards an optimum balance with 
minimum regulatory interference. 
The regulation of interoperability is a balancing act between control by rightsholders and openness 
of interfaces and this thesis builds on existing research to refine and expand the criteria that 
identifies the ‘pivot’.  Recommendations with least intervention and encouraging efficient market 
solutions are made with an emphasis on improving reverse engineering’s effectiveness, particularly 
in the openness and dissemination of interface specifications.    
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Introduction 
This is a law dissertation which considers the regulation of intellectual property rights (IPRs) 
in software interfaces and their effect on software interoperability.  There is no exception 
to patent protection for the purpose of achieving interoperability and the exception to 
copyright protection only permits reverse engineering to achieve interoperability subject to 
specific conditions.  Competition law has been invoked on a few occasions to require 
disclosure of interface information but this remedy is only available when the rights holder 
abuses a dominant position and is ex post and prone to error.  Lack of interoperability 
persists in many industries including those that are oligopolistic in nature.   
The legal and economic literature in this area highlights the balance that must be struck 
between IPRs - mainly copyright, patents and trade secrets, and the need for 
interoperability to create an expansion in use, enabling competition and encouraging 
innovation.  Interoperability, or a lack of it, lies at the heart of the debate currently raging 
over the digital giants such as Google, Apple, Facebook and Amazon, and the rise of 
“platforms” that create “walled gardens” which make it hard for users to move content 
from one platform to another.”1   
The main regulatory tools - competition law and intellectual property, have the same goals 
– to maximise both allocative efficiency (cheaper products with less resources), and 
dynamic efficiency (superior products) – but there is conflict in the way they operate.  Even 
regulation in the form of the exceptional circumstances test as applied in the Microsoft case 
has been criticised as a false negative which can harm incentives to innovate.  A lack of 
interoperability is however also believed to harm innovation.   
There has been debate and studies which have looked at the perspective of interoperability 
and its impact on network markets.  This dissertation examines the present legal regime in 
the context of an oligopolistic market where the competition law remedy in the form of the 
exceptional circumstances test is not obviously available.  Interoperability not only affects 
11 
 
 
the well published cases of the internet platforms but is very prevalent in all industries that 
rely on software to construct and record their data.  The case of SAS Institute Inc v World 
Programming Ltd2 is one such example where the software user is locked into the software 
supplier because of a lack of compatibility with competing software.  In order to establish 
that a real world problem exists the law will be considered in the context of the oligopolistic 
market of the 3D CAD industry. Through doctrinal analysis and the examination of case 
studies and the analysis of policies and practices in the industry, the thesis will illustrate the 
challenges posed by a lack of interoperability and investigate whether the existing legal 
regime provides solutions and seek to identify improvements. 
1.2 Context and Perspective  
The study examines the legal regulation of interoperability in the context of the 3D CAD 
market.  3D CAD software is crucial to the economy as it records vital design information 
and knowhow on all engineered products in the developed and developing world.  Another 
vital role is facilitating rapid innovation, which enables the development of sophisticated 
products.  The industry is easily identifiable as there are four main suppliers of 3D CAD 
software – Siemens, Autodesk, Dassault Systemes and Parametric Technologies – in an 
oligopolistic market.3  Despite attempts to promulgate standards there are formidable 
interoperability issues and users are essentially “locked in” once they have purchased a 
particular brand of software.  The industry experiences all the problems associated with a 
lack of interoperability, namely; network effects; lock-in; proprietary software; and 
intellectual property rights and practices restricting access to interfaces.  The industry was 
identified in the 2013 Commission Staff Working Document as experiencing interoperability 
problems.4  It could be considered a “worst case” scenario. 
                                                                                                                                                                     
1
 Editorial, ‘Survival of the Biggest’ Economist (London, 1 - 7 December 2012 ) 13   
2
 Case C-406/10 SAS Institute Inc v World Programming Ltd  [2012] Judgement of the General Court (Grand 
Chamber) (2012) 3 CMLR 4. 
3
 Chapter 5 will evaluate the industry and conclude that it is oligopolistic in nature. 
4
 Commission Staff Working Document, Analysis of measures that could lead significant market players in the 
ICT sector to license interoperability information SWD (2013) 209 final, 18 (‘Commission Staff Working 
Document’)  
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Interoperability requires two or more programs to exchange and use information.5  It does 
not require the programs to use the same code or perform identical or similar functions, 
but they must be able to exchange and use essential information.  The exchange of 
information between programs takes place through interfaces which can take various 
forms:  application programming interfaces (APIs), protocols, and data file formats.   
Interoperability is generally considered to promote socially desirable goals.6  Intuitively it 
would seem that interoperability should create an expansion in use, enabling competition 
and encouraging innovation.7  The innovations thus stimulated would be more likely to be 
of the “follow on” type rather than “breakthrough”.8  While there is no systematic body of 
empirical evidence of a link between interoperability and competition and innovation, the 
claim is often supported by illustrative examples.9   
1.3 Broader Theoretical or Policy Relevance of the Inquiry 
The underlying policy objectives of the Software Directive, the cases applying the 
exceptional circumstances test and the merger cases are to encourage innovation and 
increase consumer choice.  Paradoxically, both strong IPR protection and maximum 
interoperability are thought to achieve these goals, but are also in conflict, so the balancing 
                                                     
5
 Council Directive 2009/24/EC on the legal protection of computer programs, (‘Software Directive’ or 
‘Directive’ as case requires) [2009] OJ  L111/16, recital 10.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
  
6
 Pamela Samuelson ‘Are Patents on Interfaces Impeding Interoperability?’ (2008)  Berkeley Centre for Law & 
Technology 1.  http://ssrn.com/abstract=1323838; Oracle America Inc. v Google Inc., Brief of Amici Curiae 
Intellectual Property Professors in Support of the Defendant-Cross Appellant and Affirmance 30 May 2013.; 
and Urs Gasser and John Palfrey ‘When and how interoperability drives innovation’ 31 October 2007. 
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/sites/cyber.law.harvard.edu/files/interop-breaking-barriers_1.pdf 
7
 Commentators including Mark Lemley ‘Antitrust and the Internet Standardization Problem (1996) 28 
Connecticut Law Review 1041, recognise the benefits of interoperability while others consider the position is 
more ambiguous, see e.g. Mario Gil-Moto ‘Economic aspects of the Microsoft case: networks, interoperability 
and competition, in Luca Rubini , “Microsoft on Trial” 344 at 359 et seq. (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2010).          
8
 Follow on innovation is dynamic rather than static competition e.g. coming within the description of dynamic 
competition advocated by Gregory Sidak and David Teece ‘Dynamic competition in antitrust law (2009) 5(4) 
Journal of Competition Law and Economics 581-631,  594 et seq. 
9
 Urs Gasser and John Palfrey ‘When and how interoperability drives innovation’ (31 October 2007). 
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/sites/cyber.law.harvard.edu/files/interop-breaking-barriers_1.pdf 
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act is far from straightforward.  Owners of proprietary software claim strong IPRs are 
essential to justify investment in innovation, while others10 favour the open systems model 
exemplified by open source software.   
In Europe the Software Directive confirmed that ideas and principles which underlie  
interfaces are not protected by copyright under the Directive.  The decision in Sega 
Enterprises, Ltd v Accolade, Inc.11 gave a similar position in the USA by reining-in copyright 
and trade secret protection of interfaces in the USA.  Since Sega there has been an increase 
in patent applications in the USA for software interfaces.12  There are acknowledged 
drawbacks to software patents for interfaces, including insufficient rigour in the standard 
for non-obviousness and lack of adequate cost effective post grant review.13  Patents are 
granted to incentivise innovation and in return for early publication of the invention.  
Software patents do not however have to disclose the source code or object code or even 
detailed descriptions of the patented program.14  As patents can be narrower than the 
interface they do not necessarily require the revelation of all the “trade secrets” necessary 
for full compatibility.     
When the Software Directive was being introduced there was intense lobbying by various 
factions of the industry, for and against reverse engineering and the open availability of 
                                                     
10
 In addition to proponents of open source software governments are adopting open standards, see 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/open-standards-principles accessed 14 October 2015 
11
 977 F.2d 1510 (9
th
 Cir. 1992) 
12
 Pamela Samuelson ‘Are Patents on Interfaces Impeding Interoperability? (2008)  Berkeley Centre for Law & 
Technology 1, 13 – there may be many thousands of patents on interfaces;  Lerner J, and Zhu F, ‘What is the 
Impact of Software Patent Shifts?: Evidence from Lotus v Borland’ (2005) NBER Working Paper 11168 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w11168 provides empirical evidence of a surge in patenting of software dating 
from the mid-1990s. 
13
 Pamela Samuelson ‘Are Patents on Interfaces Impeding Interoperability?’ (2008)  Berkeley Centre for Law & 
Technology 1, 29 
14
 James Bessen and Robert Hunt, ‘An Empirical Look at Software Patents ’ (2007) 16 Journal of Economics and 
Management Strategy 157, Courts in the USA have accepted high-level functional descriptions.  
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interfaces.15  The compromise that was reached has lasted for over ten years but its success 
has not been quantified.  Given the divergence of opinions expressed when the Directive 
was being drafted it could be assumed that the Directive was expected to have significant 
impact.  Although the Directive was a focus of academic attention in 1991 no research has 
been undertaken with the object of examining its impact on an oligopolistic market.  
Though there have been studies considering the economics of lock-in and network effects16 
the only empirical study to examine the question of interoperability under the Directive 
from a legal perspective was a quantitative study conducted for the Commission Staff 
Working Document.17  This thesis considers that work and builds on it by using qualitative 
data from a software industry to evaluate interoperability in the context of the legal 
framework, including the Software Directive and patent protection. 
Nellie Kroes, when arguing for a potential future legislative proposal to require the 
publication ex ante of interoperability information, identified the absence of evidence on 
which to base decisions when assessing the best way to encourage ex ante 
interoperability.18    
This thesis concentrates on the legal position in the EU however the development and 
practice of the law regarding IPR treatment of interfaces and competition law in the EU has 
been influenced by the legal position in the US.  The relevant theories and legal provisions 
of US law as they impact the 3D CAD industry will be considered as part of this thesis.  
                                                     
15
 Thomas Vinje ‘The History of the EC Software Directive’ in M. Lehmann & C. Tapper A Handbook of European 
Software Law ( Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1993) and Ashwin van Rooijen  The Software Interface between 
Copyright and Competition Law (Kluwer Law International 2010) 
16
 See for example Shane M. Greenstein, ‘Lock-in and the Costs of Switching Mainframe Computer Vendors: 
What Do Buyers See?’ (1997) 6 Industrial and Corporate Change and Ian Larkin, ‘Bargains-then-Ripoffs: 
Innovation, Pricing and Lock-in in Enterprise Software’ (2008) Academy of Management Annual Meeting 
Proceedings 1  
17
 Noam Shemtov is unaware of empirical data on reverse engineering and decompilation, Noan Shemtov ‘The 
Legal Regulation of Decompilation of Computer Programs: Excessive, Unjustified and in Need of Reform’ ( PhD 
Thesis QML 2013, 3 
18
 N. Kroes, ‘Speech 10/300’ (Open Forum Europe 2010 Summit: Openness at the heart of the EU digital agenda 
Brussels ) 
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1.4 Research Questions 
The main aim of this thesis is to critically evaluate the existing legal regime, in the form of 
IPRs and competition law, which regulate the phenomenon of incompatibility of software in 
an oligopolistic market, such as the 3D CAD market, to construct a model of the law and 
policy to identify shortcomings in the existing legal regime and identify possible solutions.  
The thesis will illustrate the challenges posed by a lack of interoperability and investigate 
whether the existing legal regime provides solutions and seek to identify improvements.   
The thesis has sought to answer the question of how the existing legal regime regulates the 
disclosure of interface information for the purposes of interoperability in an oligopolistic 
market such as the 3D CAD industry.  It also seeks to answer what realistic amendments can 
be made to the current law.        
The thesis evaluates how the existing regime responds to market failures that justify 
intervention.  It considers whether competition law can provide a remedy in an oligopolistic 
market characterised by a lack of interoperability.  The role of standards is evaluated and 
flaws are highlighted.   
The thesis recommends modifications to the current law aimed at increasing access to 
interface information to help the market respond to the challenges presented by a lack of 
interoperability.         
1.5 Contribution 
Using legal doctrinal research of primary and secondary materials including case law, 
previous research alongside industry documents and interviews with experts in the 
industry, this thesis makes original and significant contributions to knowledge.  
Firstly, the research provides an assessment of the legal regulation of lock-in in an 
oligopolistic market and identifies the inability of competition law to provide a remedy. It 
had previously been assumed that competition law would provide a remedy of last resort to 
require disclosure of interface information.   
Secondly, considering the indirect function of control of interfaces the justification for 
patents in interfaces standards is critically evaluated.   
16 
 
 
Thirdly, with reference to the normative framework of balancing control and openness of 
interfaces the ability of the studied market to achieve an optimum balance is evaluated, 
taking account of the impact of market conditions including IPRs, the lock-in of the users’ 
proprietary data, the software’s functional nature and the need for data integrity.   
Fourthly, with reference to this research and intellectual property law principles and 
practice existing proposals are critically evaluated including the reduction of the term of 
protection which will harm vertical interoperability of complementary software.  The 
argument that the time and cost of reverse engineering has a purpose of protecting first 
comers is countered and it is proposed that reverse engineering of interfaces should be 
easy and effective.  Recommendations are made to improve the dissemination of interface 
information to allow markets to move towards an optimum balance with minimum 
regulatory interference. 
1.6 Structure and Overview of Thesis 
This thesis analyses the phenomenon of interoperability, to make recommendations to 
improve interoperability, with minimum regulation or harm to vital aspects of the software 
industry, such as incentives to innovate.  It has been structured to start with the 
introduction of the research methodology and the phenomenon.       
The research methodology is primarily legal doctrinal research.  The effectiveness of the 
main areas of law that are the subject, namely competition law and intellectual property 
law, are determined by economic as well as legal considerations.  For this reason the 
research has included economic theory underpinning the relevant areas of law.  The 
research has gone beyond the document based analysis and includes empirical qualitative 
research of experts in the 3D CAD industry.  The research methodology behind this 
investigation concludes the second Chapter. 
The third Chapter introduces the phenomenon of interoperability and the relevant legal 
and economic principles.  The reader becomes acquainted with the conflict and balance 
between interoperability, innovation and the legal interventions of intellectual property 
rights and reverse engineering.  The state of existing research is explored including relevant 
case studies and the normative framework balancing control by rightsholders and 
openness.   
17 
 
 
The fourth Chapter analyses the 3D CAD industry from its evolution over 50 years to its 
present oligopolistic structure dominated by proprietary software that gives it a controlled 
and closed nature.  The rationale for selection is explained and the market defined.  The 
competitive conditions in the industry are reviewed specifically to understand the 
implications for the regulation of interoperability by competition law and intellectual 
property rights.  The Chapter concludes with a structural analysis based on Michael Porter’s 
techniques for analysing industries and competitors but with a focus on the legal regulation 
of interoperability. 
The fifth Chapter analyses competition law to determine whether a remedy is available in 
an oligopolistic market with no single dominant undertaking.  After discussing the 
theoretical background to the rational of competition law interfering with IPR it is 
considered how far the exceptional circumstances test provides an adequate solution.  As 
competition law is ex post and prone to error it is only a last resort to regulate 
interoperability by mandating disclosure of interface information.  It can though have some 
flexibility for individual cases within the framework of the exceptional circumstances test.  
Because of the oligopolistic nature of the 3D CAD market there appears to be no single 
dominant entity but consideration is given to the impact of interoperability on the 
definition of the market and whether the concept of collective dominance could allow the 
exceptional circumstances test to apply to an oligopolistic market.  It is concluded that 
while competition law can aid interoperability by controlling mergers the law as presently 
framed does not regulate oligopolies, particularly in the absence of economic links, and 
does not provide an effective deterrent. 
Chapter 6 considers IPRs which provide ex ante regulation but apply similarly to all cases.  
This is most appropriate where the legal consequence of the regulation is foreseeable.  The 
3D CAD industry suffers from a lack of interoperability and while there are market solutions 
they are only partial.  The amplifying effect of IPRs in interfaces provides the backdrop to a 
review of the present law on copyright, trade secrets and patents.  Ideas and principles of 
interfaces do not have copyright protection and this applies to data formats because of 
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their functional nature.19  APIs have not yet received the specific attention of the CJEU but 
US case law has reinstated the importance of the sequence structure and organisation 
aspects of interfaces.  Potentially decompilers who do not copy code will be uncertain 
about unintentional infringement of other elements of the interface.  This could be 
resolved by reinforcing that under the Software Directive the functional nature of interfaces 
means that only the code amounts to the expression.  Unfortunately the US Supreme Court 
refused to hear an appeal20 that could have recognised that copyright should not be used to 
secure a monopoly for a system or method of operation where the rules and method of 
useful art have their final end in application.21  A detailed analysis of the role of patents in 
interfaces evaluates the flawed concept and implementation of software patents and 
concludes that given the indirect effects of interfaces the economic justification for patent 
protection is doubtful. 
The impact of patents on interfaces which are de facto and formal standards is considered 
further in Chapter 7 on standards.  This Chapter starts to look at means to encourage and 
ensure adequate interoperability.  The legal regulation of standards, much of which is to 
avoid abuse by patent holders is reviewed.  It is recognised that standards in the 3D CAD 
industry provide only a partial functionality and that solution provided by standards is 
important but limited. 
Chapter 8 reviews existing recommendations to improve interoperability including a 
proposed Interoperability Directive.  The need to balance control and openness is sensible 
but considers the criteria to determine the positioning of the ‘pivot’ is not yet established.  
The 3D CAD market provides a core and critical function for its users and integrity of the 
users’ proprietary data must be taken into account when adjusting the balance between 
control and openness.  Any change must avoid market destruction.  Mandatory disclosure 
of interface information is considered overly interventionist and probably unworkable as 
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interfaces are difficult to categorise.  Reverse engineering is a vital tool to gain 
interoperability and as its purpose is limited there is no reason to protect the first comer.  
Efficient reverse engineering as permitted by the Software Directive should be encouraged.  
There are doctrinal and economic rationales for allowing interface specifications obtained 
by legitimate decompilation to be shared.  This recommendation is discussed with 
mechanisms to implement, including a register, outlined and the benefits of copyright and 
patents having similar provisions discussed.  The Chapter concludes with consideration of 
how this recommendation could work with the recommendations from the 2013 
Commission Staff Working Document.   
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CHAPTER 2. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
2.1 Introduction 
This Chapter will describe the adopted research methodologies.  The main methodology is 
doctrinal analysis. This is supported by empirical research in the form of interviews with 
industry experts.  Following the overview of the research methodologies in this Chapter the 
legal doctrinal research will follow, particularly in Chapters 5 to 7 with summary of findings 
and recommendations in Chapter 8. 
The findings of the interviews will be used throughout the thesis to corroborate the 
doctrinal literature research.  They will also be a section evaluating the findings further in 
4.11.     
As the industry is small and interconnected the names of interviewees or details that 
identify the interviewees will be withheld.  Footnote referencing to interview transcripts 
validate the evidence.   
2.2 Doctrinal Research 
As a law dissertation the principal methodology is doctrinal analysis into the law and legal 
concepts.  It provides a systematic exposition of rules governing a particular legal category.  
It analyses the relationship between those rules, explaining areas of difficulty and 
recommending future developments.22  The approach identifies a body of inter-related 
principles, including rules and guidelines, associated with a legal concept or principle.  
These core legal principles, embodied in statute and case law, are interpreted using a 
number of secondary sources including academic papers and consultation documents and 
applied to factual situations.  The doctrinal approach has advantages, the most important 
of which are accuracy and availability.  A large legal database is available, mainly in 
electronic format which is highly searchable.  The doctrinal approach can be applied to the 
complex matrix of primary and secondary sources to analyse and study in depth the 
relevant areas of intellectual property law and competition law. 
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The 3D CAD industry is based in the USA and Europe although the market is global.  This 
dissertation will focus on the legal regime in Europe, considering the role of the Software 
Directive, patent law and European Competition Law.  Because of the importance of the 
USA to the industry, comparison will be drawn with the treatment of software interfaces in 
the US, particularly the development of case law on copyright and patents and the 
approach adopted by the US Justice Department enforcing anti-trust laws.   
Analysis of legal doctrines alone is not sufficient to obtain the objectives of this thesis and 
literature on relevant economic propositions will be reviewed.  It is acknowledged that law 
research is not a clearly distinct methodology but an amalgam of elements including 
applied logic, economics and practices.23  The purpose and rationale for intellectual 
property law and competition law are social and economic goals to maximise both 
allocative efficiency (cheaper products with less resources), and dynamic efficiency 
(superior products).  However, there is conflict in the way they operate, and this special 
position has given rise to a large amount of literature in the field of economics which 
cannot be ignored.  The literature deals with the economic rationale for intellectual 
property and competition law and with the effects of interoperability, standards and lock-
in. This literature has been analysed in the context of a law thesis to form an understanding 
of the purpose of the legal regime regulating the 3D CAD market.        
Building from the doctrinal analysis in the context of the 3D CAD market, a model of the 
legal regime will be developed, which will be evaluated to draw conclusions with a view to 
improving the regulation of interoperability.     
2.3 Qualitative Empirical Research  
The research started as a mixed method dissertation incorporating doctrinal research and a 
case study.  What emerged is predominantly a law doctrinal dissertation though the thesis 
includes an element of empirical qualitative research.  This allows the study to go beyond a 
document based analysis and investigate the reality in which the law operates.   
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Although doctrinal research can be accurate, empirical research, while improving the 
understanding of reality and allowing elaboration on future developments with some level 
of probability, is more tentative and prone to changes driven by altering circumstances.24  
This is at odds with the fondness for legal certainty but nonetheless it has been accepted, 
especially by the legal realism movement, that empiricism has a role to play in the study of 
law.25    
The aim of the research is first and foremost to analyse the legal regulation of the 
phenomenon of software interoperability.  While this can best be achieved by doctrinal 
methodology, to help the research concentrate on real world problems, rather than 
abstract concepts, the analysis is being carried out in the context of the 3D CAD industry.  
As explained earlier this industry is intrinsically important and could be a “worst case 
scenario”.   
Research into the industry from industry documents, academic papers and interviews was 
carried out to inform and determine the existence and nature of the phenomenon of 
interoperability in the industry.  Interviews were conducted to corroborate the desk based 
research into the industry.  Analysis of the various sources identified the relevant 
converging lines of enquiry and convergence of conclusions.  The theoretical propositions 
and hypothesis were identified and have informed data collecting and analysis.  This 
allowed the law to be evaluated and analysed in a real world context and improved the 
relevance of the research. 
In order to ensure that the evidence gathered by interviews was valid the interviews were 
selected and conducted in accordance with case study and empirical enquiry methodology.     
A case study entails “the detailed and intensive analysis of a single case.”26  It is a holistic 
approach, attempting to “capture the totality of the phenomenon” and is “rich in 
description and understanding of the program, its complexity and its dynamic.”
27
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A case study is an empirical enquiry that: 
 Investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially 
when the boundaries between the phenomenon and context are not clearly evident.     
 Copes with a technically distinctive situation in which there will be many more 
variables of interest than data points.  
 Relies on multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to converge in a 
triangulating fashion.  
 Benefits from the prior development of theoretical propositions to guide data 
collection and analysis.28 
A case study methodology is used when there is a need to cover contextual issues, which 
are highly pertinent to the phenomenon under consideration.29   
Although this is not first and foremost a case study, nevertheless when gathering and 
analysing interview data the four tests commonly used to establish the quality of empirical 
research were considered: 
 Construct Validity: establishing correct operational measures for the concepts being 
studied.   
 Internal Validity (for explanatory or causal studies only, and not for descriptive or 
explanatory studies): establishing a causal relationship, whereby certain conditions 
are shown to lead to other conditions, as distinguished from spurious relationships 
 External validity: establishing the domain to which a study’s findings can be 
generalised.   
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 Reliability: demonstrating that the operations of study – such as the data collection 
procedures can be repeated, with the same results.30   
To ensure construct validity multiple sources of evidence were used and a chain of evidence 
established.  Although the importance of the 3D CAD market justifies the study, analytical 
generalisations arising from the study may justify external validity.   The propositions posed 
and the detailed questions will form the basis of the data collected to ensure reliability.     
2.4 Sampling Methodology 
Within each sector a sample was selected by purposive screening31 rather than random or 
non-probability sampling.  The goal was to achieve a sample in a strategic way that was 
relevant to the research proposed and gave a good deal of variety with different key 
characteristics.  While the sample was not random, it was not chosen for convenience but 
with research goals in mind.  It was selected as relevant to an understanding of the social 
phenomenon. 
The four key areas around recruitment were considered: initially finding a knowledgeable 
informant; getting a range of views; testing emerging themes with new interviewees; and 
choosing interviewees to extend results.32  The interviewees could be considered elites, as 
they are experts in their field, and the best way to achieve access to elites can be through 
other elites.  Therefore contact with the industry was established and introductions to 
potential interviewees did arise.33   
It is recognised that actual recruitment may deviate from the planned method and can 
happen in an ad-hoc and chance basis while remaining valid reference criteria.  “It is 
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important to try to get a range of views”34 as these can produce ‘radically different’ or 
contrasting talk – often central to modifying theories.  Above all, it is vital to take notes 
about the recruitment process and offer it in reports on research as questions of access and 
recruitment can be central to understanding the ‘outcomes’ of the research. 
Four sectors of the industry were identified.  If the purpose was to achieve a detailed and 
intensive analysis of the case of interoperability in the industry then all four sectors would 
have been interviewed.  However as the purpose of the interviews was to provide context, 
focus and direction for the legal analysis the number of interviews were more limited and 
selective: 
 Suppliers of 3D CAD systems  
 Suppliers of complementary software 
 Users  
 Translators and standards setting bodies 
The questions that interviewees were asked were based on concerns the literature analysis 
had identified as most relevant to the investigation of whether the existing legal regime is 
adequate and to identify potential improvements.  The interviews were in a semi-
structured form.  All interviewees were asked a number of similar questions which give 
some standardisation and validity but also allowed for flexibility to respond to the direction 
the interviewee takes to allow for new emphases or even new issues to emerge in the 
course of the interview.35  Questions were compiled to keep the interviewer on track and to 
give consistency.  They gave structure to the inquiry but were not literal questions.  They 
were generally in the form of level 2 questions which are asked of the industry rather than 
individual interviewees.36   The form of questions were open questions to allow an 
unstructured approach to data collection to access the interviewee’s perceptions, motives 
and attitudes towards interoperability in the 3D CAD market. 
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Most interviews were recorded digitally but three of the interviewees declined to be 
recorded as they stated that they were working in a sensitive commercial environment.  
Interviews that were not recorded were conducted by the interviewer taking notes during 
and immediately after the interview in order to convey the course of the interview 
diligently as the standard of research requires.  
2.5 Interview Sample 
A total of nine face to face interviews were conducted from across the four sectors of the 
industry between May 2013 and November 2014.  In addition there was email 
correspondence with industry observers and other experts based in the USA.  Informal 
interviews and discussion also took place with design engineers and software engineers to 
explore technical and commercial issues concerning software interfaces.    
Industry sector No.interview Description of role of interviewee 
Suppliers of 3D CAD 
systems 
2 
Senior executives of two different suppliers.  Both 
based in UK but operate across Europe  
VAR for 3D CAD 
supplier 
1 
Senior executive of Value Added Reseller of 3D CAD 
software 
Suppliers of ancillary 
and complementary 
software 
2 
Senior employees of two different suppliers of 
software where compatibility with 3D CAD software 
is essential    
Translator and 
standard setting 
bodies 
1 Senior member of the STEP committee 
Users of 3D CAD 
software 
2 
2 formal interviews with design engineers with 
extensive knowledge of 3D CAD software as 
designers, software engineers and project 
managers and further informal conversations with 
other software and design engineers.   
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Industry Analyst  1 
Senior industry analyst based in UK but frequently 
presenting at COFES37 
2.6 Subject Areas Explored in the Interviews 
Policy and practice on interoperability - As discussed in the previous Chapter the benefits 
of interoperability are complex and nuanced.  It is presumed that proprietary software 
suppliers are opposed to interoperability.38  In an oligopoly a lack of interoperability will 
mean that the market is stagnant as users are locked-in to suppliers and each supplier can 
retain their market share.  This observation has been made of the 3D CAD market.39  
Conversely if one supplier wants to increase its market share it is thought necessary to 
increase interoperability.40  The suppliers’ responses may be constructed to present policy 
they wish to project rather than reality and for this reason comparison was made with data 
collected from other interviewees including the industry analyst.   
Knowledge of the Legal Position - A major criticism of any attempt to reduce IPR protection 
is that it reduces the incentive to invest and innovate.41  The knowledge the suppliers have 
of the legal position, particularly compulsory licencing and reverse engineering, is explored 
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to give a better understanding of the impact the legal regime may have on influencing 
behaviour ex ante.      
Interfaces – As interfaces are the tools for achieving interoperability these questions 
examined in more depth the practice adopted in respect of interfaces.  Issues that were 
explored included the practice on disclosing interface information.  The extent to which 
suppliers write comprehensive interface specifications was also be explored as these were 
key documents to enabling interoperability.42   
Reverse Engineering - Article 6 of the Software Directive which permits decompilation for 
the purposes of interoperability was one of the most contested provisions.  The 
interviewees’ views were sought on issues such as whether reverse engineering should be 
permitted to enable interoperability of competing products to see whether this is an 
outdated view.  Reverse engineering is widely practiced but has severe shortcomings.  The 
extent to which reverse engineering is used was explored, particularly in relation to 
translators and standards bodies. 
Causes of Lock-in - A user can be locked-in by network effects or to a particular vendor.  
The causes of the lock-in differ and the phenomenon of lock-in in the industry was explored 
in the interview.  Suppliers and users were also asked whether lock-in was foreseen and 
whether the price and other terms reflected this.43          
Investment in R&D - The impact on R&D investment of interoperability and key aspects of 
the legal regime is explored by these questions.   This category may have been addressed 
and exhausted in earlier questions.  
Future Scenario - This looked at the interviewees’ opinion on the trajectory for 
interoperability and whether the legal regime can influence this.  
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2.7 Sample Questions and Answers  
In Appendix 1 are sample questions and answers taken from the semi-structured44 
interview transcripts to give the reader a perception of interviews.  They have been chosen 
as examples of answers that either corroborated the literature or otherwise useful in 
evaluating interoperability during the research.   
The sample questions (with extracted answers in Appendix 1) are: 
 Is lack of interoperability in 3D CAD Software a problem for manufacturing industry? 
 How easily can interfaces be identified and documented?  Are the interfaces clearly 
distinct? 
 Should disclosure of interfaces be encouraged or even mandated? 
 Should interface information obtained by decompilation be disclosed and shared? 
 Are customers locked in to a particular 3D CAD System?  What are the challenges for 
customers? 
 Are market forces/customer demand driving interoperability and solving lock-in?  
 Why is interoperability in 3D CAD software a technical challenge and why does STEP 
or another standard not provide a solution? 
 How does interoperability affects policy and practice on R&D investment? 
The findings of the interviews will be used throughout the thesis to corroborate or 
challenge the doctrinal literature research and most notably in sections 4.8 – 4.11 on the 
Industry, 8.2 Findings and the Appendix. 
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CHAPTER 3. NATURE AND CONTEXT OF INTEROPERABILITY  
3.1 Introduction 
Before the concept of interoperability is considered in the context of the 3D CAD market 
interoperability and related concepts are introduced in a broader context.  This Chapter 
establishes a foundation against which subsequent Chapters analyse the relevant law. 
The Chapter starts with the legal and technology context for interoperability in software.  
The rationale for interoperability is then introduced with an analysis of the conflicting 
socially desirable goals of interoperability and IPRs.  The consequences of network effects 
and lock-in are evaluated to assess whether these cause a failure in the market and 
whether this justifies further intervention.  Lock-in is evaluated with a distinction drawn 
between market lock-in and supplier lock-in and consideration given to the implications for 
intervention.  Existing case studies evidencing lock-in are reviewed as well as a normative 
approach to benchmarking the balance between openness and control in the legal 
framework.  The Chapter concludes with summarising the general propositions concerning 
software interoperability and outlines the focus of the remaining thesis.  
3.2 Interoperability  
The Software Directive considers interoperability to be the functional interconnection and 
interaction between elements of software and hardware and “the ability to exchange 
information and mutually to use the information which has been exchanged.”45 
This requires something more than just the physical or logical interconnections and 
interactions of the interface.  It involves not just the ability to exchange information, but 
that the information can be mutually used.  This implies that interoperability is not just a 
technical matter.  The information must be capable of being used, not just theoretically 
exchanged. 
Interoperability can vary from the interface between computer programs operating on a 
single computer, to the exchange of data between large and complex organisations 
dependent on ICT systems such as government departments and health services.  The 
interface between computer programs may only involve a machine-executable interface, 
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whereas interoperability in a large complex ICT system involves human user interfaces and 
their ability to interpret and use the information.   
The definition of interoperability, and the benchmarking of whether or not it has been 
achieved, is a wider issue than just the exchange of information.  It has been defined by the 
RoadMap prepared by the Berkman Centre as “..the ability to efficiently transfer and use 
information uniformly across organisation, systems or components.  It helps link systems, 
information and processes within and across enterprises”46 and acknowledges that 
“frequently the main barriers to interoperability are not technical.”47   
This broad interpretation of interoperability implies that we are not just looking for a 
technical fix but must look at the humans and firms involved.  For example, was it correct to 
say that iTunes  was compatible with MP3 when the conversion was not straightforward, 
and the benefits did not justify most users expending the time to discover how to convert 
and then carrying out the process for a commodity worth only 99 cents? 
How broadly interoperability will be construed at law is still uncertain.  The degree of 
interoperability required by the Commission was considered at length in Microsoft v 
Commission.48  While the determination was mainly influenced by competition law issues, 
the Court did pay heed to the Software Directive concept of interoperability.
49
  In this case 
the degree of interoperability required was the extent necessary for competitors to remain 
viable in the market.  This takes account of various factors appearing in the Roadmap.   
The definition of interface and interoperability are linked.  A more extensive expectation of 
interoperability could determine what parts of computer programs are considered 
interfaces.  This is demonstrated by Microsoft where the Commission required Microsoft to 
                                                     
46
 Jeff Kaplan ‘Roadmap for Open ICT Ecosystems’ (2004) Berkman Centre for Internet & Society at Harvard Law 
School, recognised this broader definition and that although technology is an enabler, interoperability is not 
only technology-driven.  It “must respond to the needs and desired business outcomes of the communities 
that use, develop and maintain systems 
47
 Ibid 5 
48
 Microsoft v Commission [2007] 5 C.M.L.R. 11 
49
 Ibid para 225 to 227 
32 
 
 
provide “specifications for protocols...including Windows domain controller services, Active 
Directory services and “group Policy” services”.50   
“the complete and accurate specifications for all the protocols [that are] 
implemented in Windows work group server operating systems and that are used by 
Windows work group servers to deliver file and print services and group and user 
administration services, including the Windows domain controller services, Active 
Directory services and Group Policy services, to Windows work group networks”. 
Arguably not all this information was necessary to achieve full multivendor interoperability 
and if Microsoft’s definition of interoperability had been accepted the extent of interfaces 
would have been more limited.                
There is no single definitive definition of interoperability and while this thesis acknowledges 
the phenomenon and the need for interoperability it will not attempt to finalise a 
definition.  The definition in the Software Directive which requires the ability to mutually 
use the information as well as the ability to exchange is however a reference point 
evidencing the legal requirement.        
3.3 Interfaces   
While interoperability requires two or more programs to exchange and use information it 
does not require the programs to use the same code or perform identical or similar 
functions.  They must however be able to exchange and use the exchanged information.  
The exchange of information between programs takes place through interfaces which can 
take various forms:  application programming interfaces (APIs), protocols, and data file 
formats.   
APIs disclose to other developers the standard means of requesting the platform to carry 
out tasks for their application.  Platforms provide APIs to encourage developers to write 
applications for their program to gain network effects.  They are outward looking and do 
not reveal the details of how the task is accomplished.  Protocols define and specify rules 
for exchanging information such as how to format and identify messages.  Code compliant 
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with the protocols enables IT systems to work together.  While APIs usually run on only one 
computer, protocols enable code to be written to work on two or more computers.  The 
code should comply with the protocol but will not normally be written in an identical way.  
Data file formats specify how the data is encoded and stored in the files.  Some of these are 
made public but many data file formats do not even have written specifications.   
Each interface can exist in more than one form.  The original form can be in source code 
which is then compiled into machine code.  Many interfaces are then recorded as a 
specification in a word processed document.  The intellectual property rights (IPRs) that 
have been used to protect these various forms include copyright, trade secrets and patents.   
Interfaces are objectively defined as the rules by which data or instructions can be 
repetitively transferred between elements of a computer system.51   Where such a transfer 
can occur, an interface exists; where it cannot occur, there is no interface.  One cannot 
credibly claim that a portion of a program that is truly not an interface is one-or vice 
versa.52 Almost any part of the program can be considered as an interface.53 
The Software Directive defines interfaces as the parts of the computer program which 
provide for the “interconnection and interaction between elements of software and 
hardware”.
54
  The Directive encourages computer programs to function so that they can 
communicate and work with other systems and users.  This requires logical interconnection 
and interaction between software and hardware and users so they can function in all the 
intended ways.55  These interconnections and interactions are the interfaces.  Interfaces are 
essential for computer programs to work with other elements and the ideas and principles 
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underlying the interfaces are not protected by copyright in the Software Directive.56   The 
CJEU has given directions on the relevance of this exemption in SAS Institute Inc v World 
Programming Ltd57 which will be discussed in more detail later.           
3.4 Intellectual Property Rights in Interfaces 
Software is protected by copyright, trade secrets and patents.  These IPRs prevent the code 
or function being copied, and control whether other software developers can design 
products which are compatible with and interoperate with each other.  Depending on their 
business strategy, firms may be open and non-proprietary with interface information, as 
some may benefit from network effects for their systems.  Developers of platforms have an 
incentive to allow other developers to create applications to work on their platforms but 
may not be open to potential rival platforms.58  Others will have a proprietary closed 
approach.  The plan can change over time and an interface is always vulnerable and could 
change and become unavailable unless it is adopted as a standard.59 
Software interoperability is achieved through software interfaces, particularly the data 
formats but also APIs and protocols.  Proprietary software interfaces are not readily 
available (because they are not published or even properly recorded) and are often 
protected by IPRs.  Adopting standards for the interfaces helps to record and publish the 
interfaces but the adoption of standards incorporating IPRs raises several issues as to how 
the demands of both interests can be met. The main purpose of software standards is to 
increase interoperability.    
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In 1991 the Software Directive afforded copyright protection to computer programs as 
literary works, but the ideas and principles which underlie the computer program, including 
its interface, are not copyright protected.60  In this way the Directive has provided 
protection from literal copying of the machine and source codes but does not protect the 
function of the program.  Furthermore certain aspects of the interface, including the GUI61 
and specifications, are not copyright protected as literary works, which should assist 
interoperability.  Computer programs must be able to interoperate with other programs 
and some exclusions, such as ‘black box’ analyses and ‘reverse engineering’ are permitted 
subject to certain conditions, including the limitation that any decompilation can only take 
place for the purpose of interoperability.62  Although reverse engineering is commonplace, 
complex programs present significant difficulties as the process of reverse engineering is 
time consuming and can be thwarted by upgrades in the software being reverse 
engineered.63  In many circumstances reverse engineering is not a good business model.   
The manner in which the IPRs in interfaces are exercised has also been regulated by 
competition law. In 2004 the Commission ordered Microsoft to make certain information, 
including interface specifications, available to competitors in the work group server 
operating systems market.64  Microsoft’s refusal to make the information available 
voluntarily was held to be an abuse of its dominant position, which stifled innovation and 
diminished consumer choice by locking consumers into a homogeneous solution.65  
Microsoft was the most recent case to apply the ‘exceptional circumstances’ test to require 
                                                     
60
 Software Directive, recital 11  
61
 GUI, the graphic user interface is not copyright protected, see Navitaire Inc. v easyJet Airline and Bulletproof 
Technologies Inc. [2004] EWHC 1725 
62
 Software Directive, Articles 5 & 6  
63 Samuelson and Suzanne Scotchmer ‘The Law and Economics of Reverse Engineering’ (2002) 111 The Yale 
Law Journal 1575, 1607 
  
64
 Microsoft (Case COMP/C-3/37.792 Microsoft), Commission Decision of 24 March 2004 relating to 
proceedings under Article 82 EC OJ L 32.23 
65
 Ibid Commission Decision at 782 
36 
 
 
the compulsory licensing of IPRs.66  More recently the Commission required companies 
involved in acquisitions to licence interface information before clearance was granted.67 
3.5 Interoperability and Innovation 
As previously stated interoperability is considered to promote socially desirable goals and 
public benefit.68  Interoperability encourages more use of resources and more competition 
which should stimulate innovation69 which is likely to be of the “follow on” type rather than 
“breakthroughs”.70  While there is no systematic body of empirical evidence of a link 
between interoperability, and competition and innovation, the claim is often supported by 
illustrative examples.
71
   
It is certain that lack of interoperability causes expense and wastage.  The National Institute 
of Standards & Technology estimated that imperfect interoperability cost the US 
automotive supply chain at least $1 billion per year in 1999.72  Incompatibility between two 
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versions of Dassault Systemes’ CATIA 3D CAD software delayed the delivery of the A380 and 
resulted in a $6 billion loss for Airbus.73    
Perhaps the earliest and most notable impact of interoperability and open systems was the 
driving down of the quality adjusted price of the personal computer system when IBM, 
perhaps by accident, first introduced a personal computer using an open architecture.74  
The industry moved from the closed business systems adopted initially by IBM and Apple to 
a modular structure which encouraged specialisation and innovation.  Innovation in 
components such as disk drives and modems as well as applications software proliferated.  
As IBM and Apple’s market share declined the average price of computers fell by 40 per 
cent in 1992 alone.75  
Interoperability has now been accepted as an essential virtue by most governments.  The 
European Commission has accepted the benefits of interoperability in its competition law 
policy and policies for enterprise, industry and standardisation.76        
Interoperability is regulated by IPRs and competition law and both aim to give incentives to 
encourage innovation and hence competition.  The rationale for competition is that it gives 
efficient allocation of resources.  Efficiency is an important concept in the relationship 
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between IPRs and competition law.77  Efficiency can mean “static efficiency”, in which 
competition between existing technologies puts downward pressure on prices.  In contrast 
“dynamic efficiency” is competition from new technology and products.78       
This means that competition comes from new technologies rather than cost cutting.  This 
requires substantial upfront investment in research and development and increased risk 
taking which must be recouped.  Rational firms must expect sufficient profits to justify the 
investment.  IPRs are essential to this process and are not separate from competition policy.  
IPRs are not protecting “their owners from competition ... but...should be seen as 
encouraging firms to engage in competition”.79  Nevertheless as a reward and incentive for 
innovation it might be acceptable for firms to enjoy “monopoly” profits for a period of time.  
Competition law does not prevent dominance, provided there is no abuse of that position.   
Computer programs have low unit costs so the social benefit of the monopoly profits is to 
reward the firm for the “up front” investment and risk of entering the market and thereby 
encourage others to innovate and enter the market.80  This pattern only works if barriers to 
entry are not permanent.  IPRs give barriers to entry, with patents giving 20 years and 
software 50 years or longer.  In practice in the new economy existing technology is often 
superseded by the next generation of technology within a much shorter space of time.  This 
relies on IPRs only protecting copying and not substitutes so the new technology can enter 
the market. 
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3.6 Reverse Engineering 
The Software Directive gives literary copyright protection to “the expression in any form of 
a computer program”81 while recognising that the “function of a computer program is to 
communicate and work together with other components of a computer system and with 
users”82.  For this to happen a particular piece of software must interoperate with other 
pieces of software.  One way of achieving this is to “read” the interface of the software - 
however the software user cannot see the rules and codes of the software in the same way 
that the reader of a book can see the text of the book.  To gain this information he needs to 
take steps which would otherwise be reserved to the rightholder.     
The Directive has explicit exceptions to enable this to happen.  These exceptions do not 
require the rightholder’s consent and cannot be contracted out of.  The exceptions include 
the right to make a back-up copy and “to observe, study or test the functioning of the 
program in order to determine the ideas and principles which underlie any element of the 
program”.83 This latter exception is known as “black box” analysis and is not limited to 
interoperability.  When black box analysis is insufficient to achieve interoperability, reverse 
engineering is permitted if, in order to achieve interoperability of an independently created 
computer program with other programs, it is necessary to reproduce the code and translate 
its form.84  This converts the machine readable object code, which is the version normally 
supplied to the public, back into a higher level language, resembling the original source 
code which can be read by humans.  
This exception allows for the decompilation of the object code, in other words the user is 
allowed to look at and understand the basic building blocks of the program.  This exception 
is subject to certain conditions which emphasise that the exception can only be used to 
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achieve interoperability, and not to create a computer program substantially similar in its 
expression,85 or for any other act which infringes copyright.   
The social welfare benefits of reverse engineering have been described as complicated and 
ambiguous.86  Reverse engineering provisions did not appear in the first draft of the 
Software Directive and were only inserted after a battle between various factions of the 
software industry and user representatives.87   
The Commission and Council’s objective for including the reverse engineering provisions are 
said to give an incentive to both rightholders and potential decompilers to avoid reverse 
engineering.  The rightholder can deter the reverse engineering of its software by making 
information available for interoperability which obviates the need for other developers to 
explore his program in detail.  Those developers receive detailed and up to date 
information and do not need to incur the cost and risk of decompilation.  The dialogue and 
co-operation should accelerate the progress to standard interfaces and open systems.88 
Unfortunately the hard won provisions on reverse engineering have severe practical 
limitations, and they do not always give a complete answer to the problem of 
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interoperability.89  In its decision on Microsoft, the Commission found as a matter of fact 
that reverse engineering would not constitute a viable solution for companies wanting to 
compete in the work group server operating system market.90  The volume of interfaces 
that would have to be reverse engineered in a program as large as Windows would require 
considerable effort with uncertain prospect of success.   The viability of products developed 
using reverse engineering depends on the rightholder not altering its software so that it is 
no longer compatible with the new software developed by reverse engineering.  Such 
alterations frequently occur when upgrades are issued.  Reverse engineering is an 
inherently unstable basis for a business model.   The Commission’s decision referred to 
software developed by reverse engineering by the Samba group.  More than two years after 
Windows 2000 had appeared on the market, the SAMBA software still had severe 
shortcomings.91  Also, software developed by Novell to interface with Windows NT was not 
compatible with Windows 2000.  Microsoft would not release vital interface information to 
Novell, but used the lack of interoperability to discourage customers from using Novell’s 
product.92  In the more recent decision on the merger of Intel Corporation and McAfee 
Inc.93 the market investigation revealed that most respondents considered that reverse 
engineering Intel’s CPUs would take months if not years, be prohibitively expensive, and still 
be incomplete and vulnerable to subsequent changes to the CPU.94  
During the formation of the Directive there was recognition that while it is technically 
possible to decompile a program, doing so is lengthy, costly and inefficient.95  However at 
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the time it was said that “the problem of access to information may have to be addressed 
by other means which are outside the scope of the Directive.”96  One efficient solution is for 
the parties to voluntarily disclose information on agreed terms.     
Despite the exceptions in the Software Directive to permit reverse engineering, full 
interoperability between programs has not been achieved.  With certain types of complex 
software there appears to be a low level of interoperability.  Compulsory disclosure of 
interface information under Microsoft is only available where the supplier is dominant, and 
the disclosure remedy is flawed as it is ex post and prone to error.  Interoperability causes 
network effects as interoperability encourages users to adopt a network.  Conversely, a lack 
of interoperability creates boundaries to the network and intensifies its effects.  Users can 
become locked-in to the market, in that they must use software that is compatible with the 
de facto standard, and they can also be locked-in to particular software due to switching 
costs.  It appears there are shortcomings to the extent of interoperability available under 
the Directive but other solutions have arisen, some of which appear to be caused by market 
effects.  Interface information is frequently made available, particularly by operating 
systems software, to encourage the development of compatible application software.  
Commercial translators and standards have also been developed with varying levels of 
success.  
One shortcoming of the reverse engineering provisions is the practical challenge of carrying 
out the process and keeping up with subsequent changes.  Article 6 of the Software 
Directive prevents the decompiler giving the information obtained to others.97  This means 
that all software developers must independently carry out the same process.  In Chapter 8 
the effects of this restriction will be explored and analysed to see if relaxation of this 
restriction will improve the effectiveness of reverse engineering and improve the access of 
software developers to interface information. 
                                                                                                                                                                     
(2002)The Yale Law Journal 1575 - 1663, 1614 describing the considerable intellectual work and high costs 
involved in software reverse engineering and see also Andrew Johnson-Laird ‘Software Reverse-Engineering in 
the Real World’ (1994) 19 U Dayton L Rev 843 - 902, 843  
 
96
 Proposal for a Council Directive on the legal protection of computer programs [1989] OJ C 91/4, para. 3.14 
97
 Software Directive, Article 6. 2 (b) 
43 
 
 
Despite all these shortcomings reverse engineering of software is widely practiced.  It is as 
standard in the software industry as it is in traditional engineering.98  About one third of the 
respondents to a public web-based consultation use some form of reverse engineering to 
gain interoperability information as licensing.  For reasons not explained, licensing is seen as 
more inconvenient.  Small or medium-sized organisations or open source developers are 
more likely to reverse engineer than larger organisations who appear to prefer to license.99           
 
Reverse engineering can be made more difficult by the deployment of Technology 
Protection Measures (TPMs)
 100
 but only 16% of respondents to the public web-based 
consultation had used any form of TPM to protect their software. 101  TPMs such as 
passwords and encryption systems can be deployed as a protective shell around software 
and need to be circumvented before decompilation can take place.  They are protected by 
legislation but fortunately for reverse engineering the anti-circumvention regime in the 
Information Society Directive does not apply to the protection of computer programs.102  
The Software Directive does not prohibit the act of circumvention itself but only the act of 
trafficking in the circumvention tools which provisions are specifically stated to be without 
prejudice to Articles 5 and 6.  Where technology protection measures applied to a 
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computer program circumvention of those measures is not restricted by the Software 
Directive.103   
3.7 Breakthrough or Follow On Innovation 
Interface information provides interoperability.  Interoperability allows markets to exhibit 
network effects104 and network effects magnify the benefits of interoperability.  Developers 
of platforms encourage the development of applications to work on the platform which 
attracts more customers to the platform.  This will encourage others to develop 
complementary products and generate an ever larger customer base – a virtuous cycle due 
to network effects.
105
  What is less certain is the extent to which new technology in the new 
economy, including network markets, is prevented from entering the market by inadequate 
interoperability and what can be done to resolve it.  Where network effects exist 
innovation, if it happens, may take the form of the “gale of creative destruction”106 rather 
than evolution.  Existing technologies would be replaced by new technologies in their 
entirety and so not need to be compatible with each other. 
Arguably breakthrough technology is better than follow through technology as the new 
technology does not free ride on existing technology so incentives to innovate are 
preserved and encouraged.  However follow on technology is acceptable in old markets and 
                                                     
103
 In the US the Digital Millennium Copyrights Act (1998) 112 Stat 2860 ‘DMCA’ gives unprecedented 
restrictions and inverts the rules on reverse engineering.  The DMCA outlaws circumvention technologies and 
indirectly outlaws reverse engineering, subject to specific exceptions.  This includes reverse engineering when 
necessary to achieve program to program interoperability.  The information obtained by reverse engineering 
can only be disclosed for the sole purpose of accomplishing interoperability.  There have been various 
instances of judges and commentators taking a position that would restrict the dissemination of information 
legitimately obtained.  For example a journalists publication of information was thought to violate the DMCA 
even though legitimately obtained Universal City Studios, Inc. v Reimerdes 111 F. Supp. 2d 294 
103
      
104
 Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro ‘Systems Competition and Network Effects’ (1994) 8 J ECON PERSP 94.  The 
utility provided to each individual user of a specific platform or system increases with the total number of 
users, so the higher the number of users the higher the demand.    
105
 Pamela Samuelson ‘Are Patents on Interfaces Impeding Interoperability?’ (2008) Berkeley Centre for Law & 
Technology 1, 7 http://ssrn.com/abstract=1323838 
106
 Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (George Allen, London, 1976) 81 et seq. ( first 
published 1942). 
45 
 
 
the concept and reality of existing technology so complex that it cannot be certain that 
breakthrough technology will always give the greatest technical advance in all areas. 
Markets with products that have incompatible standards tend, after a period of intense 
competition, to have one single firm emerge dominant.   As one firm entices more 
developers and consumers to its standard the market may “tip”.107   It is argued that 
technological innovation in the new economy markets is so rapid that no market leader, 
even with strong network effects, can defend itself against new market entrants with “killer 
applications” meaning that “serial monopolies” are the norm with competition “for the 
market” rather than “within the market”.108   It is however possible that a firm may win the 
de facto standards battle, not on merit but with the help of a few “tactical antitrust 
violations”, 109 and then hold the market for a long time.110 
This “winner takes all” model means that entering the market is very risky.  The new 
entrant has to secure strong economies of scale and network effects to enable it to 
“leapfrog” the former market leader.   This makes investing in possible new entrants very 
risky and deters investment in potentially better products.  The serial monopoly hypothesis 
claims that an innovator needs a period of monopoly in order to recoup its investment in 
innovation.111  Strong IPRs are needed to attract investment in innovation where there are 
network barriers to entry.   
The model of serial monopoly with strong IPRs and little competition law interference has 
attractions, as false positive errors are avoided.  However, dominant companies can use 
lack of interoperability to leverage their position and attempt strategic foreclosure.  In the 
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Browser War112 Microsoft leveraged its position in operating systems to ensure OEMs113 
preinstalled Internet Explorer in a prescribed manner.  Microsoft protected its share of the 
browser market, but a more significant effect was that by damaging Netscape Navigator, 
which could run on several operating systems, Microsoft was able to protect its position as 
the dominant supplier of operating systems.  The pace of competition law meant that 
judicial relief came too late for Netscape.114             
Incumbents who have essential IPRs may attempt to steer innovation and the evolution of 
technologies, partly by innovating faster themselves (positive effects) but also by 
attempting to thwart innovation by potential competitors who may challenge their 
dominant position (negative effects)115.   IPRs in interface information belonging to 
dominant companies can be used to prevent the emergence of superior technology which is 
not compliant with the de facto industry standard.  This allows the dominant company to 
ratchet up its IPR protection.   
The benefit of IPRs is that the owner can exclude others from using the protected subject 
matter, but this exclusivity is not an exemption from competition.  It is only an instrument 
that compels the proprietor’s competitors to compete by substitution as opposed to 
imitation.   
3.8 Market Failure and Intervention  
Because of the fast pace of innovation in the software industries it is advocated by some 
that the discipline of the market will give the optimum outcome and government 
intervention will only be inefficient.  Many economists, mainly from the USA and drawing 
on free market theories originating in the Chicago School, argue against intervention on the 
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basis that the market is the best discipline.  Lawyers from USA and Europe who analyse case 
law and rules with reference to the economic theories take a more pragmatic view of legal 
regulation and particularly competition law, especially concerning the new economies.116 
They see that in practice the law is not perfect so it is best to err on the side of caution as 
the market may well remedy any positive errors.117   The theories of the Chicago School and 
the pragmatic views of Easterbrook118 have dominated the debate on whether there is a 
case for intervention in the new economies.   
 Many US and European commentators are critical of the European Commission’s approach 
in Microsoft.  Not only was the case an undesirable extension of the ‘essential 
circumstances’ test but it failed to give an effective and timely remedy.  The Commission 
was approaching the case with its ordo-liberal heritage having only recently adopted an 
economic effects based approach.  The goal of innovation remains a policy priority and 
workable competition is seen as the best system for achieving an efficient market with the 
market as the best discipline for maintaining efficiency and encouraging innovation.  Where 
however a lack of interoperability causes a failure in the market there may be a case for 
intervention to optimise innovation.  IPRs are themselves an intervention in the market and 
if they give the wrong balance between protection for rightsholders and openness for 
interoperability the IPRs can themselves cause a failure in the market. 
3.9 Network Effects and Market Failure              
Network effects which can give rise to “network externalities” have been seen as causing a 
failure in the market.  Network effects occur when the value of a product in a network will 
increase if more users subscribe to the network.119  Network externalities are seen as a 
failure of the market, as the market is influenced by outside factors.   
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While network effects are relevant to many computer programs, they are not as strong in 
the 3D CAD market.  While it would be beneficial for the user if his 3D CAD system worked 
with others, it is not vital to the primary purpose of the system.  Nevertheless network 
effects can cause or accentuate lock-in.  Lock-in in network markets is normally the scenario 
where a technology wins a market because of network effects and the market is locked-in 
to a particular technology.  The classic example of this is the Betamax v VHS battle.  The 
market fails if the best technology does not win due to network externalities.  Most of the 
literature argues that while dangers exist, intervention is not justified as government 
seldom succeeds in “picking winners”.   
Consumers as well as industrial users may be affected by interoperability issues.  Once 
consumers have bought a platform or software they may be unable to move their data.  
They are “locked in”,120 and if they have not chosen the emergent de facto market standard 
they are faced with the additional costs of changing to the market standard and may lose 
the use of their expensively acquired data.  This dilemma is apparent in the new market for 
e-readers.  At least two of the e-readers are closed systems.  Users who build up a library do 
not know whether they can transfer it to another platform.  A study commissioned by the 
Book Industry Study Group identified the number one complaint among consumers about 
e-readers as “certain e-books [are] specific to certain e-readers.” 121  
Distinctions are drawn between direct and indirect network externalities.  Direct effects are 
physical connections such as those to a telephone network.  Indirect effects are other 
effects such as software being more plentiful, increased availability of aftercare and lower 
prices.  Katz and Shapiro recognise that systems markets with network effects may be 
inefficient, and theoretically government intervention could be justified.  However there is 
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evidence that private institutions may have solutions to the market and the problems can 
be resolved without government intervention.  This is desirable as governments may not 
have all the information they need to intervene in a beneficial manner, the “picking 
winners” scenario.122   
Liebowitz and Margolis refine Katz and Shapiro’s work on network externalities 
distinguishing between network effects and externalities and claim that while “network 
effects are common and important, network externalities are theoretically fragile and 
empirically undocumented”.123   Network externalities were a specific type of network 
effect in which “the equilibrium exhibits unexploited gains from trade regarding network 
participation”.124  It was said this reflects the understanding of externalities as an instance 
of market failure.   While network effects are common there is less evidence of network 
externalities and this reclassification plays down market failure and the need for 
intervention.  They conclude that after looking at the Qwerty keyboard, the VHS tape and 
the internal combustion engine that they are not aware of any compelling examples of 
market failures and the wrong choice being made “..the a priori case of network 
externalities is treacherous and the empirical case is yet to be presented.”125 
Where a technology becomes the norm because of network effects causing technology 
lock-in, the markets may be able to guide the adoption of technology efficiently and 
intervention may be unnecessary and even harmful.  Lock-in should not however be treated 
as a homogenous, simplified phenomenon by looking only at relatively trivial lock-in such as 
the iTunes and the Querty keyboard without attempting a comprehensive definition.126  
Most literature on lock-in is concerned with lock-in in the form of “path dependency” that 
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suppresses the feasibility, in principle, of improvements in the path127 does not appear to 
consider the problem that exists when consumers are locked-in to a technology because of 
the high switching costs.  Consumers can however become locked-in by a particular 
technology without strong network effects.    
3.10 Supplier Lock-in  
A lack of interoperability can result in users who have bought a platform or software being 
unable to join a network or to move their data and being “locked in”.128 There are two 
aspects to this lock-in: firstly “network” lock-in where, if they have not chosen the 
emergent market standard, users are faced with the additional costs of changing to the 
market standard, and secondly “vendor” or “supplier” lock-in which may cause users to lose 
the use of their expensively acquired data.  Supplier lock-in is caused by incompatibility 
between the user’s existing data and alternative forms of software, and is differentiated by 
the scale of switching costs per user and unquantifiable factors such as legacy issues and 
risk of undetected errors in data.  A user locked-in to a supplier may also suffer from 
network lock-in where the supplier’s software is the market leader but supplier lock-in can 
occur without network lock-in such as where the user’s existing data is stored in the 
supplier’s software and there are high switching costs.  Supplier lock-in has existed for many 
decades when capital equipment was only physically compatible with the original supplier’s 
equipment.  This branch of lock-in can now be caused by lack of interoperability between 
computer programs.   
Supplier lock-in can be caused by a variety of switching costs:  damages due to contractual 
commitments, the cost of replacement equipment, loyalty programs, search costs, 
transaction costs and uncertainty about alternative suppliers, retraining and 
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compatibility.129  The costs of switching from one proprietary software program to another 
can include new hardware, software customisation, training and implementation.  Training 
alone is significant, and business processes may have to be changed to meet the needs of 
the new software.  Existing data may have to be converted with the risk that it is corrupted 
or even lost in the process. An industry estimate is that all of these costs are about eleven 
times the cost of the software itself.130  
The 3D CAD market is affected by market lock-in as it is easier to transfer data using the 
same propriety system.  This encourages the use of the more prevalent brands and OEMs 
often require their suppliers to use the same software.  Supplier lock-in is however 
considered a stronger feature of the 3D CAD market due to high switching costs with the 
users’ proprietary data stored in the proprietary software systems. Lock-in in the 3D CAD 
market is lock-in to the supplier rather than lock-in of the market.  It is a question of degree.  
When a network market is locked in there will be switching costs but these can be low per 
user, and other issues such as inertia and lack of co-ordination are relevant.  Lock-in in the 
3D CAD market is caused by the scale of the costs to the user and unquantifiable factors 
such as legacy issues and risk of undetected errors in data.  When a consumer is locked-in 
to a network market they can still individually enter the market, albeit at a cost, and the 
emphasis is on the market that is locked rather than the individual.  With a user of 3D CAD 
the costs of re-entering the market can be large and this could effectively bar them from 
entering the market at all.  For this reason there could be a failure in the market.   Switching 
costs include new hardware, software customisation, training and implementation.  
Training alone is significant and business processes may have to be changed to meet the 
needs of the new software. 
                                                     
129
 Types of lock-in and switching costs are suggested by Shapiro and Varian ibid and also by Paul Klemperer 
‘Competition when Consumers have Switching Costs: An Overview with Applications to Industrial 
Organizations, Macroeconomics, and International Trade’ (1995) 62 (4) Review of Economic Studies 515-539. 
130
 Hal Varian, Economics of Information Technology (2003) revision of Raffaele Mattioli Lecture, University, 
Milano, Italy,  15-16 November 2001 http://people.ischool.berkeley.edu/~hal/Papers/mattioli/mattioli.html; 
also Ian Larkin ‘Bargain-then-Ripoffs: Innovation, Pricing and Lock-in in Enterprise Software’ (2008) Academy of 
Management Annual Meeting Proceedings  1-6 
52 
 
 
92% of respondents to a public web-based consultation said they had encountered 
problems with a lack of interoperability information and 84% said this constrained their 
choice of subsequent acquisitions causing lock-in.131  As well as experiencing problems with 
software from dominant suppliers interoperability problems were identified with suppliers 
who would not qualify as significant market players.  Specifically issues were reported with 
different CAD systems as well as Enterprise Resource Planning ‘ERP’ systems offered by 
smaller suppliers.132   
3.11 Supplier Lock-in, Market Failure and Intervention 
In the case of market lock-in due to a prevalent technology there is an argument that users 
must bear some of the cost for letting the market arrive at the best innovative technology.  
Consumers must bear the switching costs.  The need to encourage innovation may justify 
this as the most efficient approach.  This would accord with Coase’s Social Cost theory.133  
The opinion that consumers’ ability to switch to other search engines instantaneously and 
at no cost is said to constrain Google’s ability and incentive to anti-competitive acts134 was 
influential in the 2013 Federal Trade Commission’s investigation into Google’s alleged anti-
competitive practices.135  However where users are locked-in to a supplier with very high 
switching costs they are prevented from entering the market and arguably prevented from 
transacting an efficient resolution.  The cost to the user is so substantial that it may not be 
justified as a social cost.   
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It is claimed that the evidence for technology lock-in is anecdotal and highly questionable136 
and does not justify intervention.  There are however significant differences in the nature of 
lock-in and while it may be correct that market lock-in is best solved by the market there 
remains the possibility that different forms of lock-in need different solutions.  Economists 
who looked at supplier lock-in are far less bullish about achieving a market solution.  Farrell 
and Klemperer consider supplier lock-in due to switching costs binds customers to suppliers 
if products are incompatible, locking customers or even markets into early choices and 
giving suppliers lucrative ex post market power.137  Firms “compete for the market” or “life-
cycle competition”, which can be fierce, but with incompatibility competition can involve 
direct efficiency losses and can magnify incumbents’ advantages.138          
Large switching costs occur when a buyer has made an initial purchase, and he is effectively 
locked-in to buying a series of goods such as upgrades or new modules of software.  This 
can create ex post monopolies for which firms compete ex ante.  “Ex ante competition 
often fails to compete away ex post rents: switching costs typically raise oligopoly 
profits”.139  At best ex post rents induce “bargain-then-ripoff” pricing (low to attract 
business, high to extract surplus) which distorts the market and gives consumers the wrong 
signals about whether to switch.  Also switching costs “can segment an otherwise 
undifferentiated market as firms focus on their customers and do not compete aggressively 
for their rivals’ buyers, letting oligopolists extract positive profits”.140  Farrell and Klemperer 
cautiously favour some intervention in the form of pro-compatibility public policy.  Priority 
should be given to particular markets where incompatibility is strategically chosen rather 
than inevitable. 
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3.12 Case Studies Evidencing Lock-in  
3.12.1 Mainframe Computers 
An early study into switching costs associated with computer programs was conducted by 
Greenstein looking at lock-in and the cost of switching mainframe vendors.141  The study 
looked at mainframe computers in Federal Government.  From previous research it was 
known that anticipated lock-in induces fierce competition from suppliers for buyers which 
may reduce the impact of consequent monopoly rent.  But not all monopoly rents were 
competed away for “technical uncertainty is asymmetrically resolved”142 among competing 
suppliers.  Suppliers will withdraw offerings while others are more innovative.  Some buyers 
will be satisfied with their choice of supplier while others are not but continue with the 
supplier due to switching costs.  Still others will be so dissatisfied they will change despite 
the switching costs. 
There is a general presumption that buyers prefer a market with interoperability, where 
firms provide compatible ‘mix-and-match’ components, 143  for example IBM-compatible 
personal computers.144   There is also a presumption of conflict of interests between 
proprietary suppliers and buyers with buyers preferring non-proprietary standards.  
Suppliers who have established a proprietary network will resist any movement towards a 
more competitive mix-and-match structure.  Once buyers have bought into a system 
vendors have incentives to design incompatible systems to take advantage of switching 
costs145 and may actively discourage interoperability.146 
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Greenstein found that buyers took a variety of actions in anticipation of lock-in due to 
switching costs and while these ameliorate the costs they did not eliminate them.  Action to 
reduce the use of proprietary technology moved the industry towards mix-and match.147  
This was an early forerunner of the policy to encourage open source software in public 
institutions. 
3.12.2 ERP Software 
In 2008 Larkin conducted a survey of lock-in and switching costs of Enterprise Resource 
Planning (ERP) software, which is a sub-set of Enterprise Application Software.148  Up until 
then “the few empirical studies that exist largely use aggregate measures of market share 
and pricing rather than actual contract by contract data”.149  Larkin surveyed a sales 
database of a leading enterprise software vendor to examine the strategy adopted by the 
suppliers and the customers’ response to high switching costs.  There was significant 
evidence of “bargain then rip-off” behaviour with new customers paying about 50% less 
than locked-in customers.   Interestingly there was also evidence that “better” customers 
can avoid switching costs.  Customers with strong IT departments take advantage of initial 
bargains and then choose not to upgrade and so avoid purchasing at the locked-in rate.  
Presumably the IT departments of these customers feel confident in their ability to 
maintain the software when they lose the benefit of vendor maintenance due to not 
upgrading the software.  Also, customers with the strongest financial performance not only 
get initial bargains but are the most likely to switch, and get good prices again, rather than 
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upgrade at the locked-in rate.150  While there is clear evidence of lock-in it appears that 
suppliers are not completely in control and buyer behaviour can ameliorate the effects of 
lock-in.          
Purchase of ERP software such as Oracle Financial Systems and SAP has been described as a 
“one-way street”151 when the purchase of a particular package effectively requires the 
purchaser to place future purchases with the same software family because the software 
has low compatibility with other packages.  The purchaser is locked-in because the costs 
involved in switching to another package are prohibitively high.  Once the initial decision to 
go with a system is made it becomes prohibitively expensive to switch.152  Interoperability is 
important because of the long life expectancy of organisational data and the inability to 
change software without a common standard.  The position is not fixed however with some 
suppliers seeing an advantage in changing the degree of interoperability with competing 
packages and some adding proprietary features and extensions which defeat otherwise 
open standards.153  Software built around a standard that allows compatibility was an 
important factor along with price.  One large manufacturer who attempted to change their 
ERP system to a competing ERP system at a better price abandoned the attempt after one 
year and reverted to their old ERP system.154   Lock-in had been caused by non-technical 
issues with the skill set and knowledge base built around the former ERP system in practice 
inhibiting the switch.   
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3.12.3 3D CAD Software 
A study of the Product Life-Cycle Management market was carried out by IDC 
Manufacturing Insights in 2011.155  It distinguished between the 3D CAD market which it 
referred to as the visual design authoring and simulation applications (CAx) which includes 
CAD and FEA software and the PLM market which it described as collaborative product data 
management applications in industries such as automotive, aerospace and defence. 
The study confirmed the vendors of CAD as Autodesk, Dassault Systemes, PTC and Siemens 
PLM.  FEA vendor ANSYS was included in the CAx segment.  In the PLM market competition 
is mainly between three of the four CAD vendors joined by SAP and Oracle.  CAx is 
described as a mature market with little growth whose relevance is overlooked by 
enterprise.  IDC however ranks this as the most important segment of the PLM market as 
there is potential growth in new applications.  Competition is greater in the PLM market as 
the barrier to changing a supplier is much lower than with 3D CAD software.  PLM users are 
more likely to nge their enterprise PLM products in coming years to take advantage of price 
cuts, consolidation and regional vendor preferences.156  
End users seem to have a dilemma with the market with OEM end users struggling to 
choose between “an ERP-PLM portfolio that locks them in for years and best-of-the-breed 
products from different engineering software providers.”157  It can be inferred from the 
report that there is more competition and switching of suppliers in the PLM segment than 
the 3D CAD segment which has less interoperability and more lock-in.  The 3D CAD Software 
market will be considered in more detail in Chapter 4.     
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3.12.4 iTunes, the iPod and DRM  
The Apple iTunes and the iPod is one of the best known and most widely commented upon 
examples of lock-in that was used to leverage an adjacent market.  It is a valuable case 
study as the lock-in was reduced firstly by demands of the market and then by new 
technology.  The iTunes music service started in January 2001 but sales did not take off until 
April 2003 when the “third generation” of iPods was introduced.  These were compatible 
with the USB 2.0 ports on PCs and had software available to offer compatibility with older 
iPod models.  In June 2003 Apple sold its one-millionth iPod, and in September iTunes 
downloads passed the 10 millionth song mark.  
But incompatibility remained due to digital rights management (“DRM”) which is made 
possible due to TPMs.158  iTune files could only be played on iPods and vice versa so 
consumers who built up a library of iTunes had to own an iPod.  It appears that iPods could 
play non iTunes files but the extent to which iTune files can be re-recorded in MP3 format 
at that time is uncertain and obscured.  What is certain is that due to DRM a first recording 
of a song downloaded from iTunes can only play on an Apple device.  The result was that 
consumers who had built up a library of iTunes, which although individually cheap (99 cents 
per song) cumulatively had a significant value (at that time iPods carried up to 1000 song or 
$990 worth of downloaded files) and needed a relatively expensive iPod to listen to them.  
MP3 players can be bought for a tenth of the price of an iPod.  Theoretically it might have 
been possible to convert files but law abiding consumers were effectively locked-in to the 
iPod because of the value of their library and the convenience it provided to use the iTunes 
service with the iPod.159  
DRM allows IPR holders to diversify the way they offer their works more than they can in 
traditional markets, but DRM is a barrier to entry.  While IPRs are “intangible barriers” and 
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remedies are ex post, DRM is a “tangible barrier” composed of technology rather than rules 
and is ex ante.160  
While reverse engineering might technically be possible, the exemption under Article 6 of 
the Software Directive would arguably not cover the purpose of designing compatible 
players.161  The DMCA in the USA would also prevent reverse engineering as the music files 
are not likely to qualify as computer programs under the statute.162 
"The iPod makes money. The iTunes Music Store doesn't."163  If Apple’s business model is to 
use relatively cheap iTunes downloads to tie customers to the iPod, using DRM to restrict 
interoperability and maximise sales of iPods at optimum price makes business sense
164
.  The 
readily available iTunes service with seamless compatibility with the iPod and a variety of 
other services not available to other portable players gave an attractive integrated service.  
Apple could use this to maximise profits across its products and also to increase barriers to 
entry for the portable player market.  While DRM might reduce the overall use of iTunes 
downloading service, making iTunes only compatible with the iPod allows Apple to price the 
iPod to maximise profits overall.  Also by introducing more features that can be 
downloaded and thus increasing the complexity and variety of the integrated service Apple 
was again increasing the entry barriers. 
This sort of pricing scheme has been seen with the manufacturers of razors and printers, 
with the cheap razor and expensive replacement blades or cheap printers and expensive 
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replacement ink.165 Commentators have criticised these comparisons arguing that the Apple 
model is for consumers to buy the expensive iPod first and then the option to use the 
iTunes software and buy the cheap iTunes songs.166  However this is incorrect as the 
potential for lock-in occurs because of the value of the library built using iTunes which 
needs an Apple product to use. 
Competition to DRM integrated iTunes/iPod model came from illegal downloads, which 
could be played on the iPod, evading the DRM to create copies playable on another 
portable player, or the few competitors, such as Dell that existed at that time.   
In 2007 Apple’s DRM not only tried to block music from competitors such as RealNetworks 
playing on iPods.  If an iPod owner had managed to load music from another digital onto 
their iPod they would receive an error message telling them to restore their iPod to factory 
settings which then wiped non-iTunes music from the device.167 
By the end of 2006 a total of 90 million iPods had been purchased and 2 billion songs 
downloaded from iTunes store.  That gives an average of 22 songs per iPod.  The most 
popular iPod at that time held 1000 songs and were normally full, meaning that only 3% of 
the songs had been downloaded from iTunes.168  This also meant that only 3% of music was 
DRM protected with the remaining 97% unprotected and playable on any open format 
player.  As Steve Jobs commented:        
It’s hard to believe that just 3% of the music on the average iPod is enough to lock 
users into buying only iPods in the future.  And since 97% of the music on the 
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average iPod was not purchased from the iTunes store, iPod users are clearly not 
locked-in to the iTunes store to acquire their music.169 
3% is the average but the lawful consumer who downloads most of their songs from iTunes 
may feel locked-in to Apple.  Consumers who mainly store illegal downloads or songs from 
CDs do not suffer the same inconvenience.  
It would appear from this statement that the pressure to remove DRM did not come from 
consumers’ dissatisfaction (although consumers did resent that downloads could not be 
copied in the same way as CDs) nor from the European competition authorities.  From the 
statement made by Steve Jobs it would appear that what was uppermost in his mind was: 
 Firstly a key provision of the agreements with the music companies that if the DRM 
system is compromised and their music becomes playable on unauthorized devices, 
Apple would only have a few weeks to fix the problem or the entire music catalogue 
could be withdrawn from the iTunes store.170  With only 3% of songs coming from 
iTunes DRM was more of a threat to their business model than an asset.   
 Secondly, while the four music companies required the music sold online to be DRM 
protected the CDs they sold were not protected.  CDs could be copied directly onto 
iPods or uploaded to the Internet and (illegally) downloaded to iPods.  This probably 
constituted a significant part of the 97% of songs on iPods.   
Apple was competing with non DRM protected songs (In 2006, under 2 billion DRM-
protected songs were sold worldwide by online stores, while over 20 billion songs were sold 
completely DRM-free  and unprotected on CDs by the music companies themselves)171 and 
Apple was exposed to the risk of the music companies withdrawing their licence if iTunes 
was not DRM protected.   
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Steve Jobs set out a market solution to the problem of lack of interoperability and possible 
lock-in posed by the DRM system: 
At that time the overwhelming majority of the music companies’ revenues came 
from selling CDs which must play in CD players that support no DRM system.  So if 
the music companies are selling over 90 percent of their music DRM-free, what 
benefits do they get from selling the remaining small percentage of their music 
encumbered with a DRM system? There appear to be none. If anything, the 
technical expertise and overhead required to create, operate and update a DRM 
system has limited the number of participants selling DRM protected music. If such 
requirements were removed, the music industry might experience an influx of new 
companies willing to invest in innovative new stores and players. This can only be 
seen as a positive by the music companies. 
In 2008 the music companies started to abandon DRM.  Ironically a reason given for this 
was the threat they felt from Apple.  As Apple refused to license its DRM version to rivals its 
best-selling iPod drove the iTunes store to become the third-largest music retailer in any 
form in the US and achieved more than 70% of the UK download market.
172
  (This gives a 
very different picture to Steve Jobs claim that only 3% of songs on an iPod came from the 
iTunes store).  The record companies173 felt that Apple was in a position to dictate the 
economic terms and the business models.  The music industry thought that one way of 
drawing people away from iTunes was to get rid of DRM.174 
When the music companies freed Apple from the obligation to encode the files Apple 
increased the price per song and charged consumers for unlocking their existing library at 
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30 cents a song175.   Apple offered tracks in its AAC format rather than MP3 – which still 
limited interoperability.  Many popular devices such as the iRiver and Archos players and 
Creative's Zen did not support the AAC format and converting to a MP3 format was a time-
consuming process.176   
The bottom line is that while Apple will allow the customer to use iTunes' DRM-free 
music on other players, it won't go out of its way to make it particularly easy to do 
so.  Apple also revealed it will offer music videos without DRM protection, although 
it had no plans to do the same with films or TV shows.177 
Apple’s use of DRM allowed it to raise barriers to entry in the portable player market and to 
maximise profits in that market.  To its credit it provided a service that attracted people to 
pay for downloaded music and reduced the price of music, but was the business model 
potentially harmful to consumers?  Using DRM to restrict interoperability imposes 
additional costs on consumers and hardware producers, particularly where there are 
competing DRMs which are not cross licensed.  Economies of scale are foregone as 
“consumers are separated into different incompatible subgroups.”178  The online music 
market has network effects and the use of DRM and lack of interoperability fragments the 
market, this is likely to decrease welfare and potential benefits as consumers do not enjoy 
being part of a larger network.179  Ironically if reverse engineering were permitted it would 
increase the size of the legitimate network and with music at a lower price it would 
encourage more legal downloading, although this would arguably be at Apple’s expense. 
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3.12.5 What can we learn from iTunes? 
It is established that DRM can fragment existing markets and create new markets.  One 
example is the division of the music market into the download market and the traditional 
market such as CDs.180  DRM can also erect and strengthen barriers to entry which can be of 
concern when they are implemented, not for the purpose of protecting copyright but to 
prevent competition such as where there would otherwise be interoperability between 
competing complementary goods.  Arguable DRM within the entertainments industry is less 
likely to have anti-competitive effects because it will be protecting unique goods which are 
often copyright protected.  However the DRM protection can morph to protect goods that 
would otherwise be compatible.  This was a concern in Sony/BMG joint venture.   Sony 
could use its own DRM system to offer music in formats that would not be readable 
through equipment that adopted competitive DRM solutions.181   
Even where DRM originally protects IPRs it can morph to protect physical products.  DRM 
was ostensibly used to protect iTunes at the insistence of the record companies but was 
used by Apple to limit competition and raise barriers to entry in the portable player market. 
In Chamberlain v Skylink182 and Lexmark183 DRM was applied to products to limit 
competition in the accessory or aftermarket.  The cases were brought under the DMCA
184
 
alleging unlawful reverse engineering.  While neither Court was asked to consider any 
matters of competition law both judgements considered that DRM should not be used to 
limit competition in the accessory market as this would reduce consumers’ choice in the 
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secondary market and reduce competition pressures that drive innovation.185  These cases, 
where DRM solutions are used in connection with compatible goods, have highlighted the 
danger that DRM can be a tool to foreclose connected markets.186            
In addition to the technical lock-in caused by DRM there was an element of lock-in due to 
switching costs.  The switching costs per customer were not very significant but enough to 
lock customers into the Apple system.  Switching costs were borne disproportionately by 
customers who paid for a library of songs from iTunes and then had to repay to convert 
them.  The lock-in was in the form of market lock-in but there was also supplier lock-in as 
users had their data (songs) stored in the proprietary system. 
 It is not clear why Apple stopped using DRM.  It appears to be a market driven decision.187  
Apple may have had genuine concerns that if the DRM was unencrypted it would risk action 
by the record companies; they had gained their market share thanks to DRM but it might 
have outlived its purpose and could backfire due to its unpopularity.  Consumers were using 
non encrypted sources such as CDs and illegal downloads.  Here an open system brought 
commercial pressure to bear on the closed systems.    
Apple appears to have used DRM to leverage its market position.  When the market 
changed DRM was removed.  Apple still retained the AAC format which it did not licence 
and it remained a relatively incompatible system.  Even taking into account Apple’s 
preference for being vertically integrated and using exclusive proprietary software, the 
iTunes DRM scenario was a salutary tale for what to expect from the present trend for 
platform technologies in products and online services.  However the latest chapter of the 
Apple iTunes saga is the decline of its preeminent position with the increase in the 
bandwidth available to consumers, enabling the rise of music streaming providers such as 
Spotify.     
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3.13 Achieving the Right Balance 
The background to software interoperability reviewed in this Chapter presents a picture of 
suppliers using various means including IPRs and TPMs to lock customers into their own 
software systems.  It also displays examples of remedies that can come from customers’ 
own action and from general market effects.  The law can set a framework but it does not 
give all the solutions.  These come from the ingenuity of the users and the commercial 
pressures acting on the suppliers.  This however remains a rather haphazard picture of the 
present impact of interoperability and lock-in and does not enable the assessment of 
whether legal regulation is providing the optimum or even an acceptable framework.     
The work on interoperability undertaken by van Rooijen makes a valuable contribution 
articulating a normative framework for evaluating interoperability.  The normative 
framework takes account of the balance that must be struck between the rightsholders’ 
need for control to incentivise innovation with the benefits of openness, again to enable 
competition and encourage innovation.188  Striking the right balance is important for 
consumer welfare.  It also recognises that the benefits and disadvantages of ex ante certain 
regulation and ex post flexible regulation must be considered.   
Rooijen argues that control over interfaces can stimulate dynamic innovation189 but factors 
such as the extent of supplier lock-in and the market being oligopolistic will affect dynamic 
innovation, particularly resulting from follow on innovation. 
Van Rooijen proposes that control over interfaces has a dual function, the direct and the 
indirect function.190  The direct function is similar to that of control over any technology 
which gives incentives to innovate, but as the investment in interfaces is normally recouped 
by licensing the main computer program, the incentives are barely necessary.  The indirect 
function is the control over interoperability and control over access to competing and 
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complementary software, access to networks and access to consumers own data.  As 
software industries are characterised by a substantial degree of interdependence the 
impact on competition and market power can be disproportionate.191  Again a balance must 
be struck but this indirect control over interface specifications, and other technical 
standards, cause different effects and outcomes including on static and dynamic 
competition.  The optimal balance for interfaces is different with more emphasis on 
openness than control.  Competition law and copyright law were found to not fully 
recognise the indirect effects of control but to treat all subject matter similarly.  This failed 
to recognise the effects of control over interface specifications on interoperability and its 
effect on competition and innovation.192   
While the need to strike a balance is recognised and a ‘middle ground between openness 
and control’ advocated,193 it is recognised that IPR regime determines the balance of 
control ex ante which gives certainty.194  But an IPR regime is however unable to meet the 
requirements of specific cases and given the complex and widely differing nature of 
software available, it is desirable to have more substantive criteria to identify the location 
of the ‘pivot’ between control and openness.195  Shemtov proposed a model that uses 
recoupment of R&D costs as a benchmark for licensing innovative software architecture to 
competitors when coupled with revenue generated on sales as sufficient incentive to 
continue and invest in original research and development.196   Samuelson and Scotchmer 
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proposed four criteria to assess the social welfare effects of the law’s recognition of a right 
to reverse engineer.197 
This thesis uses the normative structure and the indirect effects proposition by applying it 
to oligopolistic markets and software patents.  It is considered in the context of a specific 
software industry, the 3D CAD industry, which is characterised by supplier lock-in rather 
than predominantly network effects.  This allows the framework to be applied to a clearly 
identified market and to evaluate how the market addresses the control and openness 
provided by the legal framework for software interoperability.     
3.14 Summary        
This Chapter has demonstrated that the relationship between interoperability, competition 
and innovation is not proven or clear cut, but is complex and nuanced.198  Interoperability 
causes network effects as compatibility within a network is demarcated by the lack of 
interoperability on its boundaries and this can cause lock-in, restricting consumer choice 
and competition.199  As interfaces are not accessible the IPR protection in computer 
programs protection may be stronger than intended200  and the optimal balance between 
control and openness of interfaces is different with more emphasis on openness than for 
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other software.201  Software users are not necessarily passive victims of lock-in but can 
ameliorate the impact of lock-in.202 Network effects and lock-in do not necessarily justify 
intervention203 and forces in the market can bring pressure on suppliers to increase 
interoperability.  To increase market share it may be necessary for the suppliers to make 
interfaces available.204 
The Commission, CJEU and member states look favourably on interoperability, not only in 
the Software Directive but also in Article 102 and mergers.205  Article 102 is however only 
available for dominant suppliers and is an unattractive remedy as ex post and prone to 
error.
206
  There remains uncertainty about the legal status of interfaces although certain 
aspects amounting to ideas and method of operation are not copyright protected.207  The 
Software Directive does not require suppliers to make interface information available 
although it permits reverse engineering including decompilation in certain circumstances.
208
   
Reverse engineering is essential and used frequently but is complex and time consuming 
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and a poor business plan.209  Interface information obtained by reverse engineering cannot 
be disseminated although this restriction does not apply to information obtained by 
observation.210   
The landscape is complex but a vital aspect is not just the interfaces or network of the 
software but the data that is created, collected and stored by the software.  The emphasis 
should not be on the ‘plumbing’ of the software systems and their direct network effects 
but on the secondary or indirect effects caused by the data created by and stored in those 
systems.  This data can include both information collected from users by the platform 
owners and the users’ proprietary data stored in the software.      
While it is possible that the dominance of Google’s search engine may be eclipsed by a 
‘platform shift’ what Google has, that others before it have not, is the ability to mine and 
accumulate data and “its unparalleled ability to exploit that data.”211    
It is the existence of users’ proprietary data that is stored in the software’s particular 
format that prevents the switching between platforms, such as in 3D CAD software.  This 
causes the type of lock-in that may have a substantial effect on both static and dynamic 
competition and which it is said, may justify intervention.212      
By contrast users of software have restricted access to information on interfaces and are 
unable to disseminate information obtained by decompilation even where it is not 
copyright protected.  This lock-in means they are unable to access their own proprietary 
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data that is stored in the software without the software rightholders permission.  Due to 
this and other restrictions and costs, such as retraining, they are locked-in and competition 
in markets such as the 3D CAD industry is restricted.  As the market is oligopolistic there is 
no effective competition law remedy.  What is required is an improvement in the ex ante 
IPR regime to improve the access to interface information.  This thesis explores the existing 
legal regime in the context of the 3D CAD industry, paying particular attention to the 
regulation of access to the interface information, and recommends improvements and 
methods of implementation.  
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CHAPTER 4. THE INDUSTRY  
 
4.1 Introduction 
This thesis is concerned with the specific topic of the regulation of interoperability.  For this 
reason the analysis of the 3D CAD industry will not be a general competitive analysis but 
will focus on the issue of interoperability.  It will consider the competitive conditions in the 
industry but with a view to analysing the implications for the legal regulation of intellectual 
property rather than developing a competitive strategy.  The emphasis will be on the 
interplay between a lack of interoperability and its impact on the structure of the industry, 
and the role played by intellectual property rights and competition law.   
The Chapter will start with an overview of the rationale for selecting the 3D CAD industry 
before defining the market using industry data and decisions by the European Commission.   
The evolution of the general software market 
and the 3D CAD industry will then be 
considered to provide context and illustrate the 
proprietary nature of the software that gives it 
its controlled and closed nature.  The Chapter 
will conclude with a structural analysis drawing 
on Michael Porter’s techniques for analysing 
industries and competitors.  The focus on 
interoperability and legal regulation rather than 
a general competitive analysis is continued.     
  
CATIA 3D CAD Model of 13.5 metre 
Satellite Earth Station Antenna 
Pedestal 
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4.2 Rationale for Selecting the Subject 
3D CAD software is widely used in engineering industries to develop, design, and manage 
the lifecycle of products.  The software is crucial to the economy as it records vital design 
information and knowhow on all engineered products in the developed and developing 
world.  It has been said that “(f)or most companies, the most significant repository for their 
product-related intellectual capital are CAD data files”.213  Another vital role is facilitating 
rapid innovation, which enables the development of sophisticated products.  3D CAD 
technology reduces time to market and design and production costs.   
There are four main suppliers of 3D CAD software – Siemens, Dassault Systemes, PTC and 
Autodesk.  Efforts have been made to standardise data transfer formats by the 
promulgation of standards but there are formidable interoperability issues, and users are 
essentially “locked in” once they have purchased a particular brand of software.  The 
industry has all the elements associated with the propositions to some extent, namely: a 
lack of interoperability; network effects; lock-in; interfaces and proprietary software.  It was 
identified in the public consultation for the Commission Staff Working Document as 
software with which users experienced interoperability issues.
214
    
3D CAD is relevant to the phenomenon for the following reasons: 
 The 3D Computer Aided Design software market (‘3D CAD’) has been selected as it is 
known to be subject to a lack of interoperability.  This is recognised and spoken 
about by suppliers and users but remains an unresolved issue.215     
 There are four companies with a comparable market share, none of which are 
considered dominant.  The market is oligopolistic but it appears competitive with 
four companies engaged in R&D216 which strongly indicates dynamic competition.   
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 The extent of network effects in the market has not been verified and the extent to 
which users select software based on network effects is unknown 
 Users may be locked-in to their existing software but the extent and cause is not 
verified.   This may be due to switching costs rather than network effects. 
 The software is complex with frequent new releases so reverse engineering is 
challenging. 
 Standards and translators have failed to provide an acceptable solution.217 
  Incremental improvements in software but few new entrants.218 
 The software is expensive and users have to pay regular maintenance fees to 
continue to use the software.  
 Possible innovation mainly in rest of PLM market where customers are not locked in 
 The kernels (package of algorithms) used by all 3D CAD suppliers as the 
mathematical basis of their software are all derived from 2 original kernels which 
have been cross licensed. 
While industry studies have identified that interoperability is an issue219 there has been no 
in-depth study which looks at the problem from the perspective of the legal framework.220   
The selection of the 3D CAD industry was based on purposive sampling.  It was chosen as 
relevant to understanding the social phenomenon of interoperability.  The industry fulfils 
the strategic aim as it is relevant to the research question posed.221  
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4.3 Defining the 3D CAD Market 
3D CAD has been categorised as a part of digital product development (DPD) which 
encompasses CAD, computer-aided engineering (CAE) and computer-aided manufacturing 
(CAM), digital manufacturing (DM), and product data management (PDM).222 
The market is defined by the software’s application and solutions.  Prior to clearing the 
acquisition by Siemens of UGS in 2007, the Commission surveyed competitors, customers 
and information technology service providers.  The respondents considered that the various 
software applications and solutions (i.e. DPD, CAD, CAE, CAM, DM, and PDM) were specific 
to the function they provide.
223
    
3D CAD software was considered to be distinct from the wider PLM software but at the 
same time when combined it can form an integral part of an overall PLM solution.  PLM 
software was also distinct from other kinds of software, such as the wider enterprise 
application software (EAS), because of its specific product characteristics that distinguish it 
from the more general EAS software.  PLM software manages specific information about 
the products of the company whereas EAS addresses more general information about a 
company's resources such as personnel or finance.224 
When the Commission considered the acquisition by Dassault Systemes of IBM’s marketing 
operation of Dassault Systemes’ PLM, the majority of respondents thought there could be a 
separate 3D segmentation for certain applications, particularly CAM & CAD where the 3D 
functionality is more relevant.225  They also made a distinction between "high-end" and 
"low-end" PLM software depending on the types of PLM application, but opinions differed 
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as to the PLM applications for which the "high-end"/"low-end" distinction would be 
relevant.226 
With regard to the geographic market the investigations by the Commission found that PLM 
solutions are traded homogeneously in most world regions or at least within the EEA. None 
of the competitors considered that their PLM solutions were specifically tailored for the EEA 
market.227 
This thesis is concerned with the 3D CAD market and not the wider PLM market.  The PLM 
market is broader and has different characteristics.  There appears to be more 
interoperability between PLM software and the market is competitive.      
4.3.1 Sub-markets within the 3D CAD Market 
Two of the suppliers in the market, Siemens and Dassault Systemes, supply products that 
were formerly categorised as “high-end” but which now are more generally referred to as 
“specialist” software.  Both these companies also market mid-range or mainstream systems 
that compete with software from two other suppliers, PTC and Autodesk.  The features and 
functions of “mid-range” software are no longer considered to be inferior to the “high-end” 
systems228.   
Specialist software does have some differences: 
 it meets certain specialised needs,229 and continues “to develop valuable tools to 
meet the needs of a narrow band of very demanding customers”.230  For example, 
CATIA offers packages for ship hull and aerospace sheet metal design 
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 the price of the software is only a fraction of the overall price which will also include 
services such as training, customisation and implementation consulting  
 it is sold directly, rather than through a VAR channel,231  and focuses on large 
automotive and aerospace customers.       
There has been convergence in the characteristics of the two categories of software.232     
The high-end or specialist 3D CAD products primarily serve major OEMs233 in traditional 
sectors such as the automotive and aerospace industries that require a high specification 
product.  Second tier and sub-contractors may use high-end 3D CAD when specified by their 
OEM customer, or because their product has features which require more sophisticated 
capabilities that are only found in high-end 3D CAD systems. 
Competitors in the high-end/specialist sector: 
 Siemens PLM division of the Siemens Group with Siemens NX   
 Dassault Systemes - CATIA 
 Parametric Technologies Corporation (PTC)- Creo (formerly ProENGINEER)234 - 
Non high-end: 
 Siemens PLM division - SolidEdge  
 Dassault Systemes - SolidWorks  
 Autodesk - Inventor    
For this thesis both the high-end or specialist software market and the mid-range software 
will be considered.  Distinction will be drawn between these two different sub-markets 
where relevant.  They will be referred to as high-end and middle range.   
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4.4 Interoperability in the 3D CAD Market 
There is abundant evidence that users of 3D CAD Software experience a lack of 
interoperability.  All the interviewees acknowledged the problem.  A report in 2013 on the 
state of 3D collaboration and interoperability found that about 30% of respondents had 
experienced significant project delays or ordered incorrect parts due to design data 
problems following the exchange of files.  Almost half had engineers spending 4 hours per 
week fixing design data issues following exchange of files and 14% of engineers spent more 
than 24 hours per week, often working overtime.  With 90% of respondents transferring 10 
files per month and 16% transferring over 1,000 files per month this is seen as a serious 
issue for manufacturing industry.235  These metrics portray “the highly publicised huge cost 
of poor interoperability”236     
Interoperability is discussed openly at industry forums, for example at COFES the main 
industry conference: 
“Interoperability of CAD data, especially 3D data, remains one of the biggest 
unanswered and open-ended questions in the industry: “When will CAD data 
interoperate”? or “Why won’t the CAD vendors make their file formats open and 
interoperable?” have been asked again and again at events like COFES (the Congress 
On the Future of Engineering Software.) And regardless of the brilliant minds in 
attendance, those questions have never been fully answered.”237 
It is also discussed in the press and other media where, for example, a blog highlights that 
while much has changed in the industry interoperability does not seem to be making much 
headway.  Software providers enable their software to read competitor’s products to 
encourage their customers to stay with them while using complementary software, but 
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suppliers do not make it easier to read their products with competitor’s applications or 
systems.238  One of the main suppliers spoke of exactly this model with the creation of a 
platform where data could be injected or ingested into the platform.239   
4.5 Evolution and Interoperability of General Software Market 
When computers were first introduced in the 1950s, software was bundled with the 
hardware and it was not until the early 1980s that IBM moved to supplying software on an 
object code only policy.  By this time the cost of hardware had declined, while software 
became more valuable and in order to maintain revenue the source code was no longer 
disclosed.
240
  Proprietary software companies such as Microsoft, Oracle and Computer 
Associates expanded rapidly from nascent software developers in the 1970s to public 
quoted companies in the 1980s, specialising almost exclusively in computer software.  
Alongside these companies were system suppliers such as IBM and ICL which provided both 
hardware and software solutions.  The norm at that time was for there to be little 
compatibility between the software systems of the various proprietary suppliers.      
Compatibility between proprietary software companies was poor and at the gift of the 
proprietary supplier.  This has continued for decades as illustrated by the cases of Microsoft 
and SAS Institute.   This incompatibility has given rise to “platforms” that create the “walled 
gardens” of the digital giants such as Google, Apple, Facebook and Amazon, which make it 
hard for users to move content from one platform to another.”241   
The 1980s also saw the introduction of the open source software licence.  Open source 
software is defined by its collaborative development, accessibility of code and distribution 
models. In the academic software community that had pioneered the Internet, a belief 
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grew that commercial imperatives were destroying the cooperative environment in which 
programmers worked. As software increased in complexity (and higher level programming 
made use of obfuscation techniques), decompilation and reimplementation of a program 
from the binary object code (in which it is distributed and executed) became more difficult. 
In order to understand a program fully, access to the source code (including symbolic labels 
and annotations) was indispensable. Richard Stallman left MIT in 1984, and pioneered an 
open approach to software development and distribution in the GNU Project, launched to 
develop a complete Unix-like operating system. In 1988, Stallman issued the first version of 
the General Public License (GPL) forcing derivatives of GNU software to keep their source 
code free from proprietary claims. In a radical spirit, which has been described as the 
constitution of the Free Software/Open Source movement, copyright law was used to 
subvert itself.242 
The GNU General Public License (GPL), as with all open source software, gives the user 
certain freedoms to run, copy, distribute, study, change and improve the software.  To 
make this meaningful users must have access to the source code.  It is these freedoms that 
give the software the prefix “free”.  Free software is a matter of liberty not price.243 The GPL 
is a copyleft licence in that the copyright holder “leaves” what would otherwise be exclusive 
rights available to others.  GPL v.2 contains a “liberty or death” clause making patent 
restrictions a breach of the licence and prohibiting further distribution of the software.244  
GPL v.3 more directly addresses patents, granting licences of software patents in added 
source code for downstream users.245  Other open source software licences such as BSD, 
MIT and Apache are more “permissive”.  GPL v.2 is however the most widely used 
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licence.246  The most popular open source licences have a built-in termination clause that 
prevents distribution of the software if it is associated with any obligations such as patent 
licences that would not permit redistribution.247  It does not mean that all software that 
reads on the OSS code must be royalty free (RF) but code that is licensed, for example 
under GPL, cannot be combined with an implementation of a FRAND standard without 
losing the ability to distribute the code.248      
Incompatibility between proprietary software systems still exists but there have been some 
improvements in recent years.  There has also been “commingling” with many software 
users and developers using both proprietary and open source software.249   Both 
proprietary and open source software can be compatible with open standards.  It has been 
said that open source can benefit the implementation of open standards, as adoption of an 
open standard under an open source development model can sometimes drive or 
accelerate standard adoption.  Proprietary software remains prevalent but the combination 
of standards and open source and general expectation and market demand means that 
there is more openness and compatibility of software is now widespread.  Nevertheless 
there are areas where a lack of interoperability remains and even in platforms which make 
APIs available interoperability can still be controlled by the rightsholder.  
4.6 Evolution of 3D CAD Software 
The roots of the 3D CAD industry can be found in the established practice of using drawings 
to record and communicate designs for the manufacture and use of products and the 
increasing use by large organisations of mainframe computers in the 1960s.  The software is 
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overwhelmingly proprietary software produced by a small number of suppliers.  While 
standards are widely used in the industry there is no evidence of open source software 
having any significant use or influence on interoperability.  The study of the evolution of the 
software and the suppliers is a story of proprietary software.  
4.6.1 Pen and Ink to CATIA V6 
4.6.1.1 By Hand - The Drawing Board 
Since the industrial revolution, and probably before that, drawings have been used by 
engineering and manufacturing organisations to design products, to communicate designs 
to the factory floor, subcontractors and customers, and to store a considerable part of the 
organisation’s intellectual property.   
Traditionally, designs were produced by teams of draughtsmen working at drawing boards 
with pencils on large sheets of paper. 
 
The Drawing Office of the Armstrong-Siddeley Company, Coventry  
In the real world, products are three dimensional.  To conceptualise a 3D product, and then 
to produce by hand a formal two dimensional (2D) drawing takes enormous skill, is 
extremely time consuming, and is prone to errors which have to be ironed out by 
manufacturing several prototypes.   
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The time consuming nature of manual drawing meant that detailed designs were often not 
produced for every part, leading to the requirement for high levels of craftsmanship on the 
shop floor, potentially incompatible parts, and uncertainty about capturing design changes 
as the product evolved over time. 
 
Hand Drawn Visualisation of Rolls Royce Merlin Engine Supercharger Arrangement 
It is very time consuming and difficult to manually produce three dimensional (3D) images 
for manuals and publicity material.  Design reviews and cooperative working are limited by 
the availability of paper drawings, and it is difficult to convey an idea of the proposed 
design to non-technical people.   Stress analysis, often a vital part of the design process, has 
to be undertaken by hand, a difficult, time consuming and frequently inaccurate process, 
one which was frequently ignored by making designs heavier and hence more expensive 
than they really needed to be. 
4.6.2 2-D Electronically - Keep Calm and Undo 
With the advent of electronic computers, systems were designed which mimicked the 
operation of a drawing board and pen, by producing a 2D drawing on a screen which could 
be easily edited and subsequently printed.  These Computer Aided Design (CAD) systems 
had considerable advantages over the traditional paper based approach, as they allowed 
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the designer to produce drawings more accurately and quickly.  As well as decreasing design 
time, CAD led to reduced manufacturing errors.  It was said that the McDonnell Douglas 
MD11 airliner, designed with an early CAD system, was the first aircraft in which the carpets 
fitted first time without trimming.  The advent of the IBM compatible PC (1983) and the 
introduction of Autodesk’s AutoCAD software package (1988) meant that 2D CAD was 
within the reach of even modestly sized companies, and its use spread very quickly. 
 
AutoCAD Screenshot  
2D CAD systems were and are a considerable step forward, but they are really only 
improvements on the traditional drawing board – 2D solutions for a 3D world. 
4.6.3 3D – Approaching the Real World 
The ability to design components in 3D is a huge advantage, but presents formidable 
difficulties.  The algorithms required to describe and represent 3D shapes and curves are 
complex, and they require enormous computing power to process and display.  As the 
algorithms have become more ubiquitous and the cost of processing power has fallen, the 
use of 3D CAD has become very widespread.  Even companies of modest size are able to 
use 3D CAD to design complex products accurately and quickly, and to analyse and predict 
the product’s performance, as well as automatically building Bills of Material and keeping 
track of design iterations. 
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The 3D CAD market is a distinct market defined by the nature of the product.  The market 
has been described as visual design authoring for product idea generation, visual 
collaboration and virtual simulation of products or processes - primarily for the design 
phase but also for planning and maintenance.250   
It emerged as a market in the 1980s when CATIA, UGS and PRO/Engineer were first sold as 
3D modellers.  At that time there was a close link between the software suppliers and the 
hardware producers.  The software was limited by the processing capabilities of the 
hardware and could only run on a limited range of hardware and operating systems.  For 
example in the mid 1980s the UGS primary platforms were minicomputers from Data 
General and Digital.  PTC designed PRO/Engineer to work on multiple platforms but focused 
on UNIX as its primary operating system.  The hardware and software combined were very 
expensive – the price for a UGS system started at $250,000.  Eventually 3D CAD systems 
moved to PCs running the Windows operating system.  More recent entrants such as 
SolidWorks were designed from the start to run on PCs.  
4.7 Industry Competitors 
4.7.1 Introduction 
Today there are four main players in the 3D CAD industry – Siemens, Dassault Systemes, 
PTC and Autodesk.  To a considerable extent, the industry’s history has been dominated by 
technological changes in computers, and the rise of new competitors able to exploit 
advances in hardware, as mainframes gave way to minicomputers, which in their turn were 
swept aside by the rise of the Windows PC. 
The three companies in the high-end/specialised sector also supply complementary 
collaborative product data management software known as Product Life-Cycle 
Management (PLM).  They tend to dominate this sector as well although there is 
competition from Oracle and SAP. 
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3D CAD products frequently include some integrated element of visual simulation or finite 
element analysis (FEA) and computational flow dynamics (CFD), and higher specification 
analysis software is available as an optional extra.  CAD companies have generally gained 
access to FEA technology through acquisition.  ANSYS is a major player in the FEA market, 
and until recently it did not produce 3D CAD software.  
4.7.2 Siemens plm 
4.7.2.1 McDonnell 
Electronic digital computers were first developed during WW2.  By the early 1960s, large 
corporations commonly possessed mainframes, and some of them realised that they could 
be used to assist in the design process.  One example is the McDonnell aircraft company, 
which started its McAuto subsidiary to develop computer services.  McAuto’s ‘CADD’ 
software was used to design McDonnell and later McDonnell Douglas (MDC) aircraft, 
although there was reluctance to sell CADD to potential competitors in the aircraft industry, 
and potential customers were deterred by the $250,000 price tag.   
By the mid-1970s minicomputers running UNIX operating systems had become much less 
expensive alternatives to mainframes, and MDC acquired United Computing, which had 
been founded in 1963 and had developed the Unigraphics (UGS) CAD program.  By 1980 
Unigraphics was 3D.  In 1988 MDC acquired Shape Data which owned the solids modeller 
Romulus and the boundary representation or B-rep solid modeller Parasolid, which UGS 
adopted as its geometric modelling kernel.   
4.7.2.2 GM and EDS 
In 1991 UGS was sold to GM’s EDS subsidiary for $400M, and in 1996 EDS was in turn spun 
off from GM.  The mid-range software Solid Edge was acquired in 1997, and by 1998 
Unigraphics was ported to Windows.  In 2004 annual revenues were about $900 million and 
earnings just over $100 million.  EDS sold UGS to private equity investors in 2004 for $2 
billion.   
4.7.2.3 Siemens 
In 2007 Siemens AG acquired the UGS Corporation for US$3.515 billion from private equity 
firms.  It now operates as a unit within Siemens’ Automation and Drives (A&D) Group, a 
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€12.8 billion business unit headquartered in Nürnberg, Germany.  UGS has customers in a 
variety of industries around the world, primarily automotive, aerospace and defence, 
consumer goods, high-tech electronics, and machinery.  At the time of the acquisition UGS 
claimed more than 46,000 customers in 62 countries. 
 
Siemens PLM Financial Information 
As Siemens PLM is part of the Siemens group of companies separate financial information 
on the PLM division is not available.  The latest financial information released to the stock 
market on UGS was in 2004 prior to the acquisition by private equity investors.  
In 2004 annual revenues were $900 million and earnings just over $100 million.  From 
interview it is understood that revenues have increased in the past 10 years in line with 
other 3D CAD Suppliers.   
Siemens’s PLM share in the overall PLM solutions market is approximately 10-20% 
worldwide, and slightly less at EEA-level.  In sub-categories of PLM (i.e. DPD, CAD, CA E, 
CAM, DP, PDM), UGS' market share reaches a maximum of 10-20% in CAD and PDM while 
as regards DM software (the so-called "digital factory"), UGS enjoys a market share of 
approximately 30-40% worldwide and approximately 30-40% EEA-wide.251   
Source of information: UGS K-10 for 2004 unless otherwise stated 
 
4.7.3 Dassault Systemes 
4.7.3.1 CATIA 
Similar efforts were made in other large manufacturing companies to harness the power of 
their computers.  The French aerospace company Avions Marcel Dassault leveraged 
pioneering work done by Pierre Bezier at Renault to develop the CATIA (Computer Aided 
Three-dimensional Interactive Application) 3D CAD program, and quickly realised its 
potential, spinning off Dassault Systems in 1981 to market the software, signing a non-
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exclusive distribution agreement with IBM which proved to be very long lasting.  CATIA’s 
customer base widened to other industry segments including industrial equipment, high-
tech, shipbuilding, energy and consumer goods, allowing customers to create digital mock-
ups which lessened the need for physical prototypes, reducing costs and time to market.   
Dassault Systemes, with headquarters near Paris, was listed in 1996 (Paris & Nasdaq), 
following which it entered a period of acquisition and innovation as it developed the PLM 
phenomenon, acquiring various companies with software products that became important 
brands in its PLM offering including SIMULIA and ENOVIA.   
 Dassault ported CATIA to Windows in 1998.  Spatial, developers of the ACIS kernel was 
purchased in 2000, and in 2010 Dassault acquired IBM’s CATIA distribution operation for 
$600 M.   
4.7.3.2 SolidWorks 
Using proceeds from gambling, John Hirschtick founded SolidWorks, developing a low cost 
but highly effective 3D CAD program for Windows based PCs.  The software was aimed at 
SMEs, which generally still used 2D CAD.  Sales of the software grew rapidly, often at the 
expense of Pro/Engineer, and the company was bought by Dassault Systemes in 1997, 
although the software continues to use the Parasolid kernel, now owned by Siemens. 
 
Dassault Systems Financial Information for 2013 
Dassault Systems had a turnover in the financial year 2013 of €2 Billion. 
This was made up of 91% software products and 9% services with CATIA making up 39% of 
sales and SolidWorks 20%.   
The majority of revenue, 73%, comes from recurring software rather than new licences or 
product development although there were 19,500 new customers in the year.    
Operating Margin was 24% 
The total number of employees is 10,685 with almost 5,000 engineers in the Research & 
Development department.  Research & Development spend is more than 20% of revenue.  
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Revenue comes 27% from America, 40% from Europe, and 27% Asia 
60% of its turnover comes from direct sales of CAD software of which Euro 1.1 billion is 
from CATIA and 0.5 billion from Solidworks.252   
Turnover in 2010 was of 1.5B Euro with an operating income of 20% of revenue.253   
Dassault Systemes’ market share has been assessed at 25%254, although some have 
estimated the market share, depending on how the market is defined (whether CAD/CAM is 
seen as separate from PLM) as high as 40%255   
Source of information: Dassault Systems Annual Report 2013 unless otherwise stated
256
 
 
4.7.4 PTC 
The advance of lower cost 3D CAD software running on UNIX platforms commenced in 
earnest in 1985 when Samuel Giesberg started Parametric Technology Corporation to 
produce Pro/Engineer software.  Pro/Engineer was first shipped in 1987.  The company was 
profitable immediately and went public in 1989.  This 3D system was a game changer, 
markedly less expensive than existing mainframe systems, and it expanded quickly, 
acquiring Computervision in 1997.  Computervision had complementary design software 
and key accounts with Airbus, Rolls Royce Aircraft Engines, Fiat, PSA, GE & Raytheon.  It also 
acquired Windchill, a smaller company, and the Windchill PLM software is now a major 
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revenue stream for PTC.  PTC’s business now includes 3D CAD, renamed as Creo from 
Pro/Engineer, and PLM software.   
Despite its markedly aggressive marketing techniques, Pro/Engineer suffered from 
competition from even lower cost Windows based software, and today inhabits a place in 
the market somewhere between the high and mid-range offerings from the other suppliers.  
During the interviews with senior executives and experts in the industry it was apparent 
that Dassault Systems and Siemens were seen as direct competitors in the high 
end/specialists software market and PTC was seen as the third player.     
PTC Financial Information for 2013 
PTC had revenue of $1.2 Billion of which $334 million came from licencing and the 
remainder from service and support.  The CAD sector, CREO, amounted to $552M of 
income of which licences $150M, service $24M & support $378M    
Research and Development costs were $221 million.257   
PTC employees 6,000, including 2,000 in product development; 
Americas accounted for 40%, Europe for 37% and Asia-Pacific for 23% of revenue  
Most sales are made direct (70%) although 420 worldwide distributors account for 30% of 
sales.   
PTC is estimated to have 10 to 20% of the worldwide market for PLM and up to 10% of the 
PLM market in Europe.258  Its share in the engineering software market – CAD/CAM is 
probably higher.  
Source of information: PTC K-10 for 2013 unless otherwise stated.259  
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4.7.5 Autodesk 
The story of the last of today’s “Big Four”, Autodesk, is straightforward.  Autodesk 
developed its AutoCAD 2D package in 1985, specifically to run on PCs.  Through a 
combination of a sound product, relatively low cost, an effective distribution network and 
elimination of competition, it soon had a near monopoly of 2D software, a position it has 
kept until today.  Realising that 3D software was the wave of the future, Autodesk 
introduced its Inventor software in 1999.  Although Inventor was initially a poor offering it 
has grown rapidly, due to improvements over time and the leveraging of the AutoCAD 
customer base.   
Inventor is based on Spatial’s ACIS kernel, but when Dassault Systems acquired Spatial, 
Autodesk developed its own geometric modelling software, ShapeManager, which was 
developed from an earlier permanent license of the ACIS kernel.  Inventor mainly competes 
with SolidWorks and SolidEdge.     
Autodesk Financial Information 2013 
Autodesk has an annual income of $2.2 billion of which 65% comes from licences and 35% 
from maintenance contracts. 
Gross Profit of 88% and a net profit of 13% 
Research and development expenditures were $ 611.1 million or 27% of net revenue 
Income came from Americas ($819M) Europe, Middle East and Africa ($852M) and Asia 
Pacific ($603M) with 15% of income from emerging economies 
3D CAD system Inventor accounts for less than 25% of net revenue 
Products licences and services provided primarily through indirect channels consisting of 
distributors and resellers.   
Annual revenues in 2010 were $1.9 billion  
Source of information: Autodesk K-10 for 2013 unless otherwise stated 
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4.7.6 Smaller 3D CAD Suppliers 
3D CAD software provided by smaller companies is also available, including IronCAD, Think 
Design and Space Claim.  IronCAD has been in the market at a low level for many years and 
the software is unique in that it uses both the Dassault Systemes ACIS and the Siemens 
Parasolid kernels.  Space Claim was founded by Mike Payne, who was previously involved in 
the foundation of PTC and Solid Works.  It has recently been bought by ANSYS which 
specialises in FEA software which must be compatible with 3D CAD Software of the main 
suppliers including Dassault Systems, PTC and Siemens.  A recent development is the 
distribution through RS Components of a free cut down version of Space Claim, 
Designspark.  There is limited information available on Think Design, a French company 
marketing several versions of 3D software.  There is not much presence from open source 
software in the 3D CAD market.  There are some exceptions in ancillary software such as 
OpenFOAM that does computational flow dynamics.  Open source presently has a low 
market share and is not presently or in the foreseeable future a viable competitor to the 
four main suppliers.  
4.7.7 Financial and Competitive Position of Suppliers in 3D CAD market 
All the suppliers are enjoying continued growth with Dassault Systems growing over 6% per 
annum in the past 4 years.  Profit margins are healthy in the region of 10% to 20%.  The 
industry appears to be successful.    
Dassault Systems has the largest volume of sales in 3D CAD but PTC and Autodesk are of a 
similar size with turnovers between $1.2 and $2.2 billion.  The turnover of the Siemens PLM 
division is understood to be around $1.5 billion.  Income is global with Asia and developing 
countries contributing to the increased revenues. 
It appears that all the suppliers invest heavily in research and development spending in 
excess of 20% of net revenue on research and development.  The main cost is software 
engineers.  Dassault Systems say they have almost half their staff engaged in research and 
development.  This indicates that while the challenge of interoperability and lock-in exists 
the suppliers are still driven to compete by innovation.   
It is not possible to confirm by public information whether research and development is 
concentrated in the 3D CAD products or the wider PLM market.  Interviews with the 
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suppliers and industry commentators did not reveal any lack of complacency with 
innovation in 3D CAD.   
“Yes we put more money into [our 3D CAD software] today than we have ever 
done”…“we invest over 60% of our annual turnover R&D and we innovate faster 
than any other company in the world, even than Apple.  We are the tenth most 
innovate company in the world by the global bench mark.  That will not change.  
Regulation would not change that”260  
“Yes there is a huge amount of R&D going on and that is because the software has 
only just scratched the surface of what designers and engineers really do”
261
   
Dassault Systemes in particular seem philosophically attached to innovation with the 
introduction of new concepts, the latest being ‘3D Experience’.  There is certainly 
incremental development within the industry.  Despite the barriers to entry that are 
presented by a lack of interoperability, innovation also comes from the small number of 
new entrants.  The obvious examples of these are PTC in 1985 which developed new 
algorithms, Solidworks which made 3D CAD affordable for the masses and most recently 
SpaceClaim which produces 3D models using geometry rather than complete historical 
data.    
The suppliers have similar market share and until the acquisition of UGS by Siemens were 
corporations of similar size concentrating primarily on engineering software.   
Autodesk has the smallest market share in 3D CAD but has a very strong position in the 2D 
CAD market which makes it a serious contender for sales in the medium-range.   
PTC has about 20% of the market for 3D CAD.  While they can take market share from 
Siemens NX or CATIA they are increasing competing with mid-range software such as 
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Solidworks and Inventor which they acknowledge in their annual report is their main 
competition. 
Siemens NX has a maximum of 20% of the 3D CAD market in both high-end and mid-range.  
It can also leverage its controls and automation products to offer customers an integrated 
package of software and other production control equipment in the ‘digital factory’ where 
it has a larger market share up to 40%.  This has the potential for disrupting the market but 
this is not yet apparent.         
Dassault Systemes has between 25% and 40% of the market.  40% can be a threshold for 
considering companies to be dominant but other competitors’ share is not significantly 
lower or dispersed.262  A lack of interoperability is the main additional factor that is relevant 
to a determination of dominance as this reduces the effect of competition within the 
market and strengthens the legal barriers to entry to the market.  The lack of 
interoperability and the impact on the definition of the market and dominance is 
considered further in Chapter 5. 
The small number of competitors reflects the meaning of oligopoly ‘sale by a few sellers’.  
There is a similarity in volume of sales and market share.  The market certainly has the 
appearance of being oligopolistic
263
 but whether it exhibits the economic and competition 
law issues associated with an oligopolistic market will be explored fully in Chapter 5.     
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4.8 Structural Analysis of the 3D CAD Industry 
Having defined the market and its evolution to provide context for the proprietary, 
controlled and closed nature of the software a structural analysis will be carried out 
drawing on Michael Porter’s techniques for analysing industries and competitors. The focus 
on interoperability and legal regulation rather than a general competitive analysis is 
continued.     
For several decades the four key suppliers in the 3D CAD Industry were of similar size with a 
turnover in the region of US one billion by 2007.  As has been considered above there is 
some difference in the products and customers.  For example Autodesk’s background has 
been strong in 2D CAD while Dassault Systems has led in high end specialist software.  
There is a strong case that the 3D CAD industry comprises two markets, the high end 
specialist software and the rest.  The market is global with all companies selling across the 
world.   
Siemens purchase of UGS Corporation and its Unigraphics software in 2007 was a significant 
change in the nature of the suppliers.  Siemens has “deep pockets” and can also leverage its 
business in controls and automation to offer customers the so-called "digital factory" where 
it enjoys a market share of 30-40% in the EU and worldwide.264    
4.8.1 Threat of Entry 
The intangible nature of the software and its lack of interoperability are key features that 
influence the structure of the 3D CAD Industry.  The lack of interoperability makes buyers’ 
switching costs a very strong barrier to entry.265  Three of the main suppliers have been in 
the industry since its inception with only PTC entering directly later in 1987.  Since then 
there has been no serious change in the structure of the suppliers as Siemens chose to 
enter the market by acquisition.  There has however been some evolution mainly by the 
introduction of lower end 3D CAD Software such as Solidworks and Inventor.  While these 
are now owned by existing suppliers incremental improvements in technology and their 
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performance has seen them take market share from the high-end specialist software.  Small 
and medium sized customers buying 3D CAD for the first time will now chose one of the 
middle-range systems which reduce the potential for market growth for the high-end 
specialist software. 
While 3D CAD is intangible and can be easily delivered either by download or USB stick 
distribution channels still present a challenge when acquiring traction to enter markets.  
Dassault Systems overcame this with its successful relationship with IBM as its distributor.  
Interestingly the potential newcomer SpaceClaim has used RS Components to distribute a 
cut down version of its software.  They are looking to benefit from the RS Components 
market reach and expertise in distribution.  The majority of sales by Dassault Systems, 
Siemens PLM and PTC are now made direct, particularly to OEMs.  VARS and distributors 
are employed to service other customers. 
The most distinct cost disadvantage, independent of scale, that a potential entrant would 
incur is the existence of proprietary technology that is protected by intellectual property 
rights including copyright, patents and trade secrets.  All the suppliers state their policy and 
practice is to protect intellectual property in their annual reports266 and over one thousand 
patents have been registered by the four main suppliers to protect their software.267   
Copyright does not prevent a competitor writing its own code but the difficulty accessing 
the interface presents challenges for new market entrants.  If a market entrant overcame 
the problems of developing new 3D CAD software it would still be difficult to get customers 
to switch because of lock-in due to legacy issues, staff training and other switching costs.  
Access to interfaces is difficult because of the restrictions on reverse engineering in Article 6 
of the Software Directive.  This is discussed in more detail on Chapters 6 and 8.   
Patent protection prevents a market entrant using the innovation contained in the claims 
but these will be narrow and do not prevent the use of alternative technology.  Patents in 
interfaces will however prevent software interoperability making it difficult to supply 
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software that buyers can switch to.  Only when the interface is adopted as a standard is it 
possible to insist on a licence of the patent on FRAND terms.   
The present government policy in the EU is to restrict the ability to reverse engineer268 
which means software interfaces are protected not only by copyright and patents but by a 
statutorily supported trade secret regime.269     
4.8.2 Rivalry between firms 
Interviews with senior industry executives gave a picture of intense rivalry between the 
existing suppliers.270  However due to the problem of a lack of interoperability and 
switching costs there is less evidence of this affecting their respective market shares.    
One headline exception to this is the switch by Daimler AG from Dassault Systems CATIA to 
Siemens PLM’s NX announced in 2010.  The migration will take 5 years to complete and 
involve retraining 6,000 employees.  The reasons for the switch by Daimler include 
“compatibility issues between CAD and PDM software”.271   Daimler already uses a 
proprietary product database SMARAGD based on Siemen’s PLM’s Teamcenter which was 
incompatible with CATIA V6.  Dassault Systems is very reliant on sales of its CAD software 
which makes up 60% of its turnover.  It excels in pure Dassault environments but third party 
integration is a problem.  It is more challenging for them “to operate smoothly in 
heterogeneous IT environments, which almost always is the situation in larger 
corporations”.272   The migration of Daimler to Siemens NX will mean the supply chain 
manufacturers will need to change to Siemens NX and has already created an “NX package 
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for subcontractors” and created a multi-CAD data model in their product database 
SMARAGD with an interface that solves the format problems.273      
Daimler’s announcement could be an illustration of the theory that a move to 
interoperability can allow supplier to increase their market share.  However it is not certain 
that the move by Daimler to Siemens is about improved openness or even better 
compatibility.  Siemens may present itself as being more open, for example by making their 
JT standard an ISO standard,274 but this is only a small step away from the predominantly 
closed proprietary model.  Improved openness is an uncertain strategy and while openness 
can be important to gain market share275 the investment required and the uncertainty 
involved prevents any one of the four suppliers moving to an open and fully compatible 
business model.276  The compatibility might earn them more market share but they could 
destabilise the existing model in the industry.  It would be a dangerous gamble.   
Possibly they could also face retaliation, although as established market players it is difficult 
to see how retaliation could be effective and not self-harming.  The main danger of one 
supplier moving to a more open model is that others might be forced to follow which would 
damage the stability that has enabled them all to enjoy sustained growth and profitability.   
It is a common view in the industry and from interviews conducted that the 3D CAD 
suppliers are not interested in making their software more compatible.  “Few CAD vendors 
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are interested in solving these CAD interoperability issues”277   “Leaving interoperability to 
the primary CAD vendor would be like asking turkeys to organize a Thanksgiving dinner.”278  
4.8.3 Pressure from Substitute Products 
Manufacturing industry has no substitute product for 3D CAD software.  There is no other 
software that can perform the function of creating models to enable manufacturing 
industry to design new products and give instructions to the shop floor efficiently and to 
support the life of the product and keep a record of proprietary data. 
 “Most software or most IT is critical non-core to the customer’s business.  When we talk 
about PLM it is critical, core to their business.  Their business processes are completely 
based on what we provide.  That is quite unique in the IT industry.”279   
In addition to the strong element of customer lock-in due to legacy issues and high 
switching costs, the 3D CAD industry is marked by the lack of substitute products that can 
perform the same function, particularly for manufacturing industry. 
Rivalry from substitute products does exist to some extent however.  Competition for high- 
end specialist software comes from the improved performance of cheaper middle-range 
software which is taking market from the high-end/specialist software.  As software such as 
SolidWorks and Inventor improve their performance some customers who do not have 
specialist requirements will move from CATIA or NX.  It is also the case that new customers 
such as start-ups and companies in the developing world will increasingly find their needs 
are met by the middle-range software as the performance of that type of software 
improves.     
Another change the 3D CAD industry is starting to experience is the move to Software as a 
Service (SAAS) with a subscription pay as you go package which can include services and 
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storage on the cloud.  Interviews revealed that this was being considered by the suppliers 
as an alternative business model.280 
Dassault Systems, Siemens, and PTC experience more competition in other areas of their 
business such as the wider PLM software but the competition still comes from alternative 
software rather than substitute products.     
4.8.4 Bargaining Power of Buyers  
Customers for 3D CAD software cover the full range of manufacturing industry.  They have 
different needs and bargaining positions.  The major OEMS281 in the Aerospace and 
Automotive industries are larger organisations than most of the 3D CAD suppliers and have 
significant bargaining power.  Not only do they purchase high volumes of software but also 
impose the same software on their supply chain.   
“Interestingly the higher up you go in the supply chain towards an OEM the more 
reliant they are to a single platform……the closer you are to the OEM the more likely 
you are to be standardised on a platform”282 
If the OEMS and other major customers do not insist on interoperability the 3D CAD 
suppliers will not do anything voluntarily.  The OEM’s could specify openness as part of a 
Request for Tender to change software applications or systems but they are more 
concerned with integrity of data and keeping costs down, not only of the software but also 
in the entire supply chain.283   This contrasts with the practice in other industries 
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particularly where the customer is a public authority when openness and open standards 
are an important requirement in any Request for Tender.  
The OEM’s choice of software can influence the entire supply chain.         
“As you move away from the OEM to the tier one, tier two, tier three suppliers, they 
will use the platform of choice of the OEM.  So firms lower down in the supply chain 
and in the indirect sales channel may have a Siemens platform and a Dassault 
Systems platform because that is what they provide to the OEMs.”284     
Daimler’s move from CATIA to Siemens NX will mean the change of 6,000 CAD licenses at 
Daimler.  The German automotive industry is seen as one of the world’s most important 
market clusters for PLM software, including 3D CAD software.  If Daimler wants the supply 
chain to use NX rather than CATIA it will be a driver to further change.285   
The OEMs feed the software down the supply chain “..that is driven by the OEM.. .. this is 
very much driven by the OEMs”286 
The major OEM accounts have considerable bargaining power not only because of their 
own purchasing power but also because of their influence on the tier suppliers.  Because of 
their size and ‘deep pockets’ they have the ability to cope with a lack of interoperability. 
With the big customers, such as the OEMs, “the number one, absolute sacrosanct 
priority is total integrity of their data and the functions they think they have bought 
for their designers and engineers to use”… “the customer believes that if the vendor 
controls the entire environment they are responsible for it and must fix it….if the 
vendor controls the environment that side is a plus because of the data integrity”… 
OEMs and other large customers can control the suppliers in another way such as 
buying 80% of the software from one supplier but keeping 20% from another.  “That 
                                                     
284
 Interview with senior industry executive #3 (May 2014) 
 
285
 Verdi Ogewell ‘Inside Daimler Mercedes switch from Dassault Systemes to Siemens PLM and NX’ 
Engineering.com (8 April 2014) http://www.engineering.com/PLMERP/ArticleID/7438/Inside-Daimler-
Mercedes-Switch-from-Dassault-Systemes-to-Siemens-PLM-and-NX.aspx [accessed 11 October 2014] 
286 Interview with senior industry executive #3 (May 2014) 
103 
 
 
is common practice in the supply chain generally and all of the customers do have 
more than one system and they occasionally prove they can change despite the 
huge upheavals it potentially implies.” 287   
The interviewee acknowledged that large customers manage the risk with a commercial 
solution rather than a technical one such as open standards.  It was noted that these 
customers would have the money to handle the transition if they wanted to change 
supplier.  
 
Cyon Research’s 2009 Survey of Engineering Software Users identified some differences in 
users’ attitude to interoperability with certain respondents ranking interoperability higher 
than others.288  CATIA V4 users and shipbuilders gave a high priority to interoperability with 
former systems than did other sectors such as the Energy sector.   Respondents from firms 
with $200 to $300 million in revenue rank interoperability higher than do those from 
smaller or larger firms.  Other groups that ranked interoperability more highly are those 
who procure from VARs rather than local dealers, and those with no plans to reduce 
technology acquisition spending despite the recession.289  While there was some variation 
in ranking, overall users ranked interoperability as one of the three most important 
selection criteria, along with total cost of ownership and improving product quality.290  Of 
course this does not mean they achieve compatibility.  Interoperability is better in the wider 
PLM market than in the 3D CAD software.  We “have given up on CAD interoperability” but 
expect interoperability from PLM.291  
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Customers other than major OEMS, including 1st and 2nd tier suppliers, have far less 
bargaining power or choice of supplier.  They are faced with only two or three choices in 
either the high-end or middle-range software and that choice may be determined by their 
customers wanting them to use the same software system.  Some suppliers may have to 
support two or more software systems which not only duplicates software purchase but 
may require them to employ more engineers to ensure they have the requisite expertise.  
There are various sales structures depending on the customers’ size, software requirements 
and position in the supply chain.  The major OEM accounts are looked after directly by the 
suppliers.  Some of the other customers are serviced by Value Added Distributors (VARs) 
and other distribution channels.   
The 3D CAD suppliers are more concentrated than the industry it sells to.  They are 
oligopolistic and most of their customers are locked-in to the software due to high 
switching costs and legacy issues.  The software is critical, core to most customers.    
4.8.5 Bargaining Power of Suppliers  
The intangible nature of 3D CAD software means that the suppliers of 3D CAD do not have 
the cost of trading in physical goods.  There are upfront costs of R&D which require highly 
skilled software engineers, after that there are very low unit costs.  Aftersales services in 
the form of maintenance and upgrades provide an important income stream but again this 
is not reliant on trading physical goods.   
There are however certain essential inputs to developing and marketing 3D CAD which will 
be considered in this section and include: IPRs in the 3D CAD software; complementary CAE 
software - FEA and computational flow dynamics; and standards and translation software  
The four main 3D CAD companies:   Siemens PLM, Dassault Systemes, PTC and Autodesk all 
have proprietary software which is protected by copyright, patents, trade secrets and 
contractual restrictions.  They also use trademarks as part of their marketing strategy.292  
Most of the software has been designed in-house or acquired through acquisition of other 
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software companies.  One aspect of the software is however cross licensed - there are only 
two leading software kernels or underlying algorithms which are owned by two of the 
companies, Siemens and Dassault Systems and licensed to competitors, Parasolid293 and 
ACIS.294    The practice of licencing the kernels was established before Siemens and Dassault 
Systems acquired them and continues on “a level play field basis”295 to a large number of 
CAD companies, many of whom are not direct competitors.296  Any industry is somewhat 
mutually reliant and ending licensing the kernel could result negatively for Siemens or 
Dassault Systems, possibly with claims of abuse for failure to supply.  A significant reason 
though is that with few kernels available the licensing is almost certainly profitable.297   
Parasolid is the 3D solid geometric modeling component originally developed by Shape 
Data, and used as the foundation of Siemens PLM’s NX and Solid Edge products. Siemens 
licenses Parasolid to independent software vendors to develop Parasolid-based applications 
in the product design and analysis market space, for example Parasolid is used as the 
geometry kernel for Dassault Systemes’ SolidWorks software.  It is said that Solidworks has 
been trying to move from the Parasolid kernel owned by Siemens to the ACIS kernel owned 
by its parent company, Dassault Systems for several years but so far without success.298 
ACIS is the kernel developed by Spatial, which was acquired by Dassault Systemes in 2000.  
It is claimed it is no longer openly published.  A development of ACIS, Convergence 
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Geometric Modeler (CGM), said to be the industry’s first commercial 3D geometry kernel, is 
used as the basis of CATIA V5 and V6.  Autodesk’s Inventor 3D CAD software uses Shape 
Manager, a kernel derived from ACIS.   
4.9 Complementary Software 
3D CAD suppliers have a complex relationship with suppliers of complementary software.  
While lack of interoperability can lock-in customers it can affect sales when customers want 
to use complementary software, particularly software they already use and in which their 
data is stored.  The lack of compatibility between CATIA and Daimler’s PLM software is cited 
as a reason for change. 
There are also various third party engineering software that is used to test and evaluate 
models created in 3D CAD, such as FEA which is a form of CAE.  For example, Siemens offers 
NX NASTRAN FEA software, which will operate with other 3D CAD programs, but requires 
the user to output a STEP or IGES file from the CAD for input into NX NASTRAN.  While 3D 
CAD suppliers have an interest in disclosing information to some of these companies so that 
the software can interoperate, conflict can arise when the 3D CAD supplier has its own 
proprietary CAE software.  ANSYS was formerly tightly integrated with Inventor, but this is 
no longer the case since Inventor included some FEA capability.  
ANSYS is the largest supplier of CAE that is not a major supplier of 3D CAD.  It has however 
recently bought SpaceClaim which is a specialist form of 3D CAD that works on geometry 
alone and does not use the historical data on the models.  It works as a form of interface 
taking the geometry data which is needed to carry out FEA but leaving the other data which 
only slows the process down.  SpaceClaim was created by engineers who were also involved 
in the founding of PTC and SolidWorks.  It appears to work with all 3D CAD software 
systems and for that reason is used as an interface to extract data for analysis.  It is unclear 
how this interoperability has been achieved although at least one interviewee considered 
reverse engineering was the most likely method.299   
Some commentators consider SpaceClaim could change the flow of engineering design 
bringing simulation right to the front of the whole process.  SpaceClaim allows for the 
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metaphorical sketch on the back of the envelope type model allowing for simulation to 
start with the simplest form of model.  This information can then be used from the 
beginning of the design.  Up till now it has been necessary to make a more detailed design 
before it can be analysed.   
SpaceClaim is particularly useful to suppliers of ancillary software such as ANSYS CAE as 
their software is sometimes unable to operate with the latest releases of CAD software.  3D 
CAD suppliers usually issue an annual upgrade.  This is made available to ancillary software 
suppliers at the time it is available to their customers and not before.  This means there is a 
time lag, often of several months during which the two software systems will not work 
together.  ANSYS and other ancillary software suppliers have to study the upgraded 
software to identify what is different and then work to ensure compatibility.300  Only then 
will the two software products work together again.  When native to native translation does 
not work SpaceClaim may provide an interim solution.      
D-Cubed is part of Siemens but sells Constraint Management Software (CMS) to other 3D 
CAD suppliers.  It provides documented information on the interfaces to allow the D-Cubed 
software to work with different 3D CAD software.  Customers are mainly the 3D CAD 
suppliers who will sell a software package of 3D CAD incorporating CMS software.  Here the 
interoperability is essential to sell the CMS and driven by commercial pressures.  The 
software function is more limited than the 3D CAD software but the interfaces need to be 
generic enough to work with the different kernels.  Documenting the interfaces takes time 
but it is “not what they spend most of their time doing.”301  
4.10 Standards and Translation Software 
Interoperability can be achieved by the 3D CAD suppliers’ own proprietary software, a 
standard such as STEP or by third party translation software.  Using a standard such as IGES 
or STEP has severe limitations as information and features are lost in translation.  Standards 
such as STEP and IGES transfer most, if not all, of the data on the model.  Most of the time 
this level of data is required and it is only for certain functions that the geometry solution 
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provided by SpaceClaim is appropriate.  The role of standards in the industry is considered 
further in Chapter 7. 
 The translation software can often do a better job than standards.  The lack of 
interoperability in the 3D CAD market has generated a small industry with companies 
whose main purpose is to supply software to enable one brand of 3D CAD software to 
translate to another form, for example Transmagic, Elysium and Theorem. 
The market for software providing interoperability solutions for 3D CAD software was 
estimated in 2007 to be $300 million to $500 million in annual revenues.302  However it can 
be appreciated that relying on translation software to ensure that the organisation’s design 
data is not rendered partly or wholly useless may represent a significant gamble.303  Some 
examples of suppliers of translation software are given below:  
TransMagic, based in Colorado, USA, was founded in 2001 to supply software for CAD 
incompatibility and 3D multi-CAD data exchange problems.  The software offers native and 
neutral 3D CAD translation and product data interoperability.  It combines 3D CAD 
translation, geometry repair, 3D model viewing and collaboration technologies to create a 
unique line of 3D CAD interoperability tools.  They claim strategic partnership with Dassault 
Systemes, Autodesk, and Siemens PLM304  
Elysium Inc develops interoperability software for 3D CAD and PLM.  It was founded in 1984 
with headquarters in Hamamatsu, Japan with 95 employees and offices in USA and Europe 
and an international network of partners and distributors.  The company claims to have 
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long-term strategic relationships with major CAD vendors such as Siemens, Dassault 
Systemes, PTC and Autodesk.305 
Spatial, owned by Dassault Systemes, has an interoperability product - 3D InterOp Spatial 
which imports from ACIS, CGM and Parasolid but its claims for export are more limited, 
mainly to CATIA V5 and V6 and standards such as STEP.  It appears to not export to 
competing software such as Siemens’ NX, Pro/E or Inventor among others 
Suppliers of complementary software and translation software are clearly finding ways to 
interface with the 3D CAD software.  How this is done in less clear.  The interviewees were 
unsure whether reverse engineering was used but considered it possible.306  Theorem 
Solutions, a UK based translator, relies on its relationship with the 3D CAD suppliers to use 
APIs provide by and supported and maintained by the suppliers to convert native data and 
to use visualisation formats.  By using APIs supported by the suppliers they avoid spending 
time in reverse engineering when new revisions or new version of applications come out.  
This avoids the time delay as Theorem can keep pace with change quickly and efficiently for 
their customers.307  The advantage of translators which are third party specialists is that 
they are driven to solve market needs unlike the 3D CAD suppliers which want to maintain 
or capture market share for their CAD product.
308
   
Standards and translators introduce an element of openness to the industry.  They enable 
customers to mitigate the effects of lock-in.  They also enable customers to retrieve their 
proprietary data and to store it securely in a neutral format.   
It appears the 3D CAD suppliers licence their APIs to suppliers of certain complementary 
software.  It has not been possible to establish how widespread this practice is and on what 
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criteria the 3D CAD suppliers determine to whom they will licence the APIs.  None of the 
interviewees knew definite information but it appears from the interviews that some 
software developers have to rely on reverse engineering which puts them at a 
disadvantage.  The 3D CAD suppliers release new software each year and it can take several 
months before the complementary software is modified to work properly with the new 
version.309  While the 3D CAD suppliers are making interfaces available they are still very 
much in control and determine who has access to this information.   
4.11  Synopsis of Industry Interviews 
The interviews corroborated many of the findings on the industry set out in this Chapter.  
Some of these findings have already been commented on in the text where relevant but the 
following is a concluding synopsis.  It uses example questions from the interviews.     
Is lack of interoperability in 3D CAD Software a problem for manufacturing industry? 
The interviews confirmed that lack of interoperability was a serious problem for the 
industry.  It increased costs and created legacy issues.310  It was thought however, that 
particularly for the OEMs, the issue of compatibility had to be traded against the need to 
ensure integrity of the data as 3D CAD is critical core to their business.311       
Are customers locked in to a particular 3D CAD System?   
There was little doubt that customers were locked in to suppliers due to a lack of 
interoperability.  The suppliers claimed this mattered less to the OEMs who valued the 
integrity of their data and the competitive edge given by enhanced features.312   Tier one, 
two and three suppliers were more disadvantaged particularly as the software system was 
dictated to them not only by lock-in to the Supplier but also by the OEM.   
Are there market forces/customer demand driving interoperability and avoiding lock-in?  
There is some evidence of customer demand influencing decision.  One example is Siemens’ 
JT standard adopted as the world’s first International Standard for viewing and sharing 
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lightweight 3D product information.313  Siemens allowed this to be adopted as an ISO due 
to customer demand to protect legacy data.314  Siemens was generally considered more 
open with one interviewee commenting that they would “see Siemens as a clear leader 
among the big players as having structure within which to put software that supports open 
standards and a kind of commitment to doing that.”315  It was “harder to point to other 
major players and really say yes at a software level they are sharing components.”  Siemens 
appears to recognise that openness brought benefits to their business, for example 
“Siemens has been very public in stating that they support open standards in order to 
support [D Cubed].  And I suppose they have done the same with JT in the format they use 
for moving data around between systems.”316  The openness appears pragmatic however in 
response to particular narrow needs rather than a broader philosophical approach. Another 
supplier perceived compatibility as allowing data to be ingested into their platform and 
considered the Apple model to be open.317  Also that by making their software read 
competitor’s products they encourage customers to stay with them while also using 
complementary software.  There is less incentive to open their products and make them 
easier to read with competitor’s applications. 
Examples of openness are distinguished by their rarity and go against the normal pattern of 
a closed proprietary software system.  The industry has a long way to go to achieve open 
compatibility.  There is little evidence of market forces and the lower tier suppliers are 
divided and unable to exert pressure.     
Why is interoperability in 3D CAD a technical challenge and why does STEP or another 
standard not provide a solution? 
The technical complexity of the software was seen as the main reason the STEP standard 
gives only limited interoperability.  The desire of the suppliers to bend the standard to be 
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closest to their proprietary capability was recognised but generally averted as STEP is driven 
by an industry consortium.318 
Suppliers of complementary and ancillary software were confident they could distinguish 
and document their interfaces.  It is essential for these companies that interfaces are 
available to interoperate with the 3D CAD software and they are highly focused on this.  
Even for these people though the ambiguity as to what constitutes an interface existed with 
comments such as “The software is basically interfaces.”319    
The knowledge of the law was varied with one supplier being aware of clean room 
procedures but most of the interviewees being surprised that decompilation was 
permitted.   
Should interface information obtained by decompilation be disclosed and shared? 
The response to proposals that interfaces should be disclosed either by compulsion or 
sharing of reverse engineered was mixed.  Most spoke positively of balancing the disclosure 
of interface information while protecting the kernel.  One common view heard during all 
interviews is that the kernel of the software programs is sacrosanct and would not be open 
“the kernel that is something we would never, we would never go to that level.  That is 
literally too far the other way.”320  The same interviewee was more relaxed about interfaces 
and did not have a fundamental problem with the sharing of interface information.  This 
dichotomy was reflected in all interviews.  This unconsciously reflects the position that 
interfaces are different to the main computer program.  The interviewees may not be 
consciously considering the issues of indirect function or control of interoperability but they 
all perceive the interface as subject to a different optimal balance and of less intrinsic value.   
The strongest criticism was the fear it could rise to competing standards.321  Whether this 
potential confusion and inefficiency would arise and whether it would justify suppressed of 
information is beyond the scope of this research but is considered in recommendations for 
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further research.  Data from the interviews will be referred to in the doctrinal analysis in 
the next Chapters 5 to 7 and will be further evaluated when considering recommendations 
in Chapter 8.    
Unfortunately it seems that key customers such as the major OEMs do not drive the 
pressure to more openness.322  This contrasts with industries who sell to government 
authorities and bodies where interoperability and open standards are a requirement of the 
tender.323  The tier suppliers maybe required by the OEMs to use the software but are too 
dispersed to have bargaining power.  The forecast is that while there may be pockets of 
openness this will remain under the control of the 3D CAD suppliers and this will not change 
for the foreseeable future.324  
4.12 Summary 
The 3D CAD industry was selected as relevant to the social phenomenon of interoperability 
and is relevant to the research question posed.325  Interoperability has been identified as an 
issue326 but there has not been an in-depth study looking at the problem from the 
perspective of the legal framework.327   
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The 3D CAD industry is doing very nicely.  The suppliers are profitable and expanding.  The 
business they work closely with, namely the OEMs and suppliers of complementary 
software such as FEA and translators also appear to benefit.  There are occasional 
disruptions to the status quo and some of them are significant including Daimler’s change 
of supplier, Airbus €6 billion losses328 and the appearance into the industry from nowhere 
of PTC and Solidworks.  The fact they are significant but have not yet disrupted the model 
of incompatible software systems is all the more remarkable.  There appears to be little 
effective market pressure on the suppliers to improve interoperability.   
3D CAD is highly complex software.  It is not just an operating system, a platform to allow 
Apps to run but is a modular system that performs a highly sophisticated function.  It is 
designed to enable users to create, edit, use and store what, for many users, is their most 
valuable data.  While users would like their software to be compatible, integrity of data is 
vital, not least for the OEMs whose investment in current production and future models is 
entirely dependent on the software.  The software’s highly functional nature, it’s critical, 
core role in the users business, and that it stores the users’ own proprietary data, means 
that any disruptive change to the 3D CAD industry could be harmful to the users as well as 
the competing suppliers.  Any amendments to the legal regime must take account of the 
users’ needs, not just as consumers wanting competitive pricing but also to protect the 
existence and use of their own proprietary data.   
On the face of it innovation appears to be thriving with the suppliers continuing to invest in 
R&D.  The software can be developed further but whether this would have happened faster 
if compatible systems were subject to more competition is a counter-factual.  The suppliers 
have though produced something of great value to society.  Relying on breakthrough 
innovation could result in the waste of some past investment and innovation, as well as 
disruption to users, while follow on innovation could be more efficient and beneficial.     
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The importance of the user’s proprietary data and the impact users’ pressure can achieve is 
illustrated by the insistence that Siemens’ JT data format is adopted as an ISO standard.  
The JT standard is now suitable for legacy storage as the data format will be maintained 
which was not assured if it remained proprietary.  Users now have a standard interface and 
improved data integrity.  Without that pressure though the four suppliers’ professed 
approach to openness is to make their own software able to ‘ingest’ data from other 
suppliers’ systems.  They want to make their own software able to read competitor’s 
products to encourage customer to stay with them.   
The suppliers are far less interested in making their interfaces available to allow their 
products to work on a competitor’s platform.  Interfaces, APIs and data formats, are though 
available and provided to translators and other complementary software suppliers.  D-
Cubed, although not a 3D CAD system, is still complex software, and it manages to make 
interfaces available to ensure its software can work with all the different CAD systems.  On 
the face of it the 3D CAD suppliers have interfaces available that if they were mandated to 
make available could improve interoperability.  While this appears attractive there are 
several shortcomings.  The 3D CAD industry is established and easily identifiable but the 
impact and practicalities of mandating disclosure of interfaces for all software are unknown 
and challenging.  Even within the 3D CAD industry, while the definition of APIs remains with 
the suppliers, there is uncertainty as to whether those APIs will give the optimum or even 
adequate interoperability.  The problems associated with defining and enforcing mandatory 
disclosure will be discussed further in Chapter 8, but even if these were overcome, because 
of the complexity of 3D CAD software it is not certain whether it is technically possible for 
all four systems to achieve full functional compatibility.  Interviewees do however consider 
that more interoperability can be achieved.  The next Chapters will look in more detail at 
the legal regime before discussing recommendations to achieve a greater degree of 
openness 
.                
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CHAPTER 5. COMPETITION LAW 
5.1 Introduction 
Competition law is a tool that can regulate market economies to increase allocative 
efficiency and innovation.  Competition law is in conflict with IPRs, for while they both have 
the goals of encouraging innovation IPRs do this by giving limited exclusivity which is 
antipathetic to competition law.  To give an optimum outcome a balance must be struck.  
Chapter 3 introduced the role of competition law in regulating software industries in the 
new economy and the challenge of determining when intervention is beneficial.  In this 
Chapter the role of competition law in regulating interfaces will be explored to evaluate 
whether it can provide an effective remedy in an oligopolistic market.  
Competition law is justified by economic theories and the theoretical background will be 
explored at the start of the Chapter.  This will underpin evaluation in this and subsequent 
Chapters as to whether regulation and intervention is justified and beneficial.  Contributing 
to that evaluation is a normative evaluation of ex post intervention by competition law as 
opposed to ex ante regulation depending on whether the circumstances are structural and 
foreseeable.329   
This is followed by an overview of the development and main features of the exceptional 
circumstances test, particularly the new product test that is required where intellectual 
property rights are involved.  An analysis of the Microsoft case will consider its legal and 
practical implications and its legacy, particularly on the handling of merger cases where 
interoperability was a material concern for post-merger competition.  
The 3D CAD industry is oligopolistic and characterised by supplier lock-in, and the impact of 
these features on the effectiveness of competition law will be considered.  This starts with 
an assessment of the impact of interoperability and market and supplier lock-in  on the 
definition of  the relevant market.  This is followed by an analysis of the challenges posed to 
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competition law enforcement by oligopolies, in the absence of regulation aimed at 
oligopolies and in the context of failure to provide interface information.  
In conclusion it will be noted that the most effective competition law remedy to encourage 
interoperability is in merger cases.  In those instances the remedy is effectively ex ante, 
providing both flexibility and legal certainty.  Microsoft is the cause of this apparent success 
as the Commission realised the importance of interoperability to innovation.  It also sent a 
message that dominant undertakings could be made to disclose interface information. 
However in the absence of co-ordination, because of the complexity of the tests that need 
to be met, it is very doubtful that it will extend to refusal to supply interface information to 
alleviate a lack of interoperability and lock-in in an oligopolistic market.   
5.2 Theoretical background to the Current Problem of ‘Interfering with’ IPRs  
This Chapter considers the phenomena of interoperability in an oligopolistic industry in a 
market economy where resources are allocated predominantly by supply and demand in 
free markets rather than directed by government regulation and intervention.  To improve 
the evaluation of the impact that a lack of interoperability can have on the competitive 
process, the development of the economic theories underpinning competition law have 
been reviewed. 
The rationale underpinning market economies is that they give allocative efficiency as 
goods are produced in the quantities valued by society.  In a perfectly competitive market 
production is expanded to the point where market price and marginal cost330 coincide and 
everyone who is willing and able to purchase at the cost of production will do so.  The 
market is in equilibrium and in a state of ‘Pareto optimal’ as no one can be better off 
without someone being made worse off. 331  Other optimal efficiencies are productive 
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efficiency – downward pressure on costs which are passed on to the consumer, and 
dynamic efficiencies – the delivery of innovation and technical progress.332   
Perfect competition is a theoretical model, where there are a large number of buyers and 
sellers of homogeneous products, with no barriers to entry and all with perfect information.  
Each seller is insignificant and ‘price-takers’ not ‘price-makers’.  In reality ‘workable’ 
competition is the best that can be expected.  Oligopolies, in which a  few leading firms 
know each other’s identity and recognise they are mutually affected by output and pricing 
decisions are typified by markets which may have  allocative and productive 
inefficiencies.
333
  The persistent quandary is whether by intervening, the state can improve 
allocative and productive efficiency.  An additional dimension is the extent to which the 
state should take back that which it has granted by way of IPRs.  While IPRs are intangible, 
state generated property, reducing the IPR holder’s rights may also harm the incentive to 
innovate and hence damage dynamic efficiency.  With interfaces there is yet another issue 
as they are generally of low innovative value but as de facto standards can give 
disproportionate control over access to proprietary software and even networks.334                   
An influential approach to the challenge of achieving optimum control by competition law 
comes from the economic analysis of law, in which economic concepts are used to explain 
the effects of laws and to assess the economic efficiency of legal rules.  Leading proponents 
of this field are Ronald Coase,335 Frank Easterbrook336 and Richard Posner.337  Concepts that 
have common currency in assessing the economic efficiency of legal rules include Pareto 
efficiency and game theory.  The increase in importance of economics in competition law is 
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marked with adoption of the effects based approach in the modernisation of Article101 and 
102 as well as merger control.  This new approach was seen in Microsoft, although 
Microsoft failed to fully develop the efficiency argument.  
Precursors to the economic analysis of law were the Progressives and American Realists.  
The Progressive school of thought in the USA at the fin de siècle believed that while the rise 
of corporations was socially and economically beneficial to the economy, opportunities for 
abuse of that power clearly existed.  Progressives such as Richard Ely and John Commons 
believed the government should regulate in areas of potential abuse.  They were 
particularly in favour of regulation of oligopolistic industries and antitrust enforcement 
more generally.338   Progressives believed in the existence of rational bases for ethical and 
political values and that these could be rationally justified, but believed that law and public 
policy were inseparable and hence justified the need for intervention.  The American Legal 
Realists built on this case for a regulatory state, but were more sceptical about the rational 
foundations of legal, moral, and political values.339  The most “important common 
denominator between the two political-intellectual movements was said to be their attack 
on legal orthodoxy, the crucial characteristic of which was an understanding of law as 
politically neutral.”
340
 
According to the American Legal Realists, the free market was a system of coercive power, 
and the legal system and the market were interdependent.  Effective policy decisions 
concerning resource allocation required analysis of how the legal system itself distributes 
coercive power.  Robert Hale considered property rights not to be defensive - a means to 
protect oneself from unwanted interferences from others or the state, but offensive - the 
basis for coercing others to do something that the owner wishes.341  Taking this further it 
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was thought that a government which limits the right of large land-holders limits the rights 
of property and yet may promote real freedom.  Property owners, like individuals, are 
members of a community and must subordinate their ambition to the larger whole of which 
they are a part.342  This notion that private property rights are nothing more or less than 
state-sanctioned coercion was echoed by the Scandinavian Realists who, though less 
concerned than the American Realists with the notion of property,343 considered ownership 
to amount to a state guarantee to certain protection in possession, and that in the typical 
lawsuit over possession both sides believe they are lawfully entitled to possession.  
Ultimately the legal idea of a property right is reliant only on legal machinery and has no 
basis in reality and therefore can only have a metaphysical basis.344 This idea is epitomised 
in IPRs which are intangible and  legal constructs.   
The Sherman Act 1890 is described as the first modern system of competition law.  Its 
introduction was a protectionist measure in response to farmers, small businesses and 
those wanting to stop the transfer of wealth from consumers to big business.345  It was not 
until the 1950s and the emergence of the Chicago School did the theories of allocative 
efficiency come to dominate the economics and law of competition.  Between the 
introduction of the Sherman Act and the Chicago School, and against the backdrop of an 
industrial revolution, the Depression and the New Deal, came the Harvard School’s 
paradigm that the structure of the market determines the firm’s conduct and market 
performance.  Barriers to entry were thought to be widespread while economies of scale 
were not valued and monopoly pricing, associated with oligopolies, were thought to occur 
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at relatively low levels of concentration.  This resulted in an interventionist antitrust 
enforcement policy in the USA.346  
The Chicago School criticised the Harvard’s School’s empirical study and from the 1950s 
introduced its own theoretical model of economic efficiency as the exclusive goal of 
antitrust.  The Chicago School’s adherents thought that most markets are competitive even 
with a small number of sellers.  They considered ‘natural’ barriers to entry more imagined 
than real, and economies of scale pervasive.  Monopolies will tend to be self-correcting and 
antitrust enforcement should be tolerant of efficient behaviour and be less 
interventionist.
347
 For the Chicago School efficiency is the sole purpose of competition law.  
Policies such as distributive goals should be the subject of other laws rather than 
competition law.348   The Chicago School has been criticised, among other reasons, for its 
belief that barriers to entry are rare, and that their market efficiency model is too simple to 
account for or predict business behaviour in the real world.349    
Game theory has influenced the approach to oligopolies as part of the ‘new industrial 
economics’ or ‘post-Chicago approach’.  Whereas traditional models such as Cournot’s 
model examine oligopolies in a static manner, game theory looks at the behaviour of the 
undertakings rather than concentrating on the static structure.350  It is based on infinitely or 
finitely repeated interactions, and models strategic interactions between firms including 
their cooperation and conduct.  It recognises that the interdependence and the risk of 
mutual retaliation can encourage tacit cooperation to joint profit maximisation.351    
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Meanwhile in Europe the Austrian School embraced free markets beyond the theories 
promoted by Schumpeter, with a belief that markets could prevent long-run exploitation of 
monopoly power.  The Austrian School opposed intervention in the competitive process 
including against cartels.  By contrast Ordoliberals considered that the law could create and 
protect the conditions of competition.  As well as efficiency they had notions of fairness and 
considered small and medium sized enterprises to be important to consumer welfare and 
worth protecting against excessive market power.  The Ordoliberals had some influence on 
the development of Article 102 TFEU but the modernisation of Article 102 with the 
adoption of the effects based approach to Article 102 has moved away from the Ordoliberal 
stance to one that places the most importance on efficient allocation of resources and 
dynamic competition.  The interests of the consumer are important but not the competitor, 
indeed the courts will examine claims put forward by dominant undertakings that their 
conduct is justified on efficiency grounds.     
5.3 Application of Theories to IPRs 
Against this backdrop of seemingly contrary theories the tools of competition law and IPRs 
need to be balanced to achieve the mutual aim of encouraging innovation.  In Chapter 3 the 
debate on reconciling the conflict was introduced and the important case of Microsoft has 
been the focus for commentators in the debate on whether competition law should dictate 
licensing of IPRs.  The anti-interventionists appear to be in the majority, particularly in the 
USA.  Devlin, Jacobs and Peixoto are an example of writers favouring the free market 
approach that has its origins in the Chicago School.352  They argue in favour of breakthrough 
innovation for network markets referring to Katz & Shapiro and Liebowitz & Margolis.  Their 
analysis of lock-in is limited to market lock-in and they do not consider the situation where 
customers are locked-in due to switching costs.  They do however recognise that there 
could still be room for competition law remedies in the new economies when the 
Schumpeterian process of creative destruction is thwarted.  This could occur when lack of 
interoperability is used to foreclose the means of access.  They consider this may have 
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occurred in United States v Microsoft353 where Microsoft blocked Netscape Navigator’s and 
Sun Microsystems’ bids to gain market access thus threatening Microsoft’s position in the 
operating systems market.  Even in that case they point out that Microsoft did “not violate 
the antitrust laws simply by developing a product that is incompatible with those of its 
rivals”.354  The difference is between “interoperability as a remedy to antitrust violation and 
exclusivity as an antitrust offence in itself.”355   Devlin et al say that Europe should take note 
of this.  However Microsoft’s practice of using interoperability information to gain market 
share and then to withhold it from competitors has similarities with both the US Microsoft 
case and also with Aspen where the unilateral termination of a voluntary course of dealings 
suggested a willingness to forsake short-term gains to achieve an anticompetitive end.356 
      
There are some commentators, who while recognising the need to incentivise innovation, 
do not yet accept that the case is closed.357  Simon Genevez argues that IPRs as property 
rights should not be treated differently to other property and criticises giving quasi-
immunity to IPRs in exclusion cases advocating that it is not justified by dynamic efficiency 
arguments.358  He cites Ayers and Klemperer’s research that restrictions on patentees’ 
market power are efficient as the loss of incentives is negligible relative to the increase in 
social welfare.  This is however industry dependant and is also dependent on the degree of 
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price elasticity.359  Genevez refers to a study conducted by Scherer at Harvard in 1977 which 
showed that compulsory licensing did not discourage innovation.360  However explanations 
again were industry specific and industries with an innate high level of R&D or where 
substitutes were the norm were not deterred from innovating by compulsory licencing.  
Genevez argues that while the judgement in Trinko did not confirm the essential facility 
doctrine, it did not rule out judicial control where IPRs protection was abused.361  Provided 
the door is left open Genevez considers the rule of reason can be used to prevent actions 
taken solely to foreclose markets while preserving the incentive to innovate.         
In this complex landscape the Commission and the European Courts, and their counterparts 
in the USA, had to develop an approach to ex post regulation of interface information.  
Review by competition law on an ex post basis should have the advantage that it can give 
consideration on a more flexible case-by-case basis.  Theoretically this review should be 
better placed to determine the correct balance between openness or control of interface 
specifications and which is more likely to advance innovation.  An ex post review in this 
manner can however result in uncertainty which in itself is damaging to investment and 
innovation.  The uncertainty can be ameliorated by the Courts adopting a predictable, but 
possibly rigid analytical framework but at the expense of flexibility.  This is contrasted with 
the ex ante regulation of intellectual property law which grants exclusivity with exceptions 
and is more rigid.  There is the danger of striking a suboptimal balance between control and 
openness and static and dynamic efficiency.362  
One analysis of the tension between competition law and IPRs has proposed that the 
balance of regulation by ex ante legislation or ex post competition law intervention is 
                                                     
359
 Ian Ayres and Paul Klemperer, ‘Limiting Patentees' Market Power Without Reducing Innovation Incentives: 
The Perverse Benefits of Uncertainty and Non-Injunctive Remedies’ (1999) 97 Michigan Law Review 985 
360
 Frederic M Scherer, The Economic Effects of Compulsory Patent Licensing ( New York University 1977)  
361
 Verizon Communications Inc v Trinko LLP 124 S.Ct. 872 
362
 Ashwin van Rooijen, The Software Interface between Copyright and Competition Law (Kluwer Law 
International 2010) 197 
125 
 
 
determined by a parameter of structural foreseeability.363  Circumstances that are 
considered structural and foreseeable are best addressed by ex ante legislation, for 
example by IPRs or exceptions.  It is only where for some reason circumstances that might 
have been foreseeable were not anticipated on a particular occasion that competition law 
should step in on a one off basis.  The legislation should be amended as similar cases should 
now be foreseeable.  Only unforeseeable or non structural circumstances are best dealt 
with by competition intervention, and this should be in exceptional circumstances where 
the balance of static and dynamic efficiency is less than optimal and is not structural and 
cannot be foreseen.364  Arguably the use of competition law to intervene in the disclosure 
of interface information is a case which has been foreseen by the reverse engineering 
provisions of the Software Directive.  Applying these parameters it could be said that the 
Microsoft case, where intervention corrected IPRs that were considered too broad, would 
signal either that intervention should not have happened or that the consequences were 
not fully foreseen and anticipated.  The courts must assess not only whether the suboptimal 
balance was anticipated by the relevant IPR but also what the ex post optimal balance 
should be.  It is said that the courts often neglected the first element and the second is an 
economic evaluation.365 The Federal Circuit of the United States favours the per se rule 
where IPRs are nearly always lawful which means the second part of the analysis is 
overlooked.  The test of the European Courts is the exceptional circumstances test, which 
will be looked at in detail in the following section, incorporates a new product test which 
stands as a poor proxy for both parts of the analysis.366  IPRs protect certain aspects of 
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technology or expression and new product development can be foreseeable and 
anticipated.  
The application of the exceptional circumstances test to the refusal to supply IPRs is more 
concerned with structural ownership issues resulting from the ex ante allocation of rights 
rather than from behaviour which is patently abusive.  The structural and foreseeable 
nature of the problem indicates that an ex ante solution in the IPR regime is better than ex 
post competition law.  There have however been aggravating circumstances in some of the 
cases, including in Microsoft where interface information was originally disclosed before 
withdrawing it when the benefits of network effects had been achieved and were available 
to exploit on a more exclusive basis.    
5.4 Exceptional Circumstances Test 
Competition law recognises that IPRs are important in encouraging innovation which is 
beneficial to consumers but IPRs are not immune to control by competition law and in 
exceptional circumstances owners of IPRs have been ordered to grant compulsory licences 
to competitors.  The exceptional circumstances test is as a variant of the essential facilities 
doctrine which originated in US law367 where it was seen as an exception to the principle 
that a trader is free to decide who he should deal with.  The legal basis for the exceptional 
circumstances test in Europe is Article102 TFEU paragraphs (b) and (c).  The concept that 
refusal to supply amounts to an abuse which limits markets to the prejudice of customers 
and discrimination which might in the end eliminate competition from the relevant 
market.368  It is also said to be a development of the existence/exercise doctrine that was 
developed by the CJEU to avoid Article 345 TFEU preventing rules set by Member States 
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that prejudice the system of property ownership.369  The Commission has built on the 
exceptional circumstances test in its Guidance on Enforcement Priorities.370   
One of the earliest cases concerning refusal to supply an IPR was Volvo AB v Erik Veng (UK) 
Ltd which determined that refusal to licence IPRs by a dominant company was not an abuse 
per se.   Volvo held that refusal might amount to an abuse in certain circumstances, such as 
the arbitrary refusal to supply spare parts to repairers or fixing exorbitant prices.  The cases 
which developed the exceptional circumstances test, namely Magill371, IMS Health372 and 
Microsoft373 to some extent concerned the attempt by the dominant entity to exceed the 
scope that the IPR regime was intended to protect.
374
    IPRs are not identical for although 
they all aim to provide a form of limited exclusivity they have different types of subject 
matter and are subject to different defences and exceptions.375 Relatively weak IPRs 
allowed the use of a dominant position to leverage the position on, or block a secondary 
market.  In Magill the IPR was considered to be a subspecies of copyright, blocking the 
information rather than the expression.  In IMS Health the copyrights were combined with a 
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dominant industry standard which excluded competition.  In Microsoft the level of IPR 
protection is unclear and some of Microsoft’s IPRs may have originated from the public 
domain.376  
 These variations in the characteristics of IPRs are relevant to the way in which the 
exceptional circumstances test is applied.  Rather than seeing the test as an erosion of IPRs, 
it could be considered an ex post exception to IPRs comparable to existing ex ante 
exceptions such as the exception for interfaces under the Software Directive.  Ex post 
exceptions have the advantage of providing flexible, case-by-case scrutiny but this can 
reduce certainty.    
With the exception of Oscar Bronner,377 the cases decided using the exceptional 
circumstances test concern a refusal to licence material protected by copyright.   Oscar 
Bronner did not concern IPRs but the CJEU discussed the exceptional circumstances test and 
expanded on certain areas including the issue of indispensability. 
The most recent case to use the exceptional circumstances case was Microsoft, where the 
circumstances that may be considered exceptional are where the refusal: 
 Relates to a product or service indispensable to the exercise of a particular 
activity on a neighbouring market. 
 Is of a kind as to exclude any effective competition in that neighbouring market. 
 Prevents the appearance of a new product for which there is a potential 
consumer demand.378   
The new product test only applies where the exceptional circumstances involves IPRs.  In 
those cases the circumstances were arguably foreseeable and even anticipated.  This 
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indicates that the use of the exceptional circumstances test was correcting unsatisfactory 
shortcomings in the IPR regime and is not the optimum method for achieving 
interoperability.379   
The exceptional circumstance test only applies where one party is dominant.  The 3D CAD 
market is an oligopolistic market.380  It would therefore be necessary to establish collective 
dominance to secure a remedy under Article102.  As will be discussed later the 3D CAD 
market does not meet the criteria for collective dominance.  Nevertheless in order to 
analyse whether the exceptional circumstances test could apply to the 3D CAD industry the 
test, as formulated by case law and the Commission’s Guidance, this thesis has carried out 
an analysis.  The comments below summarise key aspects as well as highlighting uncertainty 
and inconsistencies: 
 Separate Upstream Market.  The separation between the upstream and 
downstream markets only needs to be potential or hypothetical.381 The creation of 
interfaces and their specifications could be seen as a separate market.382  The extent 
of IPR protection in interfaces will be considered in Chapter 6.  There is a trade in 
interface specifications separate from the interface itself, for example translator 
companies in the 3D CAD industry, and this will be considered further in Chapter 8.  
 Previous Trade in Input.  It is not necessary for the input to have been traded 
before, though this may be relevant in assessing whether the input is indispensable, 
the efficiency claim or even the risk to competition.  There may be cases where the 
interface information has been previously available but is then withdrawn or 
changed, as occurred in the Microsoft case but it is not essential for there to have 
been any discernible trade in interfaces.   
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 Indispensable.   There appears to be consensus that the input must be 
indispensable to competition in the downstream market.  What is less clear is the 
degree of evidence required to satisfy this test.   While the test has been developed, 
the decisions in the cases are deeply rooted in their findings of facts.  It has been 
said that Oscar Bronner drew back the limits of the test but arguably the facts of 
that case were not such as to satisfy the test of being indispensable.383   
 Elimination of Competition.   The General Court in Microsoft stated that the test 
should be whether the refusal is liable or likely to eliminate all effective 
competition.
384
  Article 102 is concerned more with proof of conduct that could 
possibly produce effects than proof of effects.385  This approach is continued in the 
Commission’s Guidance.386  Early cases including Commercial Solvents and Volvo 
looked at the exclusion of competition from the particular claimant, while in later 
cases both the Court and the Commission speak of the elimination of competition in 
the whole of the downstream market.  This could mean either that a dominant 
undertaking could avoid the abuse by licensing to a less efficient competitor,387 or 
that the dominant undertaking would be required to licence to all competitors and 
potential competitors in the downstream market.  This would be a development of 
the exceptional circumstances test, but might be appropriate in certain areas such 
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as the licensing of interface information to enable interoperability of software and 
platforms. 
 Consumer Harm/New Product.  Case law and the Commission’s Guidance identify 
consumer harm as the prevention of the development of new products.388 In 
Microsoft the Court noted that the requirement for a new product is found only in 
the case of the exercising of IPRs.389   The aim of allowing competition in the 
downstream market is to encourage follow on innovation rather than just to 
introduce price competition as this could prevent the owner making a return and 
harm future incentive to invest in innovation.  The aim appears to be to avoid 
consumers missing out on new or improved goods or services for which there is a 
potential consumer demand.  In Magill there was a new product.  IMS required that 
an undertaking requesting a license does not intend essentially to duplicate the 
goods or services already offered but intends to produce new ones not offered by 
the IPR owner for which there is a potential consumer demand.390    Microsoft 
lowered the bar, and required only technical developments.  It was further stated 
that evidence that the alternative systems had distinguishing features would be 
relevant in establishing potential consumer harm, but the new product rule is not 
the only parameter to be considered in determining whether the refusal is capable 
of causing prejudice to consumers, as Article 102(b) TFEU includes limiting 
production, markets or technical development to the detriment of the consumer.391   
The new product test may be justified for some IPRs but it could be inappropriate 
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for interfaces which have become a de facto standard.  This was effectively the case 
in IMS Health and Microsoft.  It has also been questioned whether the new product 
test gives a valid defining factor to differentiate between foreseeable and 
exceptional cases.392 
5.4.1 The New Product Test and Interfaces 
The new product test may also fail to optimise innovation.  Applying the new product test 
assumes the benefit of new product development outweighs the negative effects caused by 
the actual or threatened disclosure of interface information or licence of IPRs on the 
dominant competitor.  It is said that from an economic perspective the real question is not 
what consumers might like but what they are willing to pay for.  The willingness to pay for 
innovation is best left to the markets not the courts on the basis that firms will innovate if 
they think customers will pay.393   However if a customer is locked-in to a software supplier 
he is not able to move to the innovation, which prevents the market operating to reward 
innovation, and the existence of lock-in may justify intervention.     
The innovative value of interfaces is generally low but the incentive for innovation comes 
from the prospect of extracting value from a platform’s substantial network benefits.  The 
incentive comes from the plan to gain market power from network effects.394  This is 
substantially the same argument as competition for the market where there are some 
consumer advantages.  Network effects are however caused by interoperability which is in 
turn caused by intervention in the market by IPRs.  Platforms are not a naturally occurring 
feature in the market.  They come about because of IPR restrictions on interfaces where the 
level of innovation can be low.  As proprietary network effects happen because of this 
intervention the argument that they are better left to market forces is not proven.                   
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The situation is even more complex with interfaces which are de facto standards.  
Competitors are not always looking to introduce a new product but to use the interface to 
compete horizontally.  In IMS Health the copyrighted brick structure was a de facto 
standard and the value came from its network effects.  The new product test was 
inappropriate as follow-on innovation was not feasible because of the incentive for 
standardisation.  The new product test did not give sensible criteria for intervening to 
improve the competitive position and encourage innovation.  It failed to stimulate dynamic 
efficiency and risked impeding static efficiency.395  In Microsoft, Sun Microsystems needed 
their operating system to interoperate and compete with Microsoft on an ‘equal footing.’  
Sun’s software had some features that Microsoft’s did not but it was not a new product and 
the Court settled for requiring technical development.  The Court and Commission 
considered the interface to be basic information and in some cases variants on public 
domain interfaces.  The relatively low value of the interface specifications resulted in the 
Court concluding that a duty to share the information could not result in a substantial 
impediment to incentives to innovate.  Further consideration of Microsoft’s incentive to 
innovate was analysed under objective justification where the burden of proof was with 
Microsoft.  Microsoft failed to present a full argument merely relying on the existence of its 
IPRs and the opportunity to analyse the impact on its incentive to innovate was missed.396   
The new product test may be too high a threshold for refusal to licence IPRs that amount to 
standards, but the impact this will have on the incentives to innovate due to losing the 
higher value network effects has not been fully analysed. The new product test is a poor 
proxy for the more complex question of whether firms have sufficient incentives to 
innovate and the control of interface specifications should not be treated on an equal 
footing with other subject matter.  
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5.4.2 Economic Efficiency and Effects Based Approach 
Objective justification has been a defence to Article102 for many years, but the Microsoft 
case was the first instance of the defence being considered by the courts since the 
Commission’s review of Article102.  Microsoft did not put up a strong case and did not 
succeed in its arguments that licensing would harm investment and innovation.  The 
defence is not a balancing act but a legalistic assessment.397  One of the main issues would 
be incentives to innovate both of the dominant undertaking and competitors.  The 
requirements are now set out in Section III D of the Commission’s Guidance.    
The Commission’s Guidance on the exclusionary abuse of refusal to supply has incorporated 
much of the exceptional circumstances test.398   The test is not however the only condition 
that will determine whether behaviour is abusive.  The Commission has adopted an “effects 
based” approach to foreclosure that could lead to consumer harm.  In Section III B of its 
Guidance, the Commission requires the identification of consumer harm by appropriate 
qualitative or quantative evidence and outlines seven factors that are relevant in 
determining “on the basis of cogent and convincing evidence” whether the alleged abusive 
conduct is likely to lead to anti-competitive foreclosure. 399  The factors relevant to the 
assessment include the conditions in the relevant market, the existence of network effects 
and whether conduct may allow the dominant undertaking to “tip” a network market in its 
favour to further entrench its position.400    
This further economic analysis is important to ensure the correct application of the 
exceptional circumstances test.   In particular the analysis should ensure that the input is 
indispensable and that there is consumer harm.   The analysis will take into account all of 
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the facts of the case with a view to ensuring that the alleged abusive conduct will lead to an 
anti-competitive foreclosure that will harm consumers.  It is not enough just to ‘tick the 
boxes’ of the essential circumstances test.  Further analysis of the facts, including the 
nature of the IPRs and the particular market should be taken into account.   
It could be argued that the CJEU adopted a formalistic tick box approach in IMS,401 and that 
such an approach might give rise to false positive errors.   In Microsoft the CJEU attempted 
an effects based approach incorporating economic analysis although there has been 
criticism that the Microsoft judgement did not include adequate economic analysis.  The 
crucial point is that the CJEU did more than just tick the boxes of the exceptional 
circumstances test.   The exceptional circumstances test should now be considered a form 
of filter to identify markets and behaviour which should then be subject to closer scrutiny 
to determine whether there is abusive conduct leading to anti-competitive foreclosure.   
In this way it is possible that there can be some differentiation between interface 
information and other IPRs.  While they may all pass through the same filter of the 
exceptional circumstances test, the interface information, operating in markets 
characterised by network effects and lock-in, will not be treated in the same way as all 
other IPRs.   
Two of the factors that the Commission’s Guidance requires to be considered in the further 
analysis include the position of the dominant undertaking and the conditions on the 
relevant market.402 In Microsoft the General Court stated:  “Microsoft impaired the 
effective competitive structure on the work-group server operating systems market by 
acquiring a significant market share on that market”.403   The statement has been criticised 
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as making the holding of a market share illegal.  It has been considered a return to an 
interventionist ordoliberal stance which attempts to impact the structure of the market.404  
This is at odds with the effects based approach.    
The relevance of the significant market share in the Microsoft case is an example of a factor 
that is very relevant to interface information but that may not have a bearing on other 
applications of the exceptional circumstances test.   When interface information is involved 
the market will often be affected by network effects which present high barriers to entry.  
In those circumstances, while there may be substitute products available in the market, the 
users cannot select them as they are locked-in to the dominant standard.   In markets 
without network effects, where users are not locked-in, they can switch to substitute 
products.  If for example a dominant supplier has a 90% market share, users can still switch 
to one of the smaller suppliers without the detrimental effects felt in markets where there 
are network effects.  Inability to change suppliers can also arise from supplier lock-in caused 
by lack of interface information and high switching costs prevent changing suppliers even in 
the absence of strong network effects.  For this reason the issue of market share on the 
existence of abuse is more relevant to interface information than the refusal to licence 
other IPRs.  Where other IPRs are concerned, consumers who may not be able to get the 
dominant company’s product elsewhere can switch to substitute products without being 
locked in by non-interoperable software.    
Various economists including Katz & Shapiro and Liebowitz & Margolis acknowledge that 
there can be inefficiencies in network markets with externalities, but do not advocate 
intervention preferring an unregulated market outcome.  The benefits of intervention may 
be different when supplier lock-in prevents consumers switching products.405  These 
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economic arguments and whether different forms of lock-in may alter this position was 
considered in more detail in Chapter 3.             
5.4.3 Microsoft and Intellectual Property Rights and Remedies 
Microsoft’s European case occurred before the rulings in Bezpečnostní and SAS Institute 
which gave software interfaces an exemption.  Microsoft illustrates the relationship 
between Article102 and the Software Directive, and how this may be influenced by the 
status of interfaces.  Unfortunately it is not possible to draw a definitive picture of the 
relationship, as neither the Commission nor the General Court determined what IPRs 
existed in the information Microsoft was ordered to disclose.  They said they did not need 
to as Microsoft had abused its dominant position and met the exceptional circumstances 
test which justified the disclosure.  The Court sidestepped the issue of whether the 
interface information was copyright protected.  While noting that the contested decision 
“does not take a position as to whether Microsoft’s [IPRs] are affected or not”406 it 
proceeded on the presumption that the protocols in question, or the specifications of those 
protocols, are covered by IPRs.  Compulsory disclosure was justified by the abuse of a 
dominant position and the exceptional circumstances test following the cases of Magill and 
IMS Heath.    
The decision in Microsoft has been criticised for being a false positive, penalising success in 
the absence of abuse, which will reduce incentives to innovate and dynamic competition.407  
There are also claims that the “exceptional circumstances” test was distorted by the 
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interpretation of the “indispensability” requirement408 and the expansions of the new 
product test in a secondary market to technical development as discussed earlier.409   
Microsoft claimed the interfaces were protected by patents, copyright and trade secrets.  
However the Commission said the considerations associated with patent protection did not 
justify the refusal, indeed Microsoft took some time to even identify a single patent.410   The 
Commission was also not impressed with the trade secret argument as the protection 
afforded to trade secrets can be more limited than copyright or patent protections, and 
they exist as a result of a unilateral business decision dependant on its facts and the 
interests at stake.  Here the value of the secret was not its innovative nature but the fact 
that it belonged to a dominant undertaking.411  Also, subject to certain conditions, reverse 
engineering can legitimately disclose information for the purpose of interoperability, and 
this would defeat any attempt to protect interface information as trade secrets.
412
      
When considering the question of copyright the Commission commented that while 
specifications may be copyright their implementation is not necessarily a copy but may 
result in new work.  The order in Microsoft was for the disclosure of “complete and 
accurate specifications for the protocols”.   The use of the term “specifications” did not 
require Microsoft to disclose how it implemented the specifications in the source code.  The 
term “protocol” related to “the rules of interconnection and interaction”.413  The wording 
of the order resembles the wording in recital 10 of the Software Directive defining 
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interfaces as parts which provide “interconnection and interaction” to enable software to 
work “in all the ways they are intended to function”414.  While the full meaning of these 
phrases has not been judicially determined, in Microsoft two-way operability was required 
and presumably an objective test would be applied.  
Microsoft argued that the information disclosed went further than was necessary for 
interoperability arguing that the information would allow for “plug-replaceablity”, “cloning” 
and arguing that “the replication of the Global Catalog features of the Active Directory do 
not bear on interoperability”.415  The Commission refuted these arguments and set out 
details of why Microsoft’s “one-way” interpretation of interoperability was incorrect.
416
  
The Court considered Microsoft had not cast doubt on these assertions.417  It considered 
the concept of interoperability adopted in the order namely “the capacity for them to 
exchange information and to use that information mutually in order to allow each of those 
software products to function in all the ways envisaged” as consistent with the Software 
Directive.418  Nevertheless Article102 was held to rank higher than the Directive, and the 
level of interoperability ordered was necessary to enable competitors to remain viable on 
the market.419  Microsoft’s assertions that aspects of the information to be disclosed did 
not relate to interoperability and could amount to cloning were rejected.  The General 
Court dealt with many points including that Microsoft would not be required to disclose the 
source code and only give a general description of the algorithms, leaving it to its 
competitors to develop their own implementation of it.420  
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On the face of it the information Microsoft was ordered to disclose: “Complete and 
accurate specifications for the protocols”, was interface information for interoperability and 
hence not copyright protected.421  The main problem was that the information arguably 
went beyond interoperability into the “internal make up of Windows server operating 
systems”422 which Microsoft claimed could compromise the internal integrity and security 
of the system.  The argument was not accepted by the Commission and it is debatable 
whether a dominant undertaking should be entitled to cite security risks to justify non-
disclosure of information when that is dependent on its own architectural design 
decisions.423  Another issue was the requirement to provide an algorithm’s “general 
description”, which can amount to a most valuable but unprotected aspect of software424 
demonstrating the misfit of copyright protection for software.425  
It has been pointed out that the only example of reduced interoperability present at the 
trial was that some users needed to log on twice and that the fines and extra work imposed 
on Microsoft seem disproportionate.426  The judgement meant Microsoft had to employ 
210 software engineers and spent tens of thousands of hours to write the required 
specification.427  On the other hand it was relevant to the abuse that Microsoft had 
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formerly disclosed interface information to enter, catch up and then dominate the market, 
before introducing new software, Windows 2000, and not disclosing equivalent 
information.  Also the new software was built on industry standard access protocols and 
open source software, LDAP and Kerbos, that was not developed by Microsoft, but to which 
Microsoft had added private unilateral extensions.428  Microsoft’s behaviour in that period 
appeared to be intended to protect and exploit its dominant position429 in the PC operating 
systems market, whether from Netscape and Java or other competing platforms such as a 
rival server operating system.430               
5.4.4    Microsoft’s Legacy   
Although commitments concerning interoperability had occurred before, for example in 
1984 IBM gave an undertaking to the Commission to provide interface information for its 
System 370, there seems, post Microsoft,  to be an acceleration in the number of decisions 
by the Commission in which it has imposed interoperability.  These have occurred in merger 
cases and voluntary commitments under Article 9 of the Antitrust Regulation 1/2003.  In 
recent merger cases the Commission appears to have accepted the position that a lack of 
interoperability has an adverse effect on competition, particularly in network markets.431  
This could be seen as the Commission using Microsoft to strengthen its arm in negotiations 
and furthering a culture of interoperability.   
In December 2009 Oracle’s acquisition of Sun Microsystems was cleared following Oracle’s 
public commitment which included addressing licensing and copyright issues relevant to 
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third-party developers of open source software, MySQL storage engines, promising to 
maintain the openness and flexibility of MySQL's Pluggable Storage Engine Architecture and 
not to require commercial licenses to use the storage engine APIs.   
In the decision on Cisco’s acquisition of Tandberg,432 the lack of interoperability was seen as 
a barrier to entry to the market for high-end video conferencing systems.  The question in 
that merger was whether the market would impose interoperability or whether 
intervention was required.  Perhaps unsurprisingly, the competitors favoured intervention.  
End customers, distributors and industry analysts however thought that the market would 
impose interoperability and that a standard would develop.
433
  The market investigation 
revealed that network effects meant there was a strong case for interoperability.  It 
confirmed that interoperability was the way forward for the industry, but the merged entity 
could have an increased incentive to strategically restrict interoperability with new entrants 
or less important competitors.434  Cisco was required to divest the copyright and 
management of its TIP protocol to an industry body before the merger was approved.435 
The acquisition of the security software vendor McAfee by Intel raised concerns as 
competing security software vendors would continue to need good interface information 
post merger, information which is essential to ensure that their software was not 
disadvantaged with regard to performance and power consumption, as that would 
significantly increase workload on the CPU and affect performance of the computer.436   
There was concern that after the acquisition Intel would lose the incentive to disclose 
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information to competing security software vendors and this would foreclose the market.  
Given Intel’s large market share, customers would not be in a position to exert pressure on 
Intel to restore interoperability and reverse engineering was not “commercially viable or 
technically feasible.”437  This would have a significant adverse effect on the market, acting 
as a technical tie and foreclosing the market.  Intel committed to give equal access to 
“Instruction, Interoperability and Optimization” information.438  The Commission co-
operated closely with the U.S. Federal Trade Commission throughout the review.439 
5.4.5 Does the Exceptional Circumstances Test Provide an Adequate Solution?    
The central purpose of competition law is to “speed up the arrival of the long run” (so that 
firms lose market power faster).440  Lock-in due to lack of interoperability is a drag on this 
process and it is possible that intervention by competition law could give net benefits.441 
The willingness to intervene to promote interoperability in Microsoft and more recent 
merger cases indicates that the Commission has been convinced by the competitive virtues 
of interoperability.  Arguably, the outcome of Microsoft has strengthened the Commission’s 
bargaining position in negotiations intended to maintain interoperability post-merger and 
Article 9 commitments. 
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Interface specifications have been considered an exception under the Software Directive 
and not covered by copyright.442  This would not overturn or invalidate all criticism of 
Microsoft but arguably Microsoft is not a full frontal attack on the sanctity of IPRs but a step 
towards a more nuanced and pragmatic approach to interoperability and lock-in.          
Interface information has distinct features which mean that it may require different 
treatment to other IPRs.  While the Commission’s Guidance conflates the two in Section III 
D, objective necessities and efficiencies, it can be argued that in Section III B the Guidance 
calls for sufficient analysis for the Commission and courts to differentiate between them in 
practice.    This may mean that the law will develop so that undertakings dealing in software 
and platforms are able to assess when they have to disclose interface information, although 
this process is likely to be very slow and fraught with difficulties. 
The Software Directive permits block box analysis and reverse engineering, but it does not 
require suppliers to disclose interface information in any form.  However, following 
Microsoft, once a supplier becomes dominant it may have to compile and disclose such 
information.  We are faced with two levels of interoperability, in which the level of 
interoperability that can be required of dominant companies will be at a higher level than 
for other suppliers.  This may be justified given the impact of network effects, but the very 
existence of the remedy implies that the interface information available under the Software 
Directive is inadequate for interoperability.443  There will continue to be prospective 
suppliers unable to achieve interoperability for their software, and users locked in to 
incumbent suppliers.  SAS Institute is just the tip of the iceberg and software in the 3D CAD 
industry is another example.  It could be argued that the cumulative effect of this does not 
affect the market and is inappropriate for a remedy under competition law, but it is a 
serious problem for the user and a cost to the economy and should be addressed as part of 
the IPR regime.  
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In Microsoft the Court considered that competitors would not want to replicate exactly the 
same work-group server operating systems as Microsoft, but to offer something innovative 
and different.  This supports the requirement under the “essential facilities test” for a 
secondary market with a new product or an advance in technical development.  By contrast 
in Navitaire and SAS Institute the aim was to produce software with the same “look and 
feel”, to help users swap to the new supplier.  It is ironic that a competitor has to establish 
a new product or technological advance to interoperate with a dominant company but can 
emulate the software of any other competitor.         
The benefits of using competition law as an ex post regulation of IPRs is that it should 
provide a flexible solution after analysis on a case by case basis.  This allows for the balance 
between openness and control to be struck.  However it is said the exceptional 
circumstances test has developed to provide a rigid framework which is neither flexible nor 
appropriate for the particular factors relevant to interoperability and standardisation.444  
The considerations relevant to standards and interface information include that firms may 
be competing for the market rather than within the market.  Competition for the market is 
arguably not harmful to consumer welfare per se but has different considerations which 
may not fit within a rigid application of the exceptional circumstances test.  The IPRs in 
interfaces are often of a low innovative value, but give control to network markets, locking 
in customers and shutting out competitors.  When balancing the incentive to innovate it 
may be incorrect to focus solely on the value of the interface innovation but to consider the 
innovation incentive that can flow from the resulting control.445  
The merger and Article 9 Commitments post Microsoft have seen competition law turning 
into an ex ante remedy.  This is appropriate as the problems that are being remedied are 
structural and foreseeable.  Competition law is therefore playing a valid and important role 
on a case-by-case basis to provide a flexible remedy that will encourage interoperability and 
competition.   
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Competition law as an effective remedy is limited to merger and Article 9 Commitments.  
The disadvantages of the exceptional circumstances test have been analysed above.  The 3D 
CAD industry has additional hurdles to overcome before the exceptional circumstances test 
could be applied to the undertakings.  The industry is oligopolistic with 3 or arguably only 2 
suppliers in the high end of the industry.  On the surface there appears to be competition in 
the industry although users suffer from supplier lock-in.  Before the issue of failure to 
supply interface information could be challenged it would be necessary to show either that 
the supplier was individually dominant or two or more suppliers were collectively 
dominant.  The lack of interoperability would be very relevant to this determination.  It has 
been argued that Amazon’s Kindle and Kindle e-books are a distinct market due to 
Amazon’s restrictive e-book format which because of DRM protection features could until 
recently only be read on Amazon’s devices.446   If the market for 3D CAD could be defined at 
the individual supplier level because of interoperability the evaluation of dominance and 
abuse for failure to supply interface information could be applied.  Alternatively the 
industry, as a tight oligopoly, could be considered collectively dominant and then subject to 
review under the exceptional circumstances test.  This Chapter will continue with an 
analysis as to whether the products of individual suppliers in the 3D CAD industry could be 
considered distinct markets, or whether the industry is collectively dominant.    
5.5 Market Definition 
In the software industry, dominance has been defined narrowly.  Software maintenance 
and software updates of Digital computers were considered to be separate markets from 
non-branded systems.447  Software and services for branded proprietary systems could not 
be replaced by other suppliers’ systems and customers were locked-in, unable to switch to 
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other suppliers’ systems if Digital increased the service fees.  When accepting Digital’s 
undertaking the Commission448 was relying on the narrow market definition approach 
adopted in cases such as Hugin v Commission449 and Hilti v Commission.450   The same 
reasoning could apply to numerous suppliers in the software industry.   Complex software 
available for functions such as Enterprise Resource Management or 3D CAD does not 
usually interoperate fully with systems from other suppliers.451  After a customer has made 
the initial decision to buy from one supplier he is locked-in to that supplier for upgrades, 
add on modules, maintenance and service.  The lack of interoperability means that 
following the reasoning in the Digital Undertaking, or the cases of Hugin and Hilti, each 
supplier could be considered to be in a separate market and dominant with a high market 
share.  Rather than being oligopolistic the market would then be made up of the software 
system of individual suppliers.  The deliberate non-disclosure of software interface 
information by a car manufacturer has however been considered an abuse of superior 
bargaining position but does not necessarily delineate the manufacturer into a separate 
market where it could be considered dominant452   
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5.5.1 Commission Guidance 
A relevant product market is defined as all those products which are regarded as 
interchangeable or substitutable by the consumer, by reason of the products' 
characteristics, prices and intended use.453  Price is a key factor for measuring demand and 
supply side interchangeability454 but in markets characterised by a lack of interoperability 
and network effects, market prices may not be an accurate sufficient parameter for the 
relevant market as lock-in, network benefits and standardisation may cause markets to be 
less sensitive to price increases. 455  The Commission’s 2002 Guidelines on market analysis 
and the assessment of significant market power in the telecoms industries456 considers that 
switching costs can influence whether consumers will change products or services even 
when there is a significant lasting price increase.  Having invested in one system they will be 
unwilling to incur additional costs involved in switching to an otherwise substitutable 
service or product.  Customers may be ‘locked in’ by the prohibitively high switching costs.  
The Guidelines say that in a situation where end users face significant switching costs in 
order to substitute product A for product B, these two products should not be included in 
the same relevant market.457 
If lack of interoperability is relevant to market definition, more firms could be held 
dominant and the exceptional circumstances test could be used to force the disclosure of 
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interface information.458  Software competitors who withhold interface information to 
cause a lack of interoperability may do so in an attempt to compete for rather than within 
the market.  This form of competition is thought to incentivise investment as the winner 
takes all.  Of concern is that if the products of such companies were defined as a separate 
market the narrow definition could be seen to apply to successful companies before they 
even achieved the level of market power normally associated with dominant firms.  This 
could exacerbate the arguments that intervention reduces incentives to innovate.   
Furthermore, with fast innovation cycles, consideration should be given to include future 
market conditions.  The Commission’s 2002 Guidance on market definition considers that:  
...high barriers to entry may become less relevant with regard to markets 
characterised by on-going technological progress.  In electronic communications 
markets, competitive constraints may come from innovative threats from potential 
competitors that are not currently in the market.  In such markets, the competitive 
assessment should be based on a prospective, forward-looking approach.459  
While software is generally perceived as a highly innovative industry, the lack of interface 
information and customer lock-in will complicate scrutiny of entry barriers.  Lack of 
interoperability can present entry barriers constraining the market to existing technology 
rather than potential innovation.  What can result is the construction of various platforms 
in an oligopolistic market where customers are locked into suppliers which impacts the 
nature of competition.  
5.5.2 Microsoft/Apple/Amazon  
In Microsoft the Commission enquired whether the possibility of reverse engineering under 
the Software Directive could lower entry barriers and curtail Microsoft’s present market 
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power.460  Entry barriers, including a lack of interoperability and network effects are also 
taken into account when considering the sustainability of market share.  These entry 
barriers are considered as a confirmation of market power rather than in defining the 
market itself.  In Microsoft network effects were considered a factor in sustaining 
Microsoft’s market share and the Commission Guidance recognises that network effects 
may be a significant barrier to entry.461   
The question of market definition and dominance raised its head when DRM was used to 
make iTunes compatible only with iPods,462 but the complaints were discontinued.  It has 
been considered again with the Kindle’s leading position in the market for e-readers.  
Amazon’s Kindle uses a proprietary format AZW/KF8 and DRM rather than the open EPUB 
format.  This encourages Kindle users to buy from the Amazon store to get compatible 
books.  Network effects encourage the purchase of Kindles as they give easy access to 
Amazon’s extensive library of books which encourages authors and publishers to make their 
books available on Amazon.  Amazon is said to have 60% of the e-book market in the USA 
and 90% in the UK.463  Amazon has recently introduced a free Amazon app to allow Kindle 
books to be read on non-Kindle devices.  This move could cause the market definition to be 
broader than purely Amazon Kindles.
464
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5.5.3 Oracle/Peoplesoft 
In the acquisition of UGS by Siemens, the Commission referred to previous decisions such as 
Oracle/Peoplesoft465 where it had taken a “broad approach” in software markets.466  In 
Oracle/Peoplesoft it had recognised that there could be separate product markets within 
enterprise application software (‘EAS’) and further categorised the markets into high 
function financial management (‘FMS’) and human resource (‘HR’) solutions, to serve the 
needs of large enterprises with complex functional needs, and midmarket FMS and HR 
solutions.  Interoperability did not feature in the market analysis other than comments that 
the high function solutions would have complex proprietary APIs which, it was assumed 
would give better integration.       
Mid-market solutions tend to have simple (i.e. batch export/import) interfaces, or simple 
application programming interfaces (APIs) making them easy to integrate in a simple 
way with other mid-market software and other smaller scale solutions, but allowing little 
scope for adding directly to the functionality of the software. High-function software 
tends to have complex and proprietary APIs which allow full and complex integration 
with other large scale software solutions and additional functionality to be added to 
customize the solutions. The number of data interfaces needed in order to integrate all 
major external data sources in HR and FMS solutions are also fewer and simpler for 
mid-market solutions than for large enterprises with complex functional needs.467   
 
Subsequent research has highlighted: that competition in a market such as EAS can be 
affected by the importance of the software to the users and the risks of switching, including 
interoperability problems468 and the lack of compatibility of ERP software, a subset of EAS, 
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means that customers can be locked-in following an initial purchase due to the costs 
involved of switching.469  Had the merger occurred after the introduction of the SIEC test, 
which allows the Commission to consider post- merger non-coordinated effects in an 
oligopolistic market, the merger may not have been approved.470  
    
5.5.4 3D CAD and Siemens/UGS 
There is generally more interoperability in the EAS software industry than the 3D CAD 
industry but even for enterprise application software ‘EAS’, high-function software was 
considered a distinct market.
471
  This would however support a definition of high end 3D 
CAD software being a distinct market.  The suppliers would be Dassault Systems with CATIA, 
Siemens with Siemens NX and possibly PTC Creo.472  The question is whether legacy issues 
and other causes of supplier lock-in would prevent customers switching to the other 
supplier even if there was a significant non-transitory increase in price in their existing 
system.  This increase in price could apply to upgrades, maintenance or the purchase of 
additional modules.  The Commission accepted in Microsoft and various merger cases that 
interoperability impacts competition, and iTunes and the Kindle demonstrate recognition 
that it could also influence the definition of the market.  If the Commission was required to 
determine the definition of the 3D CAD market, the question of interoperability would be a 
very relevant factor.  What is less clear is the level of incompatibility that would be 
required.  The interoperability between Amazon’s Kindle books and Apple may be sufficient 
to widen the market definition.  Would the STEP Standard, even with its limitations, and 
translator software be considered to give a solution that would define the market wider 
than the individual supplier?            
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The Commission considered a definition of the 3D CAD market when Siemens acquired UGS 
Limited in 2007.473  Interoperability was considered by the Commission but the focus was 
on the interoperability of automation and control products as this was a market that 
Siemens and UGS were both active in before the acquisition.  Only UGS was active in the 
PLM and 3D CAD market.   
The market was defined as the PLM software market rather than the wider enterprise 
application software  as it manages specific information about the products of the company 
rather than financial and more general business information.  When distinguishing CAD 
from other products many respondents to the consultation viewed the ‘individual 
application product as specific to the function it provides’474 while also being integral to the 
overall PLM solution.   
There was no consideration given to defining the market more narrowly due to lack of 
interoperability to include only software supplied by Siemens.  The Commission considered 
the precise delineation of the product market could be left open as it thought that even 
with a narrower definition, separating CAD from PLM, no serious competition concerns 
arose from the proposed acquisition.       
The Commission relied on industry analyst reports to define market shares.475  UGS’ market 
share for PLM and CAD was assessed at 10 -20% with Dassault Systems the only named 
competitor for CAD software.  The Commission did not appear to draw any distinction 
between high and low end software but considered that given the presence of a number of 
strong competitors the proposed concentration would not lead to a significant impediment 
of effective competition in the supply of PLM solutions.  
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5.5.5 Summary 
Market definition is a ‘highly sophisticated economic and econometric analysis’476 and a 
definitive position on defining the market for 3D CAD is beyond the scope of this legal 
thesis.  The outcome of the analysis, including the SSNIP test cannot be fully prejudged but 
limiting the market to single suppliers is exceptional.  The availability of standards and 
translators as well as the incidences of changing suppliers such as by Daimler AG’s from 
Dassault Systems CATIA to Siemens PLM’s NX may be sufficient to categorise the software 
market as high-end or middle-range rather than restricting the definition to a single 
supplier.            
5.6 Oligopoly and Collective Dominance 
If the supplier of software is not dominant and in the absence of a cartel, or market 
investigation, the only solution provided by competition law to a refusal to supply interface 
information is the concept of collective dominance under Article 102.  The purpose of 
evaluating whether the market for 3D CAD could be considered oligopolistic is to find a 
solution to lock-in and other problems associated with a lack of interoperability.  Collective 
dominance would allow the refusal to supply interface information to be subjected to the 
exceptional circumstances test to determine whether it is an abuse of a dominant 
position.477   
The “oligopoly problem” is said to be one of the chief concerns of EU competition policy as 
oligopolies do not have an express Treaty provision to regulate their unique structure and 
intrinsic behaviour.478  This is seen as a “lacuna” in EU law 479 which the European 
Commission and Courts have sought to address in recent years.  Caution has rightly been 
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shown to avoid penalising the innate structure of the oligopolistic market unless there is 
behaviour that goes beyond rational responses to that market.  But this has proven to be a 
very thin line to draw.480   There is said to be an “oligopoly gap”, where subcompetitive 
performance is not adequately addressed by legal provisions to control anti-competitive 
abusive behaviour.481 
Oligopoly is defined as ‘sale by a few sellers’.  It is a phenomenon occurring somewhere on 
the continuum between monopoly and perfect competition.  ‘Oligo’ means few while 
‘mono’ means one and ‘polypoly’ means many.482   “Because there are only a few firms 
each firm can affect the market price and hence its rivals’ profit....a firm must consider rival 
firms’ behaviour to determine its own policy”.483   
Not all oligopolistic markets are a problem and there are economic models of oligopolists 
competing on price or output.484  The main argument against oligopolies is that, because 
there are only a few competitors in an oligopolistic market, they are very aware of each 
other’s presence and behaviour and are interdependent.  They are bound to match and 
follow each other’s marketing strategy and price competition will be minimal or non-
existent.  They produce non-competitive stability.485  This view is supported by the 
literature on ‘game-theory’ and ‘the Prisoner’s Dilemma’.486 The interdependence can be 
used by the oligopolists for their own self-interest if they match each other’s conduct to 
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charge profit-maximising prices at a supra-competitive level.  They do this by relying on the 
structure of the market and mutual self-awareness rather than actual communication.487             
There is debate as to whether the market structure itself produces the problem.  There is 
empirical evidence to support the structuralist theory that there is a direct correlation with 
profits being higher in oligopoly markets than in less concentrated markets.488   Later 
empirical studies failed to find a simple link between profits and concentration in a wide 
range of industries and higher profits seemed better explained by efficiencies.489   This led 
to a more agnostic view of oligopolies where efficiency was seen as a benefit and there was 
also an appreciation that coordination in oligopoly markets was more difficult to achieve 
than originally thought.490  According to the Cournot model491 oligopolistic interdependence 
exists in any market with few firms and output is often lower than in perfect competition 
but this does not always mean firms are maximising joint profits by tacit collusion.  In an 
oligopoly anything can happen and oligopolistic interdependence is not enough to justify 
intervention without joint profit maximisation through tacit collusion.492  The market 
structure is important but is not the only cause and structural remedies to deconcentrate 
the market are not the only solution.  The market can adopt a non-co-operative equilibrium 
in which profits can only be increased by co-ordinating behaviour.    Stable co-operation 
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may occur if it is more profitable than cheating which depends on the extent and nature of 
available market information.493   
The theory of oligopolistic interdependence is not without its critics who challenge the 
central proposition that oligopolies can earn supra-competitive profits without explicitly 
colluding.  The theory of oligopoly relies on a simplistic picture of markets which in reality 
are more varied and complex with different costs, goods, levels of barrier to entry so 
markets differ considerably and make it difficult to have one theory for them all.  
Oligopolies are not as interdependent as theory claims, for example one firm may benefit 
from cutting prices and there can be intense competition in some oligopolistic markets if 
not for price then for quality, after sales and other aspects.  Further, the oligopolistic 
structure might result from efficiencies and be subject to competitive pressures.  If supra-
competitive profits are achieved new firms will enter and barriers may be illusionary.    
Game theory has attempted to provide a reference model to describe the rational 
behaviour of undertakings in an oligopolistic market.  Rather than merely identifying 
structural conditions the impact of certain aspects are examined including whether they 
allow repeated interaction between oligopolists; create barriers to entry; encourage 
mutually acceptable market equilibrium; facilitate monitoring and detection of cheating 
and allow for immediate effective retaliation.    Barriers to entry, which are particularly 
relevant when there is a lack of interoperability, are considered to be a particularly 
significant factor supporting collusion.    
 Undertakings in the 3D CAD industry appear to be a tight oligopoly, indeed they could be 
said to be a perfect oligopoly with a tight market structure and with each undertaking 
enjoying a significant market share.494   
A tight oligopoly is said to have two essential features:  
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 Some factors that makes for easy price comparison and alignment, such as a small 
number of sellers, homogeneous products, high market transparency.  Members of 
the oligopoly can monitor each other and coordinate actions including responding if 
one of them lowers their prices.  The 3D CAD industry has “very complex pricing”495 
but the numbers of suppliers is very small and with similar products.496      
 Some factors, such as high barriers to entry or lack of buyer market power, which 
allow prices to be raised without risk of losing market share.497 A lack of 
interoperable interfaces would certainly increase barriers to entry and lock-in can 
reduce the buyer’s bargaining position.  
5.7 Competition Law Enforcement of Oligopolies 
The legal tools that are potentially available to address subcompetitive performance in 
oligopolies are Article 101 and Article 102 for agreements, concerted practice or collective 
dominance; the European Union Merger Regulations498 and regulatory procedures such as 
market investigation.499   
The appropriate legal tool depends on whether the oligopoly problem is seen as structural 
or behavioural.  If it is accepted that oligopolies are always bad leading to inevitable non-
collusive price parallelism then a structural approach would be the sensible solution.  The 
Merger Regulations are a tool to prevent the formation of oligopolies and Article 7 of 
Regulation 1/2003 gives a structural remedy on breach of Article 101 or 102.  There is a 
potential structural solution in the market investigation regime on a national basis such as 
under the Enterprise Act 2002, or by the Commission under Regulation 1/2003, Article 17 
                                                     
495
 Interview with senior industry executive #3 (May 2014) 
496
 Interview with senior industry executive #4 (July 2013) – there was only about a 10% difference in the 
various 3D CAD modules. 
497
 Giorgio Monti, ‘The Scope of Collective Dominance under Articles 82 EC’ (2001) 38 Common Market Law 
Review 131, 135 
498
 Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between 
undertakings OJ L 24/1 (Merger Regulation) 
 
499
 In the UK, market investigations can be brought under the Enterprise Act 2002 
159 
 
 
but investigations and structural remedies are rare and only used in exceptional cases.  
They have the benefit of a less prosecutorial process recognising that the market may have 
arrived at a ‘bad’ equilibrium rather than necessarily finding wrong doing.500  A regulatory 
approach, which attempts to control prices or impose practices, is a counsel of despair and 
last resort, and the State could look at barriers to entry and ensure they are not themselves 
the cause through restrictive licensing, regulation or legislation.501   
Article 101 and 102 are primarily concerned with behaviour and do not assume that 
oligopolies are intrinsically harmful.  Article 101 will be considered first as it would outlaw 
cartel behaviour such as agreements not to disclose interface information.  Its role in 
regulating the disclosure of interface information is important but more straightforward.  
The role of the merger regulations will then be considered as it has already been used pre- 
merger to protect interoperability post-merger and it has been important in developing the 
law on collective dominance.  The merger regulations are only available for a concentration, 
while Article 102 should provide a remedy to distorted existing markets.  For this reason it 
will be discussed at more length even though its role in regulating oligopolies is 
undeveloped and the rules incoherent which hinders its purpose.   
5.7.1 Article 101 TFEU  
An agreement or concerted practice between oligopolists to restrict interoperability will be 
caught by Article 101 and will be void and unlawful, unless it comes within Article 101(3).  
An agreement or concerted practice by undertakings to withhold software interface 
information from customers, or from each other, could have the purpose or effect of 
restricting competition by directly or indirectly fixing trading conditions, or limiting or 
controlling markets or technical development and be contrary to Article 101 (1).502 
                                                     
500
 Barry Hawk and Giorgio Motta, ‘Oligopolies and Collective Dominance: A Solution in Search of a Problem’ 
Treviso Conference on Antitrust Between EC Law and National Law, Eighth Edition; Fordham Law Legal Studies 
Research Paper No. 1301693. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1301693, 66 
501
 Richard Whish and David Bailey, Competition Law (8th edn, Oxford University Press 2015), 602 
502
 Commission Decision in Microsoft, para 782, where the Commission concluded that the refusal to supply 
interface information stifled innovation and diminished consumer choice by locking them into the 
160 
 
 
While such an agreement could be unlawful it is difficult to distinguish between concerted 
practice and behaviour which appears parallel but is not coordinated.  Certain market 
structures allow for coordination which is to the disadvantage of customers and consumers 
but that does not amount to an agreement or concerted practice.  This has been described 
by economists as ‘tacit collusion’ but for lawyers, collusion connotes the concept of 
concerted practice and even conspiracy.  An alternative expression is ‘conscious parallelism’ 
or ‘tacit coordination’. 503  Parallel behaviour may not of itself be identified with a concerted 
practice504 but competition in an oligopolistic market might be muted as firms react to one 
another’s behaviour and for this reason:  
..although parallel behaviour may not of itself be identified with a concerted 
practice, it may however amount to strong evidence of such a practice if it leads to 
conditions of competition which do not respond to the normal conditions of the 
market, having regard to the nature of the products, the size and number of 
undertakings and the volume of the said market.505 
There may be situations where firms take into account their rival’s likely responses but an 
intelligent response to competitor’s behaviour or ‘barometric price leadership’ in an 
oligopoly may not amount to a concerted practice.506  While competitors are not entitled to 
coordinate their behaviour the Commission has the burden to prove a concerted practice 
which can be difficult when the evidence is limited solely to behaviour in the market rather 
than contact or other concertation.  The oligopolistic tendencies of a particular market 
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could justify legitimate price parallelism507  but in appropriate cases parallelism could be 
evidence of a concerted practice where there is no plausible alternative explanation.508   
Where competition in an oligopolistic market is already restricted the firms should be 
vigilant to ensure that behaviour such as price leadership does not restrict any competition 
that does exist.509   
The concern that oligopolies create an environment in which cartels can succeed without 
apparently leaving evidence of an agreement or concerted practice is known as the 
“unproved cartel gap”.  There is however doubt the gap is significant and could be 
narrowing.  Cartels need organising which creates a likelihood of evidence of agreement
510
 
and leniency programmes have increased detection and instability of cartels.  It is 
questioned whether any significant cartel gap exists to justify intervention, “at least 
through ill-fitting and inchoate doctrines such as collective dominance”.
511
   
In the absence of a concerted practice, or an agreement, to maintain low levels of 
interoperability, Article 101 does not have a role to play in ensuring competition in the 
oligopolistic 3D CAD industry. 
5.7.2 Merger Regulations 
Prior to 2004 there was a perceived gap in the Merger Regulation 2004 of non-collusive 
oligopolies.  In Airtours/FirstChoice512 the Commission considered the three firms remaining 
                                                     
507
 Lorna McGregor ‘The future for the control of oligopolies following Compagnie Maritime Belge’ (2001) 22 
ECLR 434, 435 
508
 Cases C-89  104,114,116-17, and 125-9/85 Re Wood Pulp Cartel:Ahlstrom Oy v. Commission (Wood Pulp II)  
[1993] ECR I-1307[1993] 4 CMLR 407 
509
 L 76/1 British Sugar OJ [1999] 4 CMLR 1316 
510
 M Levenstein and V Suslow, ‘What Determines Cartel Success?’ (March 2006) 54 Journal of Economic 
Literature 
511
 Barry Hawk and Giorgio Motta, ‘Oligopolies and Collective Dominance: A Solution in Search of a Problem’ 
Treviso Conference on Antitrust Between EC Law and National Law, Eighth Edition; Fordham Law Legal Studies 
Research Paper No. 1301693. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1301693,74  
512
 Airtours/First Choice (Case IV/M.1524) Commission Decision [2000] OJ 93/1  
162 
 
 
on the market after the merger could act as a tight oligopoly to unilaterally exercise market 
power without any need to act in a coordinated manner.513   The General Court annulled 
the Commission’s decision adopting an approach that associated collective dominance with 
coordinated effects.  The undertakings might be able to exercise more market power on an 
individual basis because of the increased concentration in an oligopolistic market but it did 
not create a single dominant entity.      
Proposals for reform looked at the UK test of whether the merger will ‘substantially lessen 
competition’514 but the dominance concept was well established in EU law and had 
generally worked well.  The Merger Regulations addressed the gap by amending Articles 
2(2) and 2(3) so that the test is now whether a merger would lead to an Significant 
Impediment to Effective Competition (SIEC), in particular by creating or strengthening a 
dominant position (emphasis added) rather than whether the merger would create or 
strengthen a dominant position thereby leading to an SIEC.  In this way the pre-eminence of 
the dominance test remains intact, giving continuity, while allowing the Commission to 
prohibit or require modifications of mergers that ‘significantly impede effective 
competition’ without creating a dominant entity.  Recital 25 of the Merger Regulations 
confirm that the amendment is intended to apply to an oligopolistic market and extend 
beyond the concept of dominance, where the anti-competitive effects of a concentration 
result from the non-coordinated behaviour of undertakings.  This has improved the quality 
and predictability of decision making by the Commission.515      
The Merger Guidelines have identified two ways in which mergers can significantly impede 
effective competition by creating or strengthening a collective dominant position. 516  
Firstly, non-coordinated effects where competitive constraints are removed to give 
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increased market power.  This normally applies to a single entity which gains a larger 
market share post-merger but can also apply to oligopolistic markets where despite the 
reduction in competition there is little likelihood of coordination.517  Secondly, parallel and 
coordinated behaviour, which requires a certain level of transparency in the market to 
enable the firms to know what others are doing in respect of price and output.  The 
transparency allows the firms to monitor the behaviour of others to notice any deviation 
and impose some form of sanction such as a price war.  To be sustainable it must not be 
susceptible to pressure from competitors, customers and consumers.518     
The Merger Guidelines list non-exhaustive and non-cumulative factors relevant to a 
determination of whether non-coordinated effects might occur.  The factors particularly 
relevant to an oligopoly characterised by a lack of interoperability include the degree of 
substitutability between the products of the merging firms and those supplied by rival 
producers.  This includes where customers of the merging parties have difficulties switching 
to other suppliers because of substantial switching costs as these customers are particularly 
vulnerable to price increases.  Of particular relevance are the comments concerning 
interoperability between different infrastructures or platforms, such as telecommunications 
and other communications industries,
519
 as this can give the merged entity the ability and 
incentive to raise the costs or decrease the quality of service of its rivals.520   
Recent merger cases have seen the Commission recognise that a lack of interoperability has 
an adverse effect on competition.  Cisco’s acquisition of Tandberg521 and the acquisition of 
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the security software vendor McAfee by Intel, discussed above,522 have seen Commission 
decisions and commitments to ensure an acceptable level of interoperability post merger.   
The acquisition by Siemens of UGS Limited in 2007 was declared compatible by the 
Commission.523  Interoperability was considered by the Commission but the focus was on 
the interoperability of automation and control products (A&C) as this was a market that 
Siemens and UGS were both active in before the acquisition.  Only UGS was active in the 
PLM and 3D CAD market.524  The software market was defined as the PLM software market 
of which UGS’ market share for PLM and CAD was assessed at 10 -20% with Dassault 
Systems the only named competitor for CAD software.   
Interoperability featured several times in the decision with the Commission noting that 
Siemens proposed a new product that would have an open interface with some A&C 
solutions from both Siemens and some of its competitors.  The focus was on 
interoperability of A&C solutions as the area with some overlap in activity by Siemens and 
UGS.  Open standardised interfaces appear to be common feature of the A&C industry with 
organisations such as the OPC Foundation (www.opcfoundation.org).  There were concerns 
that a focus on solutions that fully integrated PLM and A&C would create the incentive and 
ability for Siemens to drive the standard-setting process favouring its own products.525  One 
competitor raised the concern that proprietary data interfaces between both PLM and A&C 
solutions would close the market to participants on either side.  A few customers were 
concerned they would become locked-in to the merging parties’ products as a switch to 
alternative suppliers would involve high integration and transaction costs.  Some 
competitors also feared that they would be prevented from effectively addressing the 
converging PLM and A&C markets in the future.  In response the Commission noted that 
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Siemens and UGS had been promoting and developing open and standardised interfaces to 
facilitate data exchange between PLM & A&C products from different vendors.   There 
would also be pressure from customers to keep interfaces open as while entirely new 
installations of PLM or automation products are uncommon customers prefer to ‘cherry-
pick’ the best product for their needs and they often have a multiple source policy.  There 
would be an incentive to move away from the stated present approach of ‘open and 
standard’ as this would involve re-engineering product interfaces to proprietary interfaces 
with consequent time and investment which would not suit the customers’ purchasing 
patterns and could put Siemens at a disadvantage.  Also the combined market share of the 
merging parties for the converging product market, PLM & A&C, was not large and did not 
make credible the foreclosure claims on either side of the PLM or A&C market.526 
The considerations of interoperability focused on the relationship between PLM and A&C as 
this was a developing trend and both Siemens and UGS were active in this area to some 
extent.  There appears to be an existing level of openness and standardisation in the A&C 
interfaces.  What was not considered was the interoperability of PLM itself or its 
constituent parts such as 3D CAD.  In this way the Merger Regulations played a limited ex 
ante role to promote open interface information but did not address wider competition law 
issues.  There was no consideration of the closed nature of the 3D CAD industry with only 2 
kernels and 2 competitors in the high end software – UGS and Dassault Systems.  While the 
Commission did consider possible consequences of integration of PLM and A&C solutions it 
did not consider what impact acquisition by Siemens could have on the constituent distinct 
product market.  As Siemens was not active in this market this was not considered 
necessary.  To some extent the Commission’s decision left the status quo unaltered 
although it has helped Siemens have the ability to sell a production line and ‘give away the 
3D CAD software’.527  This gives Siemens a further advantage to attract and then lock 
customers into its 3D CAD software.   
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The Commission did not require increased openness when Siemens entered the 3D CAD 
market.  The decisions in the Cisco merger and the Intel and McAfee merger illustrate 
however that competition law can provide an ex ante solution rather than an ex post 
remedy by acting to ensure disclosure of interface information and promote 
interoperability.  The Merger Regulations are considering circumstances that are structural 
and foreseeable and are suitable for an ex ante approach.  They are even able to consider 
mergers on a case-by-case basis which appears to give the optimal approach – the best of 
all worlds.  The Merger Regulations can promote interoperability where IPRs or other 
aspects of competition law fail to do so.  The 3D CAD industry could be looked at both for 
coordinated and non-coordinated behaviour but in the absence of a merger, acquisition or 
other concentration they do not provide an immediate remedy.  The Merger Regulations 
may have a role in preventing future exploitation of a lack of interoperability or closing of 
markets but will not provide a remedy to existing closed proprietary interfaces.          
5.7.3 Article 102 TFEU 
Article 102 is concerned with undertakings that have substantial market power which 
allows them to act to an appreciable extent independently of competitors, customers and 
consumers.
528
 This will allow them to have power over price or other factors such as quality, 
service, and innovation.  A second form of market power is the “power to exclude” with 
behaviour such as loyalty rebates, refusal to supply and predatory pricing.529  Article 102 is 
considered to be an important last resort to prevent the worst excesses of a lack of 
interoperability but is only available where there is dominance.  In an oligopolistic market 
collective dominance is needed which has been a very difficult concept to establish.   
The law that has developed to determine the concept of collective dominance has been 
applied both to existing oligopolies and to mergers but there are inherent differences 
between the two as oligopolies are unpredictable, “anything can happen”530 and regulation 
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is ex post whereas mergers are assessed ex ante but are predictable “tangible” events.531  
The scrutiny of ex post conduct, under Article 102, has been problematic and the cases and 
resultant judicial policy is perplexing and still requires development.532  What has emerged 
is said to be a three part test, where before the question of dominance and abuse are 
addressed, an assessment must be made as to whether the undertakings constitute a 
collective entity vis-a-vis their competitors, trading partners and consumers?533   Before the 
questions of dominance and abuse are addressed it is necessary to establish whether the 
undertakings are a collective entity.  This means whether they present themselves on the 
market as a single entity.  Perhaps the most important factor is whether they have a 
common marketing strategy.  This however is not particularly helpful to industries 
characterised by a lack of interoperability and lock-in as the effect of any common policy on 
interface information would be to compartmentalise the market rather than make it 
common and homogenous. 
To amount to a collective entity they must, from an economic point of view “present 
themselves or act together on a particular market as a collective entity.”534   There must 
also be sufficient transparency to enable entities to monitor each other’s behaviour, a 
threat of retaliation for deviation and to be sustainable it must not be susceptible to 
pressure from competitors, customers and consumers.535  The various judgements have 
spoken of “economic links” which could be an agreement, however legal links have been 
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said not to be indispensable to a finding of a collective entity.536   There has been debate as 
to whether the links that exist in a tight oligopoly could amount to economic links, however 
in the only cases that have been successfully brought under Article102, in which the 
undertakings were held to be abusing a collective dominant position, all had an existing 
legal agreement.  They mainly concern liner conferences where Article 102 was used 
because a block exemption made a case under Article101 uncertain. 
We certainly should not condemn all oligopolistic interdependence as this would be 
tantamount to condemning oligopolies per se.  Many oligopolies are naturally drawn to 
align their conduct because of market conditions.  The Court has approved of behaviour 
that allows undertakings to “adapt themselves intelligently to the existing and anticipated 
conduct of competitors.”537  There is a line to draw between tacit collusion and mere 
innocent parallel conduct on one hand and between tacit collusion and a concerted practice 
which is caught by Article 101(1).  To use interdependence as a link risks censuring the 
innocent.  The ECMR has permitted a finding of tacit collusion as leading to collective 
dominance and Piau538 seems to say the same criteria will apply to Article 102 cases.      
The 3D CAD industry has no known legal links between undertakings although there are 
licences of the software kernels.539  The absence of legal links means that, based on past 
decisions, Article 102 is not a viable means of regulating anti-competitive behaviour such as 
the refusal to supply interface information.  The criteria to determine collective dominance 
is not settled.  The importance and nature of economic links is uncertain and the case law in 
general is undeveloped.  To evaluate whether Article 102 could provide a remedy to abuse 
in the 3D CAD industry the background to collective dominance will be explored to see 
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whether it can provide a remedy to achieve the correct balance between openness and 
control in the 3D CAD software industry.   
5.7.3.1 Economic Links 
The General Court confirmed the principle of collective dominance in its judgment in the 
case known as Italian Flat Glass that: 
There is nothing in principle, to prevent two or more independent economic entities 
from being, on a specific market, united by such economic links that, by virtue of 
that fact, together they hold a dominant position vis-á-vis the other operators on 
the same market.540   
In the Italian Flat Glass case the General Court countered the position taken in Hoffman-La 
Roche that dominance is applicable only to independent undertakings and that a dominant 
position must be distinguished from parallel courses of conduct which are peculiar to 
oligopolies.541  The Court did however consider Article 101 and 102 conceptually 
independent of one another and overruled the Commission for merely ‘recycling the facts’ 
from Article 101 to Article 102.   The judgement did not expand on what behaviour might 
be required, or the concept ‘economic links’ but left this to subsequent cases.
542
   
The next cases to come before the European Courts concerned ‘liner conferences’ where 
agreements existed.543  The cases contained material abuses of Article 101 which detracted 
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from the understanding as to how Article 102 should operate.544  The conduct in both cases 
amounted to “overt collusion” with an explicit agreement.545   
One important point to come out of one of the liner conference cases, TACA, was that for 
the purposes of establishing the existence of a dominant position, it is not required that no 
competition exists between the undertakings.  This raises the possibility that oligopolies 
which compete on price could be caught for aligning other policies.546   This would allow 
enforcement proceedings to be brought where there is alignment on interface information 
even though price competition exists.  However given the conservative approach adopted 
by the Commission it is conceivable that any enforcement under Article 102 will be 
prioritised to focus on markets where there is a lack of effective competition on a large 
range of parameters.547  The issue of supplier lock-in is unlikely to be high priority for 
competition law enforcement save in cases that rival the Microsoft case for prominence and 
widespread impact.   
There has been much debate about the nature of ‘economic links’ and the term remains ill-
defined.  One model suggests the links can take the form of “links in law” which include the 
‘liner conference’ agreements seen in TACA and CEWAL as well as structural links such as 
cross shareholdings in the Irish Sugar548 case.  These economic links involve overt collusion 
allowing firms to substitute coordination for competition.  The cases where there was some 
form of agreement also involved possible infringements of Article 101 but as the agreement 
could benefit from a form of block exemption the Commission’s decision has also included 
infringement of Article 102. 
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In the merger case of Gencor brought under the ECMR, the Court, after referring to Flat 
Glass asserted that ‘[T]here is no reason whatsoever in legal or economic terms to exclude 
from the notion of economic links the relationship of interdependence existing between 
the parties to a tight oligopoly.’549  In Gencor the General Court implied that links of 
oligopolistic interdependence may be sufficient to establish joint dominance, at least, under 
the merger regulations, as well as the links of ownership or agreement.550 The decision by 
the General Court in Gencor indicated a more interventionist approach to oligopolies551 and 
was tacitly552 endorsed by the CJEU in Compagnie Maritime Belge. 553 Piau also supports the 
approach that tacit collusion or interdependence can apply under Article102 as well as the 
ECMR.554  But it must be difficult to distinguish undertakings which have aligned conduct 
due to market conditions rather than silent coordination.  It is a fine line and certainly not 
yet a bright-line distinction and there is a risk the approach creates uncertainty and 
censures the innocent.555    
5.7.3.2 Compagnie Maritime and Other Criteria 
In the Article 102 case of Compagnie Maritime, where the case before the CJEU was also 
known as CEWAL II, the CJEU suggested a broader interpretation of economic links, beyond 
the need for links in law.  ‘The existence of an agreement or of other links in law is not 
indispensable to the finding of a collective dominant position; such a finding may be based 
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on other connecting factors and would depend on an economic assessment and, in 
particular, on an assessment of the structure of the market in question.’556  This has been 
interpreted as amounting to tacit collusion by independent actions and without 
communicating with each other.557   Tacit collusion exists where the market enables firms 
to coordinate their behaviour without entering an agreement or concerted practice in the 
sense of Article 101(1).  Such behaviour advantages them at the expense of their customers 
and consumers.  It is not defined by the conduct itself, which could take various forms.  It is 
defined by the structure of the market which allows the behaviour to have a particular 
relevance and consequence.   
An alternative interpretation is of parallel conduct but without tacit collusion necessarily 
explaining the parallelism.558 Another label placed on the conduct is ‘oligopolistic 
interdependence’.  They both amount to analogous conduct of undertakings but without 
communication.  Any attempt to distinguish interdependence behaviour which included 
communication would probably bring us into the realm of Article 101(1), rather than 
collective dominance.   
In Compagnie the Court having introduced the possibility that links in law are indispensable 
spoke of an economic assessment and that a dominant position may be held by two or 
more economic entities legally independent of each other, ‘provided that from an economic 
point of view they present themselves or act together on a particular market as a collective 
entity’559… ‘vis-a-vis their competitors, their trading partners and consumers’560   This 
concept of presentation on the market as a single collective entity is arguably now the most 
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predominant criterion or approach to establish a collective dominance, rather than the 
more troublesome concept of links.561      
The CJEU spoke of a three stage test as it is only where the first question of collective entity 
is answered in the affirmative that it is appropriate to consider whether that collective 
entity actually holds a dominant position and whether its conduct constitutes abuse.562 The 
economic links or factors are examined for the purpose of establishing the existence of the 
collective entity as defined above.  Do the economic links between the undertakings enable 
them to act together independently of their competitors, customers and consumers?563 
This looks at the results of, rather than the nature of the links, an approach taken by 
Advocate General Fennelly in Compagnie 564 which is an effects based approach to 
collective dominance.565 
In Compagnie the Court did not clarify the extent to which competition in any form could 
exist within collective dominance.  Advocate General Fennelly considered that competition 
could exist based on parameters such as quality of service566 and the Commission 
considered that the existence of a “possible degree of competition between the parties”567 
does not rule out the finding of a collective dominance.568  Undertakings may, for example, 
act as a single unit on price while competing on other factors, such as quality.  While some 
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competition may not be fatal to the test it is unclear whether tacit collusion such as 
withholding of interface information could satisfy the test, even if its impact was 
aggravated by lock-in or network effects, if there was a degree of competition on price.    
There is no one model of an oligopolistic market.  Undertakings in an oligopoly may have 
different cost levels, their products will have some differentiation, there may be some 
customer loyalty and market shares may not be exactly equal.569  The ruling in Compagnie 
did not clarify the position for oligopolies falling short of the model oligopoly.570 
The following catalogue of market factors which contribute to conscious parallelism were 
adapted from the CJEU ruling in Compagnie and the writings of Patrick Ryan.571 The general 
factors are set out in bold followed by the specific relevance to the 3D CAD industry:       
Limited Competition - few competitors control the market for a given product.  There are 
four main suppliers of 3D CAD and only two or arguably three in the high-end market.   
Similar Products - products are homogenous or readily interchangeable.  The 3D CAD 
products are homogeneous.  One commentator suggested there was only a 10% difference 
in the systems.572  They are not however interchangeable.  The nature of interoperability is 
that even similar products are not interchangeable.  There is ambiguity as to whether the 
suggested criteria requires products to be homogenous or readily interchangeable, or and 
interchangeable.  Interchangeable may be used in the sense of substitutable i.e. similar or 
substitutable.  In any event a lack of interoperability in the 3D CAD market means that 
products which are similar cannot be interchanged or substituted.  It would be ironic if this 
feature which is central to any conscious parallelism prevents them from being considered 
collectively dominant.     
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Competitive Price Structures – due to the pricing structure of the market, competing 
companies are almost immediately sensitive to price changes.  Pricing in the industry is 
very complex and particularly in the high-end market will be tailored to the customers’ 
requirements using “value pricing”.573  Although suppliers have similar 3D CAD products 
there is a distinction in marketing approach and other products and value they can supply.  
Pricing is not transparent and there will be a delay in responding to a price change.  In any 
event lack of interoperability will hinder customers changing unless there was a drastic 
price cut.   
Comparable Production Costs - the production costs of the participants are similar as there 
are few raw materials or other tangibles involved.  The main costs are wages, marketing and 
establishment costs.  All the suppliers are based in America or Europe with international 
offices.  They certainly have the opportunity to have similar costs.   
Long- Standing Associations – The lack of interoperability means customers are locked-in to 
suppliers and the market is characterised by long-term relationships between user and 
supplier.  There have also been long standing associations within the industry such as the 
cross-licensing of the kernels and the marketing arrangement between Dassault Systemes 
and IBM. 
Sufficient Market Share – the market is well established and firms are satisfied with their 
current market share.  This is difficult to assess.  The suppliers have an obligation to their 
shareholders to maximise profits which normally is an incentive to increase market share 
unless higher profits can be achieved by coordination.  The technical challenges of 
interoperability may however make it difficult to gain new customers even in the absence 
of coordination.  Switching to new suppliers is uncommon in the industry.574  Suppliers may 
accept the current market share in 3D CAD and look to other products in the PLM range 
where there is more interoperability and they can compete more easily for market share.  
Lack of interoperability in the 3D CAD products means there are high barriers to entry so 
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entry to the market is difficult.  There have recently been some changes in major OEMs 
switching providers including Daimler.575 
The 3D CAD market meets all but two of the criteria namely transparent pricing and 
interchangeable products.  The failure to offer interchangeable products is caused by the 
lack of interoperability which could be caused by conscious parallelism.   
5.7.3.3 Airtours & Impala 
Following the judgement in Compagnie it is recognised that a threefold test exists to 
establish abuse of collective dominance, namely: first establish collective entity and then 
dominance and then the abuse.  The Commission decisions on collective dominance under 
Article 102 had a predominantly static analytical approach based on market structure, but 
Article 102 is designed to handle ‘conduct related retrospective’ abusive behaviour.576  In 
merger proceedings the Commission considered more dynamic, prospective structure 
related criteria including cheating incentives and the possibility of retaliation when 
determining the stability of any collusion.  In the important judgement of Airtours577 a 
forward looking analytical approach was displayed and attention paid to the economic 
rationality of tacit co-operation and whether the conditions existed for its lasting 
sustainability.578   Examination of cheating incentives, monitoring of deterrence and 
sanctioning any deviation from a common policy indicates a trend towards a conduct-
related analytical approach.579  When Airtours came before the ECMR a further threefold 
test was introduced to determine the first part of the Compagnie test, namely whether the 
undertakings are a “collective entity”. 
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 The three elements of the Airtours test: 
 The market must be sufficiently transparent for the undertakings which co-ordinate 
their conduct to be able to monitor sufficiently whether the rules of co-ordination 
are being observed. 
 There must be a form of deterrent mechanism in the event of deviant conduct 
 The restrictions on current and future competitors and the reactions of customers 
should not be able to jeopardise the results expected from the co-ordination.580 
The Airtours criteria have been adopted in the Guidelines on Horizontal Mergers to 
determine whether the coordination could be sustainable. 581  The word transparency 
replaced by the need to “monitor to a sufficient degree whether the terms of coordination 
are being adhered to”.582  This combined with the credible deterrent mechanism and the 
inability of customers to jeopardise the results are considered necessary if the coordination 
is to last long enough to have a significant impact on competition in the market.583  
Economic theory is that cartels are unstable and liable to defections without the risks of 
retaliation.  Retaliation includes the return to competition.  Collusion also requires that 
neither competitors nor customers can jeopardise the expected results of coordination.584   
In addition to transparency the oligopoly must be relatively easy to monitor, sell 
homogenous goods and be stable.  Transparency was particularly important in Airtours and 
while there were publically available list prices the type of discount available undermined 
the transparency.  The CJEU also said it must be clear at what level co-ordination is 
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occurring and how it can be monitored.585 Stability requires transparency and effective 
deterrents, such as the threat of price wars or poaching key personnel.  Without 
transparency firms cannot decode rivals signals to behave in a certain way.  For tacit 
collusion to occur essential data must be available from which to be able to infer all that is 
needed for collusion.   
The high-end 3D CAD suppliers had complex pricing and the mid-range had published price 
lists against which they give discounts.586  The discount information may not be publically 
available.  In Airtours the discounts meant the market was not transparent.  Price does not 
have to be the main area of coordination.  Supplier’s policies on disclosure of interface 
information may appear to be public but could be complex and uncertain.  The perception 
of the industry is that while there is poor interoperability across the industry the suppliers 
appear to have a slightly different attitude.  Some emphasise they can meet all of their 
customers’ needs and give data integrity while others appear to appreciate that openness 
and standards can have marketing benefits, but the difference in attitude is small compared 
to the level of incompatibility in the industry. 587     
An absence of competitive constraints or external force which can undermine the 
constituent undertakings strategy will make the oligopoly stable.   The present lack of 
interoperability means there are restrictions on competitors and customers as customers 
are locked-in to the software but it is difficult to predict on an individual basis the extent of 
the restriction.  Criteria, other than transparency are not applied so strictly, for example 
retaliation may just take the form of uncertainty about the effect a deviation may have on 
profits.588  The deterrent mechanism may be viewed as the incentive to go on with the 
status quo.  When the equilibrium depends on a refusal to deal even a single defection 
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could destroy the collusion with no going back.  A downstream market could be opened up 
which would affect the collusive profits.  These could prevent cheating without the need for 
menacing retaliation.589  One supplier adopting a policy to disclose interface information or 
moving to an effective open standard would mean there was no going back as customers’ 
expectations would require other suppliers to disclose interface information.   
By contrast symmetry between undertakings is less crucial in a tight oligopoly.590  Small and 
large firms may have different incentives and defection and retaliation depend on an 
increase in supply and the capacity of the firm.  This favours bigger firms which normally 
gives them an incentive to undercut and increase output while retaliation by small firms is a 
weaker deterrent threat.  However in a tight oligopoly with high barriers to entry bigger 
firms may prefer to give price leadership rather than expand.  This may optimise profits for 
all.  Asymmetry may be relevant when the competition concerns are price collusion as size 
and capacity are more relevant but with a joint refusal to deal, because the power does not 
depend on size alone, the field may be more level.591  Prior to Siemens acquisition of USG 
the suppliers were of similar size.  Siemens has acquired major OEM accounts but there is 
no evidence of any significant change in pricing or openness in the industry.592       
The General Court in Impala593 applied the Airtours criteria but also considered the Airtours 
criteria might: 
“be established indirectly on the basis of what may be a very mixed series of indicia 
and items relating to the signs, manifestations and phenomena inherent in the 
presence of a collective dominant position”  and “[A] finding of a common policy 
over a long period, together with the presence of a series of other factors 
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characteristic of a collective dominant position, might, in certain circumstances and 
in the absence of an alternative explanation, suffice to demonstrate the existence of 
a dominant position, as opposed to the creation of such a position, without it being 
necessary to positively establish market transparency.”594     
The Airtours criteria were therefore considered not the only way to establish collective 
dominance.  The essential element appears to be a common policy over a long period.  
Applied to Article 102 and interoperability this would mean that collective dominance could 
be established either by the Airtours three point test, which would require a transparent 
market, or by establishing a common policy by other means including ‘indicia, signs and 
manifestations and other factors’ which cannot otherwise be explained.  The judgement in 
Impala considered there would also have to be a series of other factors characteristic of a 
collective dominant position which do not have an alternative explanation.
595
  One common 
policy could be the practice of not disclosing interface information.  Other factors would be 
prices maintained at a stable and unexplained high level, another could be stability of 
market share.   
When the Impala case was appealed to the CJEU the Court applied the Airtours criteria but 
it did not criticise the alternative proposed by the General Court.596  The CJEU also said the 
existence of an agreement or of other links in law are not essential to a finding of collective 
dominance “Such a finding may be based on other connecting factors and would depend on 
an economic assessment and, in particular, on an assessment of the structure of the market 
in question.”597 
The Court then spoke of correlative factors which allowed for the adoption of a common 
policy to profit from a situation of collective economic strength, without actual or potential 
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competitors, customers or consumers who could react effectively.598  The correlative 
factors were said to include parties to a tight oligopoly in a transparent, homogenous 
market who can anticipate and align behaviour or face retaliation599 – effectively meet the 
Airtours test.   
The CJEU appears to consider that the Airtours criteria are not exhaustive factors required 
for collective dominance.  This is corroborated by the statement by the CJEU that the 
Airtours test is not incompatible with the criteria set out in the General Court in its 
judgement (the Impala criteria).600  The CJEU listed examples of the conduct that could be 
aligned, and presumably also constituted the abuse, as increasing prices, reducing output, 
the choice or quality of goods and services, diminishing innovation or otherwise influencing 
the parameters of competition.  The willingness to include a wide variety of potential abuse 
raises the potential to include the refusal to supply interface information.  However if there 
are IPRs in the information, the exceptional circumstances test would also have to be 
satisfied before the refusal would be unlawful and a remedy available.     
The CJEU then considered how the co-ordination might work.  It was observed that a lack of 
shared tacit understanding of the terms of co-ordination might result in the parties 
resorting to tactics that would be caught by Article 101.601  It was also considered important 
that the common policy was sustainable.602  The temptation to depart from the tacit co-
ordination to achieve short term profits must be countered by the ability to monitor 
adherence which requires a market sufficiently transparent for each undertaking to be 
aware, sufficiently precisely and quickly of each other and of how the co-ordination is 
evolving.  There must also be a credible deterrent mechanism while the anticipated results 
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of the common policy should not be jeopardised by current or future competitors or the 
reaction of customers.  The need for sustainability could be said to equate with the need 
for market share to not be transient in order to achieve market power.603      
The Impala criteria could be summarised as a common policy on a market due to correlative 
factors such as market concentration, transparency and product homogeneity, that allows 
conduct maximising profits to be aligned and sustained which is to a significant extent 
independent of their competitors, customers and consumers.604  The CJEU considered that 
the criteria should not be applied in a mechanical approach and each aspect of the criteria 
should not be looked at in isolation.  It should be carried out using the mechanism of a 
hypothetical tacit co-ordination as a basis.605 
Airtours concerned proceedings under the Merger Regulations where the Commission has 
to predict whether a merger will result in tacit co-ordination.  Laurent Piau confirmed that 
the same criteria should apply to Article 102 cases.606  Enforcement under Article 102 is ex 
post and it is reasonable to expect a higher standard of proof607 to avoid falling the wrong 
side of the thin line and a false positive decision.  An example of this is the application of 
the second Airtours criteria where the Commission was only required to show that a 
potential retaliatory mechanism was present rather than evidence of the existence of a 
specific retaliatory mechanism.    
Regardless of what has been said in Airtours and Impala it must be remembered that 
collective dominance was only found to exist in Article102 proceedings where there was 
some agreement of a contractual nature or participation in an industry association such as 
the liner conference arrangements.  National cases have accepted the ruling in Laurent Piau 
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extending the Airtours criteria to Article 102 but did eventually dismiss the claims either for 
failure to establish abuse, because of insufficient evidence or because of market 
characteristics incompatible with a finding of collective dominance.608  In one case it was 
said that in the absence of structural links the finding of collective abuse was subject to a 
stricter burden of proof which required consistent evidence of a stable convergence of 
commercial policies leading to an impairment of competition.609  
5.7.4 Collective Dominance in the Telecommunications Framework 
Collective dominance in the telecommunications industry is addressed in the Commission’s 
Guidance on the regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and 
services.610   The Guidelines summarise the jurisprudence of the General Court and CJEU 
and refer to the Framework Directive611 and sets out a shorter list of the appropriate 
characteristics most relevant to an assessment of joint dominance in the context of 
electronic communications: low elasticity of demand, similar market shares, high legal or 
economic barriers to entry, vertical integration with collective refusal to supply, lack of 
countervailing buyer power, and lack of potential competition.  The list is a non-exhaustive 
and non-cumulative list of market characteristics which in addition to market concentration 
and transparency would illustrate the sort of evidence that would support an assertion of 
collective dominance by tacit coordination.  The Guidance goes on to emphasise that an 
overall assessment is required rather than a mechanistic ‘check list’ approach and that 
although links are not a prerequisite they can be useful with other factors to establish 
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collective dominance and a strong incentive to converge to a coordinated market outcome 
rather than rely on competition.         
Copyright’s impediment to interoperability is caused by a scope of protection that is too 
broad when it protects the software interface, particularly as it restricts access.  There are 
useful comparisons to be drawn between the telecommunications industry and software 
industries such as the 3D CAD industry.  Legislators and regulators have had several decades 
of experience trying to ensure horizontal interconnection by telecoms operators which is 
essential to ensure competition and investment. The result is a system of sector specific ex 
ante regulation that is a trade-off between the flexibility of ex post competition law and the 
certainty of ex ante legislation.612  
There are however structural and technology differences.  The origins of the telecoms 
industry was as a public utility and state monopoly.  There are simpler, physical 
interconnections with less IPRs.    Network effects remain paramount, the infrastructure 
complex and standards common.  Regulation has worked to ensure the incumbents allow 
access to newcomers to encourage competition.  The software industry by contrast is far 
more varied, almost chaotic, and requires less investment in infrastructure.  Suppliers have 
grown from entrepreneurial creativity rather than the break-up of state monopolies with 
open source a disparate but successful community.    
One aspect of the horizontal regulation of the telecommunications industry has focused on 
an ex ante approach to reallocate rights, that are foreseeable and structurally harmful to 
competition, away from incumbents who already have a significant market share.  The 
problem is very much structural in nature requiring an ex ante approach rather than a 
competition law approach under Article 102 which focuses on abusive behaviour.  As the 
cause of the problem is historical and structural it would be wrong to identify that 
behaviour as abusive.613  The historical structural problem is overcome by specific national 
regulatory bodies which initiate a complex analysis to assess whether an operator has 
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significant market power and impose ex ante access duties on them but only temporarily to 
allow competition to develop.  Subsequent review is ex post by general competition law.  
Part of the analysis of significant market power is the assessment of collective dominance 
under the Guidelines discussed above.  This would allow regulation ex ante.  The similarities 
between telecommunications and software indicate the Commission might be open to 
consideration of collective dominance in software industries.  
Another role for regulators is the more permanent horizontal interconnection between 
networks which apply even in the absence of significant market power.614  This role is 
particularly relevant to the public utility nature of the telecommunications industry where 
users need to have safeguards that ensure any-to-any connectivity.  The regulations remove 
the need to satisfy the exceptional circumstances test and the high test for indispensability 
set in Bronner which would otherwise require operators to invest in their own network.  
The Access Directive615 promotes commercial negotiations between operators to achieve 
interconnections which is similar to reverse engineering of software in that it provides an 
instrument for access but does not guarantee the outcome.  The national regulatory body 
may intervene to ensure that interconnection is achieved.  Relying on its’ own analysis and 
expertise it can impose ex ante forward looking obligations.  This intervention does not 
require a finding of collective dominance.  It is more akin to the role of exclusions to IPRs 
such as reverse engineering and comparison of this mechanism will be considered later in 
Chapter 8 when considering recommendations and remedies to achieve interoperability.616  
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5.7.5 Abuse 
In Compagnie the CJEU spent little time on the concept of abuse.617  Citing Michelin v 
Commission,618 the CJEU considered there was a breach of the special responsibility on 
dominant undertakings not to allow their conduct to impair genuine undistorted 
competition.619  They ignored the argument that the parties were reacting intelligently to 
the market.  They also ignored the argument that predatory pricing had not taken place as 
prices had remained above cost.620    
Dominance of itself is not unlawful but constructing the concept of collective dominance 
necessitates filling the gaps in legal rules that were not designed with oligopolies in mind.  
By the time the tests are all met the step between establishing collective dominance and 
proving abuse appears much smaller.  This could imply that it is the structure of the 
oligopolistic market which constitutes the abuse, rather than the behaviour of the 
undertakings.  The corollary of this is however that firms in an oligopolistic market could be 
under an obligation not to react intelligently to the market to avoid committing an abuse 
which works against the nature of competition and takes intervention to an antithetical 
extreme.621  
The case law on what amounts to abuse by collective dominant entities is under-
developed.622  It has been asserted that a causal link between dominance and the abuse is 
not necessary so the anti-competitive effects need not result from the dominance.  
Presumably this argument would mean the same behaviour does not have to be 
                                                     
617
 Lorna McGregor, ‘The future for the control of oligopolies following Compagnie Maritime Belge’ (2001) 22 
ECLR 434, 437 
618
 Case 322/81 Michelin v Commission[1983] ECR 3461; [1985] 1 CMLR 282 
619
 CEWAL II, 85 
620
 Case 62/86 AKZO v Commission [1991] ECR I-3359; [1993] 5 CMLR 215 
621
 Lorna McGregor, ‘The future for the control of oligopolies following Compagnie Maritime Belge’ (2001) 22 
ECLR 434, 437 
622
 Richard Whish and David Bailey, Competition Law (8th edn, Oxford University Press 2015) 615  
187 
 
 
responsible for satisfying three elements of the test in Compaignie.623  This could mean that 
where the abuse is the refusal to supply interface information it is not essential to show 
that a lack of interoperability was relevant to establishing a collective entity and 
dominance, or indeed vice versa. 
Behaviour such as refusing to supply an undertaking or targeting new entrants to a market 
is difficult to explain without some element of collusive behaviour.624  It is by no means 
certain that refusal to supply would amount to an abuse of collective dominance.  Where 
however a lack of interoperability is a significant feature in an industry, it is feasible that 
refusing to disclose interface information could amount to abuse.  The same could also 
apply to non-collusive parallel behaviour reducing innovation or maintaining 
inefficiencies.625         
The abuse does not have to be the action of all the undertakings.  Undertakings occupying a 
joint dominant position may engage in joint or individual abusive conduct.626  This raises 
questions as to how this fits with the requirement “to present themselves or act together ... 
as a collective entity.” It may also be difficult to apply the concept where some 
undertakings in the collective entity have smaller market share and behaviour could be 
more about keeping pace with the market leader.  
The only defence to a claim of abuse is to show that the welfare effects of the actions are 
pro rather than anti-competitive.  Following Oscar Bronner in the context of refusal to 
supply, the Commission must assess the competitive impact rather than rely on the 
                                                     
623
 See also the all elements of the “three prong” test to establish collective entity before establishing the 
dominance and the abuse, as advocated by Barry Hawk and Giorgio Motta, ‘Oligopolies and Collective 
Dominance: A Solution in Search of a Problem’ Treviso Conference on Antitrust Between EC Law and National 
Law, Eighth Edition; Fordham Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 1301693. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1301693, 76  
624
 Alison Jones and Brenda Sufrin, EC Competition Law (5th edn, OUP 2014), 724  
625
 Ibid 932.  The 3 D CAD industry’s investment in Research and Development indicates no policy of reducing 
innovation – see Chapter 4 eg 4.7.3.2 Dassault Systemes spend more than 20% of revenue on R&D   
626
 Irish Sugar plc v Commission, para 66 
188 
 
 
proportionality standard.   This requires complex and expensive economic analysis where 
economic evidence is often ambiguous.  The alternative proportionality standard, under 
which an undertaking could demonstrate the actions are the method by which then can try 
to compete is not appropriate for the effects-based concept of abuse and welfare analysis is 
more appropriate.627      
5.7.6 Remedies 
A fundamental problem with the logic of using collective dominance to control oligopolies is 
that undertakings could be penalised for economically rational behaviour.  The CJEU has 
said that undertakings have the “right to adapt themselves intelligently to the existing and 
anticipated conduct of their competitors”.628  If Article 102 is used to penalise behaviour of 
this nature, when Article 101 could not be used to penalise the economically rational 
reactions of oligopolists, as confirmed by the decision in Wood Pulp, the parties’ legitimate 
expectations are infringed.629    
There is also the issue that where the abuse amounts to an intelligent adaption to the 
market, how can intervention provide an effective remedy to the alleged abuse without 
distorting the market?  A fine is unlikely to stop them reacting to each other’s behaviour 
and could distort the market irrationally and is tantamount to a tax on structure.630  
Ordering parties to stop “agreeing” by tacit price coordination amounts to compelling 
marginal cost pricing and the competition authority or court becomes a price control 
body.631  A behavioural remedy not to respond to each other is little better and difficult to 
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enforce.  A structural order of divesture is complex and may go against the efficient order of 
the market.632   
Fortunately however where a lack of interoperability is a cause or a factor in the collective 
dominance, or the abuse, an order for disclosure of interface information could, on one 
level, provide an effective remedy.  An order requiring disclosure of interface information 
would be a direct response to the issue, more so than a fine, and less interventionist than 
remedies such as divestiture.  This would meet the limited approach and criteria of 
remediability where oligopoly behaviour is only interfered with when the Commission can 
prescribe a remedy.  In the same way that advanced price announcements and most-
favoured-nation clauses which can facilitate price coordination in a tight oligopoly have 
been remedied, the disclosure of interface information can also be remedied by this limited 
approach.
633
 However Microsoft revealed the expense and complexity of an order to 
disclose interface information.  There was considerable uncertainty about what information 
Microsoft was required to disclose and Microsoft had to employ 210 software engineers 
and spent tens of thousands of hours to write the required specification.634   In many 
instances it will not be a cheap remedy and an inefficient one as it creates considerable 
work which may need to be repeated each time a new version of software is released.  
There is also the recurrent issue of whether disclosing interface information which can 
include IPRs has a negative effect on incentives to invest although the indirect effect of 
controlling the interface information reduces the strength of this argument.635  
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5.8 Alternative Methods under Competition Law  
The Commission has power which can be exercised widely to conduct sector inquiries under 
Article 17, Regulation 1/2003 to collect information but not to impose remedies.  The 
Commission would have to use powers such as under Article 102 if breaches of competition 
law were identified.  A number of enquiries have taken place since 2004 into large strategic 
market areas including telecommunications, energy and pharmaceuticals.636  An enquiry 
into the more niche 3D CAD industry is not expected, even though the issue of 
interoperability has been recognised to some extent by the Commission.637  An inquiry has 
the advantage that it can disclose information without attributing fault, at least initially.  A 
disadvantage to using this power is that while it would only improve interoperability in a 
single industry.  The outcome could however send clear signals to suppliers in other 
industries afflicted by a lack of interoperability.    The concept of lack of interoperability is 
now foreseeable and an ex ante change to IPRs could be more universal and appropriate.  
An oligopolistic market will not have a dominant supplier unless there is collective 
dominance.  The complexity of establishing collective dominance removes its effectiveness.  
Members States can have rules that are more stringent than Article 102638 and several have 
the concept of dominant bargaining position or abuse of economic dependence.  This 
applies where a definition of the market leaves no incumbent dominant undertaking but 
abuse occurs in the incidence of contractual relations between firms or towards 
customers.639 Germany identified conduct that could amount to abuse of a dominant 
bargaining position under their national legislation as the deliberate non-disclosure of 
interface information in the software sector by a car-manufacturer.640  Laws in six other 
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countries can also sanction abuse of dominant bargaining position or economic dependence 
in some form641  Suppliers of translation or complementary software such as CAE software, 
faced with discrimination or a change in the practice of disclosure or interface information, 
could conceivably bring a claim against one of the 3D CAD suppliers under national law to 
force the disclosure of interface information.  With a market that is Europe wide or global 
this would be a tactical and hostile move carrying risks for the complainant.  Interfaces as 
standards have an amplifying effect which justifies distinct consideration under the 
exceptional circumstance test and competition conditions more generally.642 The lack of 
interoperability causes lock-in and high switching costs which differentiates the software 
with barriers to entry.643  A move away from a structural approach to dominance, with the 
present focuses on market share, to assessing the ability to behave independently of 
competitors, customers and consumers644 could allow for a more dynamic analysis645 of the 
3D CAD industry.  However In the absence of wholesale change, or software being made a 
special case, Article 102 will not provide a solution and as the lack of interoperability is 
foreseeable an ex ante change to IPRs may be more appropriate646 and achievable.647 
5.9 Summary: Does Competition Law Provide an Effective Solution? 
Lack of interoperability reduces the interchangeability of otherwise homogenous goods and 
causes lock-in due to switching costs.  Whether this will definitively reduce market 
definition to single suppliers rather than high-end or middle range software is beyond the 
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scope of this thesis.  In all likelihood though, neither dominance nor dominant bargaining 
position, will provide imminent relief to users of 3D CAD software.         
The 3D CAD market is a tight oligopoly but the lack of pricing transparency or 
interchangeable products probably prevents the suppliers presenting themselves or acting 
together from an economic perspective as a collective entity.648   With a small number of 
suppliers they can monitor each other but pricing and the products themselves are complex 
and opaque.  No evidence has been discovered of price coordination and research and 
development infers no plan to limit innovation.649  The industry does not therefore meet 
the Airtours test.  There are also no legal or economic links in the nature of Compagnie 
Maritime.650 The Commission has been very cautious about using Article 102 to outlaw 
parallel behaviour.  It appears to prefer to use merger control or sector-specific legislation 
to address the oligopoly problem.  Of the few collective dominance decisions of the 
Commission, there have been none under Article 102 where oligopolistic interdependence 
was held to be a sufficient connecting element to justify a dominant position.  In most cases 
some legal or similar links existed and the Commission’s use of Article 102 could be 
explained by the need to circumvent Article 101(3) exemptions or immunity from fines.651    
There are many differences between Article 102 cases and merger control and the required 
standard of proof.  The standard of proof under Article 102 should be more stringent not 
least because of the backward looking nature of the Article.  The use of merger control to 
regulate interoperability is not however a full answer to the problems posed by a lack of 
interoperability.   
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 Interfaces can contain copyright, patents and trade secrets.  While certain aspects of the 
interface may be excluded from copyright652 due to the complex nature of software, there 
may be cases where in order to give sufficient information to achieve effective 
interoperability code or other information protected by copyright or patents must be 
supplied.  In Microsoft the General Court proceeded on an assumption that IPRs existed.  
With that approach, where the abuse is the refusal to supply interface information the 
exceptional circumstances test must also be met.  This presents another hurdle increasing 
the complexity of the remedy and reducing the effectiveness of the deterrent.         
Interoperability does have a remedy in the disclosure of interface information, which is not 
the case for most abuses of collective dominance.  The weakness is in the nature of the 
tests that have to be met and the complexity of the procedure before the remedy can be 
achieved.  There are too many hoops to jump through particularly as there has not yet been 
an Article 102 remedy that did not have economic links, for example in the form of 
contracts.   
Competition law should be reserved for exceptional circumstances where the imbalance 
between openness and control are not anticipated by the ex ante intellectual property 
approach.  In the case of software the need for exceptions for interface information is 
structural and anticipated.653   The potential for competition law intervention creating 
uncertainty for suppliers and the possibility of false positives reduces the effectiveness of 
competition law even as a remedy of last resort.    
Competition law does not provide effective regulation, even of last resort, for oligopolistic 
suppliers of complex 3D CAD software.  The suppliers are however aware that as an 
oligopoly competition is susceptible to scrutiny under competition law and certain practices 
may be considered an abuse.654  The existence of competition law remedies may 
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concentrate the minds of the suppliers to deter them from substituting competition for 
coordinated behaviour.  However the nebulous, uncertain nature of collective dominance 
means that it will almost certainly fail to create an effective incentive for informed suppliers 
to make their interface information available voluntarily.  It is an ex post remedy which is so 
unlikely to succeed that the risk of violation is small.  Abuse of collective dominance under 
Article 102 does not provide a realistic sanction to any parallelism in the refusal to supply 
interface information and does not promote progress to a more open environment in the 
3D CAD industry.   
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CHAPTER 6. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION OF INTERFACES 
6.1 Introduction 
The aim of literary copyright is to protect creativity rather than functionality, whereas the 
value of computer programs lies in their functionality and their algorithms, and not the 
more prosaic code used to achieve that functionality.  There is a fundamental mismatch, 
and suppliers turn to protecting their interface information because of the lack of 
protection for parts of the program which truly merit protection.655  This is exacerbated by 
the fact this is one of the rare occurrences when an IPR is not disclosed.  Whatever the 
copyright status of the interface, the situation remains that the user cannot readily see the 
rules and codes of the software.  Disclosure is the price usually paid for IPRs, but here there 
is no such requirement and this hampers competition by substitution or follow on 
technology.  Network effects are reinforced as the boundaries of the network are 
established by poor interface information causing a lack of interoperability.  The market has 
to rely on breakthrough technology, which, as seen in Microsoft, has to contend with 
sophisticated behaviour to protect interfaces.   
Restrictions on reverse engineering under the Software Directive give additional protection 
akin to trade secrets, and suppliers also file patents to give protection to functional aspects 
of the software.  This and subsequent Chapters will consider the impact of these IPRs and 
the legal consequences of copyright protecting functionality and hidden interfaces. 
6.2 Intellectual Property Rights in Interfaces 
Proprietary software companies in the 3D CAD industry protect their software by copyright, 
trade secrets and patents.  
Stated policies of the suppliers include:    
“We maintain an active program to legally protect our investment in technology 
through intellectual property rights. We protect our intellectual property through a 
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combination of patent, copyright, trademark and trade secret protections, 
confidentiality procedures and contractual provisions.”656 
“Our software products and related technical know-how, along with our trademarks, 
including our company names, product names and logos, are proprietary. We 
protect our intellectual property rights in these items by relying on copyrights, 
trademarks, patents and common law safeguards, including trade secret 
protection.657 
These IPRs prevent the code or function being copied, and give the suppliers control over 
whether other suppliers can design products which are compatible with and interoperate 
with each other.  In some industries firms may adopt a business strategy with open and 
non-proprietary interface information, as they benefit from network effects for their 
systems.  Developers of platforms have an incentive to allow other developers to create 
applications to work on their platforms but may not be open to potential rival platforms.658  
The 3D CAD industry has almost always adopted a proprietary closed approach.659  Even 
where an open approach is adopted this can change over time and an interface is always 
vulnerable and could change and become unavailable unless it is adopted as a standard.660 
The main purpose of software standards is to increase interoperability.  Software 
interoperability is achieved through software interfaces, particularly the data formats but 
also APIs and protocols.  Proprietary software interfaces are not readily available (because 
they are not published or even properly recorded) and are often protected by IPRs.  
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Adopting standards for the interfaces helps to record and publish the interfaces but the 
adoption of standards incorporating IPRs raises several issues as to how the demands of 
both interests can be met.   
6.3 Economic Rationale behind for Copyright Exemption for Interfaces 
Copyright endows the creator with exclusive rights over its original creations for a period of 
time.  This is done to raise the supply of works closer to a socially desirable level.  The 
economic rationale for copyright law is to give an incentive to produce creative work and 
avoid ‘underproduction.’  There is a trade-off between the interests of producers and 
consumers.
661
  Higher prices and access costs naturally result from the copyright monopoly 
and consumers that value the work at more than the marginal cost may not pay the higher 
price resulting in ‘under-utilisation’.  The higher prices can also deter innovation by other 
creators who would otherwise have built on the prior work.662  The value of interfaces relies 
on their indirect effects rather that their intrinsic innovation.663  Overprotection of 
interfaces, which results in a failure to differentiate between the prices and access costs for 
interface and the more valuable subject matter, may result in under-utilisation.  At the 
same time lack of access to interface information can harm follow on competition and 
cause underproduction. 
Copyright is a form of intervention in a public good for works that are non-rival.664  For 
software, copyright law is not effective at solving the public-good problem in the way 
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normally addressed by IPRs as copyright targets the portion of the good that in itself has no 
value, namely the writing.665  The law should minimise transaction costs, which include the 
costs of contracting and protecting property rights, to avoid inefficiencies.666 The costs 
involved in administering and enforcing the copyright regime are ‘deadweight loss’ as they 
use resources without adding value.667  A market can fail to develop when transaction costs 
exceed the value of copies to individual users.668   
Welfare economics recognises the costs and benefits of copyright to society.  Interfaces can 
bring network effects and network externalities which benefit social welfare and as 
consumers benefit from the network externalities they can be willing to pay a higher price 
for the benefits while producers make higher revenues.669  The case for IPRs in computer 
programs is to improve the creation, innovation and dissemination of knowledge to enable 
a competitive and prosperous software market.670  However as information is a public good 
that has been privatised by the creation of copyright only a second-best solution can be 
achieved.671  Pareto optimality is not achievable and the cost-benefit analysis is only 
credible if measured empirically.672  This supports the challenge of identifying the correct 
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balance between openness and control.673  Nevertheless since Landes and Posner’s 
maximisation of economic welfare thesis, which has been built on by subsequent 
commentators, it is accepted that the balance must be struck.674  Overly strong protection 
with no exemptions raises transactions costs, transferring rents to suppliers from users.  An 
excessively weak regime which gives insufficient incentives reduces costs, earnings and also 
incentives.675  Copyright is not unconditional but there must be trade-offs with other 
objectives and values.  The law attempts to strike a balance between protecting the creator 
and the costs imposed on other creators, such as the cost of obtaining permission to use 
copyright protected work.676 Legal exceptions have arisen for these socially desirable 
purposes, for example to enable interoperability.    
6.4 Is there Copyright in Software Interfaces? 
The Software Directive gave copyright protection to computer programs, but interfaces are 
considered an exception.677  The status and limits of the exception have not yet been finally 
and comprehensively established, but a case before the CJEU ruled that the format of data 
files did not constitute expression.678   The judgement has justifiably been criticised as being 
“at times, disappointingly compressed, if not obscure.”679  The Advocate General’s opinion 
also had failings as it did not answer the questions referred directly but he did say that the 
Directive “does not exclude interfaces from copyright protection”, merely the ideas and 
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principles underlying the interface.680  The CJEU ruled that as the format of data files is used 
to exploit certain functions they do not constitute a form of expression and, as such, are 
not protected by copyright.681  So while the source code and machine code of interfaces 
may not per se be outside the protection of copyright, there are certain aspects, such as 
specifications and protocols (the aspects relevant to standards) which are not expressions 
but ideas and principles and thus not copyright protected.  When interpreting the Software 
Directive the CJEU must take account of TRIPS which gives copyright protection to 
expressions but not to “ideas, procedures, methods of operation or mathematical concepts 
as such” (emphasis added).  Interfaces have been interpreted as methods of operation682 
and hence not copyright protected.   
Copyright is a weak protection intended for literary and artistic expression that is normally 
exposed to numerous competing expressions.  Unlike a work of art or the words of a book, 
the copyright protected material in software is not normally visible or readable.  The 
supplier usually only distributes the program in machine code and not in human readable 
source code.683  This gives a much stronger protection than is normally associated with 
copyright protection and creates a unique form of IPR.684  Not only is the source code not 
distributed but the supplier may also claim to protect it as a trade secret.  This means that 
while the interface may not be copyright protected it is inaccessible, and thus 
interoperability is hindered.    
The Software Directive attempts to address this by permitting certain acts that would 
normally contravene copyright.  One such act is to decompile machine code to re-create a 
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higher level, human readable language.  This form of reverse engineering is only permitted 
to obtain information for the purpose of interoperability.  Subject to such restrictions in the 
Directive, reverse engineering is permitted even though the supplier claims trade secrets in 
the source code.  Reverse engineering is common and often an effective means of achieving 
compatibility.  While it is not a complete remedy, as software systems are complex and 
interfaces can change when new versions are released, it is difficult to see how a supplier 
could justify royalty payment on interfaces based on trade secrets when there is a lawful 
way to discover the information.685  Indeed it has been found that copyright is rarely 
claimed in standards.686     
Although the United States and the European Union have taken different legal paths they 
have grappled with the same issues including the expression/ideas dichotomy and 
functionality to analyse and converge on the key questions of whether interfaces are 
unprotectable by copyright law and reverse engineering.687  The provisions finally adopted 
in the Software Directive were influenced by the status of US law at that time and fierce 
lobbying by large US software companies.688  Consideration of the approach adopted by the 
Courts in the US is essential and informative. 
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In 1992 the decision in Sega Enterprises, Ltd v Accolade, Inc.689 reined-in copyright and trade 
secret protection of interfaces in the USA.  Interfaces were spoken of as “functional 
requirements for achieving compatibility with other programs”690 and so excluded from 
copyright protection.  Copying code when reverse engineering for the purpose of extracting 
interface information for interoperability amounted to fair use and did not infringe 
copyright.691 To enjoy a lawful monopoly over the idea or functional principle underlying a 
work, the creator must meet the more stringent test required for patent protection.692  
Following Sega, developers are unable to protect interfaces in the USA by copyright.693  The 
case also approved decompilation of code to extract interface information, and so put trade 
secrets at risk.  This approach was followed by the District Court in the dispute between 
Google and Oracle where the Java APIs were held not to be copyrightable, as when there is 
only one way to express an idea or function everyone is free to do so (although this was 
expressly limited to the facts of the case).694  The ruling was overturned by the Federal 
Appeal Court and will be discussed later.  Since Sega there has been an increase in patent 
applications in the USA for software interfaces,695 as although being first to market may be 
an incentive to innovate, particularly where there are switching costs, without some form 
of protection software is by its nature easy to copy, either by outright pirating or by copying 
the code into new products, which eliminates the first mover benefit. 
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6.5 The Software Directive 
Although the Software Directive grants copyright protection to the expression in any form 
of a computer program, “ideas and principles which underlie any element of a computer 
program, including those which underlie its interface, are not protected.”696  This is stated 
“for the avoidance of doubt” in the recitals and in the operative part of the Directive.697  
The Directive also acknowledges that the function of a computer program is to 
communicate and work with other components of a computer system and with users.698   
To achieve this interconnection and interaction it is required “to permit all elements of 
software and hardware to work with other software and hardware and with users in all the 
ways in which they are intended to function.  The parts of the program which provide for 
such interconnection and interaction are generally known as ‘interfaces’.”699  
The functional interconnection and interaction is what is generally known as 
‘interoperability’: defined as the “ability to exchange information and mutually to use the 
information which has been exchanged”.700 
The repeated reference to the function of the computer and the interface echoes the 
“functional requirements for achieving compatibility with other programmes” that was 
important in excluding copyright protection in Sega Enterprises, Ltd v Accolade, Inc. 
Interfaces comprise not only the code that implements them but also the ideas, rules or 
principles in the specification of the interface.  The specification can be used by a 
programmer to create an independent implementation of the interface which uses 
different code.701  As the specification amounts to ideas and principles it is not subject to 
copyright.  The phrase “where the specification of interfaces constitutes ideas and 
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principles which underlie the program, those ideas and principles are not copyrightable 
subject matter” appeared in the original proposal but was removed from the final Directive.  
It was criticised for being so obvious that it would introduce the suggestion that this may 
not always be so.702  It was also objected to by members of the software industry who 
claimed that excluding specifications from copyright protection would facilitate ‘piracy’.703 
The effect of the Software Directive is not just to protect “a” single, certain configuration of 
a program but also the rights of the holder in reproductions, translations, transformations, 
changes, improvements etc that in themselves constitute original works.704  The right to 
control the use and the access to the program information combined with copyright gives a 
protection over functionality that is similar to patent rights and amounts to 
overprotectionism.705 Decompilation is permitted in Article 6 of the Software Directive to 
obtain information on functional behaviour of a computer program.  Copyright protection is 
not available for this functional behaviour.706  The restrictions in Article 6 though give the 
rightsholder the protection of a subject or benefit that without it will not be protected by 
copyright.  This subject or benefit includes but may not be limited to the specification for 
the interface needed for interoperability which, although it may not be protected by either 
copyright or patent, may have been a trade secret and is now prevented from disclosure by 
Art 6 of the Software Directive.707   Giving the equivalent of copyright protection to 
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functionality can lead to a thicket of IP barriers which can deprive markets of the benefits of 
competition.708   
We therefore have a scenario where at least some aspects of interfaces do not have 
copyright protection but even so the interfaces are not readable without reverse 
engineering.   
6.6 International Conventions and US Case Law 
Art. 9(2) of TRIPS and Art. 2 of the WCT state that copyright protection shall extend to 
expressions and not to “ideas, procedures, methods of operation or mathematical concepts 
as such”.   Neither domestic UK law nor the Software Directive expressly contain the 
exclusions that copyright does not extend to “... procedure, method of operation, or 
mathematical concepts as such”.  Nevertheless domestic and European law must now be 
interpreted in conformity with TRIPS and Art.2 of the WCT.709      710 
By contrast Sec.102(b) of Title 17 of the United States Code was amended in 1980, in line with 
TRIPS, to deny copyright protection to any “idea, procedure, process, system, method of 
operation, concept, principle, or discovery..”711   At the time the Software Directive was 
being debated and introduced in Europe the US case of Whelan v Jaslow712 gave a 
conservative interpretation that only the purpose or function was the idea and everything 
else was the expression.  This meant that interfaces could be swept up in the broad concept 
of structure, sequence and organisation, as being copyright protected.  In 1992, after the 
Software Directive had been adopted in Europe, the US position shifted.  The case of 
Computer Associates v Altai713 applied “the abstraction-filtration-comparison test”714 and 
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filtered out in the second stage those facets that are dictated by external constraints, such 
as compatibility with other programs, as not copyright protected.  In the same year reverse 
engineering was considered fair use, in Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade Inc., for if 
disassembly was per se unfair this would give a de facto monopoly over the functional 
aspects.715  A monopoly over ideas or function must satisfy the more stringent test imposed 
by patent law.716  This case is important not only because it condoned reverse engineering 
but also because it described the interface information as functional aspects.717  
 
In Lotus v Borland718, Lotus’ menu command hierarchy, including macros, were considered 
to be methods of operation and excluded from copyright protection under Sec.102.   
Borland wanted to emulate the Lotus software, not by copying the underlying code, but by 
copying the Lotus menu command hierarchy such as the “copy” and “print” commands.  
These commands explained and presented functional capabilities to the user, and were the 
method by which the program was operated and controlled.  They were essential to 
operation and the Court considered it was not necessary to determine whether they could 
have been designed differently.   Compatibility strengthened the argument that the menu 
command hierarchy was a “method of operation” as otherwise, in order to use other 
software, the user would have to learn many different operating methods. The Court found 
this notion “absurd”.719  That there are different ways to operate computer programs, and 
different ways to arrange hierarchically command terms, does not make the actual method 
chosen copyrightable.  It functions as a method of operating the computer and is 
uncopyrightable.  “The “expressive” choices of what to name the command terms and how 
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to arrange them did not magically change the uncopyrightable menu command hierarchy 
into copyrightable subject matter.”720 
The US law has applied the methods of operation exclusion to some forms of interface.  
Thanks to TRIPS and the WIPO Copyright Treaty, the methods of operation exclusion will 
now apply to domestic and European law.  
6.7 UK and European Case Law 
Against this backdrop there have now been a number of cases in Europe where software 
has been consciously emulated so that the user interface bears similarities to existing 
software.  These cases have provided an interpretation of the copyright protection afforded 
to user interfaces by the Software Directive. 
   
6.7.1 Navataire 
In Navataire Inc v easyJet Airline Co Ltd.,721 Pumfrey J considered VT100 screens were 
literary in character.  However they were ”ideas which underlie its interface” in the sense 
used in Art.1(2) of the Directive: “they provide the static framework for the display of the 
dynamic data which it is the task of the software to produce”.722  By contrast graphical user 
interface (“GUI”) screens were artistic and outside the scope of the Software Directive.   
In Navataire the source code had not been copied and there was no reverse engineering, 
but the new system was substantially indistinguishable from the original system in respect 
of its ”user interface”.  In addition to the question of whether copyright subsisted in the 
interface Pumfrey J also considered whether the copying of commands amounted to a 
substantial proportion, and whether copying the “business logic” aka “non-textual copying”, 
or copying without access to the thing copied, directly or indirectly, infringed the copyright 
in the source code.  Pumfrey rejected the claims saying:  
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If it is the policy of the Software Directive to exclude both computer languages 
and the underlying ideas of the interfaces from protection, then it should not be 
possible to circumvent these exclusions by seeking to identify some overall 
function or functions that it is the sole purpose of the interface to invoke and 
relying on those instead.723     
6.7.2 Bezpečnostní 
In the case of Bezpečnostní softwarová asociace724 the CJEU was asked to determine 
whether for the purposes of Art. 1(2) of the Software Directive the phrase “the expression 
in any form of a computer program”, includes the graphical user interface of the computer 
program or part thereof. 
Here again the interface in question is the graphical user interface (“GUI”) rather than a 
pure software interface.   The Advocate General said the question was whether the GUI 
“which is the result, on screen, of a computer program constitutes an expression”.725   The 
GUI is not seen as part of the code but only as a result of the code.   The GUI, also referred 
to as the “look and feel” enables communication and interaction between the user and the 
program.   
The CJEU considered that the GUI interface did not constitute a form of expression of a 
computer program as the GUI does not enable the reproduction of that computer program.  
It is only one element which allows the user to use the features of the program.   The CJEU 
referred to the Advocate General’s opinion that “the form of expression of a computer 
program must be protected from the moment when its reproduction would engender the 
reproduction of the computer program itself, thus enabling the computer to perform its 
task”.726  Copying the code, including into another language, would cause the computer to 
perform its task.  Presumably some forms of incomplete copying would also come within 
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the Advocate General’s test, so the code does not have to be reproduced exactly, provided 
the computer performs the task expected.  Copying the GUI would not however enable the 
reproduction of the program.   
In Bezpečnostní the CJEU confirmed that aspects of certain interfaces, GUIs in particular, 
are not expressions and are not copyright protected.  The case does not directly address 
whether the code creating the interface is protected by copyright or not.  It also does not 
consider other forms of interface, namely data formats, protocols and APIs although it 
can be inferred from the Advocate General’s test that the idea/expression dichotomy will 
vary depending on the nature of the interface involved.  
 
6.7.3 SAS Institute Inc v World Programming Ltd 
The case of SAS Institute Inc v World Programming Ltd727 was referred to the CJEU on a 
number of points.  The case illustrates the problems that lack of interoperability poses for 
users and competitors.  SAS Institute Inc (“SAS”) is a major supplier of sophisticated analysis 
software using its own SAS language.  Customers may have written thousands of application 
programs in the SAS language and while “there are other suppliers of analytical software 
which compete with SAS Institute, a customer who wanted to change over to another 
supplier’s software would be faced with re-writing its existing application programs in a 
different language.”728  Customers were locked-in to the SAS software and had to continue 
to buy an annual licence.  This case illustrates the problems faced by users of 3D CAD 
software who experience similar lock-in of their own proprietary data and legacy issues.  
They either have to pay for annual licences or maintenance contracts or incur the costs 
associated with moving to a different CAD system. 
World Programming Ltd (“WPL”) sought to provide an alternative, cheaper729 software to 
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enable users who had programs written in the SAS language to have a choice of software.  
WPL sought to emulate much of the functionality, to ensure the same inputs would 
produce the same outputs, and to ensure customer’s application programs ran in the same 
manner on WPS and SAS components.   
WPL did not have access to the source code nor did it decompile the software.730  The 
source code for the WPL software was mainly written using the SAS manuals and observing 
the operation of a Learning Edition of the SAS software.  The method WPL used to create 
the interface was characterised by observation of the format of data files to enable WPL to 
write source code which read and wrote data files in the same format.731  SAS claimed that 
WPL had infringed the copyright in its manuals, and thereby indirectly the copyright in the 
programs, and breached the terms of the licence of the Learning Edition of the SAS 
software.  The facts are similar to Navitaire but involve interfaces between the software 
and data files rather than the user interface.    
Many provisions of the Software Directive, as transposed into English Law, were analysed 
by Arnold J in the High Court decision.  Aspects of the SAS software were considered to be a 
language or aspects of functionality and therefore excluded from copyright protection.732   
Arnold J then considered whether interfaces are protected by copyright in a computer 
program.  He was faced with the situation where WPL had not decompiled the interface 
and at no time had they been able to see and copy the source code.  In these respects the 
facts were similar to Navitaire.  In SAS Institute the interface information had been obtained 
by examining the SAS System in operation to work out enough of the format of the 
SAS7BDAT data file to write a new source code which reads and writes data files in that 
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format.733  The element of the interface that was in question, arguably, was akin to the 
ideas, rules or principles by which the interface was specified.  Arnold J recognised that 
methods of operation were also excluded from copyright.734 
The original proposal for the Directive, referred to by counsel for WPL, clearly stated that 
these rules or principles by which interfaces are specified are not copyright protected.  If a 
specification is used to write new code to achieve interoperability then that does not 
infringe copyright.  But what of the code that actually constitutes the interface?  This is the 
expression, and would appear still to be copyright protected.  The original proposal says 
competitors are free to build on the identical idea (the specification) but may not use the 
same expression as that of protected programs (the code).  It also proposes that similarities 
in the code which implemented the ideas, rules or principles due to the inevitability of 
certain forms of expression, where constraints of the interface are such that different 
implementation is impossible, will not infringe copyright as the idea and expression are said 
to merge.735 
Arnold J, agreeing with Pumfrey J in Navitaire, concluded that interfaces were not 
protected by copyright.  He considered that the legislative history supported this and the 
inclusion of reverse engineering in the later version of the Directive was not counter to that 
interpretation.  The purpose was to entitle third parties to obtain information about 
interfaces in one or more ways.  This he concluded meant that once the information is 
obtained it was intended that “competitors would be free to copy the interface anyway.”736  
The question is: What constitutes copying the interface?  If it is using the specification to 
produce new code, then that would equate to using the ideas and principles which underlie 
the interface.  This is in line with the wording of the Directive.  Copying the code itself is 
something else.  The only reference to this is in the Directive’s original proposal where it 
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speaks of the form of expression being constrained where the idea and expression may 
merge.737  The courts should however consider whether the interfaces amount to methods 
of operation and are therefore exempted from protection. 
Arnold J then considered what aspects of the SAS software amounted to an interface.  The 
syntax of the SAS Language was part of the programming language rather than an interface, 
but as such is still unprotected by copyright.  The SAS data file formats were considered 
“precisely the kind of information which is required by third parties in order to access data 
stored in those formats for the purposes of interoperability”738 and thus were interfaces.   
WPS could read and write files in the SAS data file format but this did not amount to an 
infringement of the copyrights in the SAS components.  There is no evidence that WPS 
reproduced a substantial, or indeed any, part of the SAS source code.  Instead they had 
examined the system in operation and worked out enough of the format of SAS7BDAT data 
files to write their own code.   
When Advocate General Bot referred to his own reasoning in Bezpečnostní about what 
constitutes expression, he said that the protection of a computer program is not confined 
to the literal elements, to the source code and object code, but extends to any other 
element expressing the creativity of the author.739  He acknowledged the impact of the 
WCT and that not only are ideas excluded from copyright but also procedures, methods of 
operation and mathematical concepts.740  He then explained that he considered the 
functionalities and language of a computer program are not capable, as such, of being 
protected by copyright.  To determine whether copyright exists, account should be taken 
not of the time and work or level of skill, but the degree of originality.741  He said that the 
language is a functional element lacking any originality and drew a comparison with the 
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language used by the author of a novel.  This does not stop code written in the language 
from copyright protection as this would amount to the expression.742  It will be for the 
national courts to examine whether reproducing functionalities has also reproduced “a 
substantial part” of the elements of components “which are the expression of the 
intellectual creation of the author of those components”.743  The opinion supported the 
distinction between ideas and expression in respect of functionality and language.  
The opinion is less helpful on the question directly concerning the program interface and 
whether reading and writing files in the same format is making use of the interface’s idea, 
principle, methods of operation or its expression.  Advocate General Bot rephrases the 
question to ask whether copyright has been infringed by “deciphering” the format of the 
SAS data files to write a new source code.  Arguably deciphering the format can be done 
either by observation or by some form of translation.  Only if translation is involved does it 
amount to decompilation under the Directive.  As stated earlier, it was found as a matter of 
fact that decompilation did not take place.  WPL had observed the format files.  They had 
not translated or altered SAS’ code in the way that would amount to reverse engineering, 
as described in Art. 4 (b).  The Advocate General’s Opinion however focuses on Art 6 of the 
Directive which deals with reverse engineering.  It says Art. 6 should be interpreted strictly, 
decompilation should be an exceptional act, and the licensee will have to demonstrate the 
“absolute necessity” of its actions.744  This language is even more restrictive than the 
language of the Directive and may not help the cause of interoperability.  It is worth noting 
at this point that in the subsequent CJEU judgement it was emphasised that WPL did not 
have access to the source code which differentiated their ruling from AG Bot’s imprecise 
view and “neutralised” the implication that reverse engineering is only permitted when 
absolutely necessary rather than the somewhat more permissive conditions in the Software 
Directive.745     
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Arnold J stated that “interfaces as described in recital [15] of the Software Directive are not 
protected by the copyright in a computer program.” The Advocate General’s opinion states 
that the Directive “does not exclude interfaces from copyright protection”, merely the ideas 
and principles underlying the interface.  There may be less difference in these statements 
than meets the eye.  Interfaces are not per se outside the protection of copyright.  Source 
code and machine code interfaces may be copyright protected but there are certain 
aspects, such as specifications and protocols which are not expressions but ideas and 
principles and thus not copyright protected.   
The CJEU ruled that “the format of data files used in a computer program in order to exploit 
certain of its functions” are not a form of expression for the purposes of the Software 
Directive.746 This does not say that data files are never copyright protected.  If code didn’t 
perform a function then copyright might apply.  It does mean that when the purpose of 
data files is functional, as they invariably are, including for interoperability, they are not 
copyright protected under the software directive.  The CJEU did not define copyright but  
Advocate General Bot defined it as “the set of possibilities offered by a computer system, 
the actions specific to that program.  In other words, the functionality of a computer 
program is the service which the user expects from it.”747  More specifically the CJEU 
referred to the reading and writing of data in specific format as being a means by which 
users exploit certain functions.748  As the functionality of a computer program is dictated by 
a specific and limited purpose there is similarity to ideas and it is legitimate for other 
programs to exist offering the same functions. 
When to achieve that functionality there is a choice amounting to intellectual creativity in 
the program code, design work and “the way in which all of these elements are 
arranged”749  there can be no direct copying and new code or designs must be written to 
achieve the same function.  But an element of choice due to a combination of several 
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functions or the skill and judgement in devising the functionality did not stop it falling on 
the ideas side of the line.    
The CJEU expressed a policy rationale for this approach that accepting protection of 
functionality akin to patent protection would amount to monopolising ideas which would 
be harmful to technological and industrial progress.  The CJEU appears to be justifying the 
use of copyright protection for software over patent protection as it refers to the rationale 
of only protecting the expression and leaving the desired latitude to create similar or 
identical works provided there is no copying.750   
The Court kept open the possibility that the content of the format of the data files could be 
protected by the Information Society Directive 2001/29.  As in the case of BSA the GUI 
could contain other intellectual property rights.  This would however only extend to the 
reproduction of the expression of intellectual creation.751  Excluding the format of data files 
which have a functional purpose allows for the reproduction of the functionality, even 
when there are elements of choice, provided the code or design of data formats is not 
copied verbatim.752 
The rulings in SAS Institute have affirmed that functional behaviour was not protectable 
expression under the Software Directive as it embodied methods of operation
753
  
Functional behaviour in computer programs do not form literary expression and copyright 
protection is not available.754   The legal issues and decisions in SAS Institute aligned with 
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the legal issues and outcome in Lotus v Borland.  Both the data formats and the macro 
commands were functional with little element of choice for the author.  Europe had 
considered the position of the GUI and data formats.  Consideration of APIs would take 
place in the USA with a clash of giants.  
The decision to remove functionality from copyright protection contrasts with the approach 
taken by the Federal Court of Appeal in the most recent decision in Oracle America Inc. v 
Google Inc.755 when considering the copyright in APIs.  There the Court considered that if it 
accepted that a computer program is uncopyrightable simply because it carries out pre-
assigned functions then no computer program is protectable.  The Court required a more 
extensive abstraction-filtration- approach and assigned the function of interoperability to 
the fair use exception.       
6.8 Back in the USA - Oracle v Google 
While data formats were being considered in SAS Institute by the CJEU and the courts in 
England the legal status of copyright in APIs was being considered in the USA.  In Oracle v 
Google the District Court ruled that the code and the structure, sequence and organisation 
of Java API packages were not copyrightable.  The District Judge ruled that the declaring 
code, which Google had reused rather than rewritten, was not copyrightable as there was 
only one way to write it and the merger doctrine stopped Oracle claiming copyright 
ownership.  The overall structure of API packages is a command structure and a system or 
method of operation and is therefore not entitled to copyright protection under S102(b) of 
the Copyright Act.756   
On appeal, while it was accepted that Google wrote its own implementing code it was not 
disputed that Google copied 7,000 lines of code and generally replicated the overall 
structure, sequence and organisation of 37 Java API packages.757  Google had copied the 
Java shorthand commands, whose specific format - java.package.Class.method (input) 
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reflects the software’s structure, which was indirect copying of the sequence, structure and 
organisation.  For the shorthand commands to work on the Android platform the method 
headers, also known as declarations, must be replicated precisely as Android and Java must 
be identical when it comes to those particular lines of code.758 So Google directly copied the 
code.  This would amount to literal copying of the code and non-literal copying of the 
sequence, structure and organisation.   
This case therefore is not a complete step back for reverse engineering759 as the extent of 
literal copying of the code would distinguish the case from standard reverse engineering.  
Had Google reversed engineered the API packages and then written their own code Oracle 
would have no remedy under copyright.  However as the Java method headers had become 
the de facto industry standard the structure needed to be copied to ensure interoperability.  
Crucially it was considered that the method headers were a method of operation and 
excluded from copyright under a subject matter approach to Section 102(b).760    
Google accepted that there were similarities in the wording of the ‘declaring’ code but also 
pointed to differences and denied that its documentation was a copy.  Google also said the 
similarities were largely the result of the fact that each API carries out the same function in 
both systems.761  The similarities are not because of a simple cut-and-paste exercise but 
because it is inevitable that declaration of the functions of an API are going to be similar 
and even nearly indistinguishable.762   
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Federal Courts vary in their approach.  Some circuits deny copyright protection to all 
systems or methods of operation763 while others grant copyright protection to essentially 
all elements of an original and creative computer program (including systems and methods 
of operation).  The circuit of the Federal Appeal Court in the Oracle and Google case apply 
the abstraction/ filtration/ comparison test.764   
The Federal Appeal’s Court considered that merely being embodied in a method of 
operation does not extinguish particular expression from copyright protection.  Section 
102(b) only reflects the dichotomy between ideas and expressions and method of 
operations are copyrightable if the creator could have designed them in different ways.765   
It was not accepted the declaring code as a system or method of operation was not 
copyright protected.  Rather than apply the function test to subject matter approach the 
Court looked on the matter from the tradition approach and to determine the 
ideas/dichotomy question applied an abstraction-filtration-comparison test.  Applying this 
test to the APIs was necessary to identify whether any of the expression merged with ideas 
because they were constrained by efficiency or other external requirements.      
The Federal Appeals Court was almost scathing of the functional approach766 and ruled that 
to avoid copyright Google would need to rely on the fair use exception.  It appears to have 
refined and narrowed the opportunities for claiming exemption from copyright for 
interfaces.  It has renewed an emphasis on structure, sequence and organisation and non-
literal copying which must be determined by the abstraction-filtration-comparison test 
rather than excluding automatically if it amounts to a system or method of operation.  
Rather than relying on the natural meaning of Section 102(b) it said the two sub-sections of 
102 had to be considered collectively and certain expressions are subject to greater 
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scrutiny. It did not however explain the origin or criteria for the test or even appear to apply 
it but simply held that because Sun could have written the method headers in different 
ways, they were copyrightable. 767 
The Court considered the question of compatibility and whether the Java method headers 
had become the de facto industry standard was irrelevant to copyright but factors to 
balance in the fair-use defence.768 
The Federal Appeal Court determined that the District Court wrongly applied Lotus v 
Borland.  In that case the defendant did not copy the underlying code but did copy the 
menu command hierarchy “Copy” “Print” and “Quit”.  But these commands were not 
creative, unlike the code and structure, sequence and organisation of the Java API 
packages.    Also the commands in Lotus were essential to operating the system whereas 
Google did not need to copy the structure, sequence and organisation of the Java API 
packages to write programs in Java language.  While these points distinguished Lotus, what 
will have more implications for the legal standing of interfaces is the disapproval of the 
importance of functionality.  Several rationales and authorities were cited for the 
propositions that although an element may be a method of operation or system it may 
contain separable expression that is eligible for copyright protection.769  The point was also 
made that merger and Scenes a Faire are evaluated and determined when the original work 
is created and hence discredited the argument that subsequent code or structure, 
sequence and organisation had to follow the original.770  The District Judge was criticised 
from looking “at externalities from the eyes of the plagiarists, not the eyes of the program’s 
creator”.771  Once a program is created a defendant’s desire to achieve “total compatibility 
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…is a commercial and competitive objective which does not enter into the … issue of 
whether particular ideas and expressions have merged.”772 
The District Judge had justified characterising the structure, sequence and organisation of 
the Java API Packages as a “method of operation” on interoperability grounds as duplication 
of the command structure is necessary for interoperability.773  The District Court had relied 
on Sega Enterprise v Accolade and Sony Computer Entertainment, Inc v Connectix Corp774 
although these were predominantly fair use cases.  The Federal Appeal Court held that, 
while those cases recognized that software contained unprotected functional elements, it is 
not the same as denying the existence of separate creative expression or the existence of 
any copyright protection.775 Sega and Sony were distinguishable as intermediate copies 
were made to understand the functional aspects of the copyrighted works and the new 
products were created with new code written.  The District Court should have conducted 
the abstraction-filtration-comparison test to separate the expression from the underlying 
function and filter out the ideas and elements “dictated by consideration of efficiency, so as 
to be necessarily incidental to that idea; required by factors external to the program 
itself.”776 While some elements may be unprotected as functional it is not the same thing as 
saying the entire work loses copyright protection.   
The Federal Appeals Court was also not convinced by Google’s argument that it had to copy 
the packages so that an app written in Java could run on Android as there was no evidence 
of any Java apps that could run on the Android platform.  The Court considered that 
compatibility was sought not with the Java platform but rather to capitalise on the fact the 
software developers were already trained and experience in the use of Java API packages.  
Google wanted to leverage Java for its existing base of developers.  This competitive 
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objective could be relevant to fair use but not to whether the code and structure, sequence 
and organisation were copyrightable in the first place.777        
The decision in Oracle v Google has tempered the notion that any code or organisation that 
is used as an interface is divested of copyright protection either because it is functional or 
because of merger of the idea with the expression.  Common sense supports this view for 
interfaces are not absolute.  The software developer which owns the copyright might 
identify one aspect as an interface while another software developer might select another 
interface by reverse engineering.  It would be impossible to categorically identify and 
delineate which code or organisation had copyright protection and which did not.   
The decision is not a complete reversal but it will make the determination of what is 
legitimate interoperability more refined.  As the ruling stands it will create uncertainty for 
the industry and those developers wanting to create interoperable programs.  It sends a 
clear signal that the structure, sequence and organisation cannot be copied with impunity 
and that code has to be written from scratch.  Where however is the line drawn between 
commands that can be copied such as “copy” and those that are original?  When can the 
programmer be certain that efficiency and other external constraints are acceptable?   Will 
it require them to analyse the constraints on the ‘original’ code, such as to meet the 
requirements of a common platform, before deciding what code can be reused?   
The Federal Appeals Court ruling in Oracle v Google is a clear reminder that software must 
comply with the principles of copyright law even where the functional aspects of the 
medium strain the application of those principles.  It brings interfaces back within the scope 
of copyright protection subject to the fair use defence which has been referred back to the 
District Court.  The Federal Appeal Court set out its opinion on the fair use defence to guide 
the District Court on a clear and appropriate picture it should give to the jury.778  Google 
appealed on the question of “whether copyright protection extends to all elements of an 
original work of computer software, including a system or method of operation,  that an 
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author could have written in more than one way?”779  Google appealed to the Supreme 
Court which was said to be justified on the basis that the Federal circuit is in disarray about 
the application of Section 102(b) to software, and the ruling conflicts with the statutory 
section and the Supreme Court’s precedent.780  The Supreme Court refused to hear the 
appeal. 
Two comments are pertinent to the issue of program’s functionality.  Firstly one of four 
factors that must be taken into account when considering the fair use defence is the nature 
of the copyrighted work.781  This should recognise that computer programs have functional 
as well as expressive components.  The necessity of copying the expressive elements of 
code in order to perform the function could support a finding of fair use.  Secondly, 
although when determining whether the Java API packages had copyright, the Federal 
Appeal Court overruled the trial Court’s undue reliance on functional aspects of the 
packages and Google’s desire to achieve interoperability, these factors could be relevant to 
a fair use analysis.  The Federal Appeal Court referred to the process in Sega of breaking 
down a computer program into its component subroutines and sub-subroutines and then 
identifying the idea or core functional element of each – essentially the filtration analysis.782  
The Court found this particularly true of the core packages which anyone may need to copy 
if they are to write programs in the Java language and said there may be others which are 
essential components of any Java language-based program.   
The Federal Appeal Court appears to be saying that merger or functionality will not prevent 
copyright protection where the original software code or structure, sequence and 
organisation is not determined by efficiency or external factors, such as the need to 
interoperate with a pre-existing standard platform.  The filtration test should be used to see 
whether there are elements that could meet the merger or functionality test.  Where 
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however the original software is not so constrained then subsequent software designed to 
interoperate would have to rely on the fair use test.  
      
6.9 Is there an Atlantic Divide? 
What then are the present similarities and differences between the EU and the USA 
approach to copyright protection of interfaces and encouragement of interoperability?  US 
law has developed primarily by case law with some codification of exception such as ideas, 
and methods of operation in section 102 (b) of the Copyright Act.  The position in the EU by 
contrast is influenced by the Software Directive which while not expressly stating copyright 
protection is unavailable for interfaces in various recitals and articles does more or less 
explicitly promote interoperability.783 In both SAS Institute and Oracle v Google the judges 
at first instance, who both ruled the interfaces had no copyright protection, arguably took 
an approach that was overly simplistic while the CJEU and Federal Appeal Court took a 
more discerning approach.784   
The CJEU was faced with a case where the defendants genuinely wanted to interoperate to 
increase competition.  As there was no reverse engineering by decompilation there was no 
need to consider whether code had been copied or the conditions in Article 6.  This made 
the case more straightforward.  The pertinent part of the CJEU ruling is that the format of 
data files used to exploit certain of its functions is not a form of expression.785  The CJEU 
acknowledged that the Software Directive chose copyright as the median for protection, 
which protects the copying of individual expression and avoids the monopolisation of ideas.  
Functionality was defined by AG Bot “as the service the user expects”.  It was not clarified 
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whether functionality had to align with exemption such as ideas, procedures or methods of 
operation in the US Copyright Act or TRIPS and WIPO, or whether it was a merger of ideas 
and expression.  This may cause future problems for courts analysing functionality in future 
cases.”786  The functionality applies to the code and as the Software Directive specifically 
includes preparatory design material it also applies to the sequence, structure and 
organisation provided it engenders reproduction of the program.787  The CJEU appears to be 
introducing a test for the Software Directive that assumes a distinction can be made 
between performing a function, such as interoperability, and the copying of the detailed 
way in which the code and probably the structure, sequence and organisation is written.788  
No consideration of efficiency or factors external to the original program were required or 
made.  No abstraction- filtration-comparison test made, although this could be done by the 
national court.  Provided there was no copying, functionality permitted WPL’s actions.  The 
grey area is the notion that copyright protection may still be found in data format, 
presumably in the absence of functionality, if they meet the test of being the author’s own 
intellectual creation.789  This reflects the CJEU ruling in BSA that other forms of copyright 
could exist in the GUI.   
The Federal Appeal Court in Oracle v Google did not accept that functionality automatically 
removed copyright as they considered all software to be functional.790  They did not 
distinguish between the aim of the program and the manner of its detailed expression in 
the code.  The Court was looking at APIs rather than data formats which were the subject of 
SAS Institute.  While arguably more creativity and time went into writing the APIs than the 
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data formats both have a clear functional purpose.  There are other more significant factual 
difference between the two cases.  Google had copied source code, namely the Java 
declaring code, and the API’s structure, sequence and organisation.  It did so not for 
straightforward interoperability but to “capitalize on the fact that software developers 
were already trained and experienced”791 in using the particular Java packages.  While this 
could be considered semantic rather than technical interoperability it has been considered 
valid in such cases as the GUI cases of Navataire and Bezpečnostní and in Lotus v Borland.        
While the facts might justify a difference in outcome between the two cases the legal 
argument and rationale behind the rulings does reveal a divergence.  The CJEU by referring 
to copyright protecting only the individual expression and leaving other authors latitude to 
create similar of even identical programs provided they refrain from copying792 is saying 
that new code written or structure, sequence and organisation designed to implement the 
same function, namely interoperability, will not breach copyright.  This position is not 
completely at odds with the Federal Appeal Courts decision in Oracle v Google.  There the 
Court was not convinced by the argument that Google had to use the identical Java 
declaring code or structure, sequence and organisation.  The Court denied an 
interoperability exception in previous case law and ruled that even if software contained 
functional elements it did not mean associated work lost copyright protection.  The Court 
should filter out elements including those constrained by external factors, seen from the 
eyes of the program creator.  If there was a need to copy what remained subject to 
copyright to achieve interoperability, the defence of fair use was the appropriate means to 
determine whether the copying of the code or structure, sequence and organisation was 
legitimate.793 
The Federal Appeal Court’s approach was in line with the traditional idea/expression 
approach rather than the subject matter approach.  A compelling need for exact duplication 
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of expression does not normally arise if the purpose is only to duplicate functionality.794  
The Court commented that to exclude functionality per se would exclude copyright 
protection for software and ruled against Google’s copying of the code.  The Software 
Directive adopts the traditional idea/expression approach in Article 1(2) where it refers to 
ideas and principles underlying computer programs and its interfaces not being copyright 
protected by the Directive.  There are echoes of the subject matter approach in the 11th 
recital that “logic, algorithms and programming languages” are not protected by the 
Directive.  It is uncertain what is meant by a “system” “process” or “method” and how non-
functional expression needs to be to benefit from copyright protection.795  The functional 
approach is potentially much broader than just excluding the interface specification from 
copyrightable subject matter.  It could mean computer programs being excluded from 
copyright protection which is against the intention of the Software Directive.796   
The traditional idea/expression approach was adopted by the Courts in both SAS Institute 
and Oracle v Google.  In SAS Institute, where the code was not copied, there was no 
infringement and in Google v Oracle, where the code was copied, there was infringement.  
The material difference in approach is dictated by the wording and structure of the law.   
As well as promoting interoperability the Software Directive explicitly refers to the 
functionality of computer programs and in particular the function of working together with 
other computer systems.797 While TRIPS, which refers to methods of operation, was 
considered in SAS Institute the CJEU was not limited to TRIPS interpretation of the 
idea/expression dichotomy and could consider the broader purpose of the Directive.  With 
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the definitions in the recital and the strong emphasis on interfaces and interoperability it is 
fair to conclude the Software Directive was “intended to promote reuses of interfaces 
essential to interoperability”798         
While European law has the purposive interpretation of the Software Directive it does not 
have the safety valve of the fair use doctrine.  Everything relies on how the idea/expression 
dichotomy is applied to the challenging environment of software with its high level of 
functionality.  The Software Directive singles out the function of interoperability.799   The 
Courts have relied on the Directive to introduce an evolution of the idea/expression 
dichotomy so that interface functionality for interoperability is an idea.  While it has not 
been categorised as a procedure or method of operation, any implementation of the 
interface which does not involve direct copying of the code (and other forms of expression 
such as preparatory design work) will not infringe copyright under the Directive.  In the US 
by contrast the courts do not have to rely solely on the idea/expression dichotomy.  They 
can use the more subtle test of fair use to achieve the balance between IPR protection and 
the public interest in interoperability.  
Competition law had a comparable situation until 2004.800  Europe had a very formalistic 
competition law regime and in the absence of the US rule of reason regime the CFEU had 
on occasions to bend over backwards to avoid findings of anti-competitive behaviour 
where, on an economic evaluation, the benefits would outweigh the disadvantages.  The US 
Justice Department by contrast could find the elements of anti-competitive behaviour but 
apply an economic rule of reason test to avoid censure.  The two regimes may end up in the 
same place but arrive there by different means and routes. 
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6.10 Summary 
The CJEU ruling in SAS Institute has given some guidance on the position and should enable 
more developers to legitimately obtain interoperability.  Oracle v Google, where the Court 
gave far less weight to the functional nature of interfaces, has raised some doubts about 
the status of APIs.  That case however involved the ‘verbatim’ copy of the declaring code 
and the sequence, structure and organisation, combined with Google’s ambiguous stance 
on interoperability means that the message to come from that case is complex.  Reverse 
engineering that writes new code is acceptable but doubts have been raised again about 
the status of sequence, structure and organisation and whether it can be copied.  Although 
Oracle v Google does not directly affect Europe the US case of Whelan v Jaslow where the 
sequence, structure and organisation of an interface was protected, was not helpful to 
advocates for open interfaces when the Software Directive was negotiated.  It will not help 
the future of interoperability if the advances made in SAS Institute and the cases following 
from Computer Associates v Altai are lost.  Over protection of the sequence, structure and 
organisation of interfaces does not recognise the “essentially utilitarian” nature of 
computer programs.801     
The Software Directive and the CJEU ruling in SAS Institute do give an important element of 
openness which is beneficial for interoperability.  Although the legal position has benefited 
there are still technical and commercial challenges particularly the challenge of gaining 
access to the interface remains.  The Software Directive allows for black box analysis and 
decompilation, but the effectiveness of these exceptions is limited by the complex nature of 
the software and the ability to alter interfaces with upgrades.   
In the 3D CAD industry data formats and APIs are used for the purpose of interoperability.  
The STEP standard is a data format that enables models to be transferred between 
software systems.  It only gives limited interoperability as data required to edit the model is 
not transferred.  The APIs are disclosed to translators, who provide software and a service 
to users of 3D CAD to convert their data between the different proprietary software 
systems, and other complementary software providers, but not all as some must rely on 
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reverse engineering.  The present legal position allows for elements of reverse engineering 
and voluntary disclosure of interface information but it fails to give a complete answer.  
Copyright is not a good fit for software, because of its functional nature, and suppliers feel 
their valuable core areas are vulnerable, and compensate by attempting to overprotect 
interfaces. The situation could be improved by the introduction of a sui generis form of 
protection and exceptions, but short of that and to avoid undesirable regulation another 
option would be a change to the Software Directive to allow for the dissemination of 
interface information obtained by reverse engineering.  The Directive currently prevents 
the disclosure of any interoperability information obtained by decompilation,802 and this 
forces each supplier to repeat the painstaking exercise for itself.  Lifting this restriction 
would remove duplication of effort and allow firms to specialise in providing 
interoperability information to other vendors, or innovating in the knowledge that an 
interface is available.803 This would create a market for interface information which could 
encourage, but not oblige, suppliers to make their own interface information available to 
ensure its quality, and could also bolster the use of standard interfaces.  This market 
response will no doubt be resisted by many in the software industry with the same 
vehemence displayed when the Software Directive was introduced.  This option will be 
discussed more fully in Chapter 8.      
6.11 Trade Secrets 
For copyright to prevent the copying of software there must be a copying of the manner of 
expression.  Using the ideas and other information contained in the software is insufficient.  
It is the ideas and other information however that may be the most valuable element of the 
software requiring the most investment and innovation.  This is reinforced by the difficulty 
in observing the machine code or reconstructing the source code.  Both software suppliers 
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and users consider aspects of software to be trade secrets.804 As software has to be 
supplied, generally in machine code, some of its know-how is also supplied and unrestricted 
decompilation could make it possible for competitors to take and use the know-how in their 
own programs.805    
Microsoft claimed their interfaces were protected by trade secrets in addition to patents 
and copyright.806   The Commission was not impressed with the trade secret argument as 
the protection afforded to trade secrets can be more limited than copyright or patent 
protections, and they exist as a result of a unilateral business decision dependant on its 
facts and the interests at stake.  Here the value of the secret was not its innovative nature 
but the fact that it belonged to a dominant undertaking.807  Also, subject to certain 
conditions, reverse engineering can legitimately disclose information for the purpose of 
interoperability, and this would defeat any attempt to protect interface information as 
trade secrets.808      
Software products are not intrinsically protected as trade secrets.  Reverse engineering or 
analysis of a product including the electronic content of digitised material, such as an 
encrypted program implanted in a vending machine, without special conditions will not 
generally be treated as protected as a trade secret.809  Reverse engineering of even an 
encrypted computer program may not be a breach of trade secrets law.  The mere 
existence of technical obstacles to access does not classify the computer program as a trade 
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secret.  The starting point is that trade secret protection cannot be invoked against the use 
of interoperability information obtained through reverse engineering.810  The position with 
software that is password protected or licenced on terms expressing its status as a trade 
secret is less certain.811   
 
Clauses imposing trade secret obligations and restricting the right to reverse engineer are 
common in the USA where they can be valid and effective.  In Europe Article 8 of the 
Software Directive makes void any contract clause attempting to restrict the reverse 
engineering provisions of Article 6.  However licence terms have attempted to require that 
information resulting from decompilation must be treated as a trade secret.  This does not 
prevent the reverse engineering of the interface but purports to restrict the use of the 
resulting information even where there is no copyright protection.  Article 6 does not give 
any express right to use the reverse engineered information so arguable a clause preventing 
its use may not fall foul of Article 8 which also says that the provisions of the Directive are 
without prejudice to the rules on trade secrets.812  
 The Software Directive prohibits reverse engineering other than for the purposes of 
interoperability.  The Software Directive also prohibits the dissemination of information 
obtained by legitimate reverse engineering.813   A situation is created where know-how in 
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the software which is not protected by copyright is protected as though it were a trade 
secret.  It is akin to creating a statutory trade secret.   
 Article 39(2) of the TRIPS Agreement has three conditions for trade secret protection: (1) 
The information must be secret in that it is not generally known among or readily accessible 
to persons within the circles that normally deal with the information in question; (2) The 
secrecy gives it commercial value and (3) the rightful owner must have taken reasonable 
steps to keep the information secret.  According to TRIPS, persons who have secret 
information lawfully in their control can prevent its unauthorised disclosure, acquisition or 
use “in a manner contrary to honest commercial practices.” 814     
While the use of information protected by IPRs retrieved by reverse engineering can be 
unlawful815  the act of reverse engineering itself is not usually considered to be contrary to 
honest commercial practices. 816   By preventing reverse engineering of software other than 
in very restricted circumstances the Software Directive arguably goes further than required 
by TRIPS.  Even where the Software Directive permits reverse engineer it prohibits the 
dissemination of this information.817   Here information such as interface specifications are 
not protected by the supplier’s IPRs and the restriction is again beyond that required by 
TRIPS.818   
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Copyright protection for computer programs is effectively a sui generis protection and the 
focus lies on protecting access to valuable know-how in the source code rather than the use 
of the expression.819 This is emphasised by the decompilation rights in Article 6 with permit 
access to the interface but not the software’s architecture.  The Software Directive 
therefore gives statutory protection to trade secrets which protects the functionality of the 
software without the inventive rigour or disclosure requirements of patents.  Not only is 
this unique protection afforded to the specific subject matter of the software but access 
and use of the interfaces is also controlled and restricted.  The indirect effect of controlling 
these interfaces impacts competition and innovation.820 This form of trade secrets law adds 
another layer of IPR protection which was not anticipated.  It has significant anti-
competitive effects for firms which need interoperability to sell products either working 
with or competing with the protected program.821  For interoperability to be achieved, 
access to information on the code matters, and the present provisions for reverse 
engineering do not provide the access that is required.  
6.12 Patents 
Since the case of Sega there has been an increase in patent applications in the USA for 
software interfaces.822  Although being first to market may be an incentive to innovate, 
particularly where there are switching costs, software without some form of protection is 
by its nature easy to copy, either by outright pirating or by copying the code into new 
products, which eliminates the first mover benefit. 
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The CAD industry has made use of patents since the 1980s823 with Dassault Systemes 
holding 188 patents, Autodesk 669 and PTC 37.  Siemens also has about 250 patents with 
reference to computer aided design or CAD.  It has not been established that all of these 
Siemens patents relate to software but software is the only product of Dassault Systemes, 
Autodesk & PTC.   
The rate of increase of patents filed by Europe based Dassault Systems has increased 
steadily over the past 15 years from 9 in 2000 to 30 in 2013, and 27 patents to October 
2014.  In comparison the rate of patenting at Autodesk has not shown an overall increase.  
With a rate of patenting varying from 16 to 63 patents per year, patent filing peaked in 
2007 (63 patents filed) compared to any subsequent year but still averages 41 patents filed 
a year.    
The 3D CAD suppliers use patents to protect their proprietary software.  There is no 
evidence of any policy to avoid patent protection of interfaces.  Interfaces are objectively 
defined by the occurrence of transferring data or instructions repetitively between 
elements of a computer system.824  They are not defined solely or exhaustively by the 
supplier.  There is a real probability that patents exist in interfaces of 3D CAD software. 
Of respondents to a public consultation as part of the Commission Staff Working Document 
in 2013825, less than 5% of owners protected their interoperability information by patents, 
while 25% of users said the needed interoperability information was protected by 
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patents.826 The cause of the discrepancy is unclear.  It could be due to patents being 
concentrated in interfaces or to the users’ misconception about the incidence of patents.  
While the extent of patents in interfaces in 3D CAD software cannot be quantified there is 
strong evidence that they exist. 
6.13 Software patents in the USA and UK 
Following Diamond v Diehr827 there was an increase in the number of software patents 
issued by the USPTO and while no one can be sure of the number it may be hundreds of 
thousands.828  The US Supreme Court ruled in Bilski v Kappos829 in 2010 that the claims 
were too abstract.  By doing so they risked pre-empting all uses of the method even if the 
inventor had not foreseen them.  Unfortunately there was little guidance in the judgement 
to help determine when ideas are too abstract.  They were not as supportive as the earlier 
Federal Appeal Court decision of the machine or transformation test where for a method to 
be patentable it must either be carried out by a machine or transform something from one 
state to another.  The test was considered useful but not exclusive.  In Bilski the patent did 
not mention any machine in the claims nor did it transform anything.    In a latter case of 
CLS Bank International v Alice Corp830 the Supreme Court determined that claims were 
ineligible as they were nothing more than an instruction to apply abstract ideas using a 
generic computer.  Again the abstract principle was relied on rather than the machine or 
transform test which is less useful for software though the decision does not exclude per se 
software or business methods nor imposes any special eligibility on software or business 
methods.831  
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Software, along with mathematical and business methods, is not patentable “as such” 
under the European Patent Convention and the Patents Act 1977.  To be patentable it has 
to have a “technical contribution” which is new and non-obvious, and which is generally 
referred to as a computer implemented invention.832  Various interpretations and 
applications of the phrase “as such”833 have resulted in the granting of software patents.  In 
1985 the approach adopted by the European Patent Office was to permit software 
inventions that had a “technical effect” allowing software to be patented as part of a 
concrete apparatus such as a mobile phone.  By 1990 as a result of decisions of the EPO’s 
Board of Appeal the approach had evolved to allow for the patenting of “technical 
software” that was decoupled from actual devices.  This is believed to have increased 
further the number of software patents in Europe although the quality of these patents 
may have been no higher than the US counterparts.  The notoriously controversial attempt 
to adopt a Software Patent Directive that would have formalised software patents while 
exempting interfaces was dropped in 2005 leaving the EPO and member states to attempt 
to rationalise the case law of the Board of Appeal and national courts.  Board of Appeal 
cases that strengthened the test for “inventive step” which tightened the criteria for 
granting software patents and is thought to reduce the number of bad patents.  Nationally 
countries including Germany and the UK are attempting to rein in and refine the patenting 
of software834    In Symbian835 the meaning of technical was considered and while an 
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invention involving a computer is undoubtedly “technical”, in law the mere presence of 
conventional computing hardware does not of itself mean an invention makes a technical 
contribution and so avoids the computer program exclusion. This approach contrasted with 
that of the European Patent Office.  
 
The notion of interoperability information can be wider than computer programs, for 
example covering protocols and hardware-software interfaces which are not excluded from 
patentability.836  The USPTO has required a useful, concrete and tangible result837 even if 
only on the computer screen, but with no “as such” statutory exclusion the “enablement” 
requirement for software inventions has been eliminated.  Software patents now make up 
15% of all patents granted in the USA, where about 20,000 software patents are granted 
each year.838  The propensity to apply for software patents increased by 16% per annum in 
the 20 years to 1996 while spending on R&D grew by only 4.4%.  The reason for the low 
relative growth in R&D spending is not clear and it may be due to R&D being more efficient 
and taking place in promising and expanding fields rather than a fall in innovation.839   
6.14 Can the Purpose and Benefits of Patents be Reconciled with Software 
Interoperability?    
6.14.1 Innovation and Interoperability  
The rationale for patents is to encourage innovation by excluding others.  This would 
appear to be at odds with the aims of interoperability and competition to encourage 
innovation.  The professed link between patents and innovation is the justification for 
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granting exclusivity in a similar way to copyright protection.  Patents protect ideas and 
function, unlike copyright which just protects the expression of those ideas.   
The literature gives a stated justification for patent protection as the desire to stop others 
appropriating the work of an innovator, as this would prevent the innovator recouping a 
return on his R&D costs.840  The use of patents to stop others appropriating innovations in 
software has three potential economic consequences - monopolies, rent seeking and 
favouring current over future innovation.  The right to try to exclude others may result in 
market power which is considered a social cost that is necessary to stimulate innovation 
and provide a return on R&D expenditures.  Debatably, although patents rarely give 
monopolies in any economic market and patent doctrines can avoid unnecessary rent 
seeking,841 there is an acknowledged impact on competition caused by a lack of 
interoperability and lock-in in software markets.842  One of the solutions to a lack of 
interoperability or lock-in is the use of standards.  There can however be a lack of choice in 
patents in standards where a distinction is drawn between patents in ‘similarity’ standards 
and patents in ‘compatibility’ standards as they have a different economic impact.   FRAND 
rules are appropriate for similarity standards where the user can choose whether to take 
advantage of the patented technology.  Where compatibility standards define interfaces, all 
who wish to use the system must pay for the patent without any decision on their part 
about the value of the patent to them.  This is seen as an unplanned expansion of the 
patent system that greatly impacts the rights of others and which should be recognised and 
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addressed.843  The STEP standard is a compatibility standard and while there are only a 
small number of patents in the standard, interviews indicate they give a disproportionate 
level of concern.844 
The desire to generate a stream of innovation over time means that it can be 
counterproductive to raise the level of protection too high.  Inventors and creators want to 
benefit from previous works.  While failure to give any protection might be a disincentive to 
R&D, the pace of technological change and progress could be slowed if the appropriate 
balance is not achieved.845  The software sector is one where innovation tends to be 
cumulative and therefore the impact of patents can be negative for innovation.  While 
patents reduce the prospects of imitation in a static world, software development is 
dynamic and sequential and patent protection may inhibit complementary innovation.846  
This may explain why, as patent protection of software became accepted,847 firms in the 
computer and electronics hardware industries, which obtained the most software patents, 
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(2008)  Berkeley Centre for Law & Technology 1, 28     
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actually reduced their R&D spend relative to sales.848 Most software patents in the USA 
were obtained by manufacturing firms, especially in the electronics and machinery 
industries (which include computers), with only 5% in the hands of software publishers and 
other software service firms, excluding IBM which accounted for an additional 2%.  Patents 
tend to benefit the larger firms more as they have the resources to apply for, maintain and 
defend patents.  Smaller firms are ambiguous about the advantages of patents.  Although 
some find patents are strategically important and can help secure finance849 they can be 
deterred because of expense and the fear of patent disputes with wealthier firms.850 There 
has been an increase in patenting by large firms such as Adobe, Microsoft and Oracle, while 
most software firms hold no patents.851  Although large firms may engage in patent 
portfolio races it has been concluded that software patentability has “no particular positive 
impact on software innovation per se”.852   
The lack of exemption in patent law for decompilation to achieve interoperability could 
have a dampening effect on interoperability, as when embarking on decompilation it is 
difficult to know what will be found and whether a patent is present.853  Reverse 
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engineering is important in preserving competition and compatibility between products 
particularly in markets characterised by network effects.854 
“reverse engineering promotes the fundamental patent policies of disclosure and 
enablement, ensures that patents will not be leveraged to protect unprotectable 
components of software, preserves the balance sought by intellectual property 
systems as a whole, and also helps patentees enforce their rights”.855    
Patent protection for a single software component could prevent the ‘making’ or ‘using’ of 
the whole of a complex program including the temporary uses required for 
decompilation.
856
  Conversely, as European patent law requires a specific technical 
invention with a technical character, and protection is limited to the claims and specific 
applications, decompiling aspects of the program such as its architecture and aspects of 
interfaces may not amount to ‘making’ or ‘using’ the patented invention.857  Analogies have 
been drawn between reverse engineering and exemptions permitting research concerning 
the claimed invention. 858  In Europe this defence extends to commercially sponsored 
research although not to commercialisation of the results.  As patent protection is broad, 
prohibiting independent development and different ways of carrying out the invention, a 
strong case is made for revising the research exemption to cover those activities carried out 
to analyse software for interoperability purposes.859    
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6.14.1 Implementation  
Patents granted on technologies that were already known or were obvious, means the 
resulting patents cause social costs without offsetting benefits.860  A serious criticism of 
software patents is not the concept but its “abysmal implementation.”861 Particularly in the 
USA, patents are being granted for processes and ideas that are obvious and not 
inventive.862 In the 1980s and 1990s insufficient familiarity with software technology and 
inadequate access to appropriate databases to ensure vigorous examinations resulted in 
the USPTO granting patents on processes that programmers claimed had been known and 
used for decades.863  This problem is recognised and there have been calls to reinvigorate 
the non-obviousness standard for obtaining patent protection for software interfaces.864  
Following these concerns internal procedures were revised and a relatively cheaper 
administrative challenge introduced to allow third parties to challenge the issuance of 
patents without resort to court litigation.  Despite this the present software environment is 
said to be “polluted by bad software patents” which have a particular effect on open source 
developers who lack the resources to challenge a patent’s validity or defend themselves 
against allegations of infringement.865 The broad and often imprecise language in software 
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claims increases the likelihood that a software developer has no idea a patent applies until 
they receive a cease-and-desist letter.  Reform is uncertain as patent legislation remains 
controversial and poor quality patents remain a potential threat to interoperability.866    
Patents are granted on a national basis and there is variance in the legal position.  It cannot 
be certain that the problems at the USPTO have affected Europe and the UK patent practice 
but criticism exists of European patents, and examples that are not innovative and where 
prior art exists have been identified.867  The patent system may be national, but 3D CAD 
software is international as are standards in software interfaces.  A policy on patents and on 
standards cannot assume that Europe is isolated from these problems.  
The acknowledged drawbacks to software patents for interfaces, including insufficient 
rigour in the standard for non-obviousness and lack of adequate cost effective post grant 
review,868 has made organisations such as OASIS and W3C sufficiently wary of patents to 
adopt royalty free policies to avoid patent hold ups.869   
In addition to incentivising innovation, patents are granted in return for early publication of 
the invention.  Software patents do not however have to disclose the source code or object 
code or even detailed descriptions of the patented program.870  As patents can be narrower 
than the interface they do not necessarily require the revelation of all the “trade secrets” 
necessary for full compatibility.  Patent protection can be available in addition to trade 
secret protection, but as the patentable element of software is often not visible, other than 
by reverse engineering, trade secrecy is an alternative to patenting.  As patenting requires 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Berkeley Centre for Law & Technology 1, 29 believes a more cost effective way to challenge invalid patents is 
needed than the current litigation and re-examination procedures. 
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some disclosure it is feared that adverse selection may occur where more innovative ideas 
are kept secret and only the obvious ideas are there for all to see.871   
6.14.2 Potential Abuse of Patent System 
In the Guidelines on Horizontal Agreements,872 firms were categorised by their use and 
ownership of patents which would affect their interests in the outcome of the standard 
setting process.873  There were the upstream-only companies that only develop and market 
IPR, and their incentive is to maximise royalties.  There are the downstream-only companies 
which make or supply services based on IPR owned by others and which want to minimise 
royalties.  The third group is made up of vertically integrated companies which both own 
IPR and make goods or supply services and have mixed incentives.  There is a concern that 
RF standards could foreclose the business for the upstream-only firms.  This business model 
of non-practicing entities (NPEs) includes universities and research centres and patent 
“trolls”.874   
NPEs acquire patents in order to license them to others, although some also conduct 
research themselves.  NPEs are very active in software patents875  as software patents can 
be vague.  NPEs are said to account for about 41% of patent litigation involving software 
patents.
876
  The loss to defendants as a result of this litigation has been assessed at half a 
                                                     
871
 Christian Koboldt,  ‘Much Pain for Little Gain? A Critical View of Software Patents’ (2003) (1) Journal of 
Information Law and Technology 
872
 Commission Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the TFEU to Horizontal Co-operation 
Agreements OJ [2011] C 11/1. 
873
 Ibid para 267 
874
 Tom Ewing and Robin Feldman, ‘The Giants Among Us’ (2012) Stanford Technology Law Review 1 – in a little 
more than five years, the largest of the NPEs have accumulated 30,000-60,000 patents worldwide, which 
would make it the 5th largest patent portfolio of any domestic US company and the 15th largest of any 
company in the world. http://stlr.stanford.edu/pdf/feldman-giants-among-us.pdf but see also Damien Geradin 
“What’s wrong with royalties in high technology industries?” (December 2009) TILC Discussion Paper DP 2009-
045 who presents the case for royalties for upstream only firms 
875
 While NPEs are not specifically active just in interfaces or standards they are attractive to NPEs as it is easier 
to identify infringements  
876
 James Bessen, ‘The Private and Social Costs of Patent Trolls’ (2011) Regulation, Winter, 26 - 35, 34.  
245 
 
 
trillion dollars while the benefit to the original patent inventor was only 2 percent of that 
amount.877  The threat of this litigation, which for software is often for an inadvertent 
infringement, can be a disincentive to innovate.878  There is concern that the incentive flow 
to small inventors does not offset the very much larger disincentive imposed on technology 
firms.   This shortfall is considered a social cost of NPEs. 
The aim of preventing imitation is the traditional patent motive, but there is evidence of 
other strategic motives.  These include blocking competitors by patenting in adjoining fields 
with no intention of exploiting the patent, and for the purpose of exchanging and cross 
licensing.879   “Patent thickets” are cited as a disadvantage of patenting of software as they 
may require complex cross-licensing to allow newcomers to enter the market, but patent 
thickets are said not to effect research and development spending.880   
6.15 Patents and Interfaces and Standards 
Patents in standards are said to aid investment in and diffusion of the standard as well as 
encouraging patents to be committed to a standard.881  Further, while patents may not be 
well suited to software inventions, there is said to presently be insufficient empirical 
evidence that patents are such a major impediment to interoperability that the exclusion of 
interfaces from patent protection is justified.
882
  There are however several examples of 
established firms with strong market positions taking patents on interfaces, possibly with 
the aim of controlling the development of competing and complementary products.883 
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Patents are considered most threatening to competition when they are held by established 
firms with market power which may use them to leverage their dominant position in one 
market into an adjacent market.884 
The exclusionary power of patents in interfaces is considered strong885 as infringements are 
easier to detect than other software patent infringements and as patents protect the 
function and not just the way the code is written, thus potentially making it impossible to 
work around the patent.886  In the absence of a Standard Setting Organisation ‘SSO’887 
imposing a FRAND or RF obligation, firms can often charge higher royalty rates for licensing 
interface patents than other patents, regardless of the intrinsic degree of innovation.888  
This practice known as “patent hold up” should be alleviated where the SSO successfully 
adopts a FRAND or RF policy.889   
Patent ambushes are another potential problem in standards where members of SSOs are 
deceptive and only assert their patents after the standard is set.  A similar risk comes from 
non-members who subsequently assert patents without any FRAND obligation.  These 
incidences are not common but significant when they do occur.   Standards in some parts of 
the ICT industry have also suffered from royalty stacking where multiple royalties impose a 
burden that is inefficient or even obstructive as individual rights holders do not take 
account of the negative effect on downstream sales.  Again it is argued that excessive 
                                                     
884
 Ibid 3  
885
 Maureen O’ Rourke ‘Towards a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law’ (2000) 100 Columbia Law Review 1117, 
1218 – noting that many interfaces are arbitrary, obvious and /or of low intrinsic value.  
886
 Mark Lemley and Carl Shapiro ‘Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking’, (2007) 85 Texas Law Review 1991, 
2016. 
887
 Standard Setting Organisation (hereafter SSO) 
888
 Maureen O’ Rourke ‘Towards a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law’ (2000) 100 Columbia Law Review 1117, 
1218. 
889
 Damien Geradin ‘Reverse Hold-ups: The (Often Ignored) Risks Faced by Innovators in Standardized Area’  
The Pros and Cons of Standard Setting, 2010 Konkurrensverket,  Swedish Competition Authority, in which it is 
argued that the risk of patent hold-ups is exaggerated and the real risk is of under compensation for patent 
holders. 
 
247 
 
 
cumulative royalties are uncommon and whether royalties are passed downstream to end 
customers depends on a number of market factors.890      
A further concern is that the royalty that can be imposed may be due to the nature of the 
standard rather than the value in the IPR.  The IPR holder may try to profit from the 
standard’s strategic position and extract excessive rents.891     
Participants in the process of adopting a new interface standard tend to accept the IPR of 
others if its own IPR is also accepted.  Although the participants benefit, this is unfair to 
those who do not participate and to the end user who ultimately bears the cost.892       
Patents may not be the only IPR in interfaces, but patents appear more likely to attract 
licence fees than other IPRs.  Following the Microsoft case and the settlement in 2009, 
Microsoft still continued to charge royalties for its interface patents but not for non-
patented interface information.893  Microsoft’s willingness to license protocols including to 
SAMBA on GPL-friendly terms may not have occurred but for the Commission’s 
enforcement action.894        
6.16 How do SSOs Approach IPR? 
While the terms adopted by SSOs vary, the majority require or encourage members to 
disclose essential patents, and sometimes all IPRs of which they are aware.  It is not usually 
required for participants to disclose pending patents or to conduct searches.  Some SSOs do 
not require disclosure provided the patent holder is willing to commit to licence on FRAND 
or RF terms.  An empirical study found that mandating RF licensing is negatively associated 
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with a disclosure requirement, but that FRAND is strongly associated with such a 
requirement.895  
The W3C requires patents necessary for interoperability to be licensed RF, although there is 
a procedure for getting an exclusion from RF.896  OASIS adopted RF licensing options but 
also allows for some licensing of patented technologies for standards on RAND terms.  
Apparently the RF terms have proved more popular and the overwhelming majority have 
adopted RF policies for application and web services approved by OASIS.897  
Patents remain enforceable even where an RF policy for interface patents is adopted, but it 
is thought that this policy reduces their leverage and economic value.  This will dampen 
incentives to acquire patents.  Even so, some open source developers do not agree with 
W3C and similar RF policies as the license may still include restrictions that are not 
acceptable to some members of the open source community.898 
When a sample of SSOs policies was reviewed in 2002,899 the majority adopted standards 
which included IPRs, but two SSOs prohibited the continued ownership of any IPRs adopted 
by a standard, and one required members to give up patent rights.  The policy of at least 
one of those SSOs, the ISO, which validates the STEP standard,  has changed and members 
can now continue to own patents with a policy of disclosure and licence of patents on RF or 
RAND terms.900  Four SSOs permitted members to own the patents but only if they licensed 
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them RF.901  A further survey recorded in 2005 found a majority of SSOs (63%) used RAND in 
the patent licensing rules and only 9% used RF rules.902 More recently there are signs of a 
shift towards RF licensing as Google and Web standards bring competitive pressure to 
adopt RF licensing models.903 
One thing most SSOs have in common is that while they may require patents to be licensed 
on FRAND terms, the negotiations on converting that principle into actual figures and words 
must take place between the parties.  The 2005 survey found that only 9% of organizations 
have a dispute resolution mechanism.  Most SSOs are not involved in agreeing what may 
constitute a reasonable fee or other terms.904  Interviews confirmed that the ISO was not 
involved in setting fees for the use of the STEP standard.905 
6.17 Remedies for Breach of Patents 
Not only is the existence of poor quality patents harmful to interoperability but the nature 
of the remedies, particularly the granting of injunctions, can exacerbate the position.  This is 
especially the case in the ICT industry where they can be thousands of patents in one 
product.  Patent trolls906 are particularly active in the software industry with software 
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patents ten times more likely to be asserted than other patents907   The threat of injunction 
and damages and legal costs is a recognised problem.908  Under TRIPS, injunctions should be 
available for patent infringement but can be subject to certain requirements909 
There is an argument that the patent system is “self-correcting” which was demonstrated in 
the US Supreme Court decision in eBay v MercExchange which disapprove of granting 
injunctions as the “general rule” as “a right to exclude” referred to the nature of the rights 
and not the nature of the remedy.910  The threat of an injunction is a strong bargaining tool 
employed by patent trolls to charge exorbitant fees and to leverage negotiations where a 
patent only covers a component of a larger product.911 The decision in eBay favours 
interoperability as a reasonable royalty rate will normally make the patentee whole912 and 
the public interest favours competition.913  
Damages and even royalties can themselves be harmful to interoperability.  Damages 
payments are usually aimed at compensating the claimant rather than penalising the 
wrongdoer.  Damages could equate to the royalties that could have been paid or where a 
licence would not have been granted to compensation for anticipated profits.  An account 
for profits, which is based on actual diverted profit rather than notional damages is 
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available but not as an automatic alternative.914  Exemplary damages are rare although the 
EU Directive on IP enforcement sets out when damages are payable for economic and 
moral harm.915  In the US in addition to lost profits or reasonable royalty awards, in the 
event of a wilful infringement, which is found in the majority of cases, the award can 
increase three fold.916   
Large damages have negative consequences encouraging litigation rather than licensing, as 
even a settlement can result in higher licences fees.  This “royalty burden” falls on 
innovative companies and encourages patent trolls.  Failure to apportion damages results in 
damage awards for prior art in the public domain and technology patented by third parties 
over compensates plaintiffs unjustly.917  Post 2000 there has been a shift away from lost 
profit awards to reasonable royalty awards.  As lost profits are available only where the 
patent holder could have made a sale the rise in royalty awards reflects the increase in 
ownership by companies who do not manufacture or distribute.918  The basis for calculating 
lost profits or the reasonable royalty can be either a portion of revenue credited to 
invention or entire market value.   If the reasonable royalty is based only on the value of 
the infringed interfaces, rather than on the value of the entire interoperable product, it will 
encourage the development of interoperable products by reducing the risk of draconian 
damages.919   
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Even if interfaces are free of copyright and can be reverse engineered, a patent on the 
interface can frustrate interoperability.  This is particularly the case when the patent holder 
does not participate directly in the market for the program or related products but is purely 
seeking to maximise revenue without any incentive to cross license their own technology.920  
For this reason patent quality and damages are crucial to improving the interoperability of 
3D CAD software.                
6.18 Is There a Failure in the Market due to IPRs in Interfaces and Standards?  
Most commentators agree that there should be a market for standards with minimal 
government interference in interfaces both for de facto and formal standards.  IPRs are 
however by their nature interference, as they give exclusive rights of self-interest in return 
for benefits that give public economic welfare in the form of incentives to innovate and 
publication of past innovations.  IPRs are granted in the expectation that the deadweight 
loss caused by the grant of exclusivity is lower than the value of increased inventiveness 
that follows. 
Market failures are not limited to actual failures of markets to appear, but also occur when 
markets fail to align private and social economic welfare and arguably socio-economic 
goals.
921
    Market failure also occurs due to asymmetric information.  Software systems are 
sufficiently complex that, while the producer may have an advanced understanding of the 
system, the user does not, until it is too late.  
Lerner and Schankerman acknowledge that there are shortcomings in both patent policy 
and the functioning of SSOs with externalities due to network effects and a lack of 
information about the market, particularly open source software.  They do not however 
consider that governments should intervene for example by exploiting their purchasing 
power to compensate for distortions, and change the nature of the market.  They propose 
that market failure in the form of abuse of network dominance should be addressed by 
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921
 Wendy Gordon, ‘Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and its 
Predecessors’ (1982) 82 Columbia Law Review 1600-1657; and ‘Market Failure and Intellectual Property: A 
Response to Professor Lunney’ (2002) 82 Boston University Law Review 1031-2002. 
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competition law.922  A lack of interoperability, lock-in and high switching costs do not always 
justify intervention, even when the results are strong network effects.  Innovation can still 
happen in other ways, such as the “gale of creative destruction” or the “killer app” rather 
than evolution.923   
In some software markets there appears to be a dominant supplier.  It is claimed that the 
desktop PCs of Europe’s governments are completely locked in to a single proprietary 
software vendor due to high switching costs.924  The market is tipped “towards a certain 
technology or standard, not necessarily the one offering the highest user benefits, creating 
a monopoly position for the seller of that technology.”925 
Competition law provides an ex post remedy and while it can be flexible it should only apply 
to exceptional cases which are not structural and which have not been anticipated by an ex 
ante regime.  Identifying in advance which cases are anticipated rather than exceptional can 
be difficult.  This was attempted in the Software Directive926 in Europe and considered in 
Trinko927  In telecommunications law and design protection law ex ante exemptions are in 
                                                     
922
 Josh Lerner and Mark Schankerman, The Comingled Code: Open Source and Economic Development (MIT 
Press 2010).  In email correspondence with the authors (29 August 2012) Jacques Crémer and Mark 
Schankerman propose that procurement power should not be used to address any perceived market failure 
which should be addressed instead by competition law or by drafting exceptions to patent protection into 
patent law. 
923
 Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (George Allen, London, 1976) first published 
1942, 81 et seq 
924
 It is said that less than ten thousand of Europe’s civil servants use a desktop system that does not depend 
on this proprietary software vendor which equates to one fifteen-hundredth (0.0007) of the total of fifteen 
million desktops; Gijs Hillenius, ‘Governments could save millions by reducing their dependence on a single 
desktop PC software vendor’ (11 March 2011) European Journal of ePractice, www.epracticejournal.eu. 
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 Michiel Bijlsma, Paul De Bijl,  and Viktoria Kocsis ‘Competition, innovation and intellectual property rights in 
software markets’ (CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis No 181 March 2009) 55-74  
926
 Thomas Vinje ‘The History of the EC Software Directive’ in M. Lehmann & C. Tapper A Handbook of European Software 
Law, Clarendon Press Oxford 1993; Ashwin van Rooijen  The Software Interface between Copyright and 
Competition Law (Kluwer Law International 2010), 202 
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 Trinko (US Supreme Court 2004) 411, there was no duty to deal by the telecommunications operator 
Verizon under competition law as there was already a duty under telecommunications law.  
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place which remove the need to resort to competition law to correct for structural and 
foreseeable.  Design protection laws exempt control over interconnecting and replacement 
parts in secondary markets.  The telecommunications industry has a pro-active regulator to 
address refusals by operators to interconnect. 
The IPR regime for software, which is arguably not fit for purpose, gives an additional 
barrier to entry by giving monopoly rights that may not efficiently incentivise innovation.  
For competition law to intervene there must be both dominance and evidence of abuse, 
and the remedy invariably gives only a slow ex-post remedy. But due to lack of 
interoperability and the resulting lock-in and high switching costs there can be little 
competition in some software markets even where there is no obvious monopoly.928  Lack 
of interoperability means the market is not contestable, but as there is no single dominant 
supplier a normal remedy under competition law is unavailable.  
Chapter 5 demonstrated that competition law will not address failures in oligopolistic 
markets, such as the 3D CAD industry, caused by a lack of interoperability.   Where a market 
such as the 3D CAD industry suffers from large switching costs which can create ex post 
monopolies and segment an otherwise undifferentiated market allowing firms to focus on 
customers rather than compete with rival buyers and extracting oligopolistic profits, some 
intervention in the form of pro-compatibility public policy may be justified, particularly 
where incompatibility is chosen rather than inevitable.929  
Market power is usually closely linked to the subject matter protected by intellectual 
property rights.  An example is a patent which protects the precisely claimed subject matter 
but not the entire product containing the protected subject matter.  Traditionally copyright 
protects the original expression of the novel.  The position is not the same for interface 
specifications as their demand can be driven not by their subject matter but by the demand 
                                                     
928
 An example is the 3D computer aided design market see Cyon Research ‘Intellectual Capital and 
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for the computer program or platform that relies on the interface.  This can be magnified by 
network effects and lock-in.  This arguably gives control over more than the subject matter 
which is disproportionate and undesirable.930  
Interfaces are essentially de facto or formal standards.  It is generally difficult to anticipate 
in advance which subject matter will evolve into a standard.  Interfaces specifications are 
more easily identifiable as standards.  The case for an ex ante approach to control of 
interface specifications is stronger than for standards generally.  It is more feasible to 
achieve an ex ante approach which gives more certainty to software developers which 
should encourage competition and innovation.  This is not however reflected in the 
Software Directive which has too little openness of interface information particularly in the 
overly restrictive provision on reverse analysis in Article 6.931 
Vendor lock-in and high switching costs are said to give a first-mover advantage leading to 
higher prices and entry barriers for suppliers of new software products.  “In software 
markets, the implication is not necessarily that production by a single firm is the most 
efficient outcome.”932  ”The resulting high monopoly price creates a deadweight loss, that 
is, a loss in welfare that occurs when demand is reduced due to a mark-up in the price.”933  
By “welfare”, economists mean consumer and producer surplus.934 
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 Ashwin van Rooijen  The Software Interface between Copyright and Competition Law (Kluwer Law 
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The dependence on a single IT vendor by public bodies has been described as “a waste of 
public money that public bodies can no longer afford”,935 a waste not only of public money 
but also of the private money of the citizen who has to use a specific product (rather than 
any product compliant with an applicable standard), to use a public service.  Policies 
encouraging public bodies to purchase compatible software by specifying open standards 
can bring pressure on the market to remedy lock-in and reduce cost.936  With the exception 
of the JT standard, there is little evidence of this sort of pressure being brought to bear on 
the 3D CAD market as OEMs appear to value data integrity over openness of software 
systems.937    While the software is protected by IPRs and there is little effective market 
pressure to increase openness interoperability will continue to cause huge cost to users.938   
6.19 Summary  
The 3D CAD suppliers all use copyright, trade secrets and patents to protect the intellectual 
property in their computer programs.  These regulations allow the suppliers to protect the 
innovation created by their research and development activities.   The rationale for the IPRs 
is to incentivise innovation by giving a defined monopoly. 
The law has recognised that software interfaces should be exempted from copyright 
protection.  In the US there is uncertainty as to how far functionality will exclude either 
direct or indirect copying of code and other expression but ideas and principles underlying 
the interface are exempt.  In Europe the format of data files used to exploit functions has 
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 Neelie Kroes Address at Open Forum Europe 2010 Summit: ‘Openness at the heart of the EU Digital Agenda’ 
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been held to justify exclusion from copyright protection.939   Interfaces that are written in 
new code from specifications obtained by reverse engineering are not copyright protected 
under the Software Directive.    
The law on software patents has developed separately and there is generally no exemption 
for interfaces.  There is evidence that the concept and implementation of software patents 
is flawed, does not incentivise innovation and could restrict the operation of standards and 
interoperability.  This raises the question of whether there is any economic justification in 
encouraging patent protection of interfaces.  The case is certainly doubtful and intellectual 
property has failed to adequately address the indirect effects of control over interface 
specifications on interoperability.  This failure can impact competition and innovation.940  
It raises the question whether there is a failure of the market with overprotection of 
interfaces which cannot be rectified by reverse engineering or by conventional competition 
law, particularly in an oligopolistic market.941  Lack of interoperability is conventionally 
overcome by the use of standards.  The 3D CAD industry has several standards including the 
most widely used STEP standard but this provides limited compatibility.  Standards that are 
compatibility standards cannot be avoided and consequently give an unplanned expansion 
of the protection for both copyright and patents.  The hidden nature of the code also 
extends the protection usually secured by trade secrets.  Standards, including the role of 
IPRs, will be considered in the next Chapter.         
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CHAPTER 7. STANDARDS 
7.1 Introduction 
Standards are sets of voluntary technical and quality criteria for products, services and 
production processes. They help businesses in working together which ultimately saves 
money for the consumer.  They are a set of technical specifications that provide a common 
design for some product or process.  One aspect is the technical specifications for markets 
where compatibility and interoperability with other products or systems is essential.942  This 
includes software to software interoperability.  Available and accessible standards can 
reduce market or supplier lock-in.  Software built around open standards can interoperate 
and avoid users being unintentionally locked-in for decades to particular IT solutions.943   
Standardisation can lead to economic efficiency and substantial consumer benefits.944   In 
addition to providing information to encourage interoperability standards can encourage 
the development of new and improved products or markets, improve quality and supply 
conditions which normally increase competition and lower output and sales costs, 
benefiting the economy as a whole.945  Knowing the requisite standard reduces risk of 
market entry and can speed up market adoption of new products and technologies.  
Competitors know the common baseline.  Standards can also increase substitutability, thus 
increasing competition and lowering prices.946 
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There are however dangers with standards and they can impact competition in three main 
ways.  They can reduce price competition, can foreclose innovative technologies and they 
can exclude or discriminate against certain companies by prevention of effective access to 
the standard.947 
Standards in interfaces include standard document formats and protocol specifications.  
These may include IPRs in the form of copyright and patents.  De facto standards are 
normally proprietary interfaces that have become standards due to the market share 
enjoyed by the proprietary software.  An example is Microsoft’s “.doc” document format.  
Open Standards by contrast are created by standard-setting organisations (SSOs) which can 
be either formal standards bodies such as the International Standards Organisation (ISO) or 
consortia such as the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) or World Wide Web 
Consortium (W3C).  It is estimated that other consortia and fora are the origin of about 60 
per cent of standards in the ICT sector.  Examples include HTTP, HTML, Wifi and XML.948   
In this Chapter the benefits, disadvantages and shortcomings of standards will be analysed 
in the context of the 3D CAD market.  This will consider not only activity and practice by the 
industry to adopt standards but also the legal framework including competition law and 
licencing of IPRs on FRAND or RF terms.   
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7.2 Standards and 3D CAD 
Standards are used in the 3D CAD industry to provide various levels of interoperability.  The 
two most widely used formal standards are ISO 10303 (STEP) and IGES949 which are both file 
formats that allow the digital exchange of information between 3D CAD systems.950        
STEP has been the most serious and continuing attempt to develop an international 
standard for data exchange of CAD models.  The standard has been limited to transferring 
geometry but is incapable of handling the additional process information needed to amend 
the model.   Only a “dumb” shape model is transferred with essential information on 
construction history and constraint parameters missing.951  Proof of concept tests on 
enhancements to ISO 10303 find that “the coverage of geometry and design intent 
achieved is only a subset of what is necessary for full practical translators and not all 
problems encountered have been fully overcome”.952   The APIs of commercial CAD systems 
are not primarily intended as an interface for model exchange which may prevent the 
transfer of all design intent information. 
STEP allows design engineers to save a 3D module in a ‘non-native’ format such as an ‘STP’ 
file.  The file can then be sent to others including suppliers and designers outside their firm.  
The recipient can see the 3D model but will not have all the design history and will be 
unable to edit the module.  For some applications this is adequate and can have advantages 
as less information is transferred.  Incomplete transfers are however common and data 
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 IGES, Initial Graphics Exchange Specification, is an ANSI standard first published in 1980.  It is said that 
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cleansing including those which involve factoring the data back in again drive up errors and 
errors cost money.953  As only incomplete information is transferred from one proprietary 
software system to another, or even between different versions, it does not provide a 
remedy to lock-in.  
STEP and IGES converters are normally supplied by the 3D CAD suppliers, incorporated into 
the modules in which their own proprietary software is supplied.  The standards are also 
used by developers of complementary software such as Eurostep to create innovate 
solutions to data exchange.954  
The lack of adequate standards has encouraged the development of software companies 
which specialise in software to provide interoperability, but the companies’ success in 
providing a technical solution or being affordable to all users is mixed.  Less than 33% of 
engineering companies surveyed used a third party translator and of those only 45% 
indicate that they get the results they want with these applications better than 75% of the 
time.955   “The translators are based on the same underlying principle as the standard that 
instead of doing multiple point to point you work through some neutral format.  Essentially 
they have their own proprietary neutral format but that means you have to buy all your 
translation requirements from them.”956  As they are not an ISO standard they are not as 
suitable for archival purposes.957 They can provide some relief to lock-in when used to 
migrate data between systems.958  As the process is complex and expensive it only provides 
a limited solution in limited circumstances. 
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 Siemens has recently allowed the JT data format to become adopted as an ISO standard.959  
This is said to be driven by customer demand although the process may have been started 
by UGS before its acquisition by Siemens.960   It is seen by others in the industry as support 
and commitment for open standards in response to what the customers want.961  “A big 
company would only make their data format a standard if they believed that being able to 
say that we support open standards is good in the market place”.962  The JT file is less than a 
tenth of the size of a normal CAD file which allows not only for visualization but also 
transferring the model more efficiently. JT is also used to support collaborating as part of a 
digital ‘mock up’ and data-sharing standard for the PLM industry and as a long-term data 
archival format.963  
The acquisition of SpaceClaim by ANSYS not only provides customers with a 
powerful but intuitive 3D direct modeling software that allows for computer 
simulation of failures at earlier stages of design but as SpaceClaim works on 
geometry and is ‘CAD-neutral’ it allows users to modify geometries regardless of the 
system in which they were created.964  This creates a de-facto standard allowing 
                                                                                                                                                                     
monitoring and auditing made the project unfeasible due to cost of manpower.   After a three month pilot to 
ensure the translations met required quality standards the translation was automated with an exception 
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designers to transfer their models to SpaceClaim for analysis by ANSYS and other 
computer simulation software.965     
A main concern for the users of 3D CAD is that the standard will be available in the future to 
ensure access to legacy data.  Users will have a commercial and often a legal requirement to 
maintain access to the data for several decades.  They do not want to be locked-in to a 
standard which then becomes unavailable because the rules and procedures on which it 
was adopted were unlawful or unenforceable.966  International standards such as STEP and 
JT have advantages over de facto proprietary standards for archival data.     
One potential disadvantage of software becoming an official or even de facto standard is 
that it creates an on-going commitment to support it and makes it harder to modify where 
necessary to support future needs.  Suppliers of complementary software must disclose 
interface information to encourage the use of their products with 3D CAD software.  
Suppliers express concern however about disclosing information in other layers of software 
which would remove freedom to change things and would lock down the behaviour of all 
the layers.967    
The 3D CAD industry utilises standards in a number of ways.  Official standards provide a 
partial solution to industry needs such as the transfer of geometry and archiving but do not 
provide a solution to lock-in.  There has been a market response to the shortcomings in the 
official standards with translators and de-facto standards but these address specific 
solutions and their business model relies on a lack of interoperability and lock-in.  Patents in 
the official standards present challenges and all the de-facto standards rely on proprietary 
software.   
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Standards in the 3D CAD industry appear to respond to market opportunities.  They must 
however do so within the regulatory framework to prevent restricting or distorting 
competition and optimising the opportunity for continued innovation.   
7.3 Standards and Innovation  
Standards are the accepted method of providing compatibility in traditional engineering, 
and in recent decades software standards have been developed to enable software 
interoperability.  Standards have well recognised benefits such as improving economic 
efficiency and promoting growth.968  Several studies have found that standards contribute 
nearly one percentage point per year in productivity and growth in some developed 
economies.969  The relationship between standards and innovation is more nuanced.  
Standards can aid innovation by reducing time to market and codifying and disseminating 
the state of the art technology.970  It appears that standards can increase product variety by 
increasing the number of value-added combinations and this is seen as more valuable than 
their impact on procurement or production costs.  There is also a perception that standards 
do not level the playing field but may favour dominant firms.971  Standards play an 
important role in network industries as they help the adoption of new technologies by 
enabling forward and backward compatibility.972 There are concerns however that “over-
standardisation” can restrict product differentiation and can decrease competition and 
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innovation.973 The level of constraint appears to vary with the nature of the standard and its 
user.  There may be more constraint with old standards, associated with lock-in to legacy 
systems, rather than with new standards, although early standardisation may constrain 
innovation.974  Some standards mainly codify knowledge and are informative and more 
likely to have a direct benefit to innovation than constraining standards concerned with 
such matters as health and safety.  The perception of the user also varies, with more 
innovative users taking knowledge from the standard and then pushing the boundaries of 
innovation so that innovation is not prevented.975  Standards in software must cope with 
lock-in, network effects and arguably a less than optimal IPR regime but overall can offer 
advantages for improved interoperability.          
If standards overreach or define more than necessary they can reduce product 
differentiation and even exclude new technologies from entering the market.  An advance 
in technology may be deterred from entering the market if it does not comply with the 
existing standard.  When a standard is being developed alternative technologies can 
complete for inclusion in the standard but once a standard is set it can become a barrier to 
entry excluding advances in technology from the market.  Over-standardisation can limit 
competition and product variety.  Competition authorities and courts tend to focus on the 
process of adopting the standard rather than the technical merits which they are less well 
placed to determine.976     
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7.4 Open and Closed Standards 
Standards can be used to improve interoperability and the openness of interfaces and 
systems.  Standards themselves are considered to be open or closed depending primarily on 
their treatment of IPRs in the standards.   
There are many definitions of open and closed standards.  On the one hand “closed” 
standards have no regulation of ownership or licensing of intellectual property rights IPRs.  
This could be a de facto standard977 or where one member of an SSO owns the IPR and 
effectively controls the standard.   On the other hand “open” standards have been defined 
as those in which the members provide their IPR so that anyone is free to use it.
978
  
Krechmer suggests 10 criteria for assessing the openness of standards including 
requirements that all stakeholders may participate and that there are low or no charges for 
IPR.979  In fact most SSOs occupy a middle ground somewhere between these open and 
closed standard definitions, permitting their members to own IPRs but requiring the 
licensing of the IPR on specified terms.980  They are open in that the standard can be used, 
but proprietary in that the IPR holder may demand some form of payment which is said to 
offer a “third way”, where the IPR has some value but does not obstruct the standard.981  
Both open and closed standards can increase interoperability and reduce lock-in.  The 
intention is to achieve a more diverse and competitive market, enabling IT to interoperate 
and share information to achieve more economic efficiency in the delivery of IT.  Projects 
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can be smaller and more manageable, and may be reused to avoid duplicating the 
commissioning of new solutions where one already exists.  Standardisation of data and 
document formats should give customers and businesses a choice in the software they use 
when accessing information. 
The STEP standard has few patents but the conclusion gathered from industry interviews is 
that patents raise challenges requiring attention and careful consideration.982      
7.5 Guidelines on Horizontal Agreements 
Setting of standards creates an exclusive market position which can easily be abused.  The 
co-operation between competitors and the setting of detailed specifications can exclude 
competing technologies.983  For this reason the behaviour of firms participating in standard 
setting can infringe Art 101 and 102, competition law provisions of the TFEU.     
The benefits of standards are well recognised as improving economic efficiency and 
promoting growth984 and for this reason are encouraged despite the possible restriction on 
competition.  For a standard to be beneficial, it must not only have technical merit, but  the 
rules, process and procedures of adoption on which it is available for implementation must 
also be sound and in particular must not infringe competition law.  The Commission has 
issued guidance in the form of the “Guidelines on Horizontal Agreements” to assist SSOs 
and other interested parties in shaping the standard setting process, to comply with 
European competition law.985   
                                                     
982 Interview with senior industry executive #4 (July 2013) Interview with industry expert #5 (September 2014) 
The question of patents in standards was discussed in interviews and took up a proportionally long time 
considering the relatively few patents involved in the standards.   
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 Sven Sattler ‘Standardisation under EU competition rules – the Commission’s new horizontal guidelines’  
(2011) 32 (7) European Competition Law Review  343-349. 
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Department of Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) by Innovative Economics Ltd Swann; Mark Lemley 
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The Guidelines cover all standards, but this document is concerned with standardisation 
agreements covering technical specifications in the 3D CAD market where compatibility and 
interoperability with other products or systems is essential.986 
In the past decade the level of essential IPRs in standards has increased.987  The Commission 
has dealt with some high profile disputes including Rambus, a “patent ambush” case, where 
Rambus did not reveal an essential patent until the industry was locked-in.988 It has been 
said that attention has shifted in recent years from concerns about collusion between 
participants, where the aim is to exclude competitors, to focus on preventing “hold up” 
problems.  This change of emphasis is a result of the increase in the incidence of patents in 
standards.989       
The Guidelines acknowledge that standardisation agreements may encourage new and 
improved products, increase competition, reduce costs and ensure interoperability.990  In 
specific circumstances however standard setting can potentially reduce competition by 
restricting price competition, foreclosing technologies and discrimination by preventing 
access to the standard for example by using IPRs to “hold-up” users after the standard has 
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been adopted.991  The Guidelines recognise that SSOs have different rules and procedures, 
but also provide a limited “safe harbour” for SSOs meeting certain criteria based on 
unrestricted but non compulsory participation, a transparent procedure and access on 
FRAND terms.992  FRAND can also cover RF licensing.993  It is thought that SSOs with an RF 
standards policy would meet the safe harbour requirements without having to disclose 
IPRs.994 Variation from these terms does not necessarily invalidate the standard but the 
rules and procedures must satisfy an effects-based assessment, contain only essential 
restrictions, and display efficiency gains which are passed on to customers.  Efficiency gains 
include technical interoperability and compatibility as they often encourage competition 
and prevent lock-in.995  
The aim of competition law and the Guidelines is to avoid competition being distorted by 
the setting of standards.  To avoid collusion a transparent process must give unrestricted 
rights for all competitors to be involved, non-discriminatory allocation of voting rights and 
objective criteria for selecting the technology.996  Participants are required to make good 
faith disclosure of any IPRs so that an informed decision can be made on whether to include 
the technology in the standard.  Perhaps of most importance though is the requirement in 
the Guidelines that once a standard is adopted there is an irrevocable written commitment 
to make essential IPR available on FRAND terms.   
FRAND can range from RF to a price that is reasonable ex ante, before the industry has been 
locked-in to the market.  The participants, not the SSO, must assess whether licence terms 
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are FRAND.997 This may well result in each firm wishing to use a standard negotiated 
separately with the patent holder.  The Guidelines say the fees should bear a reasonable 
relationship with the economic value of the IPR rather than a cost-based method as it 
would be difficult to attribute development costs to particular patents.  Comparisons with 
ex ante pricing by the company for relevant patents is one possibility.  Another is an 
independent expert assessment of the “objective centrality and essentiality to the standard 
at issue of the relevant IPR portfolio.”998 Again comparisons can be drawn with other 
relevant ex ante prices.  The Guidelines are not exhaustive and no mechanism is provided to 
resolve disputes.  It is recognised that the courts are still the only final arbiters if a 
reasonable royalty cannot be agreed.999 
The Guidelines try to block a loophole by which the FRAND obligation could be sidestepped.  
Not only must participants give irrevocable commitments in writing to licence any essential 
IPRs that are adopted by the standard on FRAND terms, but also, in order to ensure the 
effectiveness of the commitment, ensure that when they transfer the IPR any transferee is 
also bound by that commitment, for example by a contractual clause.1000 This is aimed at 
preventing a recurrence of the problems that arose when IPCom acquired standard-
essential patents from Bosch and the FRAND commitment did not automatically follow 
suit.1001  The Commission stepped in again, and IPCom relented before the opening of 
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formal proceedings.  By doing so the Commission recognised that the unrestricted access to 
essential patents on FRAND terms for all third parties safeguards the pro-competitive 
economic effects of standard setting. 
The main aim of the Guidelines is to shape the standardisation process in accordance with 
competition law.  By doing so they fortunately also help to reduce costs and lock-in by 
introducing open standards.  The common aim of safeguarding proprietary technology on 
FRAND terms for all third parties is of mutual benefit.  The Commission’s principle of 
“prevention is better than cure” of identifying IPRs before the industry is locked-in is 
another benefit.1002   
Remaining perils include: The Guidelines allow participants to disclose ex ante their most 
restrictive licensing terms.1003  The Guidelines do not allow participants to negotiate an 
aggregate royalty rate for a standard,1004 so although the individual royalty may seem 
reasonable, the aggregate cost for all the essential patents in a standard could be 
undesirably high, and potentially amount to royalty stacking.  Without the ability to discuss, 
in theory each licence has to be negotiated separately which slows and complicates the 
process and can lead to secret informal discussions.  These arrangements are inefficient and 
inconsistent with the system of patent pooling1005 where the parties can discuss and agree 
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an affordable aggregate royalty rate.  In practice royalty terms are often set between the 
patent owner and the supplier of technology using the standard.  The end user is not 
involved although the cost will normally be passed on to them.  The Guidelines only apply 
to standards that have market power.1006  It could therefore be possible to adopt a 
standard which is not subject to the Guidelines.  Before adopting a standard the terms of 
the SSO must be checked rather than assuming FRAND applies.  
The legal framework is complicated but can support a policy of open standards. The 
Guidelines have helped when adopting standards but the SSOs are not responsible for 
agreeing FRAND terms and this remains an area of uncertainty.  
7.6 Limitations of Standards Policy 
The STEP and IGES standards are not alone in providing limited interoperability.  There are 
several practical limiting factors in standards that need to be recognised as they will reduce 
the potential benefits of standards.  Standards do not guarantee interoperability.  The study 
by Shah and Kesan on compatibility between ODF, OOXML and DOC revealed examples of 
poor compatibility varying from formatting problems to loss of information in pictures, 
footnotes, comments, tracking changes and tables.  Less than 100% interoperability may 
significantly reduce the value of these document formats for some applications such as the 
archiving of information.1007   
                                                                                                                                                                     
correspondence with the authors (1 October 2012) points out that once a standard has been adopted a patent 
pool can be established and the Horizontal Guidelines will no longer apply and the terms of the Technology 
Transfer Guidelines will be controlling.      
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Another consideration is whether a single standard should be adopted, and if so which 
one.1008  There are several standards in the 3D CAD industry.1009  Not all standards are 
successful and it appears that only a few generate most of the impact in a “winner takes all” 
scenario.  Standards that are likely to have a high impact can be recognised at the 
development stage: they are more likely to have more participants and more divisive 
debates.  This can result in longer standards,1010 so more complexity and more words can 
indicate a standard with more impact.1011  It is said that little research has been done on the 
impact of competing (functionally equivalent) open standards on such matters as 
interoperability, innovation, and the environment.1012  Egyedi considers that selecting two 
or more functionally equivalent standards is inadvisable as this may reduce market 
transparency, decrease overall interoperability, decrease network externalities, decrease 
ease of use, fragment the market and possibly lead to forms of lock-in and increase 
transaction costs, for example the costs of converters.1013  To benefit from network effects 
it is best to adopt a successful standard.  Early adoption of a standard can reduce 
conversion costs, but ensuring adoption of the right standard at the right time is 
undoubtedly easier said than done.   
Kesan and Shah, analysing Massachusetts’ adoption of ODF when it was an immature 
standard, promote a policy of “multiple independent interoperable implementations” or 
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“running code” to avoid users being locked-in to an open standard.1014  Sieverding warns 
against mandating a particular path to interoperability which would include adopting a 
specific standard, open or otherwise, particularly if the open standard is immature and 
unproven.  Doing so may reduce flexibility and foreclose other opportunities of benefiting 
from advances in interoperability and so be ineffective and costly.1015  Swann also warns 
against standardisation taking place too early in the development cycle which can then 
exclude alternative and possibly superior technology.1016  Conversely, standardising too late 
can involve high transition costs.  There appears to be a proportional relationship between 
the number of standards and their positive effect on the process of innovation, which is 
reversed when the number of standards rise above a certain number.1017  
7.7 Can RF Standards Avoid the Patent Problem? 
RAND and RF terms for standards were evaluated by the US Department of Justice and the 
Federal Trade Commission in 2007.  Opinions varied from those who considered RAND to 
be effective and had no complaints with RAND terms,1018 to those who considered RAND 
was not a sufficient safeguard against the abuse of a patent that is essential to a 
standard.1019  One of the reasons RAND may be inadequate is because terms such as 
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‘reasonable’ and ‘non-discriminatory’ are not well defined.  Commentators considered 
‘reasonable’ to be so vague that it did not amount to anything,1020 and RAND to be an 
empty term.1021  SSOs give little explanation or guidance on what RAND means and there 
has not been much judicial guidance.1022   
Additionally, SSOs do not want to become involved in complaints about RAND licensing 
terms.  The absence of a good forum for resolving disputes about RAND licensing terms has 
contributed to problems including patent hold ups.1023 
There is doubt as to whether the requirement to licence on FRAND terms is even legally 
enforceable, and this may vary from one jurisdiction to another.  There is no agreement as 
to the terms or mechanism to objectively determine the terms, which amount to a “recipe 
for litigation”.1024  It should be assessed on the value before adoption as an essential 
standard.1025  It may not be possible to compel the granting of FRAND licences in private law  
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and any remedy that may exist under competition law is cumbersome and ex post.  This 
does of course look at the worst case scenario and the industry appears to operate and 
muddle through although it is questionable whether this is adequate when so much 
depends on reliable standards.     
The Horizontal Guidelines give little further guidance on how FRAND should be assessed 
although it is said that the fees should not be excessive or prevent or make it difficult to 
implement the standard.1026  It is for the participants not the SSO to assess whether the fee 
fulfils the FRAND commitment.  The Guidelines permit ex ante disclosure of the most 
restrictive licensing terms which may provide a model for license fees to be capped in 
advance.1027      
The most recognised and certain interpretation of RF is of a standard that requires all 
participants to make essential patent claims available on a RF basis.  There are however said 
to be other interpretations which are more difficult to monitor.1028 
Only a small minority (4 out of 43) of SSOs that were the subject of a study required RF 
licensing of patents incorporated in standards.1029   
RF could be the best means to limit licensing hold-up, but it does not obviously benefit the 
patent owner.  Arguably there could be a first mover advantage which could favour the IPR 
holder’s complementary technologies.1030    
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There is concern that RF does not provide an efficient incentive to innovate.  Intellectual 
property protection is the means by which those who invest in R&D have an expectation of 
achieving a return that is greater than zero.1031  The alleged connection between software 
patents and innovation has been discussed in Chapter 6.  The indirect effect of IPRs in 
interfaces is exacerbated if the interface is a standard and the justification for the closed 
IPR protection in interfaces which become standards is much weaker than for other aspects 
of the software.           
As well as removing the incentive to invest there is concern that mandating RF licences, by 
removing the licensor’s ability to earn a return from its investment in R&D through its 
intellectual property, is a disincentive to joining the standard.  RF raises the technology 
monopsony concern much more sharply than ex ante negotiation of RAND.1032   It may be 
possible to resolve the problem if members are not committed to licensing their technology 
at the outset, but are only obliged to do so if they want to take advantage of getting a RF 
license from the other members by agreeing to a reciprocal RF license.1033  This gives choice 
rather than a monopsony, but with some organisations there is a commitment on entering 
to licence all patents, and there can be asymmetry where some patents are more valuable 
than others.1034  RF is implemented in many different ways.1035  RF may be appropriate in 
certain technologies, particularly ones less populated by patents or at least few essential 
patents, where there might be unpatented alternatives, and in which case the licensor may 
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be willing to accept RF.1036  Reciprocal or cross-licensing is of less value in standards than in 
some patent pools as patents in standards may not be useful in the licensee’s income 
generating technology.  While there is evidence that RF licensing can be preferred even by 
IPR holders, there is little incentive for pure IPR companies, such as NPEs, to participate in 
RF licensing.  The grant of an RF license, even with a non-assertion clause, does not prevent 
claims by patent holders outside the SSO.  The remedies of defensive patenting, 
competition law and challenging the validity of the patent are expensive and not a 
complete solution.  This should not justify abandoning the policy of RF but it does mean 
that an open standard policy that adopts RF does not immediately lose the problems of 
claims by patent holders that are normally associated with FRAND.1037   
The European Interoperability Framework v.2 which is aimed at promoting interoperability 
in the public sector opted for a principle of openness that requires IPRs to be licensed on 
FRAND terms or on an RF basis in a way that allows implementation in both proprietary and 
open source software.1038  This is intended to foster competition between the business 
models.  While EIF2 includes RF within FRAND it has been said that a policy that prefers RF 
does not align with the first recommendation of EIF2 to align interoperability frameworks to 
take into account the European dimension of public service delivery and contravenes the 
duty of sincere cooperation contrary to the TFEU.  The EU does not have treaty competence 
in the area of organisation and delivery of public services, outside the remit of 
procurement, and cannot legislate in the area of interoperability systems for provision of 
public services.  For this reason a Commission Communication was used which is said to 
have intellectual and moral authority but is not directly legally enforceable.1039  If the public 
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sector insist on open standards when purchasing software this may spill over and influence 
software suppliers in other markets to increase their openness and interoperability.  An 
example is the Army 2020 initiative looking at standards based common interfaces to 
achieve interoperability.  It is a key demand to be able to achieve operational effect with 
the limited resources.1040   
The consultation on Modernising Standards in the EU revealed that IPRs are perceived as 
one of the most critical issues in IT standardisation.  Most of the respondents to the 
consultation supported FRAND policies although several felt more clarity, transparency and 
predictability was required.  Of those supporting FRAND, the majority also supported the 
inclusion of RF approaches as well.  They recognised that business models, other than 
charging royalties on standards, could support further R&D.1041  Disadvantages to the 
FRAND model included the time spent negotiating licensing arrangements.   This was seen 
as out of step with the speed of innovation and evolution in the IT domain where the 
increase in the number of patents had dramatically increased the complexity of monitoring 
the implementation of IPR policies.1042 
There are issues however with the inclusion of a FRAND option.  In markets where 
competing software is implemented by small firms or individuals without significant funds, 
the economic effect of open standards may only be achieved on RF terms.  If several 
standards exist in one product the amount of royalties that have to be paid, even under 
FRAND terms, could harm some competitors.1043 Basing standards on RF terms, rather than 
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FRAND or other commercial terms, is said to reduce the risk that data will become 
unavailable over time.1044     
Some open source licences, such as GNU v.2 and v.3 are considered incompatible with 
FRAND and royalty payments on patents.1045  Arguably this is a choice taken by the open 
source software developer1046 and should not of itself prohibit a policy of using both FRAND 
and RF software or even preferring RF.  Nevertheless, the existence of this legal 
incompatibility may be relevant where the main existing or potential competitor to 
proprietary software is open source software.  It can be argued that the open standard 
should be compatible with the development and distribution of the open source software’s 
licence terms.1047      
The incompatibility of FRAND licencing and open source software arose when Microsoft 
was ordered by the Commission to licence interoperability information in the form of 
protocol specifications on RAND terms including remuneration charged.  When setting the 
charge Microsoft had to disregard its market power and not impose any restriction that 
could create disincentives to compete or unnecessarily restrain innovation.1048   
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Microsoft ended up with at least two forms of licence.  A ‘No-Patent Agreement’ at a flat 
rate royalty fee of €10,000 that was compatible with open source models1049 and a ‘Patent 
Agreement’ at 0.4 per cent of licensee’s product revenues.1050  One version of the ‘No-
Patent Agreement’, negotiated by SAMBA, amounted to a non-disclosure agreement 
between Microsoft and the Protocol Freedom Information Foundation (PFIF) on behalf of 
open source developers.  In return for a one off fixed fee of €10,000 the agreement enabled 
the PFIF to licence the protocol information for free to ‘subcontracting’ open source 
developers.1051  The agreement does not include a licence of any patents.  Instead it 
contains a list of patents to inform the PFIF and the wider open source community of 
Microsoft’s patents related to WSPP.1052  The subcontractors then know what is patented 
and hence what to avoid.  In return Microsoft agrees not to assert any patents that are not 
notified in the agreement and, crucially for the open source ethos, this non assertion 
undertaking covers all open source developers involved in WSPP protocols.  This form of 
agreement was compatible with the GPL licence.1053     
Adopting a policy which mandates RF standards could reduce choice as the vast majority of 
SSOs have at least one option that allows patent holders to charge on a RAND basis.  This 
could limit the pool of standards available. 
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7.8 Impact of Standards on 3D CAD Industry 
Standards, principally the STEP and IGES standards, provide a means of transferring 
featureless models, although the transfer often has errors.1054  This allows manufacturing 
industry to share files with suppliers and customers for the purpose of their manufacturing 
business.  The standards and the JT file also give a safer format for archiving data.1055  They 
do not however provide a good answer to users who are locked-in to one of the proprietary 
3D CAD systems.  The users cannot use the standards to convert their own proprietary data 
to a different system in which they have an acceptable level of editing.  Translator 
companies have however seen the market opportunity and using a combination of 
standards, APIs and reverse engineering, developed software that can assist with the 
process of transferring data between proprietary 3D CAD systems.  This is not however an 
easier process and can take months if not years to complete.1056   Standards also allow 3D 
CAD suppliers to ‘ingest’ data from other 3D CAD systems into their own proprietary 
system.1057  This is a popular method by which the 3D CAD suppliers can enable the user to 
have some limited interoperability while still maintaining control.      
The industry has more than one standard, such as the IGES and STEP standard.  There has 
been more investment in the STEP standard1058 but some users still prefer the IGES 
standard.  There does not appear to be any conflict in their use although neither gives a 
complete answer.  
The STEP standard relies on proprietary data from the 3D CAD suppliers and while there are 
only a small number of patents in the main standards of STEP and JT it was apparent they 
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did present some challenges.  There were also some challenges identifying the limits of the 
interface and the extent of information that was needed to be disclosed.1059  The SSO gives 
an established framework within which these issues can be addressed and the STEP 
standard is very valuable to users.  The impression gained though was that there was no 
determination to improve the standard to give full interoperability.  While the standard is 
clearly going to be maintained and advanced it is not in its present guise going to give a 
solution to 3D CAD users.    
The SSO did not provide assistance with setting royalties on any patents, which is the 
normal practice.  While the patents in the standards have given some issues there was no 
evidence that securing FRAND agreements had caused a problem.  The argument that 
claiming royalties in interface standards incentivises innovation is nuanced and has certainly 
not been made convincingly.  However it does not appear that with the existing state of 
standards in the 3D CAD industry that FRAND rather than RF standards is having any 
present impact on the industry.  This may however change should more interface 
information and de facto standards increase in number.  As the information available 
becomes more dynamic negotiating FRAND licenses could be a drag on innovation.  
However with the existing rather static arrangement of standards, RF licensing does not 
appear to be the main cause of incompatibility in the industry. 
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CHAPTER 8. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
8.1 Introduction 
The object of the research was to evaluate how the existing legal regime regulates the 
disclosure of interface information for the purposes of interoperability in the 3D CAD 
industry.   
This Chapter will start with a summary of the findings of the legal analysis and empirical 
research from previous Chapters.  Building on those findings realistic amendments will be 
proposed that can be made to the current law to improve interoperability.  To this end 
proposals for reform made by various commentators will be considered to identify which 
proposal could improve openness in the 3D CAD market without damaging innovation.  The 
proposals allow for additional exceptions to IPR protection and improved access to 
information.  A new proposal will then be recommended that requires minimum 
intervention, balancing the control and access requirements of industry and users and 
which is centred on improving access to information  In particular improvements in the 
rules on sharing of information obtained by reverse engineering will be explored.   
8.2 Summary of Findings 
8.2.1 Competitive Pressures on 3D CAD Industry to Improve Interoperability  
This thesis has established that the 3D CAD industry is oligopolistic, made up of four 
suppliers who are profitable and successful.1060  The 3D CAD software is proprietary, 
protected by copyright, trade secrets and patents.1061  There is evidence from several 
sources that lack of interoperability causes a problem for users and results in expense, 
waste, reduced efficiency and lock-in which affects competition.  Suppliers with a 
“significant” part of the market may benefit from lock-in effects and may not want to 
license interoperability information for their product.1062   
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There appears to be little effective market pressure on the suppliers to improve 
interoperability.  Their most important customers are the OEMs1063 which value integrity of 
data as highly as interoperability.1064  The suppliers’ concept of openness is to make their 
own software able to ‘ingest’ data from other suppliers’ systems to encourage customers to 
stay with them.1065  Despite the lack of pressure there has been a market response.1066  This 
has not always come from the suppliers of 3D CAD but from other firms such as 
translators1067 which supply specialised software to enable models in competing 3D CAD 
software to interoperate to some extent.  This response is however only partial and often 
limited as standards and translation software provide only a partial solution.1068   
While there is presently little pressure on suppliers to disclose interfaces they do provide 
APIs and data formats to suppliers of translation software and other complementary 
software.
1069
  It would appear that interfaces can be made available and mandating their 
disclosure could aid interoperability.  However given the complex nature of the software it 
may still require the specialist knowledge of the translators to achieve effective 
compatibility and it is not certain whether it is technically possible for all four systems to 
achieve full functional compatibility.  
Chapter 5 introduced the debate about whether intervention is justified, in this instance by 
competition law restricting IPRs to mandate disclosure of interface information.  IPRs are 
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themselves a form of intervention but are seen by many as an almost inviolable right to 
encourage innovation.  Supplier lock-in may justify intervention1070 and it may be necessary 
to strike a balance between control by the rightsholder to incentivise innovation and 
openness of interfaces to achieve interoperability.  This can be achieved either ex ante by 
IPRs or ex post by competition law.1071  It was also proposed that as interfaces have indirect 
effects where their value comes from being a standard the balance may favour openness 
more than for other subject matter in the computer program.  Industry interviews 
supported this differentiation in purpose and importance.            
To achieve more openness and interoperability disclosure of interface information is 
needed and competition law can give a remedy in exceptional circumstances.1072  This 
remedy is only available where there is an abuse of a dominant position, but the 3D CAD 
industry is oligopolistic with no single dominant supplier.  The remedy of disclosure of 
information under competition law is not available in oligopolistic markets.1073  
Interoperability is unlikely to narrow the definition of the market to a single supplier and it 
is also unlikely that the suppliers will be considered collectively dominant.1074  The 
argument that has been made that competition law makes amendment to IPRs 
unnecessary1075 is disproved because in oligopolistic markets, where users are locked-in to 
suppliers due to a lack of interoperability, competition is affected but no remedy is 
available.     
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8.2.2 Openness and Standardisation of Interfaces in 3D CAD Software 
Chapter 6 analysed the control of interfaces by IPRs and the extent to which they are open 
and accessible.  The Software Directive has enabled the CJEU when considering data 
formats to exclude ideas and principles which underlie the interfaces as not expression and 
not copyright protected.1076  Emphasis has been placed on the interface functionality which 
aligns with the method of operation and subject matter approach adopted in the US.  This 
means that an interface specification written by analysis of a program without copying the 
expressive code can avoid infringing copyright.
1077
  APIs were considered in the US case of 
Oracle v Google where the District Appeal Court was not persuaded by the functional, 
subject matter approach, to determine the ideas/expression dichotomy.  In addition to 
direct copying of the code, indirect copying of the sequence, structure and organisation had 
taken place which needed to be determined using the abstraction, filtration, comparison 
test.  The US can take a traditional approach to ideas/expression and then implement the 
fair use exception.1078 In Europe the CJEU gave a purposive interpretation of the Software 
Directives so that the functionality of interfaces should not restrict interoperability.1079 
To improve interoperability to generate follow on innovation it is necessary to have access 
to and use of interface information.  Reverse engineering to create interface specifications 
occurs even though access to the software is restricted but there is little evidence that 
reverse engineering presently provides a significant answer or incentive to suppliers in the 
3D CAD industry to disclose interface information.  Even where the interface specifications 
contain no copyright belonging to the software rightsholder the decompiler is not allowed 
to share that information.  The rightsholder cannot use trade secret law to prevent 
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decompilation but the Software Directive creates a statutory trade secret law.1080    
Recommendations to improve this position to encourage access and dissemination of 
interface information will be made in this Chapter.  
Even where there is no copyright in the interface specification the software’s rightsholder 
may have protected the interface through patent protection.  The 3D CAD suppliers have 
been granted numerous patents.1081  With the exception of the Unified Patent, there is no 
exemption from patent protection for the purpose of interoperability.  The concept and 
implementation of software patents is flawed, does not incentivise innovation and could 
restrict the operation of standards and interoperability.1082  Patent protection fails to 
adequately address the indirect effect of control over interface specifications on 
interoperability and it is seriously doubted whether patent protection of interfaces can be 
economically justified.1083  There may be a failure of the market with overprotection of 
interfaces which cannot be rectified by reverse engineering or by conventional competition 
law in an oligopolistic market.1084  Because interfaces are standards and have an indirect 
effect they give an unplanned expansion of IPR rules both for copyright and patents.  The 
hidden nature of the code giving protection equivalent to a statutory trade secret also 
overprotects the interfaces. 
Standards are one means of improving interoperability. The 3D CAD industry has more than 
one formal standard including the most widely used STEP standard but they all only provide 
limited compatibility.  Standards, particularly compatibility standards which cannot be 
avoided, give an unplanned expansion of the protection for both copyright and patents.  
Patents in standards must be licensed on FRAND terms which have to be agreed between 
the parties without the Standard Setting Organisation’s ‘SSO’ assistance.  Various issues 
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with patents and FRAND licensing are discussed in Chapter 7 although there is no evidence 
this has caused a problem for STEP and it does not appear that FRAND rather than RF has 
an impact on the industry although this may change if interface availability and informal 
standards become more prevalent.1085  As the information available becomes more 
dynamic negotiating FRAND licenses could be a drag on innovation.  The argument that 
claiming royalties in interface standards incentivises innovation is nuanced and has certainly 
not been made convincingly.1086   
Translator software companies have seen a market opportunity, and using standards, APIs 
and reverse engineering, they have developed software to assist the process of transferring 
data between proprietary 3D CAD systems.  While this gives some relief from lock-in it is a 
costly and complex process which can take months to complete. The 3D CAD suppliers also 
use standards to ‘ingest’ data from other 3D CAD systems into their own proprietary 
system1087 which gives limited interoperability while encouraging customers to remain with 
their system. 
The existing legal regime only provides a low level of interoperability.  A main legal tool for 
improving interoperability, competition law, is not available.  Reverse engineering also does 
not make a significant impact, certainly not sufficient enough to encourage suppliers to 
make disclosure of interface information.  Some market solutions in the form of translation 
software companies have emerged but generally there appears to be little drive in the 
industry towards improving interoperability.   
8.2.3 Welfare Benefits of 3D CAD Software  
Despite the lack of interoperability the 3D CAD software provides a good welfare benefit as 
it improves the ability to develop goods quickly and to manage related data efficiently.  3D 
CAD is sophisticated modular software developed over several decades and it is more than 
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just a platform.1088  Industry interviews have shown that OEMs and other customers value 
integrity of data as highly if not more so than openness and full interoperability.1089  OEMs 
and other users rely on 3D CAD software to create, edit, use and store what is probably 
their most valuable data.  The software is highly complex and functional and has a ‘critical 
core’1090  function in the users business, particularly as it stores their own proprietary data. 
The lack of interoperability would prevent them switching to another supplier immediately 
and result in lost data.  It is important the problem of interoperability is solved without 
disrupting the market.  The disruption to the music industry caused by digital downloads 
did not directly harm the user as music became more available.1091 Disruption to the 3D 
CAD industry and to the supply of proprietary software in which users’ data is stored could 
be very harmful to the user and to society generally as manufacturing industry would suffer 
as vital know-how and legacy data could be lost.   
Continuing follow on innovation would appear to have more welfare benefit than some 
form of creative destruction which could destroy the existing software and replace it with a 
new platform.  3D CAD suppliers have invested heavily in designing sophisticated software 
and a model that just replaces it with something else seems unlikely and undesirable.  
Interoperability helps follow on innovation.  Not only does the software have intrinsic value 
but the users’ proprietary data is extremely valuable.  It is important to the user that they 
can access their data now and in the future.  Interoperability allows this to happen but any 
changes to the legal regime should not destabilise the industry as it is necessary to ensure 
that users can continue to use the format of the software their own proprietary data is 
stored in.  Changes must also take into account users’ needs, not only as consumers seeking 
competitive prices, but also to protect the integrity and access to their own proprietary 
data.  The functional nature of the software is relevant not only to determining the IPRs 
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status of the interface but also to ensuring the legal regime balances the need for 
interoperability with the need for data integrity.   
8.2.4 3D CAD Software Interfaces as De Facto Standards 
In addition to taking into account  the impact, not only on the suppliers’ incentive to 
innovate, but also  any harm that could be done to the integrity and continuity of access to 
the users’ data, software interfaces require different considerations and treatment to other 
subject matter in a computer program. This is because, not only do software interfaces 
directly affect interoperability, but also because of their indirect effects as standards. 
Interfaces have an indirect function of controlling interoperability and access, not only in 
competing software and networks but also in complementary software and access to the 
users existing own data.   Their impact and value is amplified solely because of their role as 
standards and this extends and distorts the IPR protection they enjoy to the detriment of 
competitors, suppliers of complementary software, and users.  Interfaces will have a 
different optimal balance than the core subject matter with more openness to counteract 
the amplifying effect that control over standards has on market power.1092  The concept 
that software interfaces require different treatment has been recognised in previous 
research1093 and in copyright case law.1094  This thesis has developed this concept beyond 
copyright to demonstrate that the law applied to patents and standards also justifies and 
supports the unique treatment of software interfaces.  This is further supported by the case 
study of the 3D CAD industry which suffers from a lack of interoperability but the status and 
openness of interfaces is recognised as distinctive from the protection afforded to other 
aspects of the software.      
8.2.5 Striking the Balance to Improve Interoperability 
It is necessary to strike a balance between IPR protection which gives control, and the need 
for access and use of interface information which gives openness. This will also achieve the 
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economic goals of increasing incentives to innovate and promote efficient allocation of 
resources.1095 The economic rationale for copyright law and its exemptions was considered 
in section 6.3.  The central economic problem is said to be that copyright protection of 
software conflicts with the desire for information, particularly interface information, to be 
disseminated.  Overprotection favours present innovation over future innovation.1096  
Future innovation can be improved by allowing a degree of copying of interfaces.1097 The 
reverse engineering provisions in Article 6 of the Software Directive is an attempt to strike a 
balance.  They were however formed more by lobbying than by economic Pareto optimality 
or empirical evidence.1098  The introduction of the Software Directive was influenced by 
lobbying from US trade representatives and negotiators and Computer Associates v Altai 
and Sega Enterprise Ltd v Accolade Inc., which held that decompilation to achieve 
interoperability was ‘fair use’ were not decided until after the Software Directive had been 
enacted.1099   
The Commission appears to consider that as the Directive and in particular the 
decompilation provisions “were the result of intensive debate among all interested 
circles…the balance found then appears to be still valid today” although maintaining the 
status quo is influenced by not wanting “to reopen the floodgate of debate”.1100 In 2013 
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however a Commission Staff Working Document looked at measures that would lead to the 
licensing of interoperability information.  They considered that “copyright does not offer 
control over the information per se embodied in a work; only the expression is protected of 
that information where it constitutes the author’s intellectual creation.”  Because software is 
distributed in machine code even where interoperability information is not copyrightable 
there is no guarantee of effective access to the necessary protocols for developers.1101  The 
Software Directive also gives control over the information obtained by reverse engineering 
even when it does not include expression as there are restrictions on sharing the 
information.1102  While the ideas behind software interfaces are not copyright protected 
more freedom to access and share the information is needed to improve interoperability.   
The Commission Staff Working Document is one of several proposals to achieve a balancing 
interest.  This Chapter will consider those proposals but this thesis considers that it has not 
yet been determined how bests to identify and obtain the correct balance.  Neither the 
correct, optimum balance nor the criteria for identifying it, have yet been identified.1103 
While the need for balance is reinforced by the proposals there has been less progress on 
establishing criteria for identifying the ‘pivot’ between control and openness.1104 This 
means it is difficult to put these principles into practice.   
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It is proposed in this Chapter that the correct approach is to start with changes that cause 
least intervention and only increase intervention if after evaluation and reflection there is 
insufficient improvement in interoperability.  To be effective any changes would need to be 
made across the EU and the first evaluation will be the recent proposals for an 
interoperability directive.   
The proposals will be considered in reverse order, starting with those that are most 
interventionist and moving towards those that need the least change to the existing law to 
give more freedom to the market to use information that does not have IPR protection.          
8.3 Review of Current Proposals  
8.3.1 An Interoperability Directive 
An ‘Interoperability Directive’ has been seen as a way to ensure a common approach across 
Europe to enforce disclosure of interface information and other remedies.  A Directive is a 
mechanism or wrapper that could include various rules to implement changes aimed to 
prevent IPRs being used to exclude competition without resorting to ex-post competition 
law or to find a deliberate strategy of exclusion to justify intervention.1105  Dominant 
suppliers, particularly of network or application infrastructure in software based internet 
services, such as software as a service, would be prevented from ‘locking in’ certain 
segments of the market which is said to happen when providing services across different 
platforms is costly.1106    This would strengthen competition between software based 
internet providers and platform owners and the increased interoperability should reduce 
training costs and encourage new entrants to markets. 1107   
An Interoperability Directive, including trade secrets and patent licences, was discussed in 
the Commission Staff Working Document in 2013 with Article 114 TFEU as the legal basis.  
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Proposals included a mandatory license of right on FRAND terms or an interoperability 
exception to mirror Article 6 of the Software Directive. 
The Agreement on a Unified Patent Court1108 provides that the rights conferred by 
European patents with unitary effect will not extend to the use of information obtained 
under Articles  5 and 6 of the Software Directive.1109  On establishment of the unitary 
patent and Unified European Patent Court patent holders will not be able to invoke patents 
against products implementing interface information obtained by black box or 
decompilation reverse analysis.  This is similar to the provision in the doomed Software 
Patent Directive.  In 2002 the European Commission proposed a Directive on software 
patentability.  The European Parliament proposed an amendment that the use for the 
purposes of achieving interoperability would not be considered a patent infringement.  The 
Directive was defeated by a vote in the European Parliament in 2005 and has been 
dropped.1110  As the exemption in the unitary patent does not however apply to classical 
European patents, or national patents which contain no such exemption, they will continue 
to stand in the way of using interface information.1111   
The Commission Staff Working Document considered a proposal extending the exemption 
in unitary patents to all European or national patents which would prevent them being 
invoked against the use of information obtained from reverse engineering for 
interoperability purposes.  No royalty fee would be payable under this interoperability 
exception.  The exception removes the risk from developers who rely on Articles 5 and 6 of 
the Software Directive to reverse engineer interoperability information that they would risk 
infringing patent rights, perhaps unknowingly.1112   An alternative option was for patent 
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claims which relate to interoperability information to be subject to an automatic license of 
right on FRAND terms similar to the arrangements for essential patents in standards.1113   
A further approach is to licence both patents and trade secrets information on a case by 
case basis giving individual consideration rather than a general application of an exception 
or the right to licence regime.  This would be modelled on the Framework and Access 
Directives for access to and interconnection of electronic communications networks.1114    
Obligations to licence would be imposed on undertakings with significant market power 
which would require new bodies in each national regulatory authority to carry out ex ante 
analysis of the market to identify those suppliers who had significant market power.1115  If 
the definition of significant market power is equivalent to dominance under European 
competition law1116 it would not apply to oligopolies such as the suppliers in the 3D CAD 
market and so would not provide a remedy to lack of interoperability and lock-in in 
oligopolistic markets.  The consultation carried out as part of the Commission Staff Working 
Document identified that interoperability problems existed with suppliers that would not 
qualify as significant market players and gave the example of interoperability issues 
between different CAD systems.1117   
After raising these initiatives the Commission Staff Working Document concluded that an 
Interoperability Directive should not proceed.  Even if effective, establishing the new bodies 
would be costly, and the analogy with the electronic communications networks breaks 
down.  Software industries, such as 3D CAD, do not have identifiable market bottleneck 
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assets.1118  They also have a different territorial scope as the electronic communications 
networks are primarily national whereas software markets generally cover the whole of the 
EU which makes implementation by national regulatory authorities inappropriate and 
ineffective.  It could also introduce a public law approach adding a third dimension to 
intellectual property law and competition law.1119   
Introducing automatic licences of right, other than just for the unified patent, would entail 
a revision of legislation in all member states, which presumably the Commission Staff 
Working Document did not consider feasible.  It was also doubted whether the provisions 
could use Article 114 TFEU as a valid legal basis or meet the principles of proportionality. 
It was assumed that implementation would be costly but the new bodies would only be 
necessary if action was limited to undertakings with significant market power.  Automatic 
rights and interoperability exception for patents would, after amendment to the law, leave 
implementation and enforcement to the parties.         
The Commission Staff Working Document preferred the introduction of non-legislative 
measures to lower transaction costs and foster a culture of licensing through the use of 
model licences and guidelines on valuing interoperability to help parties agree royalty 
rates.
1120
   
8.3.2 Compulsory Disclosure and Mandatory Licenses of Right 
Proposals to amend the existing legal position often consider some form of compulsory or 
mandatory disclosure of interface information.1121  Article 102 provided such a mandatory 
licence remedy in Microsoft.   The effectiveness of the remedy is limited as it is ex post and 
takes years to provide relief by which time the market may have moved on.  Compulsory 
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disclosure through some form of regulation is rare in copyright.1122 Regulation has serious 
drawbacks including the cost burden of the regulator and regulated and can stem the 
innovation it intended to create.   
Patent holders can already volunteer licences of right, normally in return for a reduction in 
licence fees.  This allows all patent holders the opportunity of licencing the technology on 
reasonable royalty terms.  As discussed earlier the Commission Staff Working Document 
considered converting this to mandatory licenses of right for patent claims covering 
interoperability information.1123  Patent holders would be required to offer licences on 
FRAND terms, similar to the commitments in standard setting organisations.  However as 
this would require changing the legislation of all Member States the Commission considers 
implementing automatic mandatory licenses of right would be ‘very difficult’.1124      
The Software Directive imposes a trade secret regime for computer programs1125 which 
conflicts with a requirement for disclosure of any code but particularly the source code.  
Mandatory disclosure arrangements, including registration of the source code, could give 
copyright protection only in return for disclosure of the subject matter.1126 But the source 
code is the ‘crown jewels’ and their disclosure is unlikely to strike the right balance between 
revealing interface information and the ‘thin’ protection of copyright granted to the 
valuable and functional know-how in the source code.1127  
A more direct and proportionate approach is a registration requirement by the rightsholder 
of the interface specification.  A disclosure requirement limited to the interface would not 
relate to the source code itself but only to the interface specification.  Disclosure of 
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interfaces safeguards the public domain by limiting copyright protection to the computer 
program rather than the interfaces and “domain of interoperable programs”1128 This would 
protect the rightholder’s control with less detriment to incentives to innovate.  It would 
also limit transaction costs as it removes the need for third parties to invest substantially 
and without certainty of success in reverse engineering.  The interoperability information is 
offered for free without competitors having to get a license from the copyright owner or to 
determine the royalty rate.  The cost of preparing the information rests on the rightholder 
which is probably the most cost effective solution but these costs may be substantial1129 
and may be a disproportionate burden on small developers.1130 Also it is possible that what 
the rightsholder makes available is not the optimum information.  This could involve the 
rightsholder in work that is of little benefit to the consumer.  It is effectively imposing a 
command economy on interface information rather than a demand economy which is 
achieved by reverse engineering.1131  If however the rightsholder disclosed information in 
response to the threat of reverse engineering it is more likely the information that is 
disclosed more closely maps onto the information that is required by the market which 
should be more efficient.    
Even where copyright protection is conditional upon full disclosure of interfaces, 
monitoring and enforcement remains problematic.  It is difficult to define the point at 
which adequate disclosure has taken place to ensure the body of the computer program 
has copyright protection.1132  For example, what level of disclosure or incomplete disclosure 
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is required and does the copyright owner have the say on where the interfaces are and how 
many?   As discussed earlier, interfaces can be objectively defined as the rules by which 
data or instructions can be repetitively transferred between elements of a computer 
system.1133  Interfaces exist where such transfers occur, making it difficult to categorise 
which portion of a program is truly an interface.1134  As almost any part of the program can 
be considered as an interface1135 it would be difficult to establish conclusively what 
constitutes an interface and to say whether full disclosure has taken place, particularly as 
the source code would not be available.  This introduces a high level of legal uncertainty.  
This level of uncertainty combined with the degree of intervention required to enforce the 
rightsholder to compile and disclose information means this option is not recommended.       
8.3.3 Reducing the Term of IPR Protection 
The fifty years minimum term protection required by the Berne Convention for literary 
works far exceeds the useful life of the software.  Shortening the term is not however easy.  
The difficulty of fixing a single appropriate term meant that approach was rejected for 
replacement parts under design protection law. 1136 “Attempting to influence the dynamics 
of platform software competition by identifying a single, fixed term of protection for 
interface specifications similarly appears too detailed an instrument to be effective.”1137  
Reducing the term of protection for all software does not improve the position for 
interoperability but could adversely damage incentives to innovate.  As interfaces have 
indirect effects as de facto standards reducing protection for interfaces alone to a shorter 
term is theoretically appropriate.  This could be based on the time it would take to reverse 
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engineer the relevant specifications.  Given that interfaces can be subjectively identified 
and defined it would be difficult to operate a two tier regime for interfaces and other 
software.  A two tier approach could imply that these specifications are protected which is 
not the case.1138  Rather than having to determine the nature of interfaces under the 
ideas/expression dichotomy the courts would be deciding whether code was an interface to 
determine its duration of protection.   
Introducing a shorter term of protection that is applicable to interfaces would be 
detrimental to vertical interoperability.1139  Users of complementary software could be put 
in a worse position than they are now.  While voluntary data exchange does take place 
within the 3D CAD industry not all suppliers of complementary software have advanced 
access to APIs and their software might stop working each time a new version of the 
operating or platform software is released.1140  Many users would suffer disruption to 
interoperability between existing complementary software and new versions of operating 
or platform software.  Users of complementary software for 3D CAD systems such as ANSYS 
and translation software do experience problems when new versions of the 3D CAD 
software are released and their complementary software may stop working for weeks or 
months.1141  The suppliers of complementary software generally find APIs are not available 
before the release, or frequently not at all and have to rely on reverse engineering.1142  
Even if the copyright term was reduced to a matter of months, control would still remain 
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with the operating or platform supplier.  If interfaces were given a short term of protection 
rather than excluded under the present regime the position for suppliers and users of 
complementary software could be worse.    
8.3.4 Specific Exclusion for Interface Information 
The Software Directive and case law in the CJEU has categorised interface information 
amounting to ideas and principles as not being copyright subject matter.1143    Case law has 
given guidance on what effectively amounts to an exclusion for those elements of software 
which are not concrete elements of expression.1144  While the ideas and principles behind 
the interface, which can be extracted by reverse engineering, are not protected the code 
itself can still not be copied.  A proposal for a specific exclusion would go further than the 
existing legal position by excluding the code in the interface from copyright protection.  
While interfaces can be subjectively identified and defined, the proposal is considered 
feasible as although many parts of a computer program could be named an ‘interface’, an 
interface specification is distinguishable from its implementation.1145  It is only the lines of 
code that constitute the specification that would be excluded from protection which is only 
a small part of the interface.1146   In practice this would be limited to the machine code as 
the source code would not usually be available to the decompiler, only their interpretation 
of the source code achieved by decompilation. 
An exclusion removing code in interfaces from copyright protection would not entirely 
remove control as access to the software’s code would remain limited to the purposes of 
interoperability.  When however software is reverse engineered under Article 6 the 
decompiler would have a right to use the code for the permitted purposes.  There is a need 
and benefit in copying the exact expression as it is an efficient way to achieve 
interoperability and can achieve the benefits of standardisation.  Such an ex ante approach 
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could give certainty.  The courts have not gone as far, relying on the expression/idea 
dichotomy to provide a remedy that falls short of this proposed exclusion.  If however the 
information includes code, as that is part of the expression, it is probably copyright 
protected even though its originality may be subordinate to its purpose.1147  Dissemination 
of the code, in addition to the interface specification, could economically be a very sensible 
re-use of the code as it would reduce waste and cost.  If it was limited to code 
implementing interfaces, rationally, it should not reduce incentives to innovate.1148  This 
implementation does though require amendment to the Software Directive in a way that 
redefines the copyright protection given to software rather than just changing the 
arrangements for access to those parts of the code that are not copyright protected.  For 
this reason it is recommended that these amendments should not proceed unless the 
following recommendation for sharing interface specifications, excluding code, does not 
achieve a balance that improves interoperability. 
8.4 Recommendation 
8.4.1 Access to Interface Information by Reverse Engineering 
The above proposals concerned imposing obligations on rightsholders and changes to IPRs 
themselves.  The following recommendations concern only access to the interface 
information which is not copyright protected.  They are intended to improve access to 
information needed to achieve interoperability without imposing any positive obligation on 
the rightsholder.   
The Software Directive employs copyright to protect trade secrets.  It gives software 
companies the enviable position that they can license their products to the world while still 
protecting the trade secrets contained in those products without the need to get patent 
protection for functional elements.  If there was no need for the software to be compatible 
that position could be acceptable, however the strong protection of copyright and trade 
secret skews the balance to be overly closed. 
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No other general principle of intellectual property law exempts the ideas underlying 
products from study by those wishing to create competing products.1149 The law of trade 
secrets and confidentiality permits the study of ideas by reverse analysis.1150  Trade secrets 
once learned by another are theirs to use.  The ideas contained in cookery books can be 
studied to develop competing recipes provided the expression is not copied.1151  What is 
considered here is redressing the anomaly that ideas and other non-copyright protected 
aspects of software are not visible and that they are also restrictions on disseminating any 
information obtained from decompilation.   
Decompilation and reconstruction in a higher level language can result in the exposure of 
some vital knowhow that would otherwise remain protected as a trade secret.  It will reveal 
code which is copyrightable expression.  As the location of the code that is essential for 
interoperability may not be identified without an analysis of the wider program even the 
conscientious engineer may discover more than is essential for interoperability.    It is for 
these reasons the Article 6 was so contentious and drafted restrictively.1152  However 
reverse engineering even of the entire program will not of itself reveal all of the secrets of 
its design and development. 
Software reverse engineering does not lay bare a program’s inner secrets.  Indeed, it 
cannot.  The inner secrets of a program, the real crown jewels, are embodied in the 
higher level of abstraction material such as the source code commentary and the 
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specification.  This material never survives the process of being converted to object 
code.1153  
As the Explanatory Memorandum to the Initial Proposal for the Software Directive states 
“Although it is technically possible to decompile a program in order to find out information 
concerning access protocols and interfaces this is a lengthy, costly and inefficient 
procedure.”1154  It would not give any benefit to the pirates who have other shortcuts to 
produce illegal copies of programs.  Decompilation is not a preferred technique as it is 
difficult and expensive but sometimes it is the only feasible means of obtaining the 
interface information.1155  The justification for preventing the disclosure of the interface 
specification obtained by reverse engineering has not been made out.   
If a pirate wanted to copy a program they would do just that – copy the available 
object code.  Attempting to recreate an entire program after it is compiled would be 
as sensible – and as economically efficient – as trying to unscramble an egg.  Also the 
product if used for commercial purposes would infringe copyright as a ‘translation’ 
of the original program.1156   
Reverse engineering is intended to act as a safety valve to enable a second program maker 
to develop an interoperable program when an existing program is not available.
1157
  It is 
also intended to encourage the copyright holder to disclose the interface information 
voluntarily,1158 although its success in this is mixed.  In the public consultation of the 
Commission Staff Working Document, only 24% of respondents considered the possibility of 
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reverse engineering interoperability information by third parties represented an incentive 
to license interoperability information while 21% considered it did not.1159  Industry 
executives and experts were either unaware of the possibility of reverse engineering or did 
not consider it important to their decision making.1160  This indicates that reverse 
engineering is not considered a strategic issue in the 3D CAD industry and is therefore not a 
significant driver for interoperability.  
8.4.2 Economic Rationale for Reverse Engineering 
Permitting reverse engineering is thought to be economically sound as the innovator is 
protected by the costliness of reverse engineering and the lead time due to the technical 
challenge of reverse engineering1161  Costs and lead time allow the original innovator to 
recoup its investment and protect incentives to innovate.  However the welfare benefits of 
allowing reverse engineering of interfaces differ from those of reverse engineering the 
software’s core subject matter.  In manufacturing industries reverse engineering is done to 
make directly competing stand-alone products.1162   Copyright law prevents direct copying 
of software and interfaces are reversed engineered to improve interoperability of both 
complementary as well as competing programs. Interfaces also have a different, indirect 
and magnified effect on interoperability and hence on competition and innovation.1163  
Interfaces are standards and different considerations should apply to the treatment of IPRs, 
if any, present in the interface information.1164  IPRs in interface could be used to leverage 
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market power in a way that was unintended as a matter of intellectual property law.1165  
The interface’s value comes predominantly from this interdependence rather than intrinsic 
innovation.  Decompiling interfaces is not a market-destructive means of reverse 
engineering even in the absence of costs and technical challenges.1166  The 3D CAD suppliers 
certainly distinguished between protection of the interfaces and the inviolable kernels.1167  
The logic that to be economically sound reverse engineering needs to be costly and difficult 
does not apply to interfaces.  With respect to interfaces, cost and difficulty is only a waste 
and economically undesirable.  There is no rationale for protecting the first comer.  The 
Software Directive already specifies that decompilation can only be done for 
interoperability which restricts software reverse engineering more than in traditional 
manufactured items.1168  Reverse engineering is legitimised by its purpose,1169 and when 
restricted to interfaces, difficulty or cost, does not give any welfare benefit.   The goal 
should be to make reverse engineering of interfaces as efficient as possible.    This will aid 
both horizontal and vertical compatibility. 
The Software Directive prevents access to ideas and other non-copyright protected aspects 
of software.  Noam Shemtov argues that the purpose of reverse engineering should not be 
limited to interoperability.  He makes the case that not only is this justified on the doctrinal 
grounds of the ideas and expression dichotomy but also by economic efficiency 
considerations.  The relaxation of the restrictions on decompilation would not cause a loss 
of incentives to create and develop but result in a more balanced system properly 
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addressing the unique properties of software products.1170   The US ‘fair use’ doctrine is not 
restricted solely to interoperability and is said to be more flexible than Article 6 of the 
Software Directive.  The Software Directive does however make null and void any 
contractual provision attempting to prevent reverse engineering.1171  There is no such 
statutory provision in the US and contractual provisions in software licences prohibiting 
reverse engineering are common and the enforceability of restrictions on reverse 
engineering has been highly contentious.1172 While decompilation in the US is not 
specifically limited to interoperability there must be a legitimate reason,1173 the most 
prominent of which is for the purposes of interoperability.  
8.4.3 Art of the Possible  
It is highly unlikely the climate in Europe has changed significantly to allow for a major 
change in the hard won provisions of Article 6.  The Commission has looked at the Software 
Directive and the question of interoperability on at least two occasions since the 
introduction of the Software Directive and on both occasions has shied away from making 
any changes.1174  There appears to be little appetite for legislative amendments in any 
form1175 and certainly not on the psychological scale that would be required to permit 
decompilation of all software even with an ex-post review by the courts as envisaged by 
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Shemtov.1176  While there may be doctrinal validity in allowing access to non-copyright 
protected aspects of software the effect on the required balance and the economic 
consequences have not been established to the extent that a convincing case could be 
made to a hostile audience.1177  Interviews in the 3D CAD industry reveal a clear distinction 
between allowing access to interfaces with a strong resistance to any dilution in control of 
what were considered core aspects of the computer program.1178  The need to strike a 
balance between control and openness is recognised1179 but the means of converting this 
recognition into a reliable model to identify the pivot’s position is not yet available.  Rather 
than taking the purist approach, which might be doctrinally correct but which would meet 
with over-riding resistance, the guiding principle should be the art of the possible.  It would 
be best to take a step approach starting with the minimum intervention and evaluating its 
impact.   
A form of step approach was advocated by Rooijen in the form of a regulator with 
rulemaking, dispute resolution and monitory powers.  To achieve the middle ground 
between openness and control would require the use of levers such as lifting the ban on 
sharing decompiled code or shift the burden of proof for availability of the interface 
information to the rightsholder.1180  The regulator would not be called upon to carry out 
any market-specific analysis.1181 Regulators are used in some Member States to regulate 
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Technology Protection Measures (TPMs) under the InfoSoc Directive1182 and 
telecommunications.1183    As a form of step by step approach, where the impact of the 
change can be monitored to achieve the optimum balance, the approach has advantages 
but it is unclear how it would be implemented.  Divulging to the regulator powers to vary 
the rules would involve a wholesale change to highly contentious provisions of Article 6 of 
the Software Directive and could lead to uncertainty if the regulator changes the rules too 
often.  It is unclear whether any execution of the rulemaking task would be effective at 
Europe wide level or only national or even specific case level.  Nevertheless the approach 
has merit and similarly to the proposal  for a specific exclusion for code in interfaces1184 it 
should be considered if the following proposal to permit sharing of interface specifications 
does not achieve the required balance and improve interoperability. 
8.4.4 Restrictions on Sharing Information 
Article 6 of the Software Directive permits decompilation where it is indispensable to 
achieve interoperability of an independently created computer program provided inter alia 
the information obtained is not “to be given to others, except when necessary for the 
interoperability of the independently created computer program”.1185 
Article 6 (2) (b) was submitted by the French delegation in April 1990 and considered by the 
Council working group.1186  It was adopted in the final directive and prevents the 
dissemination of information obtained from reverse analysis even when that information is 
not covered by copyright.  The literature on the adoption of the Software Directive makes 
little mention of this provision and it does not appear to have met with opposition.  
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 Directive 2001/29/EC on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the 
information society (2001) L167/10  
1183
 Directive 2002/19/EC on access to, and interconnection of, electronic communications networks and 
associated facilities and see L 337/37 Directive 2009/140/EC amending the Directive. 
1184
 Section 8.3.4  
1185
 Software Directive Art 6 (2) (b) 
1186
 Thomas Vinje ‘The History of the EC Software Directive’ in M. Lehmann & C. Tapper A Handbook of 
European Software Law, Clarendon Press Oxford 1993 
311 
 
 
Energies were perhaps understandably concentrated on resisting other proposals such as 
preventing reverse engineering interface information being used to develop a competing 
program.  When making the point that decompilation should be permitted to produce non-
infringing programs regardless of whether they compete with the decompiled program, 
ECIS said that to do otherwise would be contrary to the fundamental copyright tenet that 
the ideas and principles underlying a copyrighted work are dedicated to the public.1187  To 
apply that principle to the non-sharing provision begs the question that if the work is 
dedicated to the public why should the decompiler be prevented from sharing it? 
Decompilation is limited to ‘code’ and cannot reconstitute other preparatory material.  
Underlying ideas and principles derived from reverse engineering may be used only so far 
as the provisions of the Directive permit.1188  The non-sharing clause prevents dissemination 
of those ideas and principles obtained by decompilation.  By contrast under Article 5.3 ideas 
and principles derived from “black box“ engineering, namely observation, study or testing 
by loading, displaying, running, transmitting or storing the program, has no restriction on 
the sharing of the ideas and principles.  It is only the information, including the interface 
specification, that remains protected as though it were a trade secret.    
The separation of Article 6 into two parts corresponds to separate possible violations of the 
author’s rights.  Article 6.1 concerns decompiling the original program and 6.2 producing an 
infringing program based on the results of decompilation.1189   The Directive does not 
explain the nature of the obligation imposed on the decompiler in 6.2 and as most Member 
States merely duplicated the article no insight is given on their understanding of the 
obligation.   
It has been argued by some commentators that the use made of ‘information’ is not 
a copyright issue.  However, the access to the information contained in the program 
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cannot be given without a change in the normal rules of copyright.  Therefore, it is 
necessary to ensure that the removal of that ‘copyright barrier’ to access does not 
lead to abuses which undermine the very protection which the Directive seeks to 
give.1190 
This ignores certain realities.  Firstly copyright protects expression which by implication 
means it protects something that is visible, audible or otherwise communicated to the 
public.  It is not intended as a means to protect trade secrets.  Secondly, the restricted acts 
under Article 4 are basically reproduction, adaptation and distribution.  These are the 
normal acts which if undertaken with the rightholder’s consent will reveal the underlying 
ideas and principles.  The difference with computer programs is that, unlike most works 
that have copyright protection, the ideas and principles are not necessarily revealed when 
there is a legitimate reproduction, adaption or distribution of the software.  The problem is 
that acting within the ‘normal rules of copyright’ does not reveal these ideas and principles 
and something more and sui generis needs to happen.  It is a secondary consequence that 
the expression does not reveal all the ideas and principles of the copyrighted work.1191 
Thirdly, it is not a ‘copyright barrier’ that has to be removed but a technical hurdle that 
needs to be overcome to enable copyright to work in its normal manner to give a balance 
between protecting the expression while not giving a monopoly on the underlying ideas 
and principles.  To restrict the purposes for which the program may be reproduced, as 
imposed by the Software Directive, is restricting rights beyond that normally enjoyed.1192    
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Not only is software and the Software Directive unique in keeping ideas underlying 
products exempt from study1193 but normally copyright law does not prevent the use of or 
dissemination of ideas or other non-copyright protected information.1194  The Software 
Directive however restricts the use of information, such as the interface specification, to 
only achieving interoperability of the independently created computer program and 
prevents the information being given to others except when necessary for the 
interoperability of the independently created computer program.  To deny access to the 
ideas and principles underlying a computer program that are inaccessible without reverse 
engineering is analogous to saying that copyright protection of a book prevented the 
purchaser from reading it.  According to the Turner Report this is inherently wrong and 
would have a serious restrictive effect on innovation and competition.1195   
8.4.5 Interface Specifications 
The Turner Report referred to the ‘clean room’ procedure where analysis of competitors’ 
programs to write an interface specification is kept separate from the writing of the code to 
implement the specification which prevents the copying of the expression.  Interface 
specifications are created by the decompiler.  The machine code is decompiled to a higher 
level language which can be read by the decompiler.  Using the higher level information, a 
specification is written setting out the characteristics of the interface.  3D CAD suppliers 
were aware of this practice and thought it would be used in their company for reverse 
analysis.1196  
The subject of the interface specification can be an API or data file.  The document is the 
decompiler’s interpretation of the requirements of the interface and does not include 
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either the machine or original source code.1197   The interface specification is the work of 
reverse engineering and does not contain either machine or source code.  It comprises the 
ideas and principles of the software’s interface and hence does not contain copyright of the 
software’s rightsholder.  Despite the fact that the interface specification is normally free of 
copyright material, other than copyright belonging to the decompiler, the decompiler is 
restricted by the Software Directive in their ability to share the interface specification. 
Limiting the use of the information obtained by reverse engineering is not understandable 
from an economic standpoint.1198  That information has the nature of a public good and 
welfare consideration requires that once produced there should not be exclusions of 
possible users from that information.1199  If firms could sell the interface information they 
have obtained by reverse engineering they could recoup the costs of reverse 
engineering.1200  This would create a market for interface specifications which would reduce 
waste and increase efficiency in the process.  It could encourage start-up firms that 
specialise in this sort of information.1201  While the “cheapest cost informer”1202 is the 
original developer and owner of the software if other firms could share the interface 
specifications they acquire by reverse engineering this would also be efficient.  By stopping 
multiple competitors from collaborating on their reverse engineered efforts it leaves 
reverse engineering as a viable option only to the large developers.  This makes it harder for 
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smaller firms to enter and compete in the market.1203   The pressure group SAGE1204 
recognised that an exception permitting research and analysis could disadvantage small 
companies which could not afford to conduct reverse engineering.1205   
8.4.6 Compliance with the Berne Convention 
The Berne Convention is specifically referred to in Article 6 of the Software Directive.1206  
Article 6 of the Software Directive is considered to comply with Article 9(2) of the Berne 
convention as the exemption is specific as it “relates to a unique characteristic of novel 
subject matter among literary works”,1207 namely that machine code does not reveal its 
ideas to the human eye without reproduction, which is the reason for the exemption.  
Further the elements are not sought in order to produce a program that is similar in its 
expression but to access the unprotected elements, namely interface specifications.  For 
this reason the exception is a ‘special case’.1208     
As the exemption allows reproduction for a transitory purpose, not to write a program 
which infringes as it does not take the expression of the analysed program, but to access 
the ideas, it does not conflict with the normal exploitation of the work.  The dissemination 
of that non-protected work would also not infringe the work’s normal exploitation.  
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Copyright is not concerned with keeping ideas secret and Article 9(2) of the Berne 
convention is not concerned with protecting trade secrets.1209 
The third requirement of not unreasonably prejudicing the legitimate interests of the 
author was used to claim reverse analysis should not be allowed as it could be employed as 
a tactic by those wanting to copy the expression.  The same could be said of sharing the 
interface specification.  The argument that a limitation should not be allowed because it 
cannot be distinguished from conduct not within the limitation is not acceptable.  To allow 
such an argument would prevent exemptions such as private study or private use.1210  
Indeed the converse is true and protection would be illegitimate.  The investigation is an act 
which basic copyright theory regards as beyond the scope of protection.  It would give 
control over non-copyright material that could restrict the products of competitors and 
other software developers without achieving the standards required for patent 
protection.1211  
8.4.7 Sharing of Interface Specifications  
The change that is recommended is to amend the Software Directive to allow for the 
dissemination of interface information obtained by reverse engineering.  This would 
normally be in the form of an interface specification which is compiled from information 
obtained by reverse engineering.  The interface specification would not contain information 
protected by the software supplier’s copyright.1212  
The Directive presently prevents the disclosure of any interoperability information obtained 
by reverse engineering1213 and this forces each supplier to repeat the painstaking 
decompilation for itself.  Lifting this restriction would remove duplication of effort and 
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avoid waste.  It would allow firms to specialise in providing interoperability information to 
other vendors and other firms could innovate secure in the knowledge that an interface is 
available.1214 This would encourage decompilation by the most efficient and specialised 
firms.1215  It would create a market for interface information which could encourage, but 
not oblige, suppliers to make their own interface information available to ensure its quality, 
and could also bolster the use of standard interfaces.  This market response will no doubt 
be resisted by many in the software industry with the same vehemence displayed when the 
Software Directive was introduced.   There is concern that:  
The sharing of interface specifications could evolve into a complex pattern of 
unmanageable (sub) licencing arrangements.  It could be prohibitively difficult for 
the rightsholder to ascertain whether use of his or her interoperability information 
by a third party stems from a valid (sub)license or whether it was obtained in a 
different manner and, therefore, possibly constitutes an infringement”1216    
Properly decompiled interface specifications do not contain code or other copyright 
material belonging to the software rightsholder.  There is no doctrinal justification for the 
rightsholder being able to prevent its dissemination.  Conduct cannot be avoided just 
because it is difficult to distinguish from illegitimate conduct.1217  As will be seen the 
proposal provides for a conservative step approach and encourages registration which 
could allow the rightsholder some element of monitoring of its interfaces.  This limited 
modification of Article 6 is intended to move a moderate step towards more openness.  It is 
also hoped the increase in access to interface specifications will challenge software 
rightsholders to make the interface information available themselves.           
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The safeguards that have been imposed by Article 6 (1) can remain unaltered.1218 Allowing 
the sharing of interface specifications obtained by reverse engineering would not require 
any dilution of these restrictions.  The original compiler would still be required to have a 
licence or other permission, to ensure the information was not already available and to 
limit the reverse analysis to only what was necessary for interoperability.  Indeed the 
dissemination of interface specifications could reduce the need for reverse engineering as 
more information would be available.  This could reduce the opportunity or excuse for 
looking at parts of programs wider than the interfaces.  
With regard to Article 6(2) reverse analysis could still be limited to cases where the original 
decompiler has an independently created computer program but the original decompiler 
could then make the interface specification available to others.  Ideally however the 
requirement for an independently created computer program would be removed to allow 
for software engineers to carry out decompilation purely to write the interface 
specification.  This certainly happens in the software community1219 and encouraging the 
practice would help disseminate interface information.  The restriction, that information 
should not be “used for the development, production or marketing of a computer program 
substantially similar in its expression, or for any other act which infringes copyright” would 
remain valid.  The statement is really superfluous anyway as nothing in Article 6 or 
elsewhere permits the use of copyright material.1220    
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Some decompilers may not want to share the interface specifications as they may want to 
retain the competitive advantage the information gives them.1221  The possibility of sharing 
interface specifications was discussed during industry interviews and several interviewees 
expressed interest in the possibility.1222  Some also expressed surprise that it was not 
already permitted as they know of interface specifications being shared in the software 
community.1223  In practice interfaces of individual computer programs would only have to 
be completely decompiled once.  When new versions appear the decompilation could be 
limited to those aspects that appear from running and observing the program to be novel.  
If interface specifications from the original decompilation were continually and widely 
available, updating would be less time consuming and expensive.1224   
The wider software industry does have a pattern of sharing information, not least in the 
open source community.  If there was a market for the interface information it would be 
possible for smaller developers to buy the interface information which would remove the 
burden of reverse analysis.  This could allow smaller developers to enter and compete in 
the industry.  A market for interface specifications minimises ‘deadweight loss’ of 
administration and potentially enforcement. The availability of the information would mean 
there was less need to embark on reverse analysis and it would not even be permitted 
because of Article 6 1(b).  Permitting the sharing of interface specifications is a form of 
‘prosumer law’1225 which allows the user of the internet, or in this instance the computer 
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program, to have an active role to obtain interoperability including the ability to exit with 
their data.1226     
The rationale behind Article 6 was said to be to encourage the rightsholder to voluntarily 
disclose the interface specification but this does not appear to have had a significant 
impact.1227  If however decompilers can make that information available then this can 
either relieve the rightsholder of the burden of preparing the information for disclosure, or 
may encourage them to disclose the information themselves as they may feel more in 
control of the situation.  
8.4.8 Specific Amendments to Article 6 
No amendment is required to Article 6.1 which can remain unaltered. 
While Article 6.1 (b) can remain unaltered it has been criticised as it is uncertain when 
information is ‘readily available’.  Is it legitimate to charge for the information and if so how 
much and how complete must the information be?  Shemtov proposes inserting the words 
‘readily available under fair and reasonable terms’.1228  This would be a sensible 
amendment but not essential to the working of these proposed changes.  Article 6.1 (c) has 
been criticised as until decompilation takes place it is not possible to know exactly what 
part of the code makes up the interface and needs to be decompiled.  It is likely that some 
extraneous code could be decompiled.  Again inserting the word reasonable to read ‘acts 
are performed to the extent reasonably necessary to achieve interoperability of the 
independently created computer program.’  However this amendment is not essential to 
this proposed outcome.  To implement this proposal no amendment would be needed to 
Article 6.1.   
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Article 6.2 amended to read: 
2. The provisions of paragraph 1 shall not permit the information obtained through its 
application to be used for goals other than to achieve the interoperability of an 
independently created computer program. 
Article 6.1 refers to the interoperability of an independently created computer program 
while Article 6.2 refers to the interoperability of the independently created computer 
program. Replacing the with an in Article 6.2 removes the requirement for the decompiler 
to have already developed a specific computer program.  This would allow for 
decompilation by software engineers with the aim of licensing or otherwise distributing the 
interface specifications they have created.  Because of the difficulty of reverse engineering 
there is unlikely to be a rush of independent decompilers.  However some interest was 
expressed during industry interviews for this model, although not from the 3D CAD 
suppliers themselves.  The model could prove an efficient way of making the interface 
information available1229 although some concern was also expressed that this could create 
competitive standards which would not be efficient.1230     
Article 6.2(b) would be deleted in its entirety  
This would remove the restriction on the sharing of the interface specification.   
Article 6.2 c does not appear to add anything but can be included to avoid the doubt that 
the rest of Article 6 in some way gives an implied licence to infringe the copyright in the 
decompiled software.   
These amendments would allow for dissemination of the non-copyright protected 
information.  They do not relieve the restrictions that exist in Article 6.1 that limit 
decompilation to interoperability nor do they give any right under the Software Directive or 
other legal provision to infringe another parties intellectual property rights, other than the 
existing right to reproduce or translate software for the purpose of interoperability.  
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8.4.9 Registration of Interface Specifications 
A registry of interface specifications is proposed with the aims of: encouraging decompilers 
to make their information available; improving knowledge as to what interface information 
is available, informing rightsholders when their interfaces have publically available 
specifications.   
Interfaces of computer programs do not normally change substantially, although when new 
versions are released there will be some changes.  Once a version of the interface is 
registered and available the specification can be re-used, and combined with decompilation 
of changes to the latest version to give a current interface, without repeating the original 
work.1231  
8.4.9.1 Safe Harbour 
Registration is not compulsory, but to encourage the use of the registry, decompilers who 
notify the registrar that they have created the interface will be relieved of normal liability 
for infringement of copyright.  Where the decompiler complies in good faith1232 with the 
provisions of Article 6 the rightsholder will not be entitled to an injunction nor to damages.  
To meet this requirement decompilers will be expected to keep, and when required 
disclose, records of the decompilation process.  The only remedy that will be available to 
the rightsholder is to claim a royalty on a FRAND basis for any copyright that might have 
unwittingly been included in the interface specification.   
Ideally the changes to copyright law in the Software Directive would be accompanied by the 
introduction of a patent interoperability exception.  This exception would state that, where 
the results of decompilation or other reverse engineering for interoperability cannot be 
used because they are covered by a patent, such patents could not be invoked against 
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products implementing the information.1233  Alternatively the patent holder’s right would 
be to claim a royalty based on FRAND terms.1234    As this arrangement only applies to 
interfaces and is intended to improve interoperability with minimum cost and regulation, a 
royalty free arrangement is preferable.  This would avoid the cost and delay of parties 
negotiating royalties on prices valued prior to the code becoming a standard interface.  This 
is considered to be difficult to achieve in the absence of further regulation.1235 It is 
envisaged that the right to claim any FRAND royalties will be normally be invoked only 
when the interface specification infringes a patent right.  Interface specifications will 
generally not include copyright protected material such as code and there is little evidence 
of royalty claims for copyright in standards.1236  This may also apply to interfaces as they are 
de facto standards.1237   The patent exception is not essential to this proposal but it would 
remove the concern that, while responsible decompilation and dissemination of interface 
specifications avoids liability for copyright, it could still face claims of patent infringement.      
8.4.9.2 Publication of Interface Specifications 
The registry would publish sufficient information on the interface specification to allow 
anyone searching the registry to identify the software interface that had been decompiled.  
The decompiler registering the interface specification would have the option not to publish 
it for at least twelve months after registration.  This would enable the decompiler which 
had registered the specification to charge a fee for release of the information to recoup its 
investment.1238  There would be no charge or only a very minimal charge for registering the 
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information.  If the decompiler wanted to continue to charge for the release of the 
interface specification they would have to pay an annual fee to the registrar otherwise the 
interface specification would be published twelve months after first registration.  The 
interface specification would have to be published after a maximum term which is 
proposed as ten years.  In practice most software specifications will be redundant before 
ten years and the decompiler would stop paying the annual fee and the information could 
be publically available for free.  The situation could arise where two specifications are 
registered for the same software.  In that case each decompiler could charge for the 
information but would compete and need to offer other benefits such as easier distribution 
and clarity of information.1239       
The rationale for the reverse engineering provisions in Article 6 was to encourage 
rightsholders to make interface information available.  The dissemination of interface 
specifications would be further pressure on the rightsholders to this end.  Indeed there is 
no reason why rightsholders should not avail themselves of the register.  This would give 
notice that the interface information was available.    It would address the difficulty 
identified in the Commission Staff Working Document of how to find and obtain interface 
information.1240   It would also help further one of the non-legislatives measures 
recommended by the Working Document to improve advertising of the availability of 
interoperability information.1241  
8.4.9.3 Patents 
If a patent exemption could be brought into the regime a further amendment could not 
only encourage rightsholders to disclose interfaces on the register but also deter litigation 
by patent trolls.  It would provide that if the rightsholder make interface information on 
their own software available through the register and it subsequently transpires the 
interface infringes a third party patent the safe harbour against normal intellectual property 
claims could protect the registering party.  This would make the rightsholder liable at worst 
                                                     
1239
 These are the added values with which internet suppliers compete the most successful of which is Amazon. 
1240
 Commission Staff Working Document, 17 
1241
 Commission Staff Working Document, 15 
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for FRAND royalties.  This would help protect registered rightsholders from claims by patent 
trolls.  Patent trolls are attracted to de facto software standards as infringement is easier to 
identify.1242  If the rightsholder registered the interface the trolls would not be able to 
threaten injunctions or high damages claims so convincingly and would have to settle for a 
FRAND royalty.1243 
8.4.9.4 Contractual Preference for Registered Interfaces 
Another benefit that would flow from the introduction of the registry of interface 
specifications is that industry could prefer software where the interfaces are registered.  
This could be specified in contracts, including industry standard form contracts.
1244
  This 
would start to bring the pressure to increase openness that is seen by procurement 
practices of public authorities1245 into the private commercial environment.  This aspect 
could be more influential than any other aspect of the proposal.  It is clear from industry 
interviews that pubic authorities specify open standards and will give preference to bids 
that will improve compatibility.  This requirement influences the behaviour of their 
suppliers to design their products using open standards.1246  However public authorities are 
able to share information and collaborate to improve their knowledge and practices on 
using open standards.  As commercial enterprises conventionally compete, collaborating on 
open standards is harder.  By defining open standard software in contracts as including 
                                                     
1242
 Nicholas Saunders ‘Litigation of patents essential to technical standards – what is the future for patent 
trolls?’ CIPPM Spring Lecture 25 April  2013 
1243
 As 3D CAD Software is sold globally the jurisdictional issues of the protection would need to be considered.  
Patent trolls might be able to avoid the protection of the safe harbour by issuing proceedings outside the 
protected jurisdiction.     
1244
 For example use in the IMechE and Institution of Engineering and Technology, Model Form of Contract for 
the design, supply and installation of electrical, electronic and mechanical plant, MF/1 (Rev 6) 
1245 Interview with industry expert #7 (May 2013) and for procurement practice of public authorities see 
http://standards.data.gov.uk/  From conversations it appears that construction contracts often specify the 
architectural design software that will be used by contractors and sub-contractors to ensure interoperability.  
This would enable those contracts to specify software with registered open interfaces.   
1246 Interview with industry expert #7 (May 2013) and conversations with software design engineers 2014 - 
2015  
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software whose interfaces are registered and available either for free or on FRAND terms, 
commercial enterprises can increase the use of compatible software in an efficient and 
effective manner.     
8.4.10 Registration Platforms 
Interface specifications could be posted on a register similar to the European Federated 
Interoperability Repository (EFIR)1247 which has the Joinup platform that is a catalogue to 
enable Member States and the European Commission to document and share their 
solutions to interoperability.1248 These initiatives are presently focused on public 
administration but the concept could be available to allow for recording and sharing of 
interface specifications for all commercial software.  This could be done, preferably by 
extending the existing repository, as some software has uses in both the public and private 
sphere, or a separate register for software used by the commercial sector.  This has the 
attraction of a one stop shop across Europe.   
However as it is proposed that registration will have the legal implications of relieving some 
liability it may be more appropriate for registration to be with the intellectual property 
offices.  These offices already have in place systems to record when registration takes place 
and to ensure the integrity of the data.  There would be no need to inspect or examine the 
information that is registered.  The register’s purpose is to publicise the existence of the 
interface information and provide a safe harbour to the registering party.  All negotiations 
and transactions concerning the information will be done directly between whoever 
registered the information and the prospective licensee.  A disadvantage of using 
intellectual property offices is that they are mainly nationally based and individual searches 
would need to be undertaken of each register.  However this could be overcome if a 
common service such as Espacenet is used.1249 
 
                                                     
1247
 http://ec.europa.eu/isa/documents/actions/more-about-action-4.2.4_en.pdf [accessed 5 December 2014] 
1248
 This is part of the Interoperability Solutions for European Public Administrations (ISA) programme.  
http://ec.europa.eu/isa/documents/publications/efir-publisher-leaflets-v02_en.pdf [accessed 5 December 
2014] 
1249
 Espacenet offers free access to more than 80 million patent documents worldwide. 
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The register would increase access to interface information and improve interoperability 
without the cost of repeated decompilation of interfaces.  Conventional reverse 
engineering is tolerated as it is costly and time consuming which protects the rightsholder.  
This rationale does not apply to software interfaces as their value is indirect, coming from 
their ability to control interoperability and networks rather than their intrinsic 
innovation.1250 There is less need to protect first comers as they should recoup their 
research and development investment from other aspects of the software rather than from 
the interface.  Making the reverse engineering process any harder is wasteful and without 
welfare benefit.1251   
 
All that is required is a system of registering certain information and publishing it in an 
ordered way.  Several systems are available and could be modified appropriately.  The 
increased dissemination of the interface information in this relatively low cost but efficient 
manner would help to reduce under- utilisation of the information and increase follow on 
completion.  Copyright is a public good and overprotection of the interface, which is the 
portion of the good that normally has less innovative, has no welfare benefit.   
 
This proposal to disseminate interface specifications through a public register avoids costs 
such as the setting up of a new public body.  It is expected that efficient dissemination of 
interoperability information can avoid the need to make disclosure compulsory which will 
save the cost and deadweight of enforcement.  Transaction costs are instead borne by the 
prospective licensor and licensee which should be efficient and minimised, particularly if 
implemented alongside the soft measures recommended in the Commission Staff Working 
Document.  The recommended model licences could be made available on the same 
website as the register of interfaces which could encourage uptake.  The methodology or 
guidelines for assessing the value of the interoperability information will also help parties to 
minimise transaction costs and avoid deadweight loss.   
                                                     
1250
 Section 3.13 
1251
 8.4.2 
328 
 
 
8.5 Summary 
The proposal to allow dissemination of interoperability information which does not contain 
the software rightsholder’s copyright is doctrinally appropriate and is a modest step.  
Combined with the soft measures recommended by the Commission Staff Working 
Document it would achieve more compatibility with minimum regulation and cost.  
Monitoring the impact of the initiative will inform whether the regulation is in the right 
place to balance control and openness over the correct pivot.  If not, and more openness is 
required, then other recommendations such as allowing reuse of interface code should be 
considered.   
 
The value of interfaces comes mainly from their interdependence rather than any intrinsic 
innovation and reverse engineering of software interfaces should be made as efficient as 
possible.  Interfaces have an indirect function of controlling interoperability and access, not 
only of competing software and networks but also of complementary software and access 
to the consumers’ own data.  It is not rational to protect the first comer and making access 
more difficult is not only inefficient but harms the consumer.  The Software Directive 
already restricts decompilation to the purpose of interoperability which limits software 
reverse engineering more than in other fields.1252  Reverse engineering is legitimised by its 
purpose,1253 and is restricted to interfaces.  Making it difficulty or costly has no welfare 
benefit. 
 
The disclosure of interface information requires less amendment or monitoring.  The only 
changes required to Article 6 of the Software Directive address the question of access 
rather than substantive copyright protection.  While the proposal could be effective in 
isolation, ideally it should be accompanied by an exception to patents allowing preferably 
free use or failing that, FRAND licensing of patents in interfaces which have been 
decompiled and registered.   
                                                     
1252
 Samuelson and Suzanne Scotchmer ‘The Law and Economics of Reverse Engineering’ (2002) 111 The Yale 
Law Journal 1575, 1655  
1253
 Ibid 1655 
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The register would help inform the software industry of the existence of the interface 
information.  This will remove the need to repeat the decompilation and it is hoped 
encourage rightsholders to make the information available themselves.  If the legislation 
could go further and provide a safe harbour for rightsholders who register their interfaces 
this could not only increase awareness of the information but also reduce action by patent 
trolls. 
 
Software with interfaces available through the register can be specified in contracts which 
will help commercial enterprises follow the lead set by public authorities in stipulating open 
standards.  These initiatives combined with the ‘soft’ measures of model licenses and 
guidance on setting royalties are a practical and measured step towards increased 
interoperability. 
 
Whether they will achieve a significant increase in interoperability in the 3D CAD market is 
unknown.  3D CAD software is highly complex and technical.  It is possible that 
interoperability is feasible only through the services of specialised translators supplying 
translation software and services.  Even if that is the case the outcome may be that an 
increase in interface information allows the translators to become more efficient and to 
provide more effective services which of itself would be beneficial. While these 
recommendations build on the knowledge gained from examining the 3D CAD industry they 
are suited to other industries experiencing problems with interoperability.  Lack of 
interoperability is not limited to software industries but includes all products which have a 
software component.1254   
 
This thesis is a legal analysis of interoperability in the context of an oligopolistic industry.  
Approaching this case study from the legal perspective has identified realistic proposals to 
change the existing legal regime.  To refine the knowledge and advance these 
                                                     
1254
 Industries that have a need for software to be compatible include cars, traffic control systems, construction 
industry, defence and many more.    
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recommendations the benefit of a multidisciplinary examination of code and law is 
acknowledged.1255 Potential areas of further relevant research are how best to develop the 
system of registration and safe harbour and whether the more permissive dissemination of 
information could result in competing standards and whether that is less advantageous 
than cultivating a single standard.  It is important that any further research can include 
economics, computer science and political analysis which would give a more holistic 
approach to this complex legal, technical and commercial problem.   
                                                     
1255
 Ian Brown and Christopher T. Marsden Regulating Code (2013 The MIT Press), 200 
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CONCLUSION 
This thesis has combined legal doctrinal analysis and empirical qualitative data to carry out 
a comprehensive and detailed evaluation as to how the existing legal regime regulates the 
disclosure of interface information for the purposes of interoperability in the 3D CAD 
industry.  The 3D CAD industry can be seen as a ‘worst case scenario’ and has been singled 
out by the Commission Staff Working Document.  Concentrating on this case study has 
enabled consideration of new aspects of the interoperability phenomenon including 
implications for an oligopolistic market and supplier lock-in. 
The key phenomena associated with interoperability including lock-in were introduced and 
evaluated and this enabled a focused analysis of the 3D CAD industry and the control and 
closed nature of its proprietary software.  A structural analysis drawing on Michael Porter’s 
techniques for analysing industries and competitors again focused on interoperability and 
legal regulation.  It was clearly demonstrated that there is a marked lack of interoperability 
in the 3D CAD industry but the suppliers are profitable and R&D and innovation is thriving.  
Apart from isolated examples of the suppliers responding to customer pressure to 
standardise software and make interface information available to translators there is little 
evidence of market pressure increasing openness.  OEMs are the key customers, especially 
at the high-end, and the OEMs value integrity of data as much as interoperability as the 
software holds vital proprietary operating data.  Having established a model of the industry, 
including its oligopolistic nature, the thesis analysed the industry against competition law as 
one area of law regulating interoperability.  
 
The economic rationale behind IPRs and competition law are considered throughout the 
thesis and it is submitted that conditions such as supplier lock-in may justify intervention to 
improve the market.  This thesis illustrated, using case law, commentaries and Commission 
Guidance and Decisions concerning the 3D CAD industry, that the exceptional 
circumstances test is not an effective method for ensuring adequate disclosure of interface 
information.  It was demonstrated that even the lack of interoperability is not expected to 
reduce the market definition to single suppliers.  It was also argued that the oligopolistic 3D 
CAD industry does not meet the criteria of collective dominance for the exceptional 
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circumstances test to apply as the industry is not sufficiently transparent nor does it enjoy 
legal or economic links.  While merger regulations may provide an ex ante control it was 
established that competition law does not provide an effective deterrent or remedy.  This is 
the first evaluation of the concept of supplier lock-in due to a lack of interoperability of an 
oligopolistic market and dispels the previously held belief that competition law would 
provide a remedy of last resort to require disclosure of interface information.   
This thesis then developed the understanding of the copyright status of interfaces by a 
comparison of the treatment of functional/subject matter approach to data formats under 
the Software Directive and a more traditional approach to the idea/expression dichotomy 
for APIs in the USA.  The case was made that IPRs provide a better ex ante remedy for 
foreseeable situations but IPRs should take account that the indirect amplifying effects of 
interfaces as standards distorts the expected IPR protection.  The optimal balance for 
interfaces is different from other subject matter in software with more emphasis on 
openness than control.  These propositions were considered for the first time in the context 
not only of copyright but also trade secrets and patent protection.  It was argued that the 
Software Directive gives statutory trade secret protection by restricting access and use of 
interfaces and protecting the functionality of the software without the inventive rigour or 
disclosure requirements of patents. This form of trade secrets law adds another layer of IPR 
protection which was not anticipated.   
The law on software patents developed separately with no exemption for interfaces.  
Evidence established that the concept and implementation of software patents is flawed, 
does not incentivise innovation and could restrict the operation of standards and 
interoperability.  This raises the question of whether there is any economic justification in 
encouraging patent protection of interfaces particularly given the indirect effect of control 
over interface specifications on interoperability.  The question was raised of a failure of the 
market with overprotection of interfaces which cannot be rectified by reverse engineering 
or by conventional competition law, particularly in an oligopolistic market.  Incompatibility 
is conventionally overcome by standards and there are several standards in the 3D CAD 
industry but none give a full solution.  Interfaces are also standards and compatibility 
standards that cannot be avoided give an unplanned expansion of the protection for both 
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copyright and patents.  This research has made a significant contribution to the debate on 
whether open standards must be patent and royalty free and concluded that the argument 
that royalties in interface standards incentivises innovation is nuanced and has certainly not 
been made convincingly.  While there are many patents in 3D CAD software the STEP 
standard has few patents and it does not appear that with the existing state of standards in 
the 3D CAD industry that FRAND rather than RF standards is having any present impact on 
the industry.  This may however change should more interface information and de facto 
standards increase in number.  The information available will become more dynamic and 
negotiating FRAND licenses could be a drag on innovation. 
 
The thesis submits a summary of the findings of the research upon which existing proposals 
for reform are evaluated.  Central to this evaluation is the premise that due to indirect 
effects the balance of openness and control for interfaces is different from other subject 
matter but this is not fully achieved by competition law and IPRs.  This has resulted in less 
than optimal market conditions including significant lack of interoperability causing lock-in 
of the users’ proprietary data and an apparent failure of the market.  While law and 
research recognise the need to strike a balance the criteria for determining the positioning 
of the ‘pivot’ is not yet established.  3D CAD software is core and critical and the integrity of 
the users’ proprietary data must be preserved when adjusting the balance between control 
and openness.  Supplier lock-in favours follow on innovation rather than market 
destruction.  It is submitted that proposals such as an Interoperability Directive and 
mandatory disclosure of interface information are overly interventionist, potentially 
unworkable as interfaces are difficult to categorise, and politically unrealistic.  Reducing the 
term of protection will harm vertical interoperability of complementary software.  
Extending the exclusion for interfaces to include the code as well as the specification 
obtained by reverse engineering has advantages but this thesis promotes the least 
interventionist approach of expanding dissemination of interfaces specifications secured by 
decompilation.  The doctrinal and economic rationale for allowing interface specifications 
obtained by legitimate decompilation to be shared is made and the argument that the time 
and cost of reverse engineering has a purpose in protecting first comers is countered.  
Recommendations are made to make minor alterations to Article 6 of the Software 
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Directive without changing the copyright protection of software.  Also platforms for 
registering interface specifications and safe harbour provisions, to improve the 
dissemination of interface information are made to allow markets to move towards an 
optimum balance with minimum regulatory interference.  This approach would support the 
recommendations of the 2013 Commission Staff Working Document.   
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APPENDIX 
Sample Interview Questions and Answers 
 
Is lack of interoperability in 3D CAD Software a problem for manufacturing industry? 
“Interoperability has always been a major issue for the users of CAD systems and 3D 
systems.  I think in the early days the demand was entirely.... the users wanted all 
the applications together and in a funny sort of way they got that in the 2D arena, 
not because of interoperability but dominance of AutoDesk with AutoCad format, 
the way data was communicated around the industry.  Now that could have 
happened I suppose with 3D but it didn’t.  Why was that? In my opinion because 
there was no (single) vendor who as the 3D CAD industry got started – there were 
multiple vendors who all made progress in parallel and nobody got the kind of 
dominant position that Autodesk achieved with the 2D format.”1256   
“In order to keep an aircraft certified the certification data has to last 30 years so 
the basic design data has to last 30 years so we put it on a CAD system that has life 
of 10 years running on an operating system that changes every few months.”1257  
“If you don’t solve the interoperability problem you are actually driving cost in 
rather than taking it out and IT becomes the problem”1258 
Are customers locked in to a particular 3D CAD System?   
“It is quite difficult to get your data out of the system and into a different 
application.”1259   
“Information that is managed and generated by the software is … difficult to move 
around”1260    
                                                     
1256
 Interview with industry expert #1 (May 2014) 
1257
 Interview with industry expert #5 (September 2014) 
1258
 Interview with industry expert #5 (September 2014) 
1259
 Interview with industry expert #2 (May 2014) 
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 “Interestingly the higher up you go in the supply chain towards an OEM the more 
reliant they are to a single platform.  A single provider.” “…..but as you move down 
from the OEM to the tier one, tier two, tier three suppliers they are obviously 
bidding for work with multiple OEMs or tier two, tier ones, and therefore they will 
utilise the platform of choice of the OEM.”….”(feeding the software down the supply 
chain) “is drive by the OEMs”  1261 
They (the tier two and three suppliers) are more vulnerable.  They all complain 
anyway because they want their software vendors to do more on interoperability 
and they always will.  As they demand more from the vendors the interoperability 
problem gets worse.  If you go to some segments (the construction world).  I maybe 
being a bit cruel but the absence of interoperability is built into the business 
model.1262     
How easily can interfaces be identified and documented?  Are the interfaces clearly 
distinct? 
“It is fairly fundamental to what we produce that you are able to integrate it to 
know what the interfaces are not only from the point of view of the description of 
how to hook up the software but also how it will perform when you do particular 
operations with it.  So we have documentation which describes how to use the 
components interface descriptions, descriptions of behaviours.  So from our view 
interoperability is part of what we provide”1263   
 “It is clear to anyone who looks at it and understand the structure of what we are 
providing, what the interface is as opposed to what is the internal detail.  I think 
anyone who is familiar with the type of software we are providing and the way it is 
                                                                                                                                                                     
1260
 Interview with industry expert #2 (May 2014) 
1261
 Interview with senior industry executive #3 (May 2014) 
1262
 Interview with industry expert #1 (May 2014) 
1263
 Interview with industry expert #2 (May 2014) 
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normally done would recognise the difference between the interface and the 
core.”1264   
“The software is basically interfaces.”1265   
Should disclosure of interfaces be encouraged or even mandated? 
I think it is a question of balance I mean we look at how far and how much we would 
go.  In the question of CAD system, is it the kernel?  That is something we would 
never, we would never go to that level.  That is literally too far the other way (but) 
the scope is wide enough I think to be able to protect the company and to allow the 
customer the ability to utilise the aspect.  Every customer we work with there will 
always be competition, not direct competition but there will always be other data 
that will need to be utilised.  ..we moved to……. a platform and any data can be 
injected into the platform.  So really promoting a loop of how data works together 
data gets ingested into the platform from the source and then works the 
computation within the platform.  So that’s an interesting approach.  It very much 
follows an approach that say Apple takes so that people can develop interfaces into 
the platform … it’s very much about how you make your data available.1266      
“its an interesting journey we are on now and it does have an enormous amount of 
traction.  Its a difficult question because I think its scope is wide enough to allow the 
customers freedom and us protection.  It does mean there has to be integration of 
data models to allow that to happen and the future journey that we are now on is 
the creation of a platform that allows the ingestation of data or indeed any data 
pushed back down.”1267    
“But if we were obliged to document everything that was in theory contained within 
the software, again vector and matrix stuff in there, if there was an obligation on us 
to document that in the same way we document the interfaces we want people to 
                                                     
1264
 Interview with industry expert #2 (May 2014) 
1265
 Interview with industry expert #2 (May 2014) 
1266
 Interview with senior industry executive #3 (May 2014) 
1267
 Interview with senior industry executive #3 (May 2014) 
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use then there are lots of those interfaces in there and that would be.  I mean at 
some level they are documented because we have to be able for internal developers 
to call those and use those interfaces but reorganising that into a form that is 
suitable for an external customer would be considerable work. And then the killer 
would be any obligation to maintain those interfaces.  So yeah that would be 
difficult to do that.”1268 
Should interface information obtained by decompilation be disclosed and shared? 
“If someone was to reverse engineer all of our interfaces then in theory that could 
be used as a blue print to write what we have done again.  The software is basically 
interfaces.  So that an argument that it allows people to copy what you have done.  
If that reverse engineering is legitimate then I suppose well my feeling it is not 
something we would want the customers to be doing.  It creates for reasons of 
future compatibility issues and worries for us because we would be concerned 
about the future impact on customers.  So in that sense the more it is done the 
more I would worry about it so if there is a barrier to actually doing that then that 
feels like it is a way of discouraging everyone to do it just because they can do 
it.”1269 
“That then comes back to what is our core competence and is it the way we do 
things or is it what we do with what we have.  Our value is in what we do with what 
we have which makes us unique.  How we do it and how we structure our data base 
to do that is fairly, I wouldn’t say irrelevant, but I would say lower end.  I would 
suggest as a personal opinion rather a corporate opinion that I can’t see why we 
would have a problem.  If it was able to be done and everybody could do it and we 
had to give access to do it, I don’t think we would have a fundamental problem with 
that being shared.  But again that is personal thoughts because as I say our core 
                                                     
1268
 Interview with industry expert #2 (May 2014) 
1269
 Interview with industry expert #2 (May 2014) 
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competency is…..why couldn’t they work together to get more benefit out of the 
platform.  That would make absolute sense commercially”1270 
Would it?  Yes it would (encourage disclosure of interface information by the 
suppliers) I think but I would be facing those two alternatives wouldn’t I.  Thinking 
do I want to invest to control that interface?  I suppose that if I had customers who 
seemed to want to do that then I probably would invest.  But it is not because of the 
threat of reverse engineering it would be because the customers want it.  And then I 
would, because I would go along and say here is the interface and I take 
responsibility for the data.  And that would have to be a very strictly controlled 
interface indeed you know you suddenly if you are the supplier say you take 
responsibility for the resulting data in the existing environment the software is going 
through your process, isn’t it.  So you are managing all the updates sequences with 
review meetings and trainings of software developers and goodness knows what.  
The moment you provide an interface with third parties actually that has to be a 
very strictly controlled interface because you are not in control of the procedures 
they use or their quality checks or anything.1271   
“My concern with that is that if you are licencing proprietary models you are 
opening up a market for people doing multiple different interfaces so your 
interoperability problem doesn’t go away it just gets worse…essentially that sets up 
the opportunity for multiple competing standards which means that rather than 15 
proprietary systems you have 15 proprietary standards i.e. 30, so that would cause a 
degree of proliferation.  It also kind of renders the standards work irrelevant 
allowing everyone to do their own thing and it wouldn’t solve the issues of the 
supply chain.”1272       
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 Interview with senior industry executive #3 (May 2014) 
1271
 Interview with industry expert #1 (May 2014) 
1272
 Interview with industry expert #5 (September 2014) 
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Are market forces/customer demand driving interoperability and solving lock-in  
We strongly believe that customers that we call our partners, because we work with 
them on their business challenges is why they choose to work with us, not where we 
see them as a cash cow where we have locked them in and they have to pay us.  All 
of our big tier one customers globally work with us because of the value of working 
together.  Not because they are locked into it….the value is in the long term 
relationship with us because they can steer the direction of the product.  I think 
there is something else interesting in that.  Most software or most IT is critical non-
core to the customer’s business.  When we talk about PLM it is critical core to their 
business.  Their business processes are completely based on what we provide.  That 
is quite unique in the IT industry.  The enablement that, the ability to work at a 
senior level in that customer in terms of their vision and our vision and alignment of 
innovation cycles, efficiency gains, that is what I believe is our partnership value, 
because we work with them to ensure they achieve their goals for their 
stakeholders, their shareholders, which from my experience in IT is unique.  
Everybody else is providing critical non-core, not core, functionality.1273   
If a big customer has to say where are the big priorities here.  The number one, 
absolute sacrosanct priority is total integrity of their data and the functions they 
think they have bought for their designers and engineers to use.1274   
Just going through my mind is the Apple and Android in the mobile sphere.  Apple 
has this walled garden and controls everything.  In that walled garden everything 
works well together.  Android isn’t like that, they allow all sorts of people to play in 
their garden and put additions in a do things.  So you have naturally I think 
consumers have different expectations because of those two things.  I think it is the 
same for big business.  If a software vendor controls the environment that side is a 
plus because of the data integrity.  Do you need open standards in that 
environment?  If you a CEO then no you don’t because you control your suppliers in 
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big business in a different way.  I am going to be spending £10 million a year on this 
software.  £8 million will go to my main supplier.  £2 million of it will go to my back-
up supplier.  And you tell everyone this up front.  You say you are my main supplier 
but if anything goes wrong I have these other people who say they are ready to step 
into your shoes.  From the users point of view of a big business that would be - you 
would probably feel more confident with that set of contracts in terms of dare I say 
in terms of interoperability than your supplier having all open standards.1275    
(data integrity and interoperability) ”… are both important because of the nature of 
the supply chain.  The ten thousand suppliers, even with the drive to get it down to 
a thousand contractors to make it easier you need to ensure that your data is of as 
good a quality as possible and  you have got to have interoperability otherwise you 
have got costs.  And those costs arise not only from the translation process but also 
from the data cleansing.  Incomplete translation including those which involve 
factoring the data back in again drive up errors and errors cost money….. Looking 
back over nearly 40 years of this stuff I think at this moment we are at an un-
paralleled time for driving interoperability as more people have got it now than I 
have ever seen before.  They are starting to see the issues and benefits and they are 
starting to value their data which very soon takes them on to the interoperability 
issue.”1276   
Why is interoperability in 3D CAD a technical challenge and why does STEP or another 
standard not provide a solution? 
“..the different kernels thinking about the Parasolid, ACI and other kernels have 
slightly different rules about what constitutes a valid shape…just because something 
is valid in one system does not mean it is going to be valid in another system.  Just 
because you bring it across with no loss of information and there is always the 
possibility of losing information … and there is always the possibility of losing 
information when you write something out to file and then writing it back in again, 
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reinterpreting it… it is already difficult to transfer the physical shape across (but if) 
...you can get that information across … what it doesn’t have is how the thing will 
behave when you modify these.  Capturing that is much harder.”1277    
“I think the ability to manipulate models is important so therefore should there be a 
standard to do that?  I don’t know I am afraid that’s a very difficult question.  I can 
only see it from our approach to how we cope with there not being a standard 
means that we invest in how we ingest other data models from other providers to 
enable our software to utilise that model and be able to,  to make best use of it.  So 
we spend a lot of time in implementation of a new customer ensuring data transfer.  
Should it be standardised, what would we lose and what would we not have today?    
I don’t readily know the answer because I can only see it from my perspective.”1278   
“The big challenge with the software vendors is they want to bend the standard to 
be closest to their proprietary capability as that gives them a degree of efficiency 
but in many cases the users are saying, no we do not want, we cannot risk our 
business on you owning our data.  Because if you cannot get data out from a vendor 
system, who owns it?”1279 
 
“one of the great things about a standard is that in this area they are not driven by 
the software vendors, they are driven very much by the industry and industry 
consortia who come together for their mutual interest”1280  
 How interoperability affects policy and practice on R&D investment 
“There are some aspects we don’t publish partly because if we publish something 
then we are in it for the long term.  Our customers dont want things to change and 
as soon as we publish something then we have an ongoing commitment almost to 
support it. So if we publish all of the details of what is happening in all the layers of 
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our software then we would be basically locking down the behaviour for all those 
layers.  And we dont want to do that we want freedom to be able to tweak things to 
modify things where necessary in order to support the needs we have.  So if a 
customer who has a legitimate right to use the component where to reverse 
engineer what we provide in order to gain access to that lower level information, or 
any information, not in our published interfaces.  That is not something we would 
want to happen.   It is not necessarily a lot of IP contained in that it is really the on-
going commitment to have to support it.”1281  
“Today the way the company is structured is what does an industry value most and 
how we can develop our capability for that industry?  If that industry is driven by 
openness and interoperability then the solutions that we provide into it will be 
limited by that but also developed against that. …. Through spending many months 
with our key customers … they were most interested in how do they win a 
tender…..how early in the lifecycle of development can you create collateral to be 
able to win a tender without having to build the product which costs billions of 
pounds.  So we focused on that, how do you win a tender”1282     
 
 
                                                     
1281
 Interview with industry expert #2 (May 2014) 
1282
 Interview with industry expert #2 (May 2014) 
344 
 
 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
LEGISLATION 
United Kingdom 
Copyright Designs and Patent Act 1988 
The Copyright (Computer Programs) Regulations 1992 (S.I. 1992/3233) 
Enterprise Act 2002 
European Union 
Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2012] OJ 
C 326/01 ‘TFEU’ 
Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the 
rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty OJ L 1 
Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings [2004] OJ L 24/1 ‘Merger Regulations’ 
Commission Regulation 330/2010 of 20 April 2010 on the application of Article 101(3) of 
the Treaty to categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices [2010] OJ 
L102/1 
Council Directive of 1991/14/EC on the legal protection of computer programs [1991] OJ 
L122/42 ‘Software Directive’ 
Council Directive 2001/29/EC on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and 
related rights in the information society (2001) L167/10 ‘InfoSoc Directive’ 
Council Directive 2002/19/EC on access to, and interconnection of, electronic 
communications networks and associated facilities OJ L 108 as amended by Directive 
2009/140/EC OJ L337/37 ‘Access Directive’  
Council Directives 2002/21/EC on a common regulatory framework for electronic 
communications networks and services OJ L 108, 2002/19/EC ‘Framework Directive’ 
Council Directive 2004/18/EC on the co-ordination of procedures for the award of public 
works contracts and public supply contracts and public service contracts [2004] 
(Codified version) OJ L 134/114  
Council Directive 2004/45/EC of 29 April 2004 on the Enforcement of Intellectual 
Property Rights OJ L157/45  
Council Directive 2009/24/EC on the legal protection of computer programs [2009] OJ 
L111/16 ‘Software Directive’ 
Council Directive 2009/140/EC amending Directives 2002/21/EC on a common 
regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services, 
2002/19/EC on access to, and interconnection of, electronic communications networks 
and associated facilities, and 2002/20/EC on the authorisation of electronic 
communications networks and services, [2009] OJ L 337/37    
345 
 
 
International and United State 
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (1971) 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Annex 1C of the 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, signed in Marrakesh, 
Morocco on 15 April 1994 ‘TRIPS’ 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 28 October 1998 ‘DMCA’ 
Uniform Commercial Code 2007 Edition ‘UCC’  
  
CASES and COMMISSION DECISIONS 
United Kingdom 
American Cyanamid Co v Ethicon Ltd [1975] RPC 513   
Mars U.K. Ltd v Teknowledge Ltd ECDR (High Court, Chancery Division) 
St Albans City Council v ICL [1996] 4 All ER 481 CA 
SAS Institute Inc v World Programming Ltd EWHC 1829 (Ch) [2010] 
SAS Institute Inc v World Programming Ltd [2013] EWCA Civ 1482 (Court of Appeal) 
 
European Union 
Aerotel Ltd v Telco Holdings Ltd, Macrossan's Patent Application EWCA Civ [2006] 1371 
Airtours Plc v Commission (T-342/99) [2002] ECR II-2585 (CFI) 
AKZO v Commission Case 62/86 [1991] ECR I-3359; [1993] 5 CMLR 215 
Almelo v NV Energiebedrijf Ijsselmij C-393/92 [1994] I-1477 
Atlantic Container Line v Commission T-191/98 [2003] ECR II-3275 [2005] CMLR 1283  
Bezpečnostní softwarová asociace - Svaz softwarová ochrany v Ministerstvo kultury Case 
C-393/09 [2011] ECDR 3 
British Sugar OJ [1999] L 76/1 [1999] 4 CMLR 1316 
Bronner GmbH & Co KG v Mediaprint Keitungs-und Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co KG 
and Others (C-7/97) [1998] ECR I-7791 
Compagnie Maritime Belge Transports and Others v Commission (CEWAL) OJ [1993] L 
34/20 [1995] 5 CMLR 198 
Compagnie Maritime Belge Transports and Others v Commission (CEWAL II) (C 395/96 
etc  [2000] ECR I-1365 
Cooperatieve Vereniging Suiker Unie UA v Commission Case 40/73 [1975] ECR 1663; 
[1976] 1 CMLR 295 
France v Commission Joined Cases 68/94 & 30/95 [1998] ECR I-1375 
French-West African Shipowners' Committees decision OJ [1992] L 134/1 [1993] 5 CMLR 
446 
346 
 
 
Gencor v Commission T-102/96 [1999] ECR II-753, 4 CMLR 971 
GlaxoSmithKline Services Limited v Commission C-501/06 P [2009] ECR I-9291 (CJEU) 
Hilti AG v Commission Case T-30/89  [1991] ECR II-439, [1992] 4 CMLR 16  
Hilti AG v Commission C-53/92P [1994] ECR I-667 
Hoffmann-La Roche & Co AG v Commission  Case85/76 [1979] ECR 461 
ICI v Commission (Dyestuffs) Case 48/69 [1972] ECR 619 
Impala v Commission T-464/04 [2006] ECR II-2289 
IMS Health GmbH & Co OHG v NDC Health GmbH & Co KG (C-418/01) [2004] ECR I-5039  
Irish Sugar plc v Commission T-228/97 [1999] ECR II-2969 
Laurent Piau v Commission T-193/02 [2005] ECR II-209  
Michelin v Commission Case 322/81 [1983] ECR 3461; [1985] 1 CMLR 282 
Microsoft Corp v Commission T-201/04  [2007] ECR II-3601, [2007] 5 CMLR 11  
Navitaire Inc v easyJet Airline Co Ltd (No3) EWHC 1725 (Ch) [2004] 
P Bertelsmann and Sony Corporation of America v Commission "Impala" C-413/06 [2008] 
ECR I-4951, [2008] 5 CMLR 17 
P&I Clubs OJ [1999] L 125/12 [1999] 5 CMLR 646 
Radio Telefis Eireann (RTE) and Independent Television Publications Ltd (ITP) v 
Commission "Magill" (C 241 & 242/91 P) [1995] ECR I-743  
SAS Institute Inc v World Programming Ltd Case C-406/10 [2012] (Judgement of the 
Court (Grand Chamber) (2012) CMLR 4 
SAS Institute Inc. v World Programming Ltd Case C-406/10 [2011] ECR I-1 (Opinion of AG 
Bolt) 
Societa Italiana Vetro SpA v Commission Joined Cases T-68/89 & T-78/89 [1992] ECRII-
1403 
Tate & Lyle v Commission T-202/98 [2001] ECR II-2035, [2001] 5 CMLR 859 
Thyssen Stahl AG v Commission T-141/94 [1999] ECR II-347 [1999] 4 CMLR 810 
United Brands v Commission (27/76) [1978] ECR 207 
Volvo AB v Erik Veng (U.K.) Limited(238/87) [1988] ECR 6211 
Re Wood Pulp Cartel:Ahlstrom Oy v. Commission (Wood Pulp II) Cases C-89, 104,114,116-
17, and 125-9/85 [1993] ECR I-1307[1993] 4 CMLR 407 
Zucher v Bayerische Vereinsbank AG Case 172/80 [1981] ECR 2021 
 
Commission Decisions: 
Airtours/First Choice (Case M 1524) Commission Decision [2000] OJ L 93/1 
Cisco Sytems Inc and Tandberg ASA (Case COMP/M5669) Commission Decision [2010] OJ 
347 
 
 
C36/9 
Dassault Systemes/IBM DS PLM Software business (COMP/M.57632010) Commission 
Decision of non-opposition to notified concentration [2010] OJ C 110/1 
IBM Italia/Business Solutions/JV (COMP/M.2478) Commission Decision [2001] OJ L 24 -1 
Intel/McAfee Case (COMP M5984) Commission Decision [2011] OJ C 98 -1 
Microsoft (Case COMP/C-3/37.792) Commission Decision of 24 March 2004 relating to 
proceedings under Art. 82 EC L 32/23 
Oracle/Peoplesoft (COMP M.3216) Merger Procedure Commission Decision [2004] OJ L 
218/6 
Siemens/UGS Corporation (COMP M.4608) Commission Decision of non-opposition to 
notified concentration [2007] OJ C 113/03 
Sony/BMG (Comp/M.3333) Commission Decision [2007] OJ L 24 
Decision 2004/387/EC (21 April 2004) on interoperable delivery of pan-European 
eGovernment services to public adminstrations, businesses and citizens (IDABC) 
 
United States  
re Alappa 33 F 3d 1526 (1994) 
Aspen Skiing Co v Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp, 472 U.S. 585 (1985) 
Autodesk, Inc. v Open Design Alliance Case 2:06-1637-MJP (US District Court, Western 
District of Washington, Seattle) 
Baker v Selden 101 (1 Otto) US 99 (1880) 
Computer Associates Int. Inc v Altai Inc. 982 F 2d 693 (2nd Cir 1992) 
Diamond v Diehr 450 U.S. 175 (1981) 
eBay, Inc. V MerExchange, LLC 547 US 388 (2002)  
Lexmark International, Inc v Static Control Components, Inc. 02-CV-571. Feb. 27,2003   
Lotus Development Corp v Borland International Inc 49 F3d 807 (1st Cir 1995) 
Oracle America Inc v Google Inc (31 Mary 2012, C10-03561 WHA) (US District Court) 
Oracle America, Inc. v Google Inc (9 May 2014, 2013-1021, -1022) (Court of Appeal 
Federal Circuit) 
Sega Enterprises Ltd v Accolade Inc 977 F2d 1540 (9th Cir 1992) 
Sony Computer Equipment Inc v Connetix Corp. 203 F 3d 96 (9th Cir 2000) 
Verison Communications Inc v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko LLP 124 S.Ct. 872  
(Supreme Court of the United States) 
Whelen Associates Inc v Jaslow Dental Laboratory Inc 797 F2d 1222 (3rd Cir 1986) 
 
348 
 
 
 
OFFICIAL MATERIALS  
European Commission Guidelines and Notices 
European Commission Guidelines (2002/C 165/03) on market analysis and the 
assessment of significant market power under the Community regulatory framework for 
electronic communications networks and services [2002] OJ C 165/6  
European Commission Guidelines (2004/C 31/03) on the assessment of horizontal 
mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of concentrations between 
undertakings OJ [2004] C 31/5 
European Commission Guidance (2009/C 45/02) on the Commission's enforcement 
priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by 
dominant undertakings [2009] OJ C 45/7 
 
European Commission Guidelines (2011/C 11/01) on the applicability of Article 101 of 
the TFEU to horizontal co-operation agreements [2011] OJ C-11/01 
 
European Commission Guidelines (2014/C 89/03) on the application of Article 101 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to technology transfer agreements 
[2014] OJ C-89/3 
European Commission Notice (97/C 372 /03 )on the definition of relevant market for the 
purposes of Community competition law [1997] OJ C 372/03   
European Commission Notice on Access Agreements in the Telecommunications Sector 
[1998] OJ C 265/2 
European Commission other official material 
Proposal for a Council Directive on the legal protection of computer programs (COM(88) 
816 (1989) OJ C 91/4 
Amended proposal for a Council Directive on the legal protection of computer programs 
COM (90) 509 final (1990) 
European Commission ‘Press Release: The European Commission accepts an 
undertaking from Digital concerning its supply and pricing practices in the field of 
computer maintenance services (1997) IP/97/868’ http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-97-868_en.htm?locale=en [accessed 15November 2015]  
European Commission ‘Report from the Commission on the implementation and effects 
of Directive 91/250/EEC on the legal protection of programs’ (2000) 
EU Study on the specific policy needs for ICT standardisation (Final Report, July 2007) 
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/ict/files/full_report_en.pdf [accessed 6 August 
2015] 
Draft European Commission Directive 2009/24/EC on the legal protection of computer 
programs 
349 
 
 
European Commission 14th Report on Competition Policy  
European Commission Staff Working Document i2010 - Annual Information Society 
Report 2009 Benchmarking i2010: Trends and main achievements (Europe's Digital 
Competitiveness Report, 2009) 
European Commission ‘Modernising ICT Standardisation in the EU - The Way Forward’ 
(COM(2009) 324 Final, 2009) 
European Commission White Paper, ‘Modernising ICT Standardisation in the EU – The 
Way Forward’, COM(2009) 324 final 2 
European Commission ‘Towards interoperability for European public services – 
European Interoperability Framework for European Public Services V2’ (COM (2010) 744 
final Communication 2011) 
European Commission ‘Final Proposal for a Regulation on European Standardisation’ 
COM(2011) 315   
European Commission Staff Working Document ‘Analysis of measures that could lead 
significant market players in the ICT sector to license interoperability information’ 
(SWD(2013) 209) Final 
European Commission, ‘Google Agrees to Change Its Business Practices to Resolve FTC 
Competition Concerns In the Markets for Devices Like Smart Phones, Games and 
Tablets, and in Online Search’ (2013) http://wwwftcgov/opa/2013/01/googleshtm 
accessed 10/04/2013 
UK & USA 
UK Competition Commission Merger References: Competition Commission Guildelines 
CC2, June 2003 
Office of Fair Trading Mergers - Substantive Assessment guidance OFT 516, May 2003 
US Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission ‘Antitrust Enforcement and 
Intellectual Property Rights: Promoting Innovation and Competition’ (2007) 
Office of Fair Trading Merger Assessment Guidelines CC2 Revised, OFT 1254, September 
2010 
UK Government Public Administration Committee ‘Government and IT- "A Recipe For 
Rip-Offs": Time For A New Approach Twelfth Report’ (HC) March 2011, 715-II 
UK Government Policy on Open Standards, Standards Hub http://standards.data.gov.uk/ 
[accessed 10 December 2014] 
 
BOOKS AND CHAPTERS  
Anderman SD (ed) Intellectual and Competition Policy Property Rights (Cambridge 
University Press 2007) 
 
Band J and Katoh M, Interfaces on Trial 2.0 (MIT Press 2011) 
 
Bently L, and Sherman B Intellectual Property Law (3rd ed, OUP 2009) 
350 
 
 
 
Bork RH, The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself (Basic Books, reprinted 1993, 
1978) 
Borghi M and Karapapa S, Copyright and Mass Digitization (OUP 2013)  
 
Brown A, Intellectual Property, Human Rights and Competition (Edward Elgar 2012) 
 
Brown I and Marsden C, Regulating Code (The MIT Press 2013) 
 
Bryman A and Bell E, Business Research Methods (3rd edn, Oxford University Press 2011) 
 
Carlton DW and Perloff JM, Modern Industrial Organization (4th Edition) edn, 2005) 
 
Carrier M, Innovation for the 21st Century Harnessing the Power of Intellectual Property 
and Antitrust Law (Oxford University Press 2009) 
 
Chesbrough H, Open Innovation (Harvard Business School Press 2003) 
Economides N and Lianos I, ‘The quest for appropriate remedies in the EC Microsoft 
cases: a comparative appraisal’ in Rubini L (ed), Microsoft on Trial (Edward Elgar 2010) 
 
 
Chesbrough H, Vanhaverbeke W and West J (eds) Open Innovation, Researching a New 
Paradigm (Oxford University Press 2008)  
 
Czarnota B and Hart R, The Legal Protection of Computer Programs in Europe – A Guide 
to the EC Directive  (Butterworths 1991) 
 
DeNardis L (ed) Opening Standards (MIT Press 2011) 
 
Drexl J, ‘Abuse of Dominace in Licensing and Refusals to License A “More Economic 
Approach” to Competition by Imitation and to Competition by Substitution’, in: Claus 
Dieter Ehlermann & Isabela Atanasiu, European Competition Law Annual 2005: The 
Interaction between Competition Law and IP Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing 2006) 
 
Drexl J (ed) Research Handbook on Intellectual Property and Competition Law (Edward 
Elgar 2008) 
Epstein R, ‘Unilateral Practices and the Dominant Firm: the European Community and 
the United States’ in Copp S (ed), The Legal Foundations of Free Markets (Institute of 
Economic Affairs 2009) 
 
Farrell J and Klemperer P, ‘Coordination and Lock-in: Competition with Switching Costs 
and Network Effects’ in Armstrong M and Porter R (eds), 3 Handbook of Industrial 
Organisation (Vol 3 Elsevier 1989). 
351 
 
 
Forrester IS, ‘“Victa lacet mihi causa: the compulsory licensing part of the Microsoft 
case” ’ in Rubini L (ed), Microsoft on Trial (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham 2010) 
Gil-Moto M, ‘Economic aspects of the Microsoft case: networks, interoperability and 
competition’ in Rubini L (ed), Microsoft on Trial (Edward Elgar 2010) 
 
Glader M, Innovation Markets and Competition Analysis (Edward Elgar 2006) 
 
Hagerstrom A, Inquiries into the Nature of Law and Morals (Olivecrona K ed, C.D. Broad 
trans. 1953) 
 
Jones A and Sufrin B, EC Competition Law (5th edn, OUP 2014) 
 
Kidder LH and Judd CM, Research methods in social relations (5th edn, Holt, Rinehart 
and Winston 1986) 
 
Kokkoris I, A Gap in the Enforcement of Article 82 (BIICL 2009) 
 
Kokkoris I, The Gap in the ECMR and National Merger Legislations (Routledge 2012) 
 
Korah V, An Introductory Guide to EC Competition Law and Practice (9th edn, Hart 2007) 
 
Lerner J and Jaffe AB, Innovation and its Discontents (Princetown University Press 2004) 
 
Lerner J, and Zhu F, “What is the Impact of Software Patent Shifts?: Evidence from Lotus 
v Borland” (2005) NBER Working Paper 11168 http://www.nber.org/papers/w11168 
 
Lerner J and Schankerman M, The Comingled Code (MIT Press 2010) 
 
Lloyd I J, Information Technology Law (4th edn, Oxford University Press 2004) 
 
Middleton K, Cases & Materials on UK & EC Competition Law (2nd edn, OUP 2009) 
 
Horwitz M J, The Transformation of American Law,1870-1960 (OUP 1992) 
 
Porter ME, Competitive Strategy (Free Press 2004) 
 
Posner RA, The Economics of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1983) 
Rapley T, ‘Interviews’ in C Seale GG, JF Gubrium and D Silverman (ed), Qualitative 
Research Practice (Sage, London 2004) 
 
Rooijen A van, The Software Interface between Copyright and Competition Law (Kluwer 
Law International 2010) 
 
Rowland D, Kohl U and Charlesworth A, Information Technology Law (4th edn, 
Routledge 2012) 
352 
 
 
 
Rubini L (ed), Microsoft on Trial (Edward Elgar 2010) 
 
Scherer F M, The Economic Effects of Compulsory Patent Licensing ( New York University 
1977) 
Schumpeter J, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (5th edn, Allen and Unwin 1942) 
 
Scotchmer S, Innovation and Incentives (MIT Press 2006) 
 
Shapiro C and Varian H, Information Rules - a strategic guide to the network economy 
(Harvard Business School Press 1998) 
 
Simcoe T, ‘Delay and de jure standardization: exploring the slowdown in internet 
standards development’ in Greenstein S and Stango V (eds), Standards and Public Policy 
(Cambridge University Press 2007) 
Towse R and Holzhauer R, in the introduction to Economics of Intellectual Property 
(Edward Elgar 2002) 
Vinje T, ‘The Legislative History of the EC Software Directive’ in Tapper C and Lehmann 
M (eds), Handbook of European Software Law (OUP 1993) 
 
Whish R and Bailey D, Competition Law (8th edn, Oxford University Press 2015) 
 
Yin RK, Case Study Research (4th edn, Sage 2009) 
 
 
JOURNAL ARTICLES, REPORTS AND WEB SOURCES    
Albors-Llorens A, ‘Collective Dominance: a mechanism for the control of oligopolistic 
markets?’ (2000) 59 Cambridge Law Journal 253 
Alexander GS, ‘Comparing the Two Legal Realisms - American and Scandinavian’ (2002) 
50 The Americal Journal of Comparative Law 154 
Alkemade G and Berkvens J, ‘Software protection: life after the Directive’ (1991) 13 
European Intellectual Property Review 476 
Anderman S, ‘High technology, transitory markets and competition law’ (2001) 3 
Electronic Business Law  
–––, ‘Microsoft v Commission and the interoperability issue’ (2008) 30 European 
Intellectual Property Review 395 
Andreangeli A, ‘The Impact of the Modernisation Regulation on the Guarantees of Due 
Process in Competition Proceedings’ (2006) 31 EL Rev 342  
–, ‘Interoperability as an "essential facility" in the Microsoft case - encouraging 
competition or stifling innovation?’ (2009) 34 European Law Review 584 
Angel D and Engstrom J, ‘Manufacturing Systems and Technological Change: The U.S. 
353 
 
 
Personal Computer Industry’ (1995) 71 Economic Geography 79 
 
Apostol R, “Formal European standards in public procurement: a strategic tool to 
support innovation” (2010) 2 Public Procurement Law Review 57-72 
Arrow, K J ‘Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention’, in National 
Bureau of Economic Research (ed.) The Rate and Direction of Incentive Activity, 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962) 
Arthur WB, ‘Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns, And Lock-In By Historical 
Events’ (1989) 99 Economic Journal 116 
Astebro T, ‘Sunk Costs and the Depth and Probability of Technology Adoption’ (2004) LII 
The Journal of Industrial Economics 
Atkins, ‘Copyright, contract and the protection of computer programs’ (2009) 23 
International Review of Law, Computers and Technology 143  
Atro F, ‘Market Leaders, Antitrust Policy and the Software Market’(2007) 5 The Icfai 
Journal of Industrial Economics, 7  
Audoin P Consultants, “Economic Social Impact of Software and Software-Based 
Services” Final Report  August 2010 Smart 2009/0041, 208 
http://cordis.europa.eu/fp7/ict/ssai/docs/study-sw-report-final.pdf [accessed 16 
December 2014] 
Ayres I and Klemperer P, (1999) ‘Limiting Patentees' Market Power Without Reducing 
Innovation Incentives: The Perverse Benefits of Uncertainty and Non-Injunctive 
Remedies’ 97 Michigan Law Review 985 
Bain J, ‘Relation of Profit Rate to Industry Concentration, American Manufacturing" 
1936-1940’ (1951) 65 Q J Econ 293 
Baker JB, ‘Promoting Innovation Competition through the Aspen/Kodak Rule’ (1998) 7 
Geo Mason L Rev 495  
–––, ‘Beyond Schumpeter vs Arrow: How Antitrust Fosters Innovation ’ (2007) American 
Antitrust Institute 
Baker K, ‘VP, Standards and IPRs’ (4th Transatlantic Market Conference, Washington DC, 
July 2009) 
Barnett T, ‘Interoperability between antitrust and intellectual property’ (2007) 14 Geo 
Mason L Rev 859 
Bathelor B, Jenkins T and Butter M, ‘Copying leview: moving towards harmonisation? 
The European Court rules on the concept of fair compensation for rightholders ’ (2011) 
32 ECLR 277 
–––, ‘The fallout from Microsoft: the Court of First Instance leaves critical IT industry 
issues unanswered’ (2011) 14 Computer and Telecommunications Law Review 17 
Bender D, ‘Lotus v Borland appeal - on-screen program menus not copyright-protected’ 
(1995) 11 Computer Law and Practice 71 
354 
 
 
Berkvens J, ‘Data regulation in copyright law: will the problem of software ever be 
solved?’ (1993) 15 European Intellectual Property Review 79 
Bernoff J, Forrester Research CNET News October 20, 2003 http://news.cnet.com/2030-
1027-5093879.html [accessed 2 Nov 2011] 
Bessen J, “The Private and Social Costs of Patent Trolls” (2011) Regulation, Winter, 26 - 
35 
––– and Hunt R, ‘An Empirical Look at Software Patents ’ (2007) 16 Journal of Economics 
and Management Strategy 157 
––– and Maskin E, “Sequential innovation, patents, and imitation”  (2009) (4) RAND 
Journal of Economics, Winter, 611-635 
Beydogan TA, ‘Interoperability-Centric Problems: New Challenges and Legal Solutions’ 
(2010) 8 International Journal of Law and IT 
Bijlsma M De Bijl P  Kocsis V, ‘Competition, innovation and intellectual property rights in 
software markets’ (CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis No 181 March 
2009) 
Blind K, ‘Motives to patent: Empirical evidence from Germany’ (2006) 35 Research 
Policy 655 
–––, “Standardisation: A Catalyst for Innovation” (August 2009) Inaugural Address, 
Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus Universiteit. 
http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/17558/EIA-2009-039-LIS.pdf  
––– and Gauch S and Hawkins R, ‘How Stakeholders View the Impacts of International 
ICT Standards’ (2010) 34 Telecommunications Policy 162 
––– and others, ‘Study on the Interplay between Standards and Intellectual Property 
Rights (IPRs) Final Report’ (2011) 
Boge U and Muller, ‘From the Market Dominance Test to the SLC Test: Are there any 
reasons for a change? ’ (2002) ECLR 495 
Bolotova Y, Connor JM and Miller DJ, ‘Factors influencing the magnitude of cartel 
overcharges: an empirical analysis of the US market ’ (2009) 5 Journal of Competition 
Law & Economics 361 
Bonaccorsi A, Giannangeli S and Rossi C, ‘Entry Strategies Under Competing Standards: 
Hybrid Business Models in the Open Source Software Industry’ (2006) 52 Management 
Science 1085 
Bork RH & Sidak JG, ‘What does the Chicago School Teach about Internet Search and the 
Antitrust Treatment of Google?’ (2012) http://www.aei.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/10/-what-does-the-chicago-school-teach-about-internet-search-
and-the-antitrust-treatment-of-google_132249480630.pdf [accessed 26 December 
2014] 
Bray R, ‘The European Union Software Patents Directive: What is it? Where is it? Where 
are we now?’  (2005) 11 Duke Law & Technology Review 28 
Brown AEL, ‘Access to essential technologies: The role of the interface between 
355 
 
 
intellectual property, competition and human rights’ (2007) 24 International Review of 
Law Computers and Technology 51 
Brown J, ‘Has Parker Hannafin found the key to living with heterogeneous systems’ 
Tech-Clarity <http://tech-clarity.com/clarityonplm/?s=interoperability> accessed 19 
April 
Brunnermeier S and Martin S ‘Interoperability Cost Analysis of the U.S. Automotive 
Supply Chain’ (Center for Economics Research for NIST, 1999) 
–––, ‘A strategic vision for European standards: Moving forward to enhance and 
accelerate the sustainable growth of the European economy by 2020’ (COM(2011) 311 
final, 2011) 
–––, ‘DG Competition discussion paper on the application of Article 82 of the Treaty to 
exclusionary abuses’ (Brussels, December 2005) 
–––, ‘Draft Commission Regulation on the application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union to categories of specialisation agreements’ 
(2011) 
Buhr C-C and others, ‘The Commission's decision in the Microsoft Internet Explorer 
cases and recent developments in the area of interoperabilty’ (2010) Competition Policy 
Newsletter 
Buyers J, ‘Open Source Software’ (2007) 15 IT Law Today 
Cabral L and Salant D, ‘Evolving Technologies and Standards Regulation’ 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1120862> accessed 4 November 2012 
Callery C, ‘Considerig the oligopoly problem’ (2011) 32 ECLR 142 
Campbell-Kelly M and Garcia-Swartz D, “Pragmatism, not ideology: Historical 
perspectives on IBM’s adoption of open-source software” (2009) 21 (3) Information 
Economics and Policy 229, 237-9.    
Carlton DW and Klamer JM, ‘The Need for Coordination among Firms, with Special 
Reference to Network Industries’ (1983) 50 University of Chicago Law Review 446 
Casson T and Ryan PS, ‘Open Standards, Open Source Adoption in the Public Sector, and 
the Relationship to Mircosoft's Market Dominance ’ (2006) Interdiscipliniary 
Telecommunications Program, University of Colorado 87 
Chad Jackson, ‘Where the Interoperability Movement Falls Flat’  (Engineering.com 6 
September 2012) 
http://www.engineering.com/DesignSoftware/DesignSoftwareArticles/ArticleID/4769/
Where-the-Interoperability-Movement-Falls-Flat.aspx [accessed 16 October 2014] 
––– and David Prawel ‘The 2013 State of 3D Collaboration and Interoperability Report’ 
Lifecycle Insights and Longview Advisors http://www.tetra4d.com/collateral/3D-
Collaboration-Interoperability-Report.pdf [accessed 11 October 2014] 
Chakravarty S, ‘Experimental Evidence on Product Adoption in the Presence of Network 
Externalities’ (2003) 23 Review of Industrial Organization 233 
Chandak N and George C, ‘Can iTunes be weTunes? - Is FairPlay Playing Fair?’ 
356 
 
 
http://www.bileta.ac.uk/content/files/conference%20papers/2005/Can%20iTunes%20b
e%20weTunes%20-%20Is%20Fair-Play%20Playing%20Fair.pdf accessed 22 November 
2015 
Chappatte P, ‘FRAND Commitments - The Case for Antitrust Intervention’ (2009) 5 
European Competition Journal 319  
Chen P-y and Forman C, ‘Can Vendors Influence Switching Costs and Compatibility in an 
Environment with Open Standards?’ (2006) 30 MIS Quarterly 541 
Chiao B Lerner J and Tirole J, ‘The Rules of Standard Setting Organizations: An Empirical 
Analysis’(February 9, 2005) http://www.people.hbs.edu/jlerner/ssoempirical.pdf 
Choudhary V, ‘The patentability of software under intellectual property rights: an 
analysis of US, European and Indian intellectual property rights’ (2011) 33 EIPR 435 
Cifuentes C and Fitzgerald A, ‘Interoperability and computer software protection in 
Australia’ (1998) 4 Computer and Telecommunications Law Review 271 
Coase R, ‘The Nature of the Firm’ Economica (1937) 387 
–––, ‘The Problem of Social Cost’ (1960) 3 JJ& ECON 
Cohen JE & Lemley MA ‘Patent Scope and Innovation in the Software Industry’ (2001) 89 
Cal L Rev 1 
Cohen M, ‘Property and Sovereignty’ (1927) 8 Cornell LQ   
Connaughton, ‘Design for Manufacturability’ Research Starters - Business 
<web.ebscohost.com/ehost/delivery?vid=20&hid=9&hid=a717909a-880a-4309-a..> 
accessed 12 June 2009 
Cook W, ‘FRAND or foe - Managing Intellectual Property’ ProQuest 
<http://proquest.umi.com> accessed 15 March 2007 
Cornish WR, ‘Interoperable systems and copyright’ (1989) 11 EIRP 391 
–––, ‘Computer program copyright and the Berne Convention’ (1990) 12 European 
Intellectual Property Review 129 
Corrigan R and Rogers M, ‘The Economics of Copyright’ (2005) 6 World Economics 153 
Coupe TT and M. ON, ‘An empirical evaluation of the impact of CASE on developer 
productivity and software quality’ (1996) 11 Journal of Information Technology 173 
Cyon Research “EDS and PTC: Is there any substance to their interoperability 
agreement?”(2002) Cyon Research Corporation. 
http://www.cyonresearch.com/Portals/0/files/whitepapers/interop040302.pdf 
[accessed 28 November 2015]   
–––, “Intellectual Capital and Interoperability” (2003) Cyon Research Corporation 
–––, “A Fresh Look at the Value-Proposition of High-End MCAD” (2007) Cyon Research 
Corporation 
–––, “Survey of Engineering Software Users” (2009) Cyon Research Corporation 
Dalford O, ‘An exact arithmetic SSNIP test for asymmetric products’ (2009) 5 Journal of 
357 
 
 
Competition Law & Economics 563 
Dalton-Taggart R, ‘3D data interoperability vendors sound off’ Engineering Automation 
Report (Graphic Speak 11 July 2007) at http://gfxspeak.com/2011/07/11/3d-data-
interoperability-vendors-sound-off/ [accessed 1 August 2015] 
Daly A, 'E-book monopolies and the law' (2013) 18 Media & Arts Law Review 350 
Dam K, “The Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law, (1995) 23 Journal of Legal Studies 
247, 253. 
–––, ‘Some Economic Considerations in the Intellectual Property Protection of Software’ 
(1995) 24 Journal of Legal Studies 
Damsgaard J and Karlsbjerg J, ‘Seven Principles for Selecting Software Packages’ (2010) 
53 Communications of the ACM 
Deishin L and Mendelson H, ‘Adoption of Information Technology Under Network 
Effects’ (2007) 18 Information Systems Research 395 
Derclaye E, ‘Abuses of dominant position and intellectual property rights: a suggestion 
to reconcile the Community courts case law’ (2003) 26 World Competition 685 
Derringer PH, ‘How Boeing used a virtual PLM platform to design its 787 without the use 
of prototypes, across a global supply chain’ The Manufacturercom 
<www.themanufacturer.com/us/detail.html?contents_id=4013> accessed 9 March 2007 
Deschamps C, ‘Patenting computer-related inventions in the US and in Europe: the need 
for domestic and international legal harmony ’ (2001) 32 European Intellectual Property 
Review 103 
Desogus, ‘Parallel trade and pharmaceutical R&D: the pitfalls of the rule of reason’ 
(2008) 29 European Competition Law Review 649 
Devlin A, Jacobs M and Peixoto B, ‘Success, Dominance and Interoperability’ (2009) 84 
Indiana Law Journal, 1156 
Diego L, ‘Competition and open source with perfect software compatibility’ (2009) 21 
Information Economics and Policy 192 
Dizon MA, ‘Decompiling the Software Directive, the Microsoft CFI case and the i2010 
strategy: how to reverse engineer an international interoperability regime’ (2008) 14 
Computer and Telecommunications Law Review 213 
Dods D, ‘Network contracts: some special considerations’ (2011) 17 Computer and 
Telecommunications Law Review 29 
Dorr J and others, ‘Will abandoning DRM have a boomerang effect on Apple? - An 
empirical analysis of lock-in and network effects.’ (2009) 42 Hawaii International 
Conference on System Sciences 2884 
 
358 
 
 
Drexl J, “Intellectual Property and Antitrust Law – IMS Health and Trinko – Antirust 
Placebo for Consumers Instead of Sound Economics in Refusal-to-Deal Cases” (2004) IIC 
788 (2004), 803   
DTI, “The Empirical Economics of Standards”, (June 2005) DTI Economics Paper 12, 
Department of Trade and Industry. www.bis.gov.uk/files/file9655.pdf 
Duffy JF, ‘The Death of Google's Patents’ (2008) Patently Patent Law Blog 21 June 208 
>accessed 23 June 2008 
Duvall M and Bartholomew D, ‘PLM: Boeing's Dream, Airbus' Nightmare’ (2007) 
http://wwwtgstechcom/releases/BoeingsDream_AirbusNightmarep>accessed 10 April 
2012   
Easterbrook FH, ‘The Limits of Antitrust’ (1984) 63 Tex L Rev 1 
Economist The, Editorial, ‘Survival of the Biggest’ Economist (London, 1 - 7 December 
2012 ) 13 
–––, Briefing Internet Monopolies ‘Everybody wants to rule the world’ Economist (29 
November 2014), 22  http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2013/01/google-
agrees-change-its-business-practices-resolve-ftc  
Edwards G, ‘Margin squeezes and the inefficient "equally efficient" operator’ (2011) 32 
European Competition Law Review 402 
Egyedi TM, ‘To Select of Not? Dealing with Competing Standards in Public IT 
Procurement’ Delft University of Technology (2012) final version. 
https://www.forumstandaardisatie.nl/fileadmin/os/Vergaderstukken/Competing_Stand
ards_Report_Final_3jan12.pdf> 22 November 2015 
Emanuelson  A, ‘Standardisation agreements in the context of the new Horizontal 
Guidelines’ (2013) 33 ECLR 69 
Engel C, ‘When is intellectual property needed as a carrot for innovators’ (2011) 7 
Journal of Competition Law & Economics 277 
Epstein R A, ‘Unilateral Practices and the Dominant Firm: The European Community and 
the United States’ in Stephen Copp (ed) The Legal Foundations of the Free Markets 
(Institute of Economic Affairs, 2008)  
European Economics, ‘Study on Assessment Criteria for Distinguishing between 
Competitive and Dominant Oligopolies in Merger Control - Final Report for the 
European Commission Enterprise DG’ (London 2001) 
Evan DS and Layne-Farrar A, ‘Software Patents and Open Source: The Battle over 
Intellectual Property Rights’ (2004) 9 (10) Virginia Journal of Law & Technology 1 
––– and Schmalensee R, ‘Some Economic Aspects of Antitrust Analysis in Dynamically 
Competitive Industries’ (2002) 2 NBER Innovation Policy & the Economy (MIT Press) 1 
Ewing T and Feldman R, “The Giants Among Us” (2012) Stanford Technology Law Review 
1 
Farrell J, ‘Standardization and Intellectual Property’ (1989) 30 Jurametrics Journal 35 
359 
 
 
––– and Klemperer P, ‘Coordination and Lock-in: Competition with Switching Costs and 
Network Effects’ (2007) 3 Handbook of Industrial Organization 
––– and Shapiro C, ‘Dynamic competition with switching costs’ (1988) 19 RAND Journal 
of Economics 123 
Federspiel SB and Brincker B, ‘Software as Risk: Introduction of Open Standards in the 
Danish Public Sector’ (2010) 26 The Information Society 38 
Filippeli M, ‘Collective dominance in the Italian mobile telecommunications market’ 
(2010) 31 European Competition Law Review 81 
Fitchen J, ‘Grand Designs, Competition 'by Other Means' and New Vistas’ (2007) 21 
International Review of Law Computers and Technology 263 
Ford T C and others, ‘A Survey on Interoperability Measurement’ (June 2007) (12th 
ICCRTS “Adapting C2 to the 21st Century” Newport, RI) 
Ford-Taggart M, ‘Dassault Systemes DASTY’ (2007) 6 (7) Morningstar StockInvestor 21 
Fried I, Will iTunes Make Apple Shine?  CNET News 16 Oct 2003  
http://news.cnet.com/2100-1041_3-5092559.html [accessed 3 Nov 2011] 
Ganley P, ‘Digital copyright and the new creative dynamics’ (2004)  International Journal 
of Law & Information Technology 282 
Gasser U and others, ‘iTunes How Copyright, Contract and Technology Shape the 
Business of Digital Media - A Case Study’ (2004) Green Paper 1.0 Berkman Centre 
Research Publication 
––– and Palfrey JG, Jr., ‘Breaking Down Digital Barriers: When and How ICT 
Interoperability Drives Innovation’ (2007) Berkman Center Research Publication 
Gawer A, ‘Interoperability - With what? For whom? And when?’ (2011) Interoperability 
in the Absence of Standards Conference, Brussels, June 2011 
Genevaz S, ‘Against Immunity For Unilateral Refusals To Deal In Intellectual Property: 
Why Antitrust Law Should Not Distinguish Between Up And Other Property Rights’ 
(2002) 19 Berkeley Technology Law Journal 741 
George C and Chandak N, ‘Issues and Challenges in Securing Interoperability of DRM 
Systems in the Digital Music Market’ (2006) 20 International Review of Law Computers 
and Technology 271 
Geradin D, ‘Access to content by new media platforms: a review of the competition law 
problems’ (2005) 30 European Law Review 68 
–––, ‘Pricing abuses by essential patent holders in a standard-setting context: A view 
from Europe’ (July 2008) http://ssrncom/abstract=1174922 
–––, ‘What's Wrong with Royalties in High Technology Industries’ (December 2009) TILC 
Discussion Paper DP 2009-045 http://ssrncom/abstract=1104315 accessed 21 October 
2012  
–––, ‘Reverse Hold-ups: The (Often Ignored) Risks Faced by Innovators in Standardized 
Area’  The Pros and Cons of Standard Setting, 2010 Konkurrensverket,  Swedish 
360 
 
 
Competition Authority 
––– and others, ‘The Concept of Dominance in EC Competition Law’ (2005) Global 
Competition Law Centre, Research Paper on the Modernisation of Article 82 EC 
––– and Rato M, ‘FRAND Commitments and EC Competition Law: A Reply to Philippe 
Chappatte’ (2010) 6 European Competition Journal 129  
Gerber D, ‘The “Modernisation" of European Community Competition Law:  Achieving 
Consistency in Enforcement’ Part 1 (2006) 27 ECLR 10 
––– and Cassinis P, ‘The "Modernisation" of European Community Competition Law: 
Achieving Consistency in Enforcement’ Part 2 (2006) 27 ECLR 51 
Ghosh R, ‘An Economic Basis for Open Standards’ University of Maastricht, December 
2005 <http://www.intgovforum.org/Substantive_1st_IGF/openstandards-IGF.pdf> 
accessed 21 October 2012 
––– and others, IDABC Programme Guidelines on public procurement of Open Source 
Software (European Commission OSOReu website, 2010) 
Gilbert RJ, ‘Symposium On Compatibility: Incentives and Market Structure’ (1992) 40 
Journal of Industrial Economics 1 
––– and Riordan MH, ‘Product Improvement and Technological Tying in a Winner-Take-
All Market’ (2007) 55 Journal of Industrial Economics 113 
Giocoli N, ‘Competition versus property rights: American antitrust law, the Freiburg 
School, and the early years of European competition policy’ (2009) 5 JCL& E 747 
Glader M, ‘Open Standards: Public Policy Aspects and Competition Law Requirements’ 
(2010) 6 European Competition Journal 611 
Golding J, ‘The Impala case: a quiet conclustion but a lasting legacy’ (2010) 31 European 
Competition Law Review 261 
Gonzalez AG, ‘The Software Patent Debate’ (2006) 1 Journal of Intellectual Property Law 
& Practice 196 
Gonzalez Otero B, “Compelling to Disclose Software Interoperable Information” (2013) 
16 The Journal of World Intellectual Property 1  
Gordon W, ‘Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the 
Betamax Case and its Predecessors’ (1982) 82 Columbia Law Review 1600 
–––, ‘Market Failure and Intellectual Property: a Response to Professor Lunney ’ (2002) 
82 Boston University Law Review 1031 
Gormsen LL, ‘Why the European Commission's enforcement priorities on article 82 EC 
should be withdrawn’ (2010) 31 European Competition Law Review 45 
Graef I, “How can Software Interoperability be achieved under European Competition 
Law and Related Regimes?” (2014) 5(1) Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 
17   
Gravengaard MA and Kjaersgaard N, ‘The EU Commission guidance on exclusionary 
abuse of dominance - and its consequences in practice’ (2010) 31 ECLR 285, 247 
361 
 
 
Greenfield J, “Kindle Most Popular Device for Ebooks, Beating Out iPad; Tablets On The 
Rise” (Forbes.com 13 October 2013) 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/jeremygreenfield/2013/10/30/kindle-most-popular-
device-for-ebooks-beating-out-ipad-tablets-on-the-rise/ accessed 17 November 2014 
Greenstein SM, ‘Lock-in and the Costs of Switching Mainframe Computer Vendors: 
What Do Buyers See?’ (1997) 6 Industrial and Corporate Change 
Grosche, ‘Software Patents - Boon or Bane for Europe?’ (2006) 14 International Journal 
of Law & Information Technology 257 
Guadamuz González A, “The software patent debate” (2006) 1 (3) Journal of Intellectual 
Property Law and Practice 196 
Guardian The, How Apple is changing DRM, The Guardian, Thursday 15 May 2008, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2008/may/15/drm.apple [accessed 
30/10/2010] 
Gupta A, ‘Are open standards a prerequisite to open source?  A perspective in light of 
technical and legal developments’ (2009) 12 Computer and Telecommunications Law 
Review 22 
Hale RL, ‘Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State’ [1923] Political 
Science Quarterly 470 
Hall B and Harhoff D, ‘Recent Research on the Economics of Patents’ National Bureau of 
Economic Research Working Paper 17773 (2012) 4(1) Annual Review of Economics 541 
––– and MacGarvie M, ‘The Private Value of Software Patents’ (2010) 39 Research Policy 
994 
––– and others, ‘The Importance (or not) of Patents to UK Firms’ (2012) 
http://facultyhaasberkeleyedu/neil_thompson/Innovation_Seminar/Papers/HHRS12_U
K_patentingpdf> accessed 12 October 2012 
Han ZZ and others, ‘Interoperability from Electronic Commerce to Litigation Using XML 
Rules’ (2007) 15 International Journal of Law & Information Technology, 233 
Handke C, ‘The Economics of Copyright and Digitisation: A Report on the Literature and 
the Need for Further Research’ (2010) 03 Strategic Advisory Board for Intellectual 
Property Policy  
Hart R, ‘Interfaces, interoperability and maintenance’ (1991) 13 European Intellectual 
Property Review 111 
––– , ‘Interoperability information and the Microsoft decision’ (2006) 28 European 
Intellectual Property Review 361 
Haupt H, ‘Collective dominance under Article 82 E.C. and E.C. merger control in the light 
of the Airtours judgment’ (2002) 23 ECLR 434 
Hawk B, ‘The American (anti-trust) revolution: lessons for the EEC?’ (1988) 9 ECLR 53 
–––  and Motta GA, ‘Oligologies and Collective  Dominance: A solution in search of a 
362 
 
 
problem’ [November 2008] Fordham University Law School 
http://ssrncom/abstract=1301693 
Hemphill TA and Vonortas NS, ‘U.S. Antitrust Policy, Interface Compatibility Standards, 
and Information Technology’ (2005) 18 Knowledge, Technology & Policy 134 
Heinemann A, ‘Compulsory licences and product integration in European competition 
law - assessment of the European Commission's Microsoft decision’ (2005) 36 
International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law 63 
Heise M, ‘The Past, Present and Future of Empirical Legal Scholarship: Judicial Decision 
Making and the New Empiricism’ (2002) University of Illinois Law Review 819 
Higham N, ‘Software protection versus interoperability’ (1991) 88 Law Society Gazette 
Hillenius G, “Governments could save millions by reducing their dependence on a single 
desktop PC software vendor” (11 March 2011) European Journal of ePractice, 
www.epracticejournal.eu. 
Hilton J, ‘Dassault Systemes Launches V6 2012: Introduces New Levels of Openness and 
Lifelike Experience’ (2011) 191 Automotive Industries 55 
––– , ‘Dassault Systemes' Strength in Vehicle Design Continues to Grow’ (2009) 189 
Automotive Industries 76 
Hobson A and Starmer M, ‘Case Report: copying software - key questions referred to 
the CJEU’ (2011) 17 Computer and Telecommunications Law Review 13 
Hovenkamp H, ‘Antitrust Policy after Chicago ’ (1985) 213 Univ Mich LR 226 
––– , Janis M and Lemley M, ‘Unitateral refusals to license’ (2006) 2 JCL& E 1 
Hutchinson TC and Duncan N, ‘Defining and describing what we do: doctrinal legal 
research’ (2012) 17 (1) Deakin Law Review 83-119 
ICN ‘Report on Abuse of Superior Bargaining Position’ ( ICN Conference Kyoto, ASBP 
2008)  
Irshad H and McCall I, ‘Leniancy Programmes an Economic Discussion’ 2008 Competition 
Law Insight 5 
James S, ‘The times they are a-changin': copyright theft, music distribution and keeping 
the pirates at bay’ (2008) 19 Ent LR 106 
Jansen W and Grance T, ‘Guidelines on Security and Privacy in Public Cloud Computing’ 
(2011) NIST Special Publication 800-144 
Jobs, S ‘Thoughts on Music’ (Apple web site February 6, 2007) 
http://web.archive.org/web/20080517114107/http://www.apple.com/hotnews/though
tsonmusic [accessed 30/10/2011] 
Jones A, ‘Left Behind by Modernisation? Restrictions by Object Under Article 101(1)’ 
(2010) 6 (3) European Competition Journal 649 
Kallaugher J and Weitbrecht A, ‘Developments under articles 101 and 102 TFEU in 2010’ 
(2011) 32 European Competition Law Review 333 
363 
 
 
Kang J, ‘Technology column: updates and upgrades’ (2007) 15 IT Law Today 
Kanter D, ‘IP and Compulsory Licensing on both sides of the Atlantc - an Antitrust 
Remedy or a Cutback on Innvoation’ (2006) 27 ECLR 351 
Kaplan J, ‘Roadmap for Open ICT Ecosystems’ (2004) Berkman Centre for Internet and 
Society 
Katsoulacos YS, ‘Optimal legal standards for refusals to license intellectual property: a 
welfare-based analysis ’ (2009) 5 Journal of Competition Law & Economics 269 
Katz ML and Shapiro C, ‘Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility’ (1985) 
75 The American Economic Review 424 
–––, ‘On the licensing of innovations’ (1985) 16 RAND Journal of Economics 504 
–––, ‘How to License Intangible Property’ (1986) 101 Quarterly Journal of Economics 
567 
–––, ‘Technology Adoption in the Presence of Network Externalities’ (1986) 94 Journal 
of Political Economy 822 
–––, ‘Product Introduction with Network Externalities’ (1992) 40 Journal of Industrial 
Economics 55 
–––, ‘Systems Competition and Network Effects’ (1994) 8 The Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 93 
–––, ‘R&D Rivalry with Licensing or Imitation’ (1997) 77 American Economic Review 402 
Kesan J, ‘The Fallacy of OSS Discrimination by FRAND Licensing: An Empirical Analysis’ 
Illinois Public Law and Legal Theory Research (2009) Papers Series No 10-14 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1767083> accessed 4 November 2012 
––– and Shah RC, ‘Running Code as Part of an Open Standard’ (2009) 14 Illinois Law and 
Economics Research Papers Series No LE07-039 
Kim BC and others, ‘A method to exchange procedurally represented 2D CAD model 
data using ISO 10303 STEP’ (2011) 43 Computer Aided Design 1717 
Kim H and others, ‘A framework for sharing product information across enterprises’ 
(2005) 27 Manufacturing Technology 610 
Kim J and others, ‘Standardised data exchange of CAD models with design intent’ (2008) 
40 Computer Aided Design 760 
Kirk E, ‘Apple's iTunes digital rights management: "Fairplay" under the essential facilities 
doctrine’ (2006) 11 (5) Comms Law 161 
Kiskis M and Petrauskas R, ‘Lessig's Implications for Intellectual Property Law and 
Beyond Them’ 19 International Review of Law Computers and Technology 305 
Kjell B, ‘The Rise of Embedded Processing and the Opportunity for Open Standards’ 
[Summer 2004] IEEE Technology and Society Magazine 4 
Klemperer P, ‘Competition when Consumers have Switching Costs: An Overview with 
Applications to Industrial Organizations, Macroeconomics, and International Trade’ 
364 
 
 
(1995) 62 Review of Economic Studies 515 
Kleve P and De Mulder R, ‘Anomalies in Internet Law’ (2007) 21 International Review of 
Law Computers and Technology 305 
Kobayashi BH and Wright JD, ‘Federalism, substantive pre-emption, and limits on 
antitrust: an application to patent holdup’ (2009) 5 Journal of Competition Law & 
Economics 469 
Koboldt C,  “Much Pain for Little Gain? A Critical View of Software Patents” (2003) (1) 
Journal of Information Law and Technology 
Koenig C and Engelmann C, ‘Parallel trade restrictions in the pharmaceuticals sector on 
the test stand of Art. 82 EC: commentary on the option of Advocate General Jacobs in 
the case Syfait/GlaxoSmithKline ’ (2005) 26 European Competition Law Review 338 
Kolczynski JP, ‘Exhaustion of copyright of computer software online: a European (2011) 
(Polish, German, Austrian) and US perspective’ 33 EIPR 
Korah V, ‘Gencor v Commission: collective dominance’ (1999) 20 ECLR 337 
––– , ‘Access to Essential Facilities under the Commerce Act in the light of experience in 
Australia, the European Union and the United States’ (2000) 31 Victoria U Wellington 
LRev 231 
–––, ‘The Interface between Intellectual Property Rights and Competition in Developed 
Countries’ (2005) 2 SCRIPT-ed 
Krechmer K, ‘Microsoft Anti-Trust Litigation - The Case for Standards’ (2000) 
Communications Standards Review <http://www.csrstds.com/WSD2000.html 
Krechmer K, ‘Open Standards: A Call for Change ’ (May 2009) IEEE Communications 
Magazine 
Krechmer K, ‘The Meaning of Open Standards ’ (2005) Proceedings of the 38th Hawaii 
International Conference on System Sciences 
Kretschmer M, ‘Software as Text and Machine:  The Legal Capture of Digital Innovation’ 
(2003) 1 JILT 
––– and others, The Relationship between Copyright and Contract Law (2010) A Review 
commissioned by the UK Strategic Advisory Board for Intellectual Property Policy (SABIP) 
Kroes N, ‘Speech 10/300’ (Open Forum Europe 2010 Summit: Openness at the heart of 
the EU digital agenda Brussels ) 
Kroes N, Address at Open Forum Europe 2010 Summit: “Openness at the heart of the 
EU Digital Agenda” Brussels 10th June 2010. 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/10/300&format=HT
ML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en[accessed [23 March 2012] 
Lamadrid de Pablo, A ‘Oligopolistic collective dominance: the BCA’s Telefonica decision’ 
(March 2010) http://chillingcompetition.com/2010/03/25/oligopolistic-collective-
dominance-the-bcas-telefonica-decision/>accessed 24 November 2015 
Landes W and Posner R, “An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 (1989) Journal of 
365 
 
 
Legal Studies 325 
Lang JT, ‘Patent Pools and Agreements on Standards’ (2011) 36 European Law Review 
887 
Langer J, ‘The merger regulation and collective dominance: the battle after Gencor 
continues’ (1999) 44 EU focus 2 
Langlois R and Robertson P, ‘Networks and innovation in a modular system: Lessons 
from the microcomputer and stereo component industries’ (1992) 21 Research Policy 
297 
Lanzi D, ‘Competition and open source with perfect software compatibility’ (2009) 21 
Information Economics and Policy 192 
Larkin I, ‘Bargains-then-Ripoffs: Innovation, Pricing and Lock-in in Enterprise Software’ 
(2008) Academy of Management Annual Meeting Proceedings 1 
Larouche P, ‘The Basis of EC Telecommunications Law after Liberalization’ (PhD thesis 
Universiteit Maastricht 2000) 
Layne-Farrar A, ‘Non-discriminatory pricing: is standard setting different?’ (2010) 6 
Journal of Competition Law & Economics 811 
Leeson T, Theorem Solutions, MCADCafe interview 2014 PTC 
http://www10.mcadcafe.com/video/Theorem-Solutions-Trevor-Leeson-Principal-
Consultant-Tech.-Director-Major-Accounts/43971/media.html [accessed 17/10/14] 
Leistner, ‘"Used" software before Europe's top court - the German Federal Supreme 
Court refers the Oracle v UsedSoft case to the European Court of Justice ’ (2011) 36 
International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law 609 
Leith P, ‘Developing Theory in Legal Technology’ (2005) 19 International Review of Law 
Computers and Technology 231 
Lemley MA, ‘Antitrust and the Internet Standardization Problem’ (1996) 28 Connecticut 
Law Review 1041 
––, ‘Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting Organizations’ (2002) 90 California 
Law Review 1889 
––, ‘A New Balance Between IP and Antitrust’ (2007) 13 Southwestern Journal of Law & 
Trade in the Americas 237 
––, ‘The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as IP Rights’ (2008) 61 Stanford Law 
Review 311 
–– and Melamed D, ‘Missing the Forest for the Trolls’ (2013) 113 Columbia Law Review 
2117-2189 
–– and Shafir Z, ‘Who Chooses Open-Source Software’ (2011) 78 The University of 
Chicago Law Review 139 
–– and Shapiro C “Probabilistic Patents” (2005) 19 (2) Journal of Economic Perspectives,  
Spring,  75-98 
–– and Shapiro “Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking” (2007) 85 Texas Law Review 1991 
366 
 
 
Lerner J and Schenkerman M, ‘The Comingled Code: Open Source and Economic 
Development’ [December 2011 - January 2012] The European Financial Review 6 
–– and Tirole J Standard-Essential Patents (2014) Working Paper IDEI-803 
–– and Zhu F, What is the Impact of Software Patent Shifts?: Evidence from Lotus v 
Borland (National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 11168, 2005) 
Lettice J, ‘Apple iTunes Store goes '100% DRM-free' – allegedly’ (the Register 6th January 
2009) http://www.theregister.co.uk/2009/01/06/macworld_itunes/ [accessed 
30/10/2010] 
Levenstein M and Suslow V, ‘What Determines Cartel Success?’ (March 2006) 54 Journal 
of Economic Literature 
François Lévêque, ‘Innovation, Leveraging and Essential Facilities: Interoperability 
Licensing in the EU Microsoft Case’ (2005) 28 World Competition 71-91  
Lewis TR and Yildirim H, ‘Managing Dynamic Competition’ (2002) 92 American Economic 
Review 779 
Li J and others, ‘CADA Data Exchange Using the Macro-Parametrics Approach: An Error 
Report’ (2011) 10 International Journal of CAD/CAM 
Liebowitz SJ and Margolis SE, ‘Network Externalities: An Uncommon Tragedy’ (1994) 8 
Journal of Economic Perspectives 133 
–– and Margolis SE, ‘Path Dependence, Lock-In and History’ (1995) 11 JL Econ & Org 
–– and Margolis SE, ‘Bundles of joy: the ubituity and efficiency of bundles in new 
technology markets’ (2009) 5 Journal of Competition Law & Economics 1 
Lim B and Wen J, ‘Web Services: an Analysis of the Technology, its Benefits, and 
Implementation Difficulties’ [2003] Information Systems Management 49 
Llewellyn G, ‘Does copyright law recognise a right to repair?’ (1999) 21 European 
Intellectual Property Review 596 
Longview Advisors, Inc. “Collaboration & Interoperability Market Report” 2008 
http://www.proficiency.com/downloads/3DMarketReport2008.pdf [ accessed 12 
November 2010] 
Lundell B, describes various types of lock-in in “Why do we need Open Standards?”,  M 
Orviska and K Jakobs (Eds) Proceedings 17th EURAS (2012) Annual Standardisation 
Conference ‘Standards and Innovation’ The EURAS Board Series, Aachen 227-240. 
Lundell B and other, ‘Exploring Tool Support for Long-term Maintenance of Digital 
Assets: a Case Study’ in Fomin, V & Jakobs, K (Eds) Proceedings: 16th EURAS Annual 
Standardization Conference (2011) European Academy of Standardisation, The EURAS 
Board 207-217 
Jephcott M and Withers C, ‘Where to go now for EC oligopoly control? ’ (2001) 22 
European Competition Law Review 295 
Johnson-Laird A, “Software Reverse-Engineering in the Real World”, (1994) 19 U.Dayton 
L. Rev., 843 
367 
 
 
Mair C, ‘Openness, Intellectual Property and Standardization in the European ICT Sector’ 
(2012) 2 (2) IP Theory, Indiana University 
Mann R, “Do Patents Facilitate Financing in the Software Industry?” (2005) 83 (4) Texas 
Law Review 961 
Magnani P and Montagnani ML, ‘Digital rights management systems and competition: 
what developments within the much debated interface between intellectual property 
and competition law? ’ (2008) 39 International Review of Intellectual Property and 
Competition Law 83 
Mallinson K, ‘Artificial Distinction between Software and Telecoms for Essential IP 
Disclosure’ IP Finance (2 September 2011) 
http://ipfinanceblogspotcouk/2011/09/artificial-distinction-between-softwarehtml 
accessed 21 October 2012 
Manne GA and Wright JD, ‘Innovation and the limits of antitrust’ (2010) 6 Journal of 
Competition Law & Economics 153 
Marsden P, ‘Microsoft v Commission With great power comes great responsibility’ 
(2007) 8 Competition Law Insight 3-5,4 
––, ‘Article 82 and Structural Remedies after Microsoft’ (International Competition 
Forum 2008) 
Matutes C and Regibeau P, ‘'Mix and match': product compatability without network 
externalities’ (1988) 19 RAND Journal of Economics  221 
Maughan CW, ‘Property and Intellectual Property: Foundations in Law and Economics’ 
(2004) 22 Prometheus 379 
McGregor L, ‘The future for the control of oligopolies following Compagnie Maritime 
Belge’ (2001) 22 ECLR 434 
McIntyre D, ‘In a Network Industry, Does Product Quality Matter?’ (2011) 28 J Prod 
Innov Manag 99 
–– and Subramaniam M, ‘Strategy in Network Industries: A Review and Research 
Agenda ’ (2009) 35 Journal of Management 
McMahon K, ‘Interoperability: Indispensability and Special Responsibility in High 
Technology Markets’ (2007) 9 Tul J Tech & Intell Prop 123 
Mertikopoulou, ‘DG Competition's discussion paper on the application of Article 82 of 
the EC Treaty to exclusionary abuses: the proposed economic reform from a legal point 
of view’ (2007) 28 European Competition Law Review 241 
Meyer C and Colombe M, ‘Interoperability still threatened by EC Software Directive: a 
status report’ (1990) 12 European Intellectual Property Review 325 
–––, ‘Seeling interoperability: an industry response’ (1990) 12 European Intellectual 
Property Review 79 
Mezzanotte F, ‘Tacit collusion as economic links in article 82 EC revisited’ (2009) 30 ECLR 
137 
368 
 
 
Miller C, ‘The proposal for an EC Council Directive on the legal protection of computer 
programs’ (1990) 12 European Intellectual Property Review 347 
–––, ‘Magill case - European Court final judgment’ (1995) 11 Computer Law and Practice 
62 
Mitchell I and Mason S, ‘Compatibility of the Licensing of Embedded Patents with Open 
Source Licensing Terms’ (2011) 3 International Free and Open Source Software Law 
Review 25 
Monti G, ‘The Scope of Collective Dominance under Articles 82 EC’ (2001) 38 Common 
Market Law Review 131 
Moon K, ‘The nature of computer programs: tangible? goods? personal property? 
intellectual property?’ (2009) 31 European Intellectual Property Review 396 
Morris E and others, ‘System of Systems Interoperability (SOSI): Final Report’ (2004) 
Carnegie Mellon, Software Engineering Institute 
Muller U, ‘The rise and fall of the essential facilities doctrine’ (2008) 29 European 
Competition Law Review 310 
Mutkoski S, ‘Defining Open Standards: A Comparison of Policy and Practice’ [October 
2011] http://ssrncom/abstract=1945252 
Mutkoski S, ‘Government Procurement Policy, Patent Royalties and the Myth of 
“Discrimination” against Free and Open Source Software Developers’ (2011) 
http://ssrncom/abstract=1949832 accessed 21 October 2012 
National Audit Office, ‘Efficiency and Reform in Government Corporate Functions 
Through Shared Service Centres’ (HC 1790, 7 March 2012) 
Newton RS, ‘Lessons for all CAD users from the Airbus CATIA Debacle’ aec news 2006 
<http://aecnews.com/articles/2035.aspx> accessed 10 March 2007 
–––, ‘ODA Responds to Autodesk Lawsuit with Counter Claims of Monopolistic 
Behaviour’ acenews <http://acenews.com/articles/2192.aspx> accessed 10 March 2007 
Nguyen TT, ‘Price Squeezing: Linkline in the United States - no link to the European 
Union’ 41 International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law 316 
Ngy CI, ‘Refusal to deal and the doctrine of essential facilities in the US and EC 
competition law: a comparative perspective and a proposal for a workable analytical 
framework’ (2010) 32 European Law Review 664 
Niels G, ‘Collective dominance: more than just oligopolisitic interdependence  ’ (2001) 
22 ECLR 168 
Novakoushi M and Lewis G, ‘Interoperability in the e-Government Context’ (January 
2012) Software Engineering Institute 
Nurton J ‘The tee-shirts have taken over’ Managing Intellectual Property, 1 November 
2006, http://www.managingip.com/Article/1254474/The-tee-shirts-have-taken-
over.html accessed 15 March 2007 
Nwogugu M, ‘Pricing digital content:the marginal cost and open access controversies’ 
369 
 
 
(2008) 14 Computer and Telecommunications Law Review 198 
Ogewell V ‘Inside Daimler Mercedes switch from Dassault Systemes to Siemens PLM and 
NX’ Engineering.com (8 April 2014) 
http://www.engineering.com/PLMERP/ArticleID/7438/Inside-Daimler-Mercedes-Switch-
from-Dassault-Systemes-to-Siemens-PLM-and-NX.aspx [accessed 11 October 2014] 
Orbach BY, ‘The antitrust consumer welfare paradox’ (2011) 7 Journal of Competition 
Law & Economics 133 
O’ Rourke M, “Towards a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law” (2000) 100 Columbia Law 
Review 1117 
Page WH and Childers SJ, ‘Bargaining in the Shadow of the European Microsoft Decision: 
the Microsoft-Samba Protocol License’ (2008) 102 Northwestern University Law Review 
332 
Page WH and Seldon CJ, ‘Measuring Compliance with Compulsory Licensing Remedies in 
the American Mircosoft Case’ (2009) 76 Antitrust Law Journal 239 
Page WH, ‘Microsoft and the limits of antitrust’ (2010) 6 Journal of Competition Law & 
Economics 33 
Pal S and Fauscette M, ‘Worldwide Product Life-Cycle Management (PLM) Applications 
2011 Vendor Assessment: CAx, Discrete, and Process PLM’ (Excerpts) IDC Manufacturing 
Insights   
 
Palmer A and Vinje T, The EC Directive on the Legal Protection of Computer Software: 
New Law Governing Software Development (1992) 2 Duke Journal of Comparative & 
International Law 65 
Park S, ‘Market power in competition for the market’ (2009) 5 Journal of Competition 
Law & Economics 571 
Peyman Merat, PLM project leader, Daimler AG as reported in Engineering.com (8 April 
2014) http://www.engineering.com/PLMERP/ArticleID/7438/Inside-Daimler-Mercedes-
Switch-from-Dassault-Systemes-to-Siemens-PLM-and-NX.aspx [accessed 11/10/14] 
Pickering V and Dolmans M, ‘The 1997 Digital Undertaking’ (1998) 19 ECLR 108 
Plotkin R, ‘Software Patentability and Practical Utility:  What's the Use?’ (2005) 19 
International Review of Law Computers and Technology 23 
Polo M, ‘Anti-competitive versus competitive explanations of unilateral practices:the 
identification problem ’ (2010) 6 Journal of Competition Law & Economics 457 
Richard Posner, 'Conventionalism: The Key to Law as an Autonomous Discipline' (1988) 
38 University of Toronto Law Journal 333 
Posner RA, ‘Antitrust in the New Economy’ (2001) 68 Antitrust LJ 
Potter M, ‘Refusal to Supply and Innovation: Past, Present and Future’ (Masters 
Dissertation, Tilburg University 2010) 
Pratt MJ and Anderson BD, ‘A shape modelling applications programming interface for 
370 
 
 
the STEP standard’ (2000) 33 Computer Aided Design 531 
Pratt MJ, Anderson BD and Ranger T, ‘Towards the standardized exchange of 
parameterized feature-based CAD models’ (2004) 37 Computer Aided Design  1251 
Preece S, ‘Compagnie Maritime Belge: missing the boat?’ (2000) 21 ECLR 388 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, Patent and Trademarks Damages Study 22, 2007 
http://www.pwc.com/us/en/forensic-services/publications/assets/2007-patent-
study.pdf [accessed 20 October 2015] 
Priest G, ‘The limits of antitrust and the Chicago School tradition’ (2010) JCL& E 1  
Ratliff J, ‘Major Events and Policy Issues in EC Competition Law, 2005-2006: Part 2’ 18 
ICCLR 73 
Reuters, ‘Facebook's value slides by $10 billion; outlook unclear’ 
<http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/27/us-facebook-research-
idUSBRE86Q0ID20120727> accessed 21/11/12 
Ridyard D, ‘The Commission's article 82 guidelines: some reflections on the economic 
issues’ (2009) 30 European Competition Law Review 230 
Rodger B, ‘Oligopolistic market failure: collective dominance versus complex monopoly’ 
(1995) 16 ECLR 21 
Rokunuzzaman M and Choudhury KP, ‘Economics of Software Reuse and Market 
Positioning for Customized Software Solutions ’ (2011) 6 Journal of Software 31 
Rowland D and Campbell A, ‘Supply of Software: Copyrights and Contract Issues’ (2002) 
10 International Journal of Law & Information Technology 23 
Ryan P, ‘European Competition Law, Joint Dominance, and the Wireless Oligopoly 
Problem’ (2004-2005) 11 Columbia Journal of European Law 355 
Rychlicki T, ‘An opinion on legal regulations on reverse engineering and technological 
protections measures’ (2007) 13 Computer and Telecommunications Law Review 94 
––––, ‘GPLv3: new software licence and new axiology of intellectual property law’ 
(2008) 30 European Intellectual Property Review 232 
Samuelson P,“Questioning Copyright in Standards” 48 (2007) Boston College Law 
Review 193 
––––, “Are Patents on Interfaces Impeding Interoperability?” (2008) Berkeley Centre for 
Law & Technology 1 http://ssrn.com/abstract=1323838 
––––, ‘The Past, Present and Future of Software Copyright Interoperability Rules in the 
European Union and United States’ (2010) 34 (3) European Intellectual Property Review 
229 – 236 
––––, ‘The Past, Present & Future of Software Interoperability’ (2011) ECIS 21st 
Anniversary Event, Brussels  
––––, ‘Speaking Is Software Patentable?” (Nov 2013) Vol 56 No11 Communications of 
371 
 
 
the ACM 
–––– and R Davis, M.D. Kapor and JH Reichman ‘A Manifesto Concerning the Legal 
Protection of Computer Programs’  (1994) 94 Columbia Law Review 2308 - 2431 
–––– and Vinje TC and Cornish WR, ‘Does Copyright Protection Under the EU Software 
Directive Extend to Computer Program Behaviour, Languages and Interfaces?’ (2011) 
EIPR 34(3) 158 
Sattler S, ‘Standardisation under EU competition rules – the Commission’s new 
horizontal guidelines’  (2011) 32 (7) European Competition Law Review  343-349. 
Saunders N ‘Litigation of patents essential to technical standards – what is the future for 
patent trolls?’ (CIPPM Spring Lecture 25 April  2013) 
Schiller P, Apple Senior Vice President, Ina Fried Will iTunes Make Apple Shine?  CNET 
News 16 Oct 2003  http://news.cnet.com/2100-1041_3-5092559.html [accessed 3 Nov 
2011] 
Schmidt HKS, ‘Article 82's "exceptional circumstances" that restrict intellectual property 
rights’ (2002) 23 ECLR  210 
Schmidtchen D and Koboldt C ‘A Pacemaker That Stops Halfway: The Decompilation 
Rule in the EED Directive on the Legal Protection of Computer Programs’ (1993) 13 
International Review of Law and Economics  413-429 
Scotchmer S, ‘Openness, Open Source, and the Veil of Ignorance’ (2010) American 
Economic Association http://ssrn.com/abstract=1524051  
Seo T-S and others, ‘Sharing CAD models based on feature ontology of commands 
history’ (2005) 5 (1) International Journal of CAD/CAM  
Shah R and Kesan J, ‘An Empirical Study of Open Standards’ [2007] Illinois Law and 
Economics Research Papers Series No LE07-039 1 
Shah R and Kesan J, ‘Lost in Translation: Interoperability Issues for Open Standards’ 
(2009) Illinois Law and Economics Research Paper series No LE08-026 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1201708> accessed 4/11/12 
Shaikh M and Cornford T, Total cost of ownership of open source software: a report for 
the UK Cabinet Office supported by OpenForum Europe (2011) LSE Research Online: 
November 2011 
Shemtov N ‘The Legal Regulation of Decompilation of Computer Programs: Excessive, 
Unjustified and in Need of Reform’ (PhD thesis QML 2013) 
Sheppard S, ‘The new European Interoperability framework: opening competition in 
public procurement to both proprietary and open source software solutions and 
reinstating compliance with European Union procurement and competition law’ (2012) 
2 Public Procurement Law Review 47 
––– and Kemp R, ‘United Kingdom: The New European Interoperability Framework: 
Opening Competition to Both Proprietary and OS Software Solutions’ (2011) Practical 
Law Company 3 March 2011 
Sher S and others, ‘The emerging role of open-source software in merger analysis’ 
372 
 
 
(2011) 32 ECLR 323 
Sidak GJ, ‘Dynamic competition in antitrust law’ (2009) 5 Journal of Competition Law & 
Economics 581 
–––, ‘Patent holdup and oligopsonistic collusion in standard-setting organizations’  
(2009) 5 Journal of Competition Law & Economics 123 
Sieverding M, ‘Choice in Government Software Procurement: A Winning Strategy’ 
(2008) 8 Journal of Public Procurement 70 
Singleton S, ‘Patents and software - the Macrossan Case’ (2007) 15 IT Law Today 
Smith LJ, ‘Whether copyright protects the graphic user interface of a computer 
programme’ (2011) 17 computer and telecommunications law review 70 
Spirer J, The Case Study Method: Guidelines, Practices and Application for Vocational 
Education, The National Center for Research in Vocational Education (1980) National 
Center Publications 
Spulber, D  “Unlocking technology: antitrust and innovation” (2008) JCLE 4(4) 915  
Stackpole B, ‘Dassault Systèmes Closes IBM PLM Acquisition’ (2010) 65 (5) Design News 
41 
Staines IA, ‘The European Commission's proposal for a Council Directive on the legal 
protection of computer programs’ (1989) 11 European Intellectual Property Review 183 
Swann P, ‘The Economics of Standardization: An Update’ Report for UK BIS (2010) 
Version 22, 27 May 2010 
Takayama, L  ‘The Welfare Implications of Unauthorised Reproduction of Intellectual 
Property in Presence of Demand Network Externalities” (1994) 42(2) J. Ind. Econ. 155 
Tang P, Adams J, and Pare D, “Patent Protection of Computer Programmes” (2001, 
INNO-99-04) European Commission Report 
Tardiff TJ and Weisman DL, ‘The dominant firm revisited’ (2009) 5 Journal of 
Competition Law & Economics 517 
Teece D and Sherry E, ‘Standards Setting and Antitrust’ (2003) 87 Minnesota Law 
Review 1913 
Temple Lang J, ‘Patent pools and agreements on standards’ (2011) 36 (6)  European Law 
Review 887-895 
Tiemann M, ‘An objective definition of open standards’ (2006) 28 Computer Standards 
&amp; Interfaces 495 
Torti V ‘IPRs, Competition and Standard Setting: in Search of a Model to Address Hold-
Up’ (2012) 33(9) European Competition Law Review 387-397. 
Towse R, ‘What we know, what we dont know and what Policy-Makers would like us to 
know about the Economics of Copyright’ (2011) 8 Review of Economic Research on 
Copyright Issues 101 
Valimaki M and Oksanen V, ‘Patents on Compatibility Standards and Open Source - Do 
373 
 
 
Patent Law Exceptins and Royalty-Free Requirements Make Sense? ’ (2005) 2 Script-ed 
397 
Valimaki M, ‘A Flexible Approach to RAND  Licensing’ (2008) 29 European Competition 
Law Review 686 
Van den Bergh R, ‘The role and social justification of copyright: a “law and economics” 
approach’ (1998) 1 Intellectual Property Quarterly 17-34 
Vandenberghe G, ‘Copyright protection of computer programs: an unsatisfactory 
proposal for a directive’ (1989) 11 European Intellectual Property Review 409 
Van Eecke P, Pinot P and Egyedi T, ‘Final Report of the Study on the specific policy needs 
for ICT standardisation’ EU (2007) IDABC http://www.ictstandardisation.eu 
Varian HR, ‘Economics of Information Technology’ Revised: Mar 23, 2003 
<http://people.ischool.berkeley.edu/~hal/Papers/mattioli/mattioli.html#tth_sEc6> 
accessed 20 April 2013 
Vatiero M, ‘The Ordoliberal Notion of Market Power: An Institutionalist Reassessment’ 
(2010) 6 European Competition Journal 689 
Veen Mvd and Knubben B, ‘Assessment Procedures and Criteria for Lists of Open 
Standards’ (2011) 1 The Standardisation Forum <www.forumstnadaardisatienl> 
Verkade F, ‘Dutch implementation of the EEC Directive on computer programs’ (1992) 
14 European Intellectual Property Review 289 
Vezzoso S, ‘The Incentives Balance Test in the EU Microsoft Case: A pro-innovation 
"Economics-Based" Approach’ (2006) 27 European Competition Law Review 382 
–––, ‘Open source and merger policy - insights from the European Commission's 
Oracle/Sun Microsystems Decision’ (2011) 42 International Review of Intellectual 
Property and Competition Law 344 
–––, “Copyright, Interfaces and a possible Atlantic Divide” (2012) 3 JIPITEC 153 
Villarejo, ‘The Copyright Challenge to the European software industry’ (2011) ECIS 21st 
Anniversary event, Brussels 
Vinje T, ‘Compliance with Article 85 in software licensing’ (1992) 13 European 
Competition Law Review 165 
Walden I, ‘Contractual Harmonisation in the European Union: a new approach towards 
information technology law?’ (1995) 11 Computer Law and Practice 2 
Weston S, ‘Software Interfaces: stuck in the middle.  “The relationship between the law 
and software interfaces in regulating and encouraging interoperability” ’ (June 2012) 
International Review Intellectual Property and Competition Law (IIC)   
––– and Kretschmer M, Open Standards in Government IT: a Review of the Evidence (UK 
Cabinet Office 1 November 2012) 
Whitford WC, ‘‘Critical Empricism’ ’ (1989) 14 Law and Society Inquiry 61 
Wielsch,  (2004) ‘Competition policy for information platform technology’ 25 ECLR 95 
374 
 
 
Zhang L, ‘Refusal to license intellectual property rights under Article 82 EC in light of 
standardisation context’ (2010) 32 European Intellectual Property Review 402 
Zhao Y and others, ‘Dimensional metrology interoperability and standardization in 
manufacturing systems’ (2010) 33 Computer Standards &amp; Interfaces 541 
375 
 
 
 
 
GLOSSARY 
3D CAD  Three Dimensional Computer Aided Design 
ACIS A geometric modeling kernel developed by Spatial Corporation, part of 
Dassault Systemes. 
ANSI American National Standard Institute 
ANSYS Supplier of Finite Element Analysis software  
APIs Application Programming Interfaces 
CAE Computer Aided Engineering 
CAM Computer Aided Manufacturing 
CATIA 3D CAD software developed and sold by Dassault Systemes SA 
COFES Congress on the Future of Engineering Software - a conference for the 3D 
CAD industry 
Creo 3D CAD software supplied by PTC  
DM Digital Manufacturing 
DPD Digital Product Development which encompasses CAD, DAE, CAM, DM and 
PDM 
DRM Digital rights management, a form of technology protection measure (TPM) 
to control the use of copyrighted work  
EAS Enterprise Application Software 
FEA Finite Element Analysis 
FMS Financial Management Software 
FRAND Fair, Reasonable And Non-Discriminatory – terms on which IPRs may be 
licenced   
GPL General Public License – a form of open sources license   
ICT  Information Communication Technology 
IETF Internet Engineering Task Force 
IGES Initial Graphic Exchange Specification – an American National Standard 
(ANSI) 
IPR  Intellectual Property Rights 
ISO  International Standards Organisation 
JT  Data format developed by UGS and Siemens and now an official ISO standard 
NPE Non-Practicing Entities also known as patent trolls  
ODF Open Document Format 
OEM Original Equipment Manufacturer 
376 
 
 
Parasolid Geometric modelling kernel developed by Shape Data and now owned by 
Siemens 
PDM Product Data Management 
PLM Product Lifecycle Management software which includes 3D CAD software 
PTC Parametric Technologies Corporation a supplier of 3D CAD software 
R&D Research and Development 
RAND  Reasonable And Non-Discriminatory – terms on which IPRs may be licenced   
RF  Royalty Free licencing of IPRs 
SAP Systems, Applications & Products in Data Processing - a large German 
supplier of enterprise software 
SSO Standard Setting Organisation 
STEP Standard for the Exchange of Product model data - an ISO standard (ISO 
10303) for the representation and exchange of product manufacturing 
information 
TPM Technology Protection Measure to control use of copyrighted work  
TRIPS  Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
UGS Unigraphics CAD software acquired by Siemens in 2007 and now sold as 
Siemens NX 
VAR Value Added Reseller – a distributor that adds features or services to an 
existing product before reselling to users 
W3C  World Wide Web Consortium 
WIPO World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty (WIPO Copyright 
Treaty or WCT) 
WTO World Trade Organisation  
 
  
